Ultimii 22 de ani s-au caracterizat prin continuarea scaderii numerice a populatiei cu aproape doua milioane de romani. Schimbarea comportamentului demografic al cuplurilor fata de propria reproducere, cresterea mortalitatii precum si migratia externa, au facut ca populatia Romaniei sa se reduca constant.
-
Indicele de imbatranire, care reprezinta numarul de varstnici la 100 de copii, a fost in 2014 de 107, fata de 102 in 2012.
-
Structura populatiei feminine, pe grupe de varsta, a evoluat diferit. Generatiile nascute dupa decretul de interzicere a avorturilor din 1966 au determinat cresterea ponderii femeilor din grupa de varsta 45-49 ani. In schimb, populatia feminina din segmentul 35-44 ani a inregistrat o scadere semnificativa.
-
Ponderea copiilor nascuti-vii in afara casatoriei a crescut usor (de la 31,0% in anul 2012 la 31,5% in 2015).Din numarul total al copiilor nascuti in afara casatoriei, cei mai multi copii s-au nascut in mediul rural (54,4%). Cea mai mare parte a copiilor nascuti in afara casatoriei provin de la tinerele pana in 25 ani (56,6%).
In luna februarie 2016 s-au nascut 13.619 copii, cu 2.092 mai putini copii decat in ianuarie 2016. Tot in februarie 2016 s-au inregistrat 5684 casatorii (cu 952 mai multe decat in ianuarie) si s-au pronuntat 2691 divorturi (cu 1693 mai multe decat in luna ianuarie).
Geopolitică: Vizitând România – de George Friedman
After Slovakia, the next stop on my European trip is Bucharest, the capital of Romania. It is a place I have visited many times in recent years, in large part because I saw Romania as being a significant strategic part of coming events. I had expected Russia to at least attempt to return to great power status and to do that, it had to try to develop a degree of control over the borderlands it had dominated for most of the last three centuries.
In facing west toward the European Peninsula, Russia was invariably facing more developed and sophisticated military forces. Its national strategy was to force them to attack through vast space, arriving in Russia proper exhausted by distance and by weather. Except for the distance armies faced, Russia would have been defeated and occupied not only by those who attacked, but also those who would have attacked but didn’t because they were deterred by the distance.
There are two bands of buffer countries that were indispensable to Russia in defeating Napoleon and Hitler. The first band was Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic countries. The second band was Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. Russian troops went as far west as central Germany. Whatever minor thoughts NATO had of attacking Russia were annihilated by the sheer space that had to be traversed.
The fall of the Soviet Union pushed Russia back to its own borders, which were pretty much its borders in the 18th century. During the 1990s, there was a fantasy that Russia could simply accept these borders. However, the chaos of the 1990s taught the Russians that while they had been poor in the Soviet Union, they were also powerful and respected. After the fall of the Soviet Union, they were poorer and treated with contempt. They had little incentive to continue as they were and it seemed to me inevitable that they would attempt to recover at least part of their buffers, regardless of the buffer states’ status as independent nations.
The Baltics were lost to Russia, as they were part of NATO and the risks were too high. Belarus was another case, ruled as it is by the last Brezhnevite. But it was Ukraine that was the key to the Russian position, partly because of its size, and partly because it was here that the Russians crushed the Germans. Inevitably, the Russians would try to make certain that they regained a degree of control over Ukraine.
This was where the United States would involve itself. It had fought World War I, World War II and the Cold War to keep any potential hegemon from dominating all of Europe and using its resources to challenge the United States. The United States previously responded to rising powers by forming alliances, containment and only as a last resort by open warfare.
As Russia increased its westward pressure, the United States made tentative moves to block it. Two countries were key to this strategy – Poland and Romania. Poland was in many ways more well-defined strategically than Romania. Romania had been governed by an increasingly erratic dictator, Nicolae Ceaușescu. To get a sense of him, bear in mind that he called himself “the genius of the Carpathians.” This requires no further discussion of him. But unlike Poland, disposing of him was bloody and disposing of his security apparatus was even bloodier. Also unlike Poland, Romania emerged from communism damaged and unsure of itself.
However, if Ukraine was to become a contested region, then Romania was an essential country because of its geography. It has a substantial border with Ukraine, and neighboring Moldova, with deep ties to Romania, juts far into Ukraine. Poland blocks Russia in the north, Romania in the south. The problem was that the U.S. didn’t recognize a significant shift in Russian strategy and was focused on ballistic missile defense rather than defense against the not yet existent power of Russia. Romania was focused on the European Union and balancing between Europe and Russia, and didn’t see an overwhelming need for the United States. It was a marriage that seemed to have no point.
The ties have matured as the perceived Russian threat has increased following the events in Ukraine. What had been a minor courtship has evolved into a strategic alignment. The most important part of that alignment, apart from borders with Ukraine, is the Black Sea. The Black Sea has become critical in the competition between the West and Russia, and Romania provides a port, Costanza, which could be used as an important base.
If you look at a map, you realize that the other link in this new containment is Turkey. On the surface, Turkey ought to be deeply involved in this process, ever since it shot down a Russian plane in November. Indeed, the Turks have held recent talks with Poland and Romania, clearly discussing the Russians. But the United States is an issue for Turkey. The Americans are deeply involved in Poland and Romania, and Turkey would have coinciding interests with the United States to the north. However, Ankara and Washington are deeply divided over Syria, particularly over U.S. support for the Kurds.
Romania needs to collaborate with Turkey over Black Sea issues, and with the United States as well, but the U.S.-Turkish relationship creates complexity for Romania. Still, the degree to which U.S.-Romanian relations have evolved in the past few years is remarkable. As with most American strategic partnerships, this one will evolve to include varieties of investment and economic relationships.
In many ways, Romania stills suffers from its communist past. The government dominates economic life, and with that, almost inevitably, comes corruption. Governments whose officials have little control over wealth have little corruption. Why bribe the powerless? When the reverse is true, corruption can rise. The Romanians are now involved in a massive anti-corruption campaign, but in my view, that can’t work until there is a realignment of the economy and the state.
The Romanians will do things their way. The U.S. relationship is not built on mutual admiration of the other, but on geography. If the U.S. is going to deal with Russia, it needs to deal with any country that borders on both Ukraine and the Black Sea, and that happens to be Romania. The Romanians still remain focused on the EU as their economic guide, and the U.S. still expects allies to behave as it does – or pretends it does. There is inevitable friction, but in coming here I realized two things: the centrality of Romania to American interests and the fact that most Americans are not even clear where Romania is, much less that it has become a critical ally. Reality creates policies. Policies don’t create reality. So in the end, it doesn’t matter that the Romanians are focused on the EU and that Americans are not at all focused on Romania. The reality of Russia defines this relationship. (16 aprilie 2016; www.geopoliticalfutures.com)
Drinkology: Alcoolul şi istoria americană (2) – Erau revoluţionarii din Boston beţi?
Americanii numesc evenimentul care a fost scânteia revoluţiei pentru independenţa coloniilor Masacrul de la Boston, pe când istoricii englezi îi dau denumirea de Incidentul de pe strada King.
Conflictul principal dintre coloniile americane şi monarhia regală britanică, din acea perioadă, a fost legat de taxele pe care americanii le considerau excesive. În anii 1768-1770, acest conflict atinsese punctul de fierbere. Cele două regimente de militari englezi din oraşul Boston aveau de făcut faţă frecvent la provocări, încăierări şi mici atacuri.
În ziua de 22 februarie 1770, o bandă de tineri americani a asaltat casa agentului vamal englez şi, aruncând cu bolovani prin ferestre, au rănit-o pe soţia acestuia. Vameşul a tras un foc de armă prin fereastră, care l-a rănit pe Christopher Seider, în vârstă de 11 ani, fiul unor imigranţi germani, care a murit în aceeaşi seară. Samuel Adams, revoluţionar patriot şi berar, a organizat un mare meeting funerar. Atmosfera din oraş s-a încins şi mai tare.
Peste câteva săptămâni, soldatul englez Hugh White a sărit în ajutorul unui ofiţer britanic, pe care Edward Garrick, calfa unui peruchier, îl acuza că nu a plătit o perucă. În câteva minute s-a strâns o gloată agresivă, care a aruncat cu pietre în englezi. Câţiva soldaţi britanici au sărit în ajutor şi unul din ei a scăpat arma, când a fost lovit de un bulgăre de gheaţă. Arma s-a descărcat şi ceilalţi soldaţi, crezând că s-a dat ordin de deschidere a focului, au tras şi ei. Trei americani au murit pe loc, alţi doi au fost răniţi şi au murit în aceeaşi seară.
Ziarul Boston Gazette a publicat un articol incendiar, însoţit de un desen şi termenul folosit de jurnalist, de Masacrul din Boston a prins.
Peste trei ani, în ziua de 16 decembrie 1773, câteva duzini de americani, deghizaţi în indieni Mohawk, au urcat la bordul a trei corăbii engleze, ancorate în portul Boston şi au aruncat în mare baloturile de ceai de import, pentru care fuseseră ridicate taxele. Acest eveniment a devenit Petrecerea Ceaiului (Tea Party). În lunile următoare, alte petreceri ale ceaiului au avut loc la Boston si în alte oraşe din colonii.
Cârciumile din oraşul Boston şi în special Taverna dragonului verde au devenit locul de întâlnire al patrioţilor şi locul de discuţii care înfierbântau pe cei care pregăteau revolta. John Adams vizita grupurile de patrioţi şi discuta cu ei argumentele antiloialiste. Aici s-au format mai multe societăţi secrete conspirative, între care cea mai cunoscută a fost Fiii Libertăţii (Sons of Liberty), din care făceau parte John Hancock, Benjamin Rush, John şi Samuel Adams.
Până să plece în expediţia are a dus la atacarea corăbiilor şi aruncarea în mare a baloturilor de ceai, participanţii băuseră câteva ore, dar nu ceai, ci bere şi rom. Unii istorici cred că dacă aceeaşi patrioţi ar fi fost treji în noaptea cu pricina, revoluţia americană ar fi avut un debut întârziat.
Ca urmare a actelor intolerabile comise de colonişti, regele George III al Angliei a suprimat guvernarea locală în statul Massachusstts şi în celelalte colonii. Dar, măsurile coercitive nu au făcut altceva decât să mărească numărul provocărilor şi în 1776 coloniile au intrat in război cu Marea Britanie. În parte şi din cauza berii de Boston, din care bem şi astăzi faimoasa bere care poartă numele unuia din revoluţionari. (MSM)
TRIVIA: Cine a inventat computerul?
Invenţia care a schimbat lumea modernă nu a venit pe lume la o anumită dată şi nu a fost creaţia unei singure minţi de geniu, ci a rezultat dintr-un proces cu mai multe etape.
Primii strămoşi ai computerului au fost uneltele care să ajute la calcularea rapidă, aşa cum au fost abacul şi rigla de calcul, ultima inventată de William Oughtred în 1622.
Apoi au venit pre-computerele, care au avut capacitatea de a prelucra cifre, cum au fost proiectul Maşina Analitică imaginată (dar neconstruită) de Charles Babbage în 1840, aparat care este bazat pe principii mecanice, apoi cele electromecanice din anii 1930-1940 şi cele electronice: Colossus (construit de englezi în anul 1943, pentru a descifra cifrurile germane), calculatorul electro-mecanic al lui Konrad Zuse (german), ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator And Computer) construit de John Mauchly şi J. Presper Eckert la Universitatea Statului Pennsylvania în anii ’40. Acestea au fost maşini aproape de computer, fără să atingă stadiul de maşini care pot fi învăţate un program, pe care îl stochează şi prin care pot efectua diverse operaţii digitale.
Adevăratul computer s-a născut din fuziunea a două realizări, datorate celor doi adevăraţi părinţi ai computerelor:
-
Conceptul englezului Alan Turing (1912-1954), care a avut viziunea unei maşini electronice cu un program modificabil, care este încorporat şi care permite efectuarea mai multor operaţii;
-
Aparatul EDVAC, conceput de John von Neumann ( 1903-1957, emigrant american de origine maghiară, strălucit matematician, fizician, inventator şi pionier al ştiinţei computerelor, a lucrat la Berlin şi Hamburg, apoi la Universitatea Princeton din New Jersey. A participat la Proiectul Manhattan lucrând cu Richard Oppneheimer). A modificat aparatul ENIAC prin adăugarea componentului de program intern. (MSM)
John von Neumann şi calculatorul EDVAC
Profeţìi: Următorii 25 de ani – de George Friedman
0: Summary o Our Forecast
Dec. 2, 2015 We look into the future and forecast what the world will look like in a quarter of a century. We predict several disruptions in the global structure by 2040 and conclude that much of the instability over the next 25 years will be focused in the European and Asian continents.
Here is a summary of some of our key predictions for the next 25 years.
Summary
In this glimpse into the next quarter century, we forecast several significant changes and disruptions in the global structure, which will be summarized here. However, one fact that will not change is the United States’ position as the sole global power. Over the next 25 years, it will adopt a new strategy to maintain power at the lowest possible cost. This strategy will resemble isolationism, in that the U.S. will not be drawn into regional military conflicts in any significant capacity. The U.S. will support its allies with supplies, training and some air power, however, it will contain regional problems in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, rather than directly and forcibly engaging. This will prove to be a prudent strategy and help the U.S. sustain its global dominance.
In Europe, the European Union as an institution will collapse or redefine itself as a more modest trade zone encompassing a smaller part of the continent. The current free trade structure is unsustainable because its members, particularly Germany, have grown overly dependent on exports. This dependency makes these economies extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in demand outside of their own borders. Germany is the most vulnerable country and will experience economic decline due to inevitable fluctuations in the export market. Consequently, by 2040, Germany will be a second-tier power in Europe. Other countries in Western Europe will be affected by its decline, leading Central Europe, and Poland in particular, to emerge as a major, active power.
Russia will continue to suffer from the effects of declining oil prices. The revenue from this commodity had been used to sustain internal cohesion. With this revenue now severely drained, Russia will devolve into a confederation or even fragment into secessionist parts by 2040. The future of Russian nuclear weapons will become a crucial strategic issue as this devolution takes place.
In Asia, as the decline of China’s competitiveness in the export market continues, high unemployment will become a significant challenge to the Chinese president. The regime will attempt to survive the economy’s downward spiral by tightening its grip on power and sliding back into dictatorship. However, the regional divergences in China are too widespread and not easily suppressed by dictatorship. Therefore, by 2040, China will see a return to regionalism, accompanied by turmoil. As China weakens, a power vacuum will emerge in East Asia, which will be filled by Japan. By 2040, Japan, with its enormous economy and substantial military capabilities, will become the leading East Asian power.
In the Middle East, we do not foresee Islamic State being sufficiently contained in the coming decades. On the contrary, it is likely to expand its territory. Turkey and Iran are the only regional actors with the capability to challenge IS, and Iran is unlikely to do so in any substantial way. Given Islamic State’s territorial aspirations, Turkey will have to engage militarily to defend its borders. As Turkey asserts its military and economic strength, these developments will effectively bring a return of the Ottoman Empire, thrusting Turkey back into the position as the dominant regional power by 2040.
To summarize, the dominant theme we see playing out over the course of the next 25 years is increasing disarray in Europe and Asia, contrasted by prolonged stability in North American and Latin America. Despite the growing unsteadiness in Eurasia, we also expect to see three regional powers emerge: Japan, Turkey and Poland. These countries will be outliers in an otherwise fragmented Eastern Hemisphere.
Main Forecasts:
• The main trend over the next quarter of a century will be the continued and intensifying instability in the Eastern Hemisphere and increasing stability in the Western Hemisphere.
• Over the next 25 years, the United States will remain the world’s sole global power.
• The U.S. will adopt a new strategy of maintaining power at the lowest possible cost, eschewing direct military intervention for containing regional problems and supporting allies.
• The European Union cannot maintain its free trade dimension and, since that dimension is at the heart of the EU, the union itself, including the euro, will at the very least contract geographically and will more likely disappear.
• The EU will redefine itself as a more modest trade zone encompassing a smaller part of the continent.
• Germany is the most vulnerable country to the coming EU collapse. The country will experience economic decline due to inevitable fluctuations in the export market, on which it is heavily dependent. By 2040, Germany will be a second-tier power in Europe.
• The rest of northwestern Europe, excluding Britain, will also experience a decline, linked to Germany’s slump. Power and economic dynamism will, therefore, shift away from Western Europe and to Central Europe.
• Poland will emerge as a major, active power in Europe.
• Well before 2040, Russia will at best operate as if it is a confederation, with regions linked but not under Moscow’s control. Alternatively, this may be combined with genuine secession of various regions, particularly in the High Caucasus, the Pacific Maritime region and Karelia. Whatever the details, the likelihood of Russia remaining intact is low.
• China’s economy has been showing signs of slowing growth and, by 2040, the country will see a return to regionalism, accompanied by turmoil.
• As China weakens, a power vacuum will emerge in East Asia, which will be filled by Japan. By 2040, Japan, with its enormous economy and substantial military capabilities, will become the leading East Asian power.
• Islamic State will not be sufficiently contained in the coming decades.
• Islamic State’s strength will be a challenge when its reach goes beyond the frontiers of the major powers. All of its opponents will react at that time, but only two are capable of extended offensive activity: Iran and Turkey.
• By 2040, we expect Turkey to be forced into the position of challenging the Islamic State. This situation will be, in effect, the return of the Ottoman Empire in Arab territory.
• In an operation against IS, we expect Turkey to be successful, but its success would draw Turkey into an occupation that it could not easily withdraw from.
Other Forecasts:
• The U.S. strategy with Russia from now until 2040 is to confront Moscow with a line of resistance (which includes the Baltic states, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) without itself becoming overly exposed.
• By the mid-2020s, both Germany and Russia will grow weaker and, while Poland may not surge by itself, its relative weight will increase dramatically.
• Russian military might will increase in the early phases of its terminal crisis causing tensions with Poland, but will fade as its core economic and political problems become less manageable.
• The future of Russian nuclear weapons will become a crucial strategic issue as the country’s devolution takes place.
• The contraction in oil revenue will have long-term consequences in Russia. There will neither be sufficient resources for Moscow to sustain the region, nor an effective security apparatus to compel unity.
• The emergence of new economic powers, which will certainly happen in the next 25 years, is likely to be matched with new sources of energy, including hydrocarbons and others.
• As mentioned previously, Turkey will be forced to assert its military and economic strength against IS and other challengers, thrusting Turkey into the position of being the dominant regional power by 2040. This power will not be limited to the south, but will extend to the northwest into the Balkans and north into the Black Sea Basin.
• Some areas that are currently not seen as globally significant will emerge as economic powers, if not yet strategic challenges to the United States. They will be the high-growth, low-wage countries and, in many cases, simultaneously advanced industrial countries.
• As the Western Hemisphere grows increasingly stable compared to the Eastern Hemisphere, Latin America will be in a strikingly important position. However, it is still in an early stage of development that will likely last until 2040 for most countries.
• As Eurasia’s fragmentation continues, the logical outcome is the rotation of powers. At or near the periphery of a severely weakened Eurasia, we expect to see three regional powers emerge, as described already above: Japan will return to being the major East Asian power; Turkey will be the dominant power in the Middle East; and Poland, leading a coalition from the Baltics to the Black Sea, will become a major player in Europe.
• From Europe to China, there are extraordinarily capable and creative populations that will continue to create wealth for themselves and others. But all of these countries – with the exception of India, which is already divided in many ways – are undergoing a process of fragmentation that will reduce their weight in the international system.
De necrezut: Funar: „Einstein, un ESCROC, a furat teoria relativităţii de la Eminescu. Germania este ţara dacilor”
Interviu halucinant realizat de Adevarul cu fostul primar al Clujului, Gheorghe Funar. El susţine ca oculta iudeo-ungurească încearca de milenii să cotropească pământul sfânt al Daciei şi că tot ce ne inconjoară e o escrocherie evreiască, de la lupoaica capitolină până la incendiul din Colectiv.
Funar sustine ca Eminescu a fost omorat de evrei, dupa care Einstein i-a furat teoria relativitatii.
„Dintre cei care au trait in ultimii 2.000 de ani pe planeta Pamant, dupa fiul Domnului se situeaza Mihai Eminescu ca genialitate. Stiti ca Mihai Eminescu este cel mai mare fizician al lumii? In fizica, Eminescu s-a ocupat de Teoria relativitatii si a scris primul pe planeta Pamant formula de calcul al vitezei luminii: V = M x C la patrat. A aparut plagiatorul ala, escrocul de Einstein, care zice ca E = M x C la patrat. Mi-a spus toate astea un profesor de fizica din Azuga, care a aflat si el de undeva de preocuparile lui Eminescu din domeniul fizicii.
Evreii au avut destule motive ca sa-l lichideze pe Eminescu, pentru ca s-a aflat in fruntea societatii Carpati, care avea ca obiectiv refacerea Daciei mari. El n-a fost nebun, n-a avut sifilis, astea sunt escrocherii evreiesti. L-au omorat evreii, l-au asasinat cu injectii si i-au prescris frectii cu mercur, sa-i intre si in piele o cantitate mai mare. Tot n-a murit Eminescu. Si atunci i-au dat cu o caramida in cap.
Nemtii au primit, pe filiera evreiasca, manuscrisele lui Eminescu. Le-au vazut marii lor fizicieni si au zis: ‘Noi nu riscam sa iesim in public cu aceste descoperiri ale lui Eminescu, ca, poate, cineva le afla si nu vrem sa ne facem de minune. Il stim pe unu’ Einstein, ii dam treburile astea sa le sustina el. Daca cineva descopera escrocheria care s-a facut, dam vina pe asta ca nu-i intreg la cap’.
Einstein a fost handicapat, pana pe la vreo trei-patru ani n-a vorbit, l-au dus la scoala, de-abia a trecut clasa. N-a luat Bacalaureatul, n-a intrat la facultate, n-a lucrat la niciun laborator de fizica, nicaieri, ca era handicapat si cand a fost mai mare. Cand a spus teoria in prima conferinta de presa, ziaristii l-au intrebat: ‘Domnu’ Einstein, dumneata ai fost un handicapat, te-ai chinuit prin scoala, n-ai Bacul, domnule! n-ai scris un rand in domeniul fizicii ca nu esti in stare. Domne, de unde ai asta?’. Si stii ce raspuns a dat? Zice: ‘Am visat’. Pai poti sa visezi daca esti handicapat?”, a declarat Funar pentru Adevarul.
Despre Germania, tara natala a lui Einstein, spune ca numele ei este de fapt „tara dacilor”. ”Germania e Deutschland, care, in traducere, ce inseamna? Tara Dacilor. Daca il intrebati pe evreul asta cu nume nemtesc, Klaus Iohannis, stiti ce va raspunde: ‘Ich bin deutsch’. ‘Eu sunt dac’. Asa raspunde orice neamt. Ei recunosc in istoria tarii ca stramosii lor sunt geto-dacii, dar si acolo au lucrat putin evreii si in loc de geti le zic goti”, a explicat Funar.
De altfel tot geto-dacii sunt responsabili si de descoperirea Americii. „In jurul anului 4.000 i.Hr., bunul Dumnezeu le-a dat porunca stramosilor nostri geto-daci sa populeze planeta Pamant. Toate popoarele lumii au ca stramosi geto-dacii. Mai intai s-au raspandit in toata Europa. Apoi s-au dus in nordul Africii, Orientul Apropiat, India, China, Japonia. Asta a fost prima roire a lor. Da, de ce va mirati? Inclusiv japonezii au ca stramosi geto-dacii. Scrierea chineza si japoneza o gasiti pe placile de aur de la Sinaia, turnata cu cateva mii de ani inainte de Hristos.
(…) In a doua roire a stramosilor nostri geto-daci, in jurul anului 2.000 i. Hr., au plecat in toata Africa, s-au dus in Australia si au populat cele doua Americi. Au facut harti de deplasare, inclusiv in Americi, iar copia unei harti facute de geto-daci a intrat in posesia unui escroc de care ati auzit, unul Cristofor Columb. Asta a avut harta geto-dacilor in buzunar si s-a dus si i-a pacalit pe regii Spaniei, Portugaliei si s-a dus sa descopere Americile, dar avea harta in buzunar”.
(Material trimis de prietenul clubului nostru Dr. Nicolae Cernăianu din Germania)
Dostları ilə paylaş: |