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Part Two of a series. Part One by LCDR Alan Hinge, appeared in the Nov/Dec 96 issue of jam.

_{The RMA for Navies}

Commander Richard Jackson, RNZN

Introduction

T

he Revolution in Military Affair* has been described as recognising "that the character of Conflict has dramatically changed' and thus 'radical changes in ... doctrine and organisation tire needed". Alan Hinge used the example of the blitzkrieg, and Signed thai this method ol operations, so dramatically different in May 1940, was in fact the 'end product of along process of ... development ... started by the Prussians after ... 1806'',

Alan went on to discuss the downside of the military information revolution - challenges in maintaining programming integrity, data security, complexity and costs of modern technology, the debilitating effect on command and coordination due to the complexity and (ironically) the availability of loo much information. Thus, he points out. there is an important need to understand the actual target system - especially in unconventional or low intensity conflict. Hence remoulding our ... organisations and processes' should be the vital focus for future force development.

Of course with the instigation ol the Defence Reform Program, remoulding our organisations is already occupying most of our days. But is the DRP really I'ocussed on the RMA of the information revolution, or is it in lad a reflection of the traditional peacetime doctrine of cutting the armed forces'.' Will the reformed structure of the ADF improve our management of battlefield information, will it improve our understanding of a future opponent's

targe) system'?

And. how will the RMA affect naval planners? Alan asks at the conclusion of his essay 'what can we take aboard to maintain or increase naval capabilities in environments of increasing austerity?' And that is the key issue of any naval RMA - what new technology or doctrine can we take to sea so as to counter an enemy's maritime force?

RMAs at Sea

The RAN today reflects the impact of three previous naval RMAs. Let me outline them.

For most ol modern history sea warfare has been dominated by the battleship, the broadside and line-

of-hattle tactics. But this century two technologies each caused a revolution in naval warfare the submarine and the aircraft. Yet revolution was hardly the word used in 1906, as lew people could see the military potential ol aircraft at all. while the submarine was dismissed as a 'damned un-Hnglish weapon'.

In fact the revolution wrought by submarines was quick to unfold - during Idl4 las James fioldnck points out in his book The King's Ships wen ol Sett) the German U-boats rapidly constrained the Grand Fleet's freedom of the seas. By I his the pattern ol submarine warfare was set. with merchant ships as the key target and escorl-ol-convoy proven as the primary operational concept to counter the new threat More importantly the unrestricted V boat campaign was actually targeting the British economy, so ASW had to become the central concern of the British naval war. ahead of the desire for a decisive battle between he battle fleets,

This revolution in naval warfare was then submerged (forgive the pun) by the post-Great War demands ol maritime peacekeeping, amis control and budge cuts, while the technological solution of Asdic (sonari was assumed to he sufficient answer to the submarine threat. In fact this RMA (of counter-submarine warfare) was incomplete, because of organisational and doctrinal failures, lit particular the formation ol an independent RAF mean) that the enormous contribution of RNAS aircraft to the defence of convoys was almost completely lost to british naval thought.

In contrast, the aviation revolution meaitl that the Royal Navy by Id 18 had flat deck aircraft carriers, a capable torpedo bomber (the Sopworth Cuckoo) and a plant to attack the High Seas Fleet in its harbours. I lie dreadnoughts of the Grand Fleet were unable to force a decisive battle, but advances in aviation gave the RN the technological means to strike at lite (Icriuan Navy, while under Beatty. the Grand Fleet was innovative enough to give the new doctrine a go In laci the Armistice intervened before the planned operation could be launched .

I bus alter World War One the new technologies of air power were not proven as revolutionising naval warfare, while key organisational and doctrinal components of the submarine revolution were forgotten, so the primacy of the linc-ol battle in naval warfare was still unchallenged.


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(IMS Dreadnought, incidentally, did not represent an KMA since the new class of battleships reflected the existing doctrine of line-of-battle and the centrally

controlled fleet The line-of-battle remained, in fact, as a major operaiional concept lor fleet operations until late 1444 - Admiral Spruauce separated his battleships from the carrier task groups during the Battle of the Philippine Sea in anlieipation of a Japanese niglil surface attach, while later at Leyic (lull, ihe Seventh Heel line-ol-hallle was crucial to the defence of the beach head. And Halsey *s failure to form a line-of-battle off San Bcrnadino Strait remains one ol the gteat what it's' of naval history.

What handicapped the british line-of-battle in WWII, and prevented a decisive battle, was their communications doctrine. The contemporary communications system of flags proved to be easily overwhelmed by the speed and distances apart of the units making up the huge battle fleet It was the organisational and doctrinal issues for naval communications that handicapped Jellicoe at Jutland. Dr Andrew Gordon's recent book The Rules of the (lame provides an exeellenl insight into the British failure to develop appropriate eomniunications doctrine, when the available communications system proved to the inadequate for rigid, centralised control of the Grand licet. The British did learn from this error, and then doctrine of battle licet operations was

much improved for wwn.

Of course WWII and the Luftwaffe brought the aviation KM A back to the forefront of naval thought. Even so. from 1440 the revolution wrought by airpovvct at sea took four years to develop. In 1942the RN pioneered radar-assisted shipbome control of the Meet's lighters It wasn't until late 1943 that the USN adopted multi-carrier circular formations (and another year tor the RN to follow suill. Only by 1444 were all the elements m place for naval warfare to at lust move on from he line ol-battle and operate with the carrier as the primary focus for licet operations.

Then in 1445 the submarine RMA shitted back in favour ot ihe submarine. Germany's high speed U-boats i w Inch rendered the ASW tactics of the Battle of the Atlantic obsolete I were followed in 1454 by the SSN. The nuclear powered submarine has since become the new capital ship (for the lew nations that can afford them I and in future conflict (as indicated by the lalklands Wan will obviously play a major part in maritime operations.

Impact Downunder

Thus tow KMAs. the development of naval aviation and ol submarines, were the primary influence on

navies in ihe Gold War. The RAN and RNZN. for example, were primarily ASW navies, while the Australian carrier fleet also claimed a I limited)

projection of power role - one that could be operated from HMAS Melbourne. Even the RNZN has (until 1462) a minor contribution for carrier-centred naval operations, with its anti-aircraft cruisers, which in the Australasian context provided a capability missing from the RAN.

Another naval RMA

But it was a new weapon that forced the next round ol doctrinal changes on the western navies - the surface to surface anti-ship cruise missile. The sinking of the E.ilat in 1467. followed by the Israeli naval successes in their 1475 war. made the SSM central to surface naval Operations. The new weapons underlined the Soviet Navy's doctrine of deploying and using anti-ship missiles on a massive scale. Bui it was not until the loss of HMS Sheffield in I4S2 to an Hxoeet. that western navies really comprehended the alarming potency ol these weapons. Again Ihe changes were not instantaneous, nor always visible, but through the eighties the focus of licet defence shifted from the prospect of air attack to the more formidable task of SSM defence.

fhe SSM is now the primary weapon of most navies across our region, and as the Argentines proved in the Lalklands. it is possible to jury rig such missiles to operate from improv Ned launchers. Joel Cay ford, a New Zealand defence commentator and former employee of Hollandsignaal in the Netherlands, warns that missile-armed fishing boats could form a surprise threat in the crowded seas o\ the South East Asian archipelago. Professor Andrew Mack is another who would echo that view.

Hence the new importance i>\ the frigate and helicopter combination; a Seahuwk or a Sea Sprite, armed with Penguins or similar missiles, can detect, identify and kill missile-armed craft at ranges that proieel the helo's mothership. The combination ol frigate and helo. important in the lalklands. was proven by the RN against the Iraqi Navy during the Gulf War. So our doctrines of surface warfare have been revolutionised, after decades of focus on ASW or AAW. Perhaps the next step is to till the helicopter hangar on board with half a do/en or so UAVs and hence lake our own LRMP force to sea'."

The RAN today (and similarly, the RNZN) is a product of the submarine, aviation and anti-ship missile revolutions. These were primarily technological revolutions, but they also forced changes in doctrine and organisation to Australia's Navy. Naval officers now find themselves in a new period of maritime peacekeeping, arms control and budget cuts (does this sound like the 1920s?)

What place does the information revolution actually have in a Navy enduring fiscally-driven reorganisation'.' The ADEN enthusiasm for the


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'Revolution in Military Affairs* reflects the wider reality o( the information and communications revolution that is transforming business and entertainment. Out in the commercial world we are all familiar with ATMs. EFTPOS transactions and telephone banking: indeed we put our every day financial needs into the hands of a far reaching computer network - with hardly any personal concern. Similarly we lake for granted that the TV in our homes will provide us with pictures and voice from yachts in the Southern Ocean, or from astronauts on orbit.

Over rated?

Yet in a military context, there are some voices who warn that the information resolution is over rated. Professor Laurence Freedman notes that information warfare has always been central to military development, but says 'war is not a virtual thing ... but intensely physical'. The information revolution, he points out. does not create a situation in which only information matters. 'Territory, prosperity, identity, order and values still matter and provide the ultimate tests lor war's success". Freedman concludes*.

One British destroyer captain has recently described how his ship gained six different and incompaiible computer systems, while he was also expected to appreciate a new desktop computer-based signal network, which - if used as designed - would have kept him at his desk about ten hours a day the quickly reverted to a Signal Yeoman with a clipboard, while he returned to his Bridge)". This experience bears out Andrew Gordon's thesis in 'The Rules of the Game", that communications specialists like to deliver systems with more and more capacity for delivering

information, regardless of the ability of the receiver to absorb an make sense of the incoming messages.

The real impetus for the inlormation revolution is in fact from land forces, where front line communications had remained primitive, until the Gulf War. Now the individual soldier can beneIII from, for example. GOS and cell-phone type technology. The ability of land and joint commanders to have a detailed picture of events at the front line ought lead to belter battle management for soldiers Yet this may complicate matters - too much information can act as a brake on decision making. Dr Gordon warns.

The gaining and the high-tech handling of information has been a specific characteristic of naval operations, since the development of flag signals. The revolution of the ship-board plotting organisation started (in the RN) with the lessons learned from Jutland and was accelerated by the need for radar control of carrier-based fighters. Navies have been in the forefront of high capacity computer-based action data systems and

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so today the addition of JOTS and similar systems does not represent a doctrinal change, rather just an increase in t he array of information available in the ops room.

But little of this is new to PWO - the information revolution is in fact simply evolution for ships at sea. The while concept of the Ops Room is to place information into its proper context - the AAW picture, the AS plot or a theatre wide picture. For the sea going fleet the information is not a conceptual change. Rather the change will have this impact on the highci headquarters - in HQ AST and HQADF. The challenge of the RAN will be to train those headquarters to stay 'hands-oil"; to resist the impulse to use available tactical level inlormation to intervene in he tactical commanders' decisions.

The information revolution won't alter the RANs role in the defence of Australia, rather it will dramatically alter the shore headquarters' ability to look over the shoulder of the commander at sea. It is for that reason. the RAN urgently needs to develop and articulate Us doctrine. Andrew Gordon (whose book, you will have noticed, I really appreciated) concludes that the best communications system is a really well understood and robust doctrine. Doctrine is a word that gels the hackles up for some naval officers, yet the RAN has a doctrine - it just doesn't articulate it well tin contrast the RNZN has made the attempt - albeit focussed on force structure rationale rather than warfighttng concepts). Hence the RAN has to put up with bumper-sticker thinking that suggests DDGs are just floating radar posts to fill gaps in RAAF radar coverage, or that naval operations means 'darkening the horizon with destroyers'.

In fact, in an oceanic region that stretches from the middle of the Indian Ocean across to the Cook islands, the RAN and RNZN have a responsibility for maritime operations across an enormous region. There-are territories, offshore resources, maritime /ones ami sovereign responsibilities lor both Australia and New Zealand that can only be defended from the sea. There is seaborne trade from many nations crossing (his vast area. Therefore in time of tension or conflict, or two navies will be conducting naval operations using proven doctrinal concepts, such as naval control ol shipping and escort of convoy; offensive submarine patrols; aerial surveillance and concentrated task forces, to bring maritime power to bear as the situation demands.

The information revolution should mean that our higher headquarters are well informed, but it does nothing to address the limited numbers of ships and aircraft available to actually defend our two nations. Hence the importance of a well understood doctrine, so our ships and maritime aircraft are not wasted in penny packets shared out among joint commanders, nor so rigidly controlled from the centre that they

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cannot read in tune. The challenge for the ADF is to develop ;i coinniand doctrine that pan benefit from he information revolution, while avoiding Ihe dangers of back-seat driving.

NOTES

I Hinge. VI.in. Ihe Revolution in Military Affairs. Some Oppoiuiiiiucs and Risks" JAN! Vol 23. No d Not /Dec 1996

21 ibid

I Mauler. Vrllnii J lioin lie Dreadnought lo Seapa Flow. Vol V, p

AAA

I llewisli. Mark; Navies warm to I'Av Systems; Jane's IDR

I-Alia, Sepleiuliei I Odd I Irecdinau. Or I awrence; Insinuation warfare, will ha I tie ever

he joined ' Speech i-J October 1996. I l-inldiie. Iiiloiiii.iiion technology needs a Jackie lishet. Itie

N.nal Review, January 1996

Hllll IOGKVPHi

l-reedinuii. lit Lawrence. Information welfare, in// battll ever he joined? Speech lo the Inlernalional centre for Socially Analysis, London. I-I October 1996

Goldriek. James; the King's Ships inn at Sen, Natal Institute

Piess. 1984 Gordon, Or Andrew; Tin Utiles t>l lite (iiinir: Jutland Hint British

Naval Command John Murray Ltd, London, i^lr"<>

Hewish. Mark; Navies Warm lo UAV Systems; June s IUK I sun

Septembet 1996
Hinge, I.GOR Alan. Ihe Revolution in Military titans S e

Opportunities and Risks; Journal "t the Australian Naval Institute, November/December I'Wh.

l.iitldile I pen-name k Intorination technology needs a Jackie Fisher,

The Naval Btvies, January 1996, Murium, Dueiriite /or lite K.\/\. Rtiyal New Zealand Natt.

Wellington. [997,

fJwctis. Admiral William A; Microchip Wars. New Zealand lielttnt Quarterly. NO- 15. Summer 1996.

The Author

Commander Richard Jacks s currently the New Zealand OS ai Ihe RAN Skill College. HMAS Penguin. He holds a USe Iroin the US

Natal Academy and a Master! in Public Policy from Victoria University ol Wellington He has commanded UMN/S Rntoiti and die naval radio Station HMNZS liuangi Prior to his posting lo Auslralia he was die Oireeloi ol Uorpoiale Relations Policy in NZ Defence

Headquarters, where he contributed an ides in JAN I. the Natal Review, the USN1 Proceedings and was., founding writei tor \z Defence Quarterly

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