Under existing Australian OHS laws, non-compliance with a duty of care that results in a work-related fatality may lead to the imposition of a penalty for that offence. The laws impose a variety of discrete or additional penalties in circumstances where such a fatality has occurred. As noted earlier, in some jurisdictions, specific offences relating to causing a work-related fatality have been created, including in the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).295 Generally speaking, this is a relatively recent development. Table 7 provides an overview.
TABLE 7: Offence provisions relating to work-related fatalities
Jurisdiction
Act and section
Description of provision
Penalty
NSW
NSW Act,
s.32A
Conduct of duty holder causes death of a person to whom a duty is owed and duty holder is reckless as to danger of death or serious injury.
Natural person: $150,000 or 3 years imprisonment (negligence), $200,000 or 7 years imprisonment (recklessness)
Cwth
Cwth Act, Schedule 2, cl.18, 21
Breach of duty or other specified obligation causes death or serious injury and offender was negligent or reckless as to consequence of breach
The Commonwealth or Commonwealth authority or a licensee (normally a corporation): $495,000
Natural person: $99,000
The general criminal law may also apply, depending on the circumstances of the offence (e.g. manslaughter, grievous bodily harm, recklessly causing serious injury). Also, where a fatality occurs in circumstances where another type of health and safety regulation applies, the offender might be subject to the penalties that apply under the relevant law (e.g. road safety laws, mining safety laws in some jurisdictions).
We are, however, unaware of any successful Australian prosecutions for manslaughter in such circumstances.
By contrast, such prosecutions are not uncommon in England and Wales. Analysis of 24 incidents in those countries that involved at least one death (54 deaths in total) resulting in a conviction for the criminal law offence of manslaughter showed that there were convictions of seven companies, 17 directors and nine business owners who were sole traders or partners.296 The longest sentence of imprisonment that was imposed was nine years (reduced to seven years on appeal).297 In many cases, the periods of imprisonment were suspended.
Previous reviews of OHS laws in Australia have all recognised the seriousness of work-related deaths, but have been divided on how the OHS Acts should deal with the matter.
Maxwell distinguished offences of non-compliance with duties of care from other criminal law offences of negligently or recklessly causing serious injury and manslaughter. This was because, unlike other criminal law offences, OHS offences were punishable whether or not harm occurred, without any question of causation. In the event, Maxwell found that manslaughter fell outside his review.298
The SA Review expressed the view that there would be little benefit in pursuing industrial manslaughter under SA’s OHS laws, given that a charge for manslaughter against anyone where death was caused either intentionally, recklessly or negligently at the workplace could be brought under the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).299
On the other hand, the McCallum Review300, considered that a separate category of offence, involving both higher penalties and a wider range of penalty options, would be the best way to ensure that cases of workplace death are dealt with appropriately and that the necessary general deterrent effect is achieved. McCallum reached this view after finding that there was a failure of sentencing patterns to keep pace with legislated increases in maximum penalties, and the apparent associated failure of general deterrence. This initiative “…would put employers on extra notice as to the need for them to be vigilant in ensuring that risks which might lead to death are to be eliminated from the workplace, which would in turn, in our opinion, have a cascading effect on all areas of occupational health and safety.”301
Stakeholder views
The AiG commented that, if liability under the model Act were based on culpability and not outcomes, it would be difficult to reject a specific offence relating to creating the risk of death or serious injury, based on reckless behaviour by any person. The AiG also saw a reckless endangerment provision as useful in reinforcing the seriousness of consequences for poor safety.302
Some government submissions expressed the view that it was either unnecessary or inappropriate to provide an express provision to deal with workplace fatalities. The submissions from the governments of South Australia, Tasmania, Queensland and Western Australia all made the point that the focus of the OHS offences should be on culpability and risk and not merely the outcome (a fatality).
The ACTU proposed a specific offence of negligently causing death in the workplace.303
The Victorian government stated that the model Act should include a specific offence of reckless endangerment like s.32 of the Victorian Act, but that manslaughter should remain within the principal criminal statutes.304
Discussion
Against this background, we have considered a range of options.
One option would involve not making any specific provision in relation to work-related deaths. The model Act would not single out particular consequences (including work-related deaths) of non-compliance with duties of care. The focus would instead be on the culpability of the duty holder in failing to meet the duty concerned. Such an approach is consistent with the thrust of modern OHS regulation. If sentencing guidelines (see Chapter 16) were considered appropriate and could be designed for a harmonised OHS regulatory context, the weight to be given to such a consequence of a failure to satisfy a duty of care might be included.
In considering this option, we are aware that other laws relating to such deaths would be available (e.g. the general criminal laws). Even so, we note that they have been little tried and not successfully used in Australia and that there may be some difficulties in securing convictions where complex corporate arrangements exist.
A second approach, which is taken under some Australian OHS laws, is to provide for an increase in the available sanctions where there is a work-related death. This usually occurs where aggravating factors (negligence or recklessness) were present.
A third option is to create a specific offence that relates to work-related deaths arising from non-compliance with a duty of care. This approach has been taken under the NSW Act and is expressly contingent on recklessness.
Only the ACT has enacted an industrial manslaughter law in its criminal law, with provision for imprisonment of up to 20 years. If such a provision were to be contemplated for the national regime, we do not consider that it should be included in the model Act.
Our approach in dealing with non-compliance with duties of care has been to ensure that the statutory responses are consistent with the graduated enforcement of the duties. We are concerned that the natural abhorrence felt towards work-related deaths should not lead to an inappropriate response. The seriousness of offences and sanctions should relate to the culpability of the offender and not solely to the outcome of the non-compliance. Otherwise, egregious, systemic failures to eliminate or control hazards and risks might not be adequately addressed.
Even so, where non-compliance with duties of care involves a high degree of negligence or recklessness and results or could result in a work-related death or other grievous harm to a person to whom a duty is owed, we consider that it is appropriately placed at the highest end of the scale of offences.
We propose that the provisions relating to penalties for non-compliance with duties of care be expressed so that this relativity is recognised. We deal later with the penalties that should be provided in the model Act, including for non-compliance which has these characteristics.
RECOMMENDATION 56
The model Act should provide that in a case of very high culpability (involving recklessness or gross negligence) in relation to non-compliance with a duty of care where there was serious harm (fatality or serious injury) to any person or a high risk of such harm, the highest of the penalties under the Act should apply, including imprisonment for up to five years.
Note: This would be a Category 1 case in our recommended 3 category system. Recommendation 57 proposes a range of penalties for each category and for the holders of the various recommended types of duty.
Chapter 12: Sentences for breaches of duties of care
Current arrangements
As we observed earlier, there is a wide disparity in the sentences under Australian OHS Acts for breaches of duties of care. The tables below compare the fines and periods of imprisonment for such offences. The first table shows the maximum fine in each jurisdiction for a breach without specified aggravating factors (the highest fine is 10 times greater than the lowest). The second table shows the maximum if there is an aggravating factor (again, the highest fine is 10 times greater than the lowest). The third table shows the maximum periods of imprisonment that may be imposed, which vary from six months to seven years.
TABLE 8: Fines where there is no specified aggravating factor
Jurisdiction
Maximum fine under OHS Act for a breach of a general duty of care without specified aggravating factors - corporations
Maximum fine under OHS Act for a breach of a general duty of care without specified aggravating factors – individuals
NSW
$550,000
$55,000
Vic305
$1,020,780
$204,156
Qld
$225,000
$37,500
WA
$200,000
$100,000
SA
$600,000
$200,000
Tas
$150,000
$50,000
NT
$550,000
$110,000
ACT
$100,000
$10,000
Cwth
$242,000 (civil penalty)
$48,400 (civil penalty)
TABLE 9: Fines where there is an aggravating factor
Jurisdiction
Maximum fine under OHS Act for a breach of a general duty of care with aggravating factors - corporations
Maximum fine under OHS Act for a breach of a general duty of care with aggravating factors - individuals
$495,000 (criminal offence – death or serious bodily harm or risk of such a consequence and duty holder reckless or negligent)
$99,000 (criminal offence – death or serious bodily harm or risk of such a consequence and duty holder reckless or negligent)
TABLE 10: Custodial sentences
Jurisdiction
Maximum period of imprisonment under OHS Act for a breach of a duty of care where there is an aggravating factor
Legislative provision
NSW
5 years
NSW Act, s.32A
Vic
5 years
Vic Act, s.32
Qld
3 years
Qld Act, s.24
WA
2 years
WA Act, s.3A
SA
5 years
SA Act, s.59
Tas
-
-
NT
5 years
NT Act, s.82
ACT
7 years
ACT Act, s.34
Cwth
-
-
Stakeholder views
The governments support custodial sentences for serious breaches of duties of care. The Victorian Government draws attention to its approach of having custodial sentences for breaches where health and safety of a person at a workplace is wilfully or recklessly placed at risk. This should be seen as consistent with the view that imprisonment is a last resort sanction for serious offences, where there is repeated or wilful conduct and a fine is not a sufficient response.306
The Western Australian Government also support imprisonment as an option for serious breaches, but considered the maximum period of imprisonment should be two years.307
The Queensland Government similarly favour imprisonment as a response to the most serious offences.308 The South Australian Government also considers that imprisonment should be available for the most serious offences, such as reckless indifference to the health and safety of others.309
The AiG accepts that imprisonment may be appropriate in the most culpable circumstances.310 The ACCI considers that the most serious offences should be subject to the criminal law as codified in the various Crimes Acts.311 The ACTU and unions generally support the availability of terms of imprisonment for serious breaches.312
Discussion
In its 1995 Report, Work, Health and Safety, the IC observed that enforcement was needed where other incentives were insufficient to obtain compliance.313 The IC found that, at that time, deterrence had never been firmly pursued in the OHS field in Australia and that the low incidence of prosecutions and minimal fines meant that there was unlikely to be any real discouragement of non-compliance.314
Among other things, the IC recommended substantially higher penalties, the designation of specialist judges or magistrates to hear OHS prosecutions, sentencing guidelines, a wider range of corporate sanctions and a right to bring private actions (to supplement limited inspectorate resources).
Changing attitudes towards the regulation of occupational health and safety, reinforced by the various reviews of OHS laws and a growing body of regulatory scholarship, have led to increases in fines under the Acts, greater provision for custodial sentences and, as discussed later, other sentencing options. Nonetheless, as shown in the tables above, there remains considerable disparity in the maximum fines and periods of imprisonment that can be imposed under the various Australian OHS Acts.
In our view, the maximum penalties provided in some jurisdictions are too low to have a meaningful value as a deterrent or as a potential punishment for a breach. In this respect, we note the observation of the UK Sentencing Advisory Panel, that ‘... in principle it should not be cheaper to offend than to prevent the commission of an offence.’315
We consider that fines are a key part of achieving the deterrence required to give credibility to a process of graduated enforcement. We consider that higher maximum fines are necessary for the model Act and that they should be complemented by a range of other sentencing options. We discuss later whether guidance should be given as to when the higher end of the range of fines should be imposed.
Against this background, we have considered three options which would provide the model Act with a more effective and relevant regime of monetary penalties. The options would:
each be adjusted to fit into the three categories of offences that we recommend,
be complemented by the wider array of sentencing options that we propose (see later); and
be governed by applicable sentencing guidelines.
Options
There are three options:
Option one – the fines under the existing Australian OHS Acts would be brought up to the highest existing levels, with appropriate indexation adjustments to recognise that they will not come into effect until 2011;
Option two – the fines would be substantially increased particularly where there was serious harm to any person (fatality or serious injury) to whom a duty was owed or a high risk of such harm and the duty holder had been reckless or grossly negligent; and
Option three – this is a variation of the second option, reserving the highest penalties in each category of offence for repeat offenders.
Discussion of the options
Option one (levelling up penalties to the existing higher range, with some additional increase to anticipate the effects of inflation) would have the advantage of minimal change for some jurisdictions and access to the jurisprudence of the courts in those jurisdictions with higher penalties. The result could be expected to be a highest maximum fine of close to $2 million.
The option has disadvantages. It assumes that the existing maximum fines are appropriate and optimally meet the objectives for sanctions in the model Act. This is open to question. It is also difficult to work from the existing range of fines to construct a coherent system of sanctions that give credibility to and encouragement for the system of graduated enforcement that we propose should underpin the model Act. For these reasons we do not recommend option one.
Option two (a new range of fines, with substantial increases for breaches, particularly those that involve gross negligence or recklessness and a serious failure to address hazards and risks) would reinforce the deterrent effect of the model Act and allow courts a greater capacity to respond meaningfully and proportionately to the worst breaches by duty holders for whom the existing range of fines may have little punitive effect. We note that in a case where death or serious injury results from a breach, the social and economic costs are likely to be far greater than even the maximum fines ($3 million for a corporation in the worst case) that we are recommending.316
We consider option two to conform to the objectives of the model Act and we recommend that option two be adopted.
Under option three, a first offender in each of the three categories of offence would be liable to a maximum penalty of two thirds of the maximum fine and a repeat offender would be liable to have the entire maximum fine imposed.
For example:
for a Category 1offence, the maximum fine would be $2 million for a first offender that was a corporation and $3 million for a repeat corporate offender;
for a Category 2 offence the maximum fine would be $1 million for a first offender that was a corporation and $1.5 million for a repeat corporate offender; and
for a Category 3 offence the maximum fine would be $0.3 million for a first offender that was a corporation and $0.5 million for a repeat corporate offender.
Similar adjustments would apply to the maximum fines for the other categories of offenders (individuals, officers, workers and others).
Even though the approach of providing higher fines for repeat offenders exists under the SA Act and the WA Act, we do not recommend option three. We consider that it is not necessarily the case that a first offence will justify a lesser penalty. Offenders may simply have gone undetected despite flagrant disregard for their duties of care. In addition we consider that the courts would, particularly if there is clear sentencing guidance, be able to make appropriate allowance for a previous record of compliance.
The proposed fines
With this in mind, we propose the following fines, with corporate fines set at five times the fine for individuals:
TABLE 11: Proposed fines for breaches of primary duty of care or specific duty of care
Category 1: Breach of primary duty, specific duty where:
there was serious harm to any person (fatality or serious injury) to whom a duty is owed or a high risk of such harm; and
the duty holder has been reckless or grossly negligent.
$3,000,000
$600,000
Category 2: Breach of primary duty, specific duty where there was a high risk of serious harm to any person to whom a duty is owed.
$1,500,000
$300,000
Category 3: Any other breach of primary duty of care or upstream duty
$500,000
$100,000
TABLE 12: Proposed fines for breaches of officer’s duty of care
Type of offence
Maximum fine for individual
Category 1: Breach of officer’s duty of care where:
there was serious harm to any person (fatality or serious injury) to whom a duty is owed or a high risk of such harm; and
the duty holder has been reckless or grossly negligent.
$600,000
Category 2: Breach of officer duty where there was a high risk of serious harm to any persons to whom a duty is owed.
$300,000
Category 3: Other breach of officer’s duty of care
$100,000
TABLE 13: Proposed fines for breaches of duty of care of worker or other person at a workplace
Type of offence
Maximum fine for individual
Category 1: Breach of duty of care of worker or other person at a workplace where:
there was serious harm to any person (fatality or serious injury) to whom a duty is owed or a high risk of such harm; and
the duty holder has been reckless or grossly negligent.
$300,000
Category 2: Breach of duty of care of worker or other person at a workplace where there was a high risk of serious harm to any persons to whom a duty is owed.
$150,000
Category 3: Other breach of duty of care of worker or other person at a workplace
$50,000
In making this recommendation, we emphasise that our overall objective is to increase compliance with the Act and decrease the resort to prosecution to achieve that aim. The higher penalties would, in our view, have a salutary effect in raising commitment to good OHS. It must be recognised, however, that the application of the highest levels of fines would, for a variety of legal and practical reasons, continue to be rare.
RECOMMENDATION 57
The model Act should provide for the penalties for category 1, 2 and 3 offences relating to duties of care, as set out in Tables 11, 12 and 13.
RECOMMENDATION 58
The model Act should separately specify the penalties for natural persons and corporations, with the maximum fine for non-compliance by a corporation being five times the maximum fine for a natural person.
Note: Other sentencing options are considered later in this Chapter.
Custodial sentences for duty of care offences
Current arrangements
We have set out in the above table the maximum sentences of imprisonment under the Australian OHS Acts for breaches of duties of care. The periods vary from six months to seven years.
Stakeholder views
The ACCI observed that offences which may lead to imprisonment should be indictable offences and heard before a judge and jury. The maximum penalty should not be more than two years imprisonment. The AiG accepted that imprisonment may be justified for the most culpable behaviour (e.g. reckless endangerment). The ACTU supported the imposition of a custodial sentence for serious breaches of general duties in the model Act. The Tasmanian government emphasised that imprisonment should be available as part of a range of sentencing options to achieve the required deterrence in the model Act. The Western Australian, South Australian and Victorian Government submissions also expressly supported custodial sentences for serious offences. On the other hand, the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) and the Chamber of Minerals and Energy (CME) of WA strongly opposed the inclusion of custodial sentences in the model Act.317
Discussion
For the same reasons as we propose significant monetary penalties, we believe that there should be significant periods of imprisonment available for the worst (category 1) breaches. Under our proposals, these would be indictable offences (see Chapter 11). The present position, which ranges from no custodial sentences under the OHS legislation, to sentences of up to seven years imprisonment, is inappropriate and potentially unjust. As we have commented elsewhere, the legal consequences of a breach should not depend on the jurisdiction in which the offence occurred.
We consider that custodial sentences are appropriate for breaches of duties of care where there is a high level of culpability. We are proposing that they be available for category 1 offences. We consider that a maximum period of five years imprisonment is just. In this respect, we note that criminal law statutes provide for periods of imprisonment of 10 years or more for reckless conduct causing grievous bodily harm.318
RECOMMENDATION 59
The model Act should provide for custodial sentences for individuals for up to five years in circumstances (category 1 offence) where:
there was a breach of a duty of care where there was serious harm to a person (fatality or serious injury) or a high risk of serious harm; and
the duty holder has been reckless or grossly negligent.
Re-offenders
Current arrangements
Although there is no uniformity in the OHS Acts or other sentencing laws, to penalties for persons who have previous convictions for non-compliance with duties of care, there are two broad approaches.
Option one – Leave it to the sentencing court to decide the consequence for a defendant of prior convictions, subject to the requirements of local general sentencing statutes.319 It should be noted that the treatment of prior convictions varies between the various applicable sentencing laws of the Commonwealth, States and Territories.
Option two – Make specific provision in the model Act for an increased fine for a re-offender. Table 14 sets out the position under the OHS Acts.
TABLE 14: Overview of fines for re-offenders
Jurisdiction
Section
Increase in specified fine
NSW
s.12
50%
Vic
n/a
n/a
Qld
n/a
n/a
WA
ss.3A, 3B
25%
SA
s.60
Additional fine of up to $40,000
Tas
n/a
n/a
NT
n/a
n/a
ACT
n/a
n/a
Cwth
n/a
n/a
Stakeholder views
The South Australian Government proposed that there should be an express provision in the model Act to deal with re-offenders.
Discussion
Providing for an additional penalty may add to the deterrent effect of the sanctions for non-compliance and demonstrate the community’s intolerance of reoffending where the consequences of non-compliance can be extremely severe for those to whom the duty was owed.
On the other hand, such a provision limits the discretion of the sentencing court and assumes a high level of culpability, which may not exist, when further non-compliance occurs. Maxwell Review recommended the repeal of such a provision which existed in the then Victorian OHS legislation,320 observing that:321
“… courts ultimately have regard to fundamental principles, including the principle that a court ought not to impose a sentence that is more severe than that which is necessary to achieve the purpose or purposes for which sentence is imposed.”’
We note that provisions concerning re-offending could sometimes operate unfairly. There will usually be a variety of factors that need to be considered when a person has prior convictions, including whether the previous non-compliance is relevant to the matter before the court. Even where it is, other factors might lead the court to discount the previous conviction in all the circumstances of the case then before it. In practice, legal arguments might effectively limit the opportunities for imposing the additional penalty.
Since we are recommending significant increases in maximum penalties, it will be possible for a sentencing court to impose substantial fines that take account of prior convictions, where it is appropriate to do so.322 We also note that we are recommending a range of sentencing options that should allow a sentencing court a wider range of suitably targeted responses to deal with such cases.
RECOMMENDATION 60
In light of our other recommendations for higher maximum penalties and a greater range of sentencing options, the model Act should not provide for a further penalty for a repeat offender.
Other sentencing options
Current arrangements
In recent years, Australian OHS laws have provided courts with a greater array of sentencing options where there are breaches of obligations. These provisions extend the powers of a court beyond the traditional sanctions of fines and custodial sentences. Table 15 provides an overview of the specified additional options in each jurisdiction.
TABLE 15: Overview of sentencing options
Jurisdiction
Remedial orders/ Corporate probation orders
Adverse publicity
orders
Community service orders
Training orders
Injunctions
NSW
Yes
Yes
Yes*
-
-
Vic
Yes**
Yes
Yes*
-
Yes
Qld
-
-
-
-
Yes
WA
-
-
-
-
-
SA
-
Yes
Yes*
Yes
-
Tas
-
-
-
-
Yes
NT
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
ACT
Yes
Yes
-
-
Yes
Cwth
Yes
-
-
-
Yes
* This order relates to a project for the general improvement of OHS.
** As part of an enforceable undertaking, the court may impose specific conditions on the offender that are similar in nature to the conditions that may be attached to remedial orders in other jurisdictions.
Remedial orders and corporate probation orders require action by an offender to rectify deficiencies. As the Queensland Government pointed out,323 this might entail internal discipline, reform of internal structures, processes and practices, or an order to develop and implement an effective OHSMS. Adverse publicity orders are seen as an effective deterrent, with considerable implications for an offender’s corporate reputation. They draw public attention to the particular wrong doing and the measures that are being taken to rectify it. Community service orders require the offender to initiate or participate in activities that benefit the community, with a particular focus on improving OHS. Training orders allow the Court to require action be taken by an offender to develop necessary skills to manage OHS effectively. Injunctions are a powerful tool for ensuring compliance with the relevant duties.
Enforceable undertakings are now available under several OHS Acts, but as their availability does not always depend on a decision by a court or tribunal, they are not addressed here. They will be considered in our second report.
Stakeholder views
Generally, those who made submissions on this point support a wider range of sentencing options. There is widespread agreement on the suitability of fines for breaches of statutory obligations under OHS legislation, and on custodial sentences available for serious breaches.
Even so, while existing sentencing options were generally supported, there were proposals from the ACTU, Unions NSW and various unions for additional options. The ACTU suggested that the model Act should provide for some sentencing options that would be new to the Australian OHS regulatory context (although they may be found in other Australian regulatory contexts or in other countries). These included incapacitation through dissolution orders, orders disqualifying an offender from government tenders, equity fines, victim compensation orders and ‘outcome responsibility’.324 Unions NSW proposed a further option of share prohibition. The CFMEU also proposed the inclusion of victim compensation orders in the model Act.
Discussion
Unfortunately, there appears to be limited information available that demonstrates the long term effects on OHS of the application in Australia of the alternative sentencing options. Many of the views expressed to us, and the material that we considered, appear to be principles-based or drawn from individual cases. Even so, there is understandably strong support for this option.
The possible weaknesses of particular sentencing options may be reduced or eliminated by the judicious combining of several orders. For example, concern that a fine may not deter further breaches or result in meaningful action by an offender to improve OHS practices and performance would be addressed by orders for remedial action. Adverse publicity orders may have a greater deterrent effect than a fine for a corporation that is concerned about its reputation. In addition, a combination of orders may not only be better targeted, but also permit a more proportionate response.
We conclude that the overall objectives of OHS regulation are best served by providing a wide range of sentencing options when there are convictions for breaches of duties of care. Gunningham and Johnstone have observed, in relation to corporate sanctions, a combination of measures will yield the best results in terms of achieving the overall goal of reducing the incidence of contraventions and hence the incidence of work-related injury and disease.325
Accordingly, we have considered whether the existing sentencing options are appropriate and sufficient, as well as where there are any others that should be included in the model Act. Subject to our recommendations about fines and custodial sentences, we consider that the model Act should equip the Courts with a wider array of sentencing options.
We have concluded that injunctions provide a better calibrated option for a sentencing court than an order for incapacitation (e.g. winding-up). We have also concluded that, in this context, restrictions on tendering for government business are better dealt with by the executive than the judiciary. A government policy means that the restriction may be more widely applied than in relation to a single offender under a court’s sentence.
We did not consider that we had sufficient information or analysis to reach a final conclusion about equity fines (which require the issuing of shares to the regulator or another official entity rather than the payment of money as a fine). An equity fine does not by itself produce a change in behaviour or a commitment to improved OHS. We note that the NSW Law Reform Commission considered that they should not be supported in Australia.326
RECOMMENDATION 61
The model Act should provide for the following sentencing options in addition to fines and custodial sentences:
adverse publicity orders;
remedial orders;
corporate probation;
community service orders;
injunctions;
training orders; and
compensation orders.
Note: we support making provision for enforceable undertakings but they are dealt with in our second report to allow a full examination of the options, including providing for such an undertaking as an alternative to a prosecution and as a sentencing option.
