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21^ Paris Agreement arts 13(1), 13(4).

22^ Paris Agreement art 13(7).

23^ Paris Agreement art 6.

24^ Paris Agreement art 14.

25^ See Doelle, above n 8, 16 for a discussion on potential limitations of the Paris Outcome.

26^ See especially Chris Tollefson, Anthony R Zito and Fred Gale, ‘Symposium Overview: Conceptualizing New Governance Arrangements’, (2012) 90(1) Public Administration 3-18, and Meinhard Doelle et al, ‘New Governance Arrangements at the Intersection of Climate Change and Forest Policy: Institutional, Political and Regulatory Dimensions’ 90(1) 2012 Public Administration 37-55 for a detailed analysis on governance theory, particularly the differences between the concept of ‘governance’ and ‘government’ as it relates to, amongst other sectors, environmental and climate change policy. See also Robert O Keohane and David G Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’ prepared for The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements (Discussion Paper No 10-33, Harvard Kennedy School, January 2010).

27^ See generally Peter Newell and Harriet Bulkeley, Governing Climate Change (Routledge, 2015) 87-104; see also Neil Gunningham, ‘Environmental Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures’ (2009) 21(2) Journal of Environmental Law 179–212 which examines the architectures of environmental law, regulation and governance over the decades; See further Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, ‘Smart Regulation’ in Peter Drahos Regulatory Theory: Foundations and Applications (ANU Press, 2017) 133.

28^ Tollefson, Zito and Gale, above n 26, 7.

29^ Ibid 10.

30^ Ibid 11. For each of these three dimensions, the governance arrangements are depicted using graphs that focus on the degree of monocentric and polycentric (horizontal axis) against the formality and informality of institutions (in respect of institutions), power of the actors involved (in respect of politics) and hard and soft law (in respect of regulations).

31^ Doelle et al, ‘New Governance Arrangements’, above n 26, 37

32^ Ibid 51.

33^ For an interesting reflection of the changing nature of environmental regulation from the 1970s onwards and focusing mainly on US, UK, Australia and Canada, see Neil Gunningham, ‘Environmental Law, Regulation and Governance’, above n 27, 182–193, which supports the contention that governance arrangements are a product of the prevailing political and economic ideology of the times as well as the real-politics of government resources.

34^ Gunningham and Sinclair, ‘Smart Regulation’, above n 27, 133; See also Newell and Bulkeley, above n 27, 87-104 for a detailed consideration of the private governance of climate change and the role of non-state actors, particularly multi-nationals in constructing and moulding the forms of governance at an international level.

35^ Gunningham and Sinclair, ‘Smart Regulation’, above n 27, 133-135.

36^ Ibid 134-135. Some of these design principles will be considered in the context of reviewing the current policy and legal framework in Part IV below.

37^ Ibid 136.

38^ Ibid 139; although, Gunningham cautions against the dangers of ‘smorgasbordism’ where the excessive combination of instruments may be counterproductive.

39^ Gunningham and Sinclair, ‘Smart Regulation’, above n 27, 140-141, where the US Environmental Protection Agency’s programs are highlighted as successfully coupling such instruments when dealing with toxic emissions.

40^ Keohane, above n 26, 14.

41^ Ibid 9.

42^ Ibid 18.

43^ Ibid 19.

44^ These state and territory initiatives are examined in detail in Part IV below. Interestingly, these initiatives have strategically reframed the climate change debate around ‘job creation’ and location investment rather than emissions reduction to foster broader community support.

45^ Jacqueline Peel, Lee Godden and Rodney J Keenan, ‘Climate Change Law in the Era of Multi-level Governance’ (2012) Transnational Environmental Law 245.

46^ Ibid 248-249, which discusses several case studies to illustrate the multi-level nature of governance structures.

47^ Ibid 251.

48^ As discussed in detail below, although this is the preferred model, actions at the sub-national level together with declining technology costs of renewable projects may result in the ‘economics’ of clean energy surpassing the ‘legal’ model at the federal level.

49^ Elinor Ostrom, ‘A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change’ (Policy Research Working Paper, Background Paper to the 2010 World Development Report, World Bank, October 2009) 33.

50^ Ibid 35.

51^ Marcel J Dorsch and Christian Flachsland, ‘A Polycentric Approach to Global Climate Governance’ (2017) 17(2) Global Environmental Politics 45, 51.

52^ See eg, RMIT ABC Fact Check, ‘Fact Check: How do Australia’s Carbon Emissions Targets Compare?’ ABC News (online), 2 March 2016