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difficulties and problems
18.20 The USSD 2006 report noted that:
“Alevi cem houses (places of gathering) have no legal status as places of worship. Alevis in the Kartal district of Istanbul continued to pursue a court case against a decision by local authorities to deny them permission to build a cem house. In May authorities in the Sultanbeyli municipality of Istanbul reportedly banned the construction of a cem house on the grounds that the Pir Sultan Abdal Association, an Alevi group, had not acquired the necessary construction permits. Association officials said the local mayor and his staff had attended the groundbreaking ceremony and had promised not to interfere with the project; however, the municipality reportedly filed a case against the association after it proceeded with construction following the ban.” [5g]
18.21 The USSD 2006 report on Religious Freedom further noted that:
“In May 2006, authorities in the Istanbul municipality of Sultanbeyli reportedly halted the construction of a cem house on the grounds that the Pir Sultan Abdal Association, an Alevi group, had not acquired the necessary construction permits. Association officials said the local mayor and his staff had attended the groundbreaking ceremony and had promised not to interfere with the project. The Diyanet covers the utility costs of registered mosques, but not of cem houses and other places of worship that are not officially recognized. In May 2006, Diyanet President Ali Bardakoglu said the Diyanet could not provide such support to cem houses as it did not have funds for ‘supporting mystical worship.’ Many Alevis alleged discrimination in the Government’s failure to include any of their doctrines or beliefs in religious instruction classes in public schools. They also charged a bias in the Diyanet, which does not allocate specific funds for Alevi activities or religious leadership.” [5e] (Section II)
18.22 As reported by the Turkish Daily News on 22 June 2005:
“Turkey’s Alevis, who follow a moderate interpretation of Islam, warned Tuesday that they would go to the courts to fight for equality if the government fails to recognize their rights. Cem Foundation Chairman Prof. Izzettin Doğan said, ‘We will present our petition to the Prime Ministry and the National Education Ministry today and if we don’t receive a positive response, thousands of Alevis will file suit against the government.’ Izzettin Doğan held a press conference yesterday with members of the newly founded Federation of Alevi Foundations and a lawyer, to state the demands of Alevis and what they plan to do. Doğan said their main demands were the inclusion of the Alevi faith in school textbooks, financial support from the government for the construction of Alevi places of worship and the allocation of funds for the community from the state budget… Although they account for about a fifth of Turkey’s 70-million population and their religious practices differ significantly from those of the Sunni majority, Alevis are denied the status of a separate sect and, unlike the Sunnis, receive no financial support from the government.” [23j]
Mystical Sufi and Other Religious Social Orders and Lodges
18.23 As noted in the USSD 2006 report Mystical Sufi and other religious-social orders (tarikats) and lodges (cemaats) are officially prohibited; however, tarikats and cemaats remained active and widespread. Many prominent political and social leaders continued to associate with these religious-social orders, lodges, and other Islamic societies.” [5g]
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Non Muslim minorities
18.24 As noted in the USSD 2006 report on Religious Freedom:
“According to the general perception, Turkish identity is based on the Turkish language and the Islamic faith. Religious minorities said they were effectively blocked from careers in state institutions. Christians, Baha'is, and some Muslims faced societal suspicion and mistrust, and more radical Islamist elements continued to express anti-Semitic sentiments. Additionally, persons wishing to convert from Islam to another religion sometimes experienced social harassment and violence from relatives and neighbors.” [5e] (Introduction)
18.25 The USSD 2006 report on Religious Freedom continued:
“Under the law, religious services may take place only in designated places of worship. Municipal codes mandate that only the Government can designate a place of worship, and, if a religion has no legal standing in the country, it may not be eligible for a designated site. Non-Muslim religious services, especially for religious groups that do not own property recognized by the GDF, often take place on diplomatic property or in private apartments. Police occasionally bar Christians from holding services in private apartments, and prosecutors have opened cases against Christians for holding unauthorized gatherings.
“The law prohibits imams, priests, rabbis, or other religious leaders from ‘reproaching or vilifying’ the Government or the laws of the state while performing their duties. Violations are punishable by prison terms of one month to one year, or three months to two years if the crime involves inciting others to disobey the law.” [5e] (Section II)
18.26 The USSD 2006 report on Religious Freedom also noted that “Government authorities do not interfere in matters of doctrine pertaining to non-Muslim religions, nor do they restrict the publication or use of religious literature among members of the religion. There are legal restrictions against insulting any religion recognized by the Government, interfering with that religion's services, or debasing its property.” [5e] (Section II)
18.27 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 2007 country report published January 2007 noted that:
“On November 9th 2006 the Turkish parliament appeared to have met part of
the EU!s demands for improvement of the rights of Turkey’s small non-Muslim
minorities, by passing a law allowing foreign citizens to establish charitable or
pious foundations in Turkey, to permit the return of properties of non-Muslim
foundations that had been seized by the state, to permit them to acquire new
property and to open branches abroad. On November 29th parts of the bill
were returned to the parliament by the president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, on the
grounds that they conflicted with the constitution. However, it can be assumed
that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will be able to use its large
majority in parliament to re-pass the bill unchanged, in which case the
president would be constitutionally obliged to promulgate it as law, but could
then appeal to the constitutional court to review the law.”
(See also Section 18.19 on situation of the Alevi community)
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Christians
18.28 The USSD 2006 report outlined that:
“No law explicitly prohibits proselytizing or religious conversions; however, many prosecutors and police regarded proselytizing and religious activism with suspicion. Police occasionally prevented Christians from handing out religious literature. The government reported 157 conversions including 92 to Islam and 63 from Islam to a different religion. Christians performing missionary work were occasionally beaten and insulted. Police officers may report students who meet with Christian missionaries to their families or to university authorities.” [5g]
18.29 As noted in the European Commission 2004 report “The unofficial estimated Christian populations are: 60,000 Armenian Orthodox Christians; 20,000 Roman Catholics; 20,000 Syriac Orthodox Christians; 3,000 Greek Orthodox Christians; 2,500 Protestants; 2,000 Syriac Catholics; 2,000 Armenian Catholics; 500 Armenian Protestants; and 300 Chaldean Catholics.” [71c] (p43)
18.30 The European Commission 2005 report noted that:
“The continued ban on the training of clergy means that non-Muslim religious minorities are likely to encounter difficulties in sustaining their communities beyond the current generation… Nationality criteria restrict the ability of non-Turkish clergy, such as the Syriacs and Chaldeans, to work for certain churches. Public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch is still banned and the election of the heads of some religious minority churches is still subject to strict conditions. Non-Turkish Christian clergy continue to experience difficulties with respect to the granting and renewal of visas and residence and work permits. Religious textbooks have been redrafted in order to address the concerns of Christian minorities. However, it is still not possible for clergymen and graduates from theological colleges to teach religion in existing schools run by minorities.” [71d] (p31)
18.31 The USSD 2006 report outlined that
“Attacks on those practicing Christian faiths continued. On January 8, five assailants severely beat Protestant church leader Kamil Kiroglu in Adana. One attacker wielded a knife and threatened to kill Kiroglu unless he renounced Christianity. The government did not investigate the incident or make any arrests. On February 5, an assailant shot and killed Catholic priest Andrea Santaro in a church in Trabzon. A witness said the gunman shouted "God is great" as he shot Santaro from behind. A 16-year-old was charged in the case, and on October 10, the defendant was sentenced to 18 years, 10 months in prison. On July 2, a Catholic priest in Samsun was attacked and suffered knife wounds. Authorities announced that, prior to the attack, the assailant had filed complaints against the priest for ‘Christian propaganda.’ The assailant was arrested and the case was pending at year's end.” [5g]
18.32 The USSD 2006 report further noted that:
“Several foreigners who are practicing Christians and have lived with their families in various cities for many years reported increasing governmental harassment during the year, including denial of residence and work permits that had been granted in previous years, monitoring by jandarma, and receiving threats to themselves and their families. These persons reported that they worshiped in their homes but did not proselytize by distributing bibles, going door-to-door, or undertaking similar activities. ” [5g]
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Jews
18.33 As recorded in the USSD report on religious freedom 2006, there are approximately 23,000 Jews in Turkey [5e] (Section I) and Jewish foundations with 20 sites. [5e] (Section II) Jews freely practised their religion. [5e] (Section III)
18.34 As outlined by the Council of Europe European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) in its ‘Third report on Turkey - Adopted on 25 June 2004 and made public on 15 February 2005’:
“The Jewish community in Turkey is not very large. Until recently, it enjoyed a relatively peaceful existence in Turkey, aside from a few isolated antisemitic [sic] incidents. In the opinion of representatives of the Jewish community, the climate has suddenly changed, mainly in the wake of a series of international terrorist attacks in November 2003, targets of which included two synagogues in Istanbul. There is now a feeling of insecurity in the Jewish community because of these and other incidents, such as physical assaults on individuals purely because they are Jewish, at least one of which proved fatal.” [76] (p25)
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18.35 The ECRI report continued:
“Anti-Semitic propaganda continues to appear in certain sections of the media and it is apparently not unusual to come across sweeping statements in the press in which Turkey’s Jewish community is equated with the policies of the state of Israel. It also appears that legal proceedings are not always instituted under Article 312 in order to punish those who make antisemitic remarks in public, although this article prohibits incitement to racial hatred. However, ECRI notes with satisfaction that the police are working with the Jewish community to improve security and that antisemitic remarks made by the son of one of the perpetrators of the aforementioned attacks have been condemned by the government and that legal proceedings were instituted against him by the judicial authorities.” [76] (p25)
19 Ethnic groups
19.01 As noted in the report “State of the World’s Minorities 2007”, released on 20 March 2007:
“Turkey, while having made notable progress in the last few years due to European pressure, continues to experience a major national identity problem with regard to recognizing minorities as well as facing up to its past history of repression against minorities such as the Armenians and the Kurds…When Pope Benedict XVI paid a landmark visit to Turkey in November 2006, issues of religious freedom once again came to the fore. Although Turkey is a constitutionally secular state that guarantees substantial rights to religious minorities, in practice deep-seated discrimination persists against non-
Muslim minorities such as Christians and Jews, and Muslim minorities such as the Alevis – a Muslim sect different from Turkey’s majority Sunnis, numbering
12–15 million.” [57c] (p97)
19.02 The US State Department (USSD) report 2006, published on 6 March 2007 recorded that “The law provides a single nationality designation for all citizens and does not recognize ethnic groups as national, racial, or ethnic minorities.” [5g] (Section 5)
(See also Section 16.01 Government monitoring of human rights)
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19.03 The European Commission Turkey 2006 Progress Report released on 8 November 2006, however noted that:
““Turkey’s approach to minority rights remains unchanged. According to the Turkish authorities, under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, minorities in Turkey consist exclusively of non-Muslim religious communities. The minorities associated in practice by the authorities with the Treaty of Lausanne are Jews, Armenians and Greeks. However, there are other communities in Turkey which, in the light of the relevant international and European standards, could qualify as minorities.” [71a] (p20)
19.04 The EC 2006 report also noted that:
“Turkey’s reservation towards the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), regarding the rights of minorities – to which a number of EU Member States objected as being incompatible with the object and purpose of this Covenant – and its reservation to the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), regarding the right to education, are of concern. Turkey has not signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities or the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.” [71a] (p21)
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Kurds
19.05 A recently published report on human rights violations against Kurds in Turkey prepared by the Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) reported that:
“Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey has not recognised the existence of a separate Kurdish ethnic community within its borders. Over 20 million Kurds presently live in Turkey, who for decades have been subjected to economic disadvantage and human rights violations which bear the hallmarks of systematic persecution intent on destroying Kurdish identity. Over the past year, Turkey has made some gains in the quest for equality for the Kurds, but much work remains.” [6c] (p1)
19.06 The same KHRP report further stated that:
“In its goal to join the EU, Turkey has enacted reforms that it says were designed to liberalise and open its political system. However, during the last year as Turkey has slid into its old habits of torture, repression, the denial of freedom of expression and association and discrimination against Kurdish people, concerns have been raised that Turkey’s reforms were merely superficial and designed to give the appearance of change, without any substantive alterations to either the political system or the everyday lives of Kurds living in the country.” [6c] (p1)
19.07 As noted in the USSD 2006 “Although the number was unknown, some minority groups were active in political affairs. Many members of parliament and senior government officials were Kurds.” [5g] (Section 3) The same USSD report in addition noted that “Citizens of Kurdish origin constituted a large ethnic and linguistic group. Millions of the country's citizens identified themselves as Kurds and spoke Kurdish. Kurds who publicly or politically asserted their Kurdish identity or publicly espoused using Kurdish in the public domain risked censure, harassment, or prosecution.” [5g] (Section 5)
19.08 As outlined by the Council of Europe European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) in its ‘Third report on Turkey - adopted on 25 June 2004 and made public on 15 February 2005’:
“According to estimates, there are between twelve and fifteen million Kurds living in Turkey. There are no official statistics as national censuses do not take account of people’s ethnic origins. The Kurds live mainly in the South-East, although many of them have left the region as part of the drift to the towns and also because of the armed conflict that went on for several years between the authorities and the PKK.” [76] (p20)
19.09 The ECRI report also stated:
“ECRI is pleased to note that the constitutional and legislative changes in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms should help to give the Kurds greater freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of association. It notes, however, that in the case of the Kurds, such freedoms are still severely curtailed, especially in practice. ECRI notes in particular reports that Kurdish students have been arrested and/or expelled from university for having signed petitions or demonstrated in support of the teaching of Kurdish in universities… In some cases, however, persons who have expressed their Kurdish identity by peaceful means have been acquitted. ECRI hopes that the new laws will pave the way for a rapid improvement in this area. It notes that parents are now permitted by law to give their children Kurdish first names, even though a circular prohibits them from choosing names incorporating the letters Q, W or X, which exist in the Kurdish language but not in the Turkish alphabet.” [76] (p22)
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Kurdish language
19.10 The European Commission 2006 report stated that:
“As regards cultural rights, permission was granted to two local TV channels in Diyarbakır and to one radio in Şanlıurfa to broadcast in Kurdish. However, time restrictions apply, with the exception of films and music programmes. All broadcasts, except songs, must be subtitled or translated in Turkish, which makes live broadcasts technically cumbersome. Educational programmes teaching the Kurdish language are not allowed. The Turkish Public Television (TRT) has continued broadcasting in five languages including Kurdish. However, the duration and scope of TRT's national broadcasts in five languages is very limited. No private broadcaster at national level has applied for broadcasting in languages other than Turkish since the enactment of the 2004 legislation.” [71a] (p21)
19.11 The Human Rights Watch (HRW) World Report 2007, published in January 2007, recorded that “The Supreme Council for Radio and Television finally took the important step of permitting television and radio broadcasting in Kurdish, although only for one hour a day. Other restraints on minority languages in the public arena remain. In April, for example, a Diyarbakir court closed the Kurdish Democracy Culture and Solidarity Association (Kürt-Der) for infringing the Associations’ Law by conducting its internal business in Kurdish.” [9b]
19.12 The USSD 2006 recorded that “The government maintained significant restrictions on the use of Kurdish and other ethnic minority languages in radio and television broadcasts and in publications.” [5g] (Section 5)
19.13 As noted in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Human Rights Annual Report 2006, released in October 2006:
“Government reforms have already led to improvements in the cultural rights of the Kurdish community. For example, following legal changes to broadcasting rights and the launch of national broadcasting in Kurdish in 2004, two local TV channels and one local radio station began broadcasting in Kurdish on 23 March 2006. In June 2006, the Turkish broadcasting authority, RTUK, announced that they were further loosening broadcasting restrictions on certain types of non-Turkish language broadcasting. Cultural programmes, such as films and music concerts, would no longer be bound by time restrictions. However, non-cultural programming in languages other than Turkish remains tightly regulated.” [4n] (p137)
19.14 The Freedom House report ‘Countries at the Crossroads 2005 – Turkey’, published in December 2004 noted that “The legalization of these [non-Turkish language] broadcasts was a major step for Kurdish rights and freedom of expression… The broadcasts have been criticized for being too short and being limited to the national station, and liberalization still has a long way to go. However, the significance of the changes cannot be overstated.” [62c] (p16)
See also Section 15.33 High Board of Radio and Television (RTÜK)
Teaching in Kurdish
19.15 The USSD 2005 report recorded that:
“A number of private Kurdish language courses closed during the year, citing a lack of students. Kurdish rights advocates said many Kurds could not afford to enroll in private classes. They also maintained that many potential applicants were intimidated because authorities required those enrolling in the courses to provide extensive documents, including police records that were not required for other courses. They maintained that the requirements intimidated prospective applicants, who feared police were keeping records on students taking the courses.” [5b] (Section 5)
19.16 The European Commission 2006 report noted that:
“Children whose mother tongue is not Turkish cannot learn their mother tongue in the Turkish public schooling system. Such education can only be made by private education institutions. As concerns Kurdish all such courses were closed down in 2004. Therefore, there are no possibilities to learn Kurdish today in the public or private schooling system. Furthermore, there are no measures taken to facilitate access to public services for those who do not speak Turkish.” [71a] (p21)
19.17 The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Human Rights Annual Report 2006, released in October 2006, however noted:
“The private Kurdish language courses launched in 2004 closed down in 2005 due to ‘lack of demand’. According to former course administrators, the unaffordable course fees and restrictions on curriculum and participation were also important contributing factors. In 2005, the pro-Kurdish political party DEHAP (now merged with the DTP) ran a campaign demanding non-Turkish mother-tongue language teaching at ordinary state schools and asking for the constitution to be amended to enable this. The constitution currently states that only Turkish can be used as a mother tongue in schools, and political campaigning in languages other than Turkish is still illegal.” [4n] (p137)
19.18 As reported by the Turkish Daily News on 26 May 2005:
“The Supreme Court of Appeals’ General Board on Legal Matters has unanimously decided to reverse a lower court decision not to close the Education Personnel Labor Union (Eğitim-Sen). Charges filed against Eğitim-Sen were based on constitutional articles stipulating Turkey’s official language as Turkish and prohibiting the state from teaching other languages at the expense of Turkish. Eğitim-Sen’s charter allows the teaching of local dialects and languages.” [23d]
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