Cyclopedia Of Economics

Q: What are the advantages and disadvantages of Austria as far as banking goes?

A: Austria has adopted the EU banking laws. Austrian banks within the European Union have no no special advantages or disadvantages.

Q: How does Austrian tax treatment of banking operations compare with other countries?

A: In Austria we have a capital gains tax of 25 percent applicable to individuals and trusts. Banks cannot deduct VAT on their transactions. The state levies stamp duties on credits and loans. Otherwise, the tax treatment of banks is comparable to other EU members.

Q: Austria's banks were renowned - or notorious - for their strict anonymity. Can you describe the history of Austrian bank anonymity and how it came to be abolished? What, in your view, was the effect on the banking system, the composition of bank clientele, and the volume of foreign savings and deposits?

A: Anonymity on savings accounts and equity investments, introduced after World War II, was abolished gradually after 1995, in accordance with EU regulations. Banking secrecy can be lifted in case of criminal and fiscal investigations. The effect of abolishing bank anonymity was minimal since there are not many substitutes for these financial institutions. Some foreign deposits may have been moved elsewhere, but that's just about it.

Q: The European Union has recently fined Austrian banks, members of the Lombard Club, for fixing the prices of deposits in a cartel-like arrangement. Could you give us the Austrian angle of this affair?

A: The Lombard Club was eventually historically justified in the post-war economy. The arguments presented by the Austrian banks were very weak because there was no awareness of wrongdoing. We think that the fines are rather high since the effect of the cartel was minimal and bank margins in Austria were much lower than in other EU countries. Mr. Haider wrongly claims his involvement in the EU-Lombard Club decision. He is a populist and a free-rider on the poor and small folks.

Q: Many Austrian banks have aggressively spread to Central Europe - notably the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Croatia, and Slovenia. Do you think it is a wise long term strategy? The region is in transition and its fortunes change daily.  Poland has switched from prosperity to depression in less than 7 years. Aren't you concerned that Austrian banks are actually importing instability into their balance sheets?

A: The move by the Austrian banks into central and eastern Europe is a very good niche market growth strategy. Austrian banks lost a lot of money in the UK, the USA, and in other parts of the world - but were very risk-conscious in central and eastern Europe, where, today, they generate high margins. In the years to come, this will be a strongly growing region. Entering these markets was a very positive decision.

Q: Austria's banks are small by international standards. Do you foresee additional consolidation or purchases by foreign banks, possibly German?

A: I am convinced that there will be additional domestic consolidation coupled with some foreign purchases. The three big German banks - HVB, Bayerische Landesbank, and Deutsche Bank - are already present in Austria.

Q: In 1931, the collapse of Creditanstalt in Vienna triggered a global depression. The markets are again in turmoil, the global economy is stagnant, and trade protectionism is increasing. Can you compare the two periods?

A: Thank you or the honor of triggering a global recession, but Creditanstalt was too small to do so. In my view, you cannot compare the markets today and in 1931. Financial skills and organizations are much more developed today. Social systems are much more secure than in the 1930's.

Q: Could you tell us about bank supervision in Austria?

A: Since April 1, 2002, Austria has an independent financial markets supervisor for banks, insurance companies, and the capital markets.

Q: Does Austria have non-bank financial institutions such as thrifts (i.e., savings and loans, or building societies), credit cooperatives, microfinance lending, sectoral credit institutions, etc.?

A: Yes, we do have this kind of nonbank financial institutions but they play a minor role, maybe less than 1 percent of the market.

Q: Does Austria have a federal deposit insurance?

A: Yes, it does. Individuals are covered for a maximum of 20,000 euros in all their accounts in any single bank. Companies are covered up to 90 percent of this amount. There is a centralized claims institution for the banking sector.

Postscript October 2008

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-9, car repossessions are up 25% in Romania, as the members of a newly-minted class of consumers are unable to meet their obligations. Austrian, Greek, Swedish, and German banks are exposed to default risks throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Consumers and businesses in Serbia, Ukraine, Hungary, and other teetering economies owe Austrian financial institutions $290 billion - almost the entire GDP of this country!

As local currencies depreciate, debts, denominated in foreign exchange, grow more expensive to service. As the real economy contracts, in the first phase of what appears to be a prolonged recession, bad loans mushroom and reserves are exhausted. This requires cash-strapped governments to recapitalize major banks. Faced with current account and budget deficits, some of these sovereigns are scrambling for outside infusions from the likes of the IMF.

Banking, German

Denial is a ubiquitous psychological defense mechanism. It involves the repression of bad news, unpleasant information, and anxiety-inducing experiences. Judging by the German press, the country is in a state of denial regarding the faltering health of its economy and the dwindling fortunes of its financial system.

Things are so bad now (June 2005) that Italy's UniCredit Bank is bidding to absorb the second largest German financial institution, HVB, for a mere 15 billion euros in an all-shares deal. UniCreit expects to shell out another 4.2 billion euros to buy out minority shareholders in HVB subsidiaries in Austria (Bank Austria) and Poland (BPH).

This will create a super-bank with more than 28 million customers served by a network of well over 7000 branches. Forty percent of this clientele (11 million) live in Central and Eastern Europe. The merged bank will control one fifth of the banking market in countries as disparate as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Poland.

UniCredit promises cost cutting to be achieved through the prompt sacking of 7% of HVB's bloated workforce of well over 120,000 employees. Alarmed, Handelsblatt, Germany's leading financial paper, urged more "ambition and patriotism" to avoid further encroachments of foreign banks into German turf. The aim, trumpeted the paper, somewhat incongruously, should be "global champions in the financial sector".

How are these xenophobic defenses to be erected? By mergers and acquisitions among German banks in the fragmented domestic market. Consolidation would lead to higher profits and less digestible takeover targets, goes the logic.

HVB itself disproves these self-deluding recipes. It is the sad outcome of a merger between Bayerische Vereinsbank and Hypo-Bank. Weighed down by an under-performing property portfolio in a waning German construction market, it is a dispiriting contrast to the dynamic (and profitable) UniCredit.

The decline and fall of German banking reached its nadir in 2002.

Three years ago, Commerzbank, Germany's fourth largest lender, saw its shares decimated by more than 80 percent to a 19-year low, having increased its loan-loss provisions to cover flood-submerged east German debts. Faced with a precipitous drop in net profit, it reacted reflexively by sacking yet more staff. The shares of many other German banks still trade below book value, after an impressive recovery from lows reached in 2001-2.

By end-2002, Dresdner Bank - Germany's third largest private establishment - had already trimmed an unprecedented one fifth of its workforce. Other leading German banks - such as Deutsche Bank and Hypovereinsbank - resorted to panic selling of equity portfolios, real-estate, non-core activities, and securitized assets to patch up their ailing income statements. Deutsche Bank, for instance, unloaded its US leasing and custody businesses.

On September 19, 2002 Moody's changed its outlook for Germany's largest banks from "stable" to "negative". In a scathing remark, it said:

"The rating agency stated several times already that current difficult economic conditions that are hurting the banking business in Germany come on top of the legacy of past strategies that were less focused on strengthening the banks' recurring earning power. Indeed, the German private-sector banks, as a group, remain among the lowest-performing large European banks."

In October 2002, Fitch Ratings, the international agency, followed suit and downgraded the long-term , short- term, and individual ratings of Dresdner Bank and of Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank (HVB).

These were only the last in a series of negative outlooks pertaining to German insurers and banks. It is ironic that Fitch cited the "bear equity markets (that) have taken their toll not only on trading results but also on sales to private customers, the fund management business and on corporate finance."

Germans used to be immune to the stock exchange and its lures until they were caught in the frenzied global equities bubble. Moody's observed wryly that "a material and stable retail franchise in its home market, even if more modestly profitable, can and does represent a reliable line of defence against temporary difficulties in financial and wholesale markets."

The technology-laden and scandal-ridden Neuer Markt - Europe's answer to America's NASDAQ - as well as the SMAX exchange for small-caps were shut down in October 2002, the former having lost a staggering 96 percent of its value since March 2000. This compared to Britain's AIM, which lost "only" half its worth at that point. Even Britain's infamous FTSE-TechMARK faded by a "mere" 88 percent.

Only 1 company floated on the Neuer Markt in all of 2002 - compared to more than 130 two years before. In an unprecedented show of "no-confidence", more than 40 companies withdrew their listings in 2001. The Duetsche Boerse promised to create two new classes of shares on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. It belatedly vowed to introduce more transparency and openness to foreign investors.

It's been downhill ever since.

Banks have been accused by irate customers of helping to list inappropriate firms and providing fraudulent advisory services. Court cases are pending against the likes of Commerzbank. These proceedings may dash the bank's hopes to move from retail into private banking.

To further compound matters, Germany is in the throes of a tsunami of corporate insolvencies. This long-overdue restructuring, though beneficial in the long run, couldn't have transpired at a worse time, as far as the banks go. Massive provisions and write-downs have voraciously consumed their capital base even as operating profits have plummeted. This double whammy more than eroded the benefits of their painful cost-cutting measures.

German banks - not unlike Japanese ones - maintain incestuous relationships with their clients. When it finally collapsed in April 2002, Philip Holzmann AG owed billions to Deutsche Bank with whom it had a cordial working relationship for more than a century. But the bank also owned 19.6 percent of the ailing construction behemoth and chaired its supervisory board - the relics of previous shambolic rescue packages.

Germany competes with Austria in over-branching, with Japan in souring assets, and with Russia in overhead. According to the German daily, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the cost to income ratio of German banks is 90 percent. Mass bankruptcies and consolidation - voluntary or enforced - are unavoidable, especially in the cooperative, mortgage, and savings banks sectors, concludes the paper. The process is a decade-old. More than 1500 banks vanished from the German landscape in this period. Another 2500 remain making Germany still one of the most over-banked countries in the world.

Moody's don't put much stock in the cost-cutting measures of the German banks. Added competition and a "more realistic pricing" of loans and services are far more important to their shriveling bottom line. But "that light is not yet visible at the end of the tunnel ... and challenging market conditions are likely to persist for the time being."

The woeful state of Germany's financial system reflects not only Germany's economic malaise - "The Economist" repeatedly calls it the "sick man" of Europe - but its failed attempt to imitate and emulate the inimitable financial centers of London and New-York. It is a rebuke to the misguided belief that capitalistic models - and institutions - can be transplanted in their entirety across cultural barriers. It is incontrovertible proof that history - and the core competencies it spawns - still matter.

When German insurers and banks, for instance, branched into faddish businesses - such as the Internet and mobile telephony - they did so in vacuum. Germany has few venture capitalists and American-style entrepreneurs. This misguided strategy resulted in a frightening erosion of the strength and capital base of the intrepid investors.

In a sense, Germany - and definitely its eastern Lander - is a country in transition. Risk-aversion is giving way to risk-seeking in the forms of investments in equities and derivatives and venture capital. Family ownership is gradually supplanted by stock exchange listings, imported management, and mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers - both friendly and hostile. The social contracts regarding employment, pensions, the role of the trade unions, the balance between human and pecuniary capital, and the carving up of monopoly market niches - are being re-written.

Global integration means that, as sovereignty is transferred to supranational entities, the cozy relationship between the banks and the German government on all levels is over. In October 2001, Hans Eichel, the perennial German finance minister, announced OECD-inspired anti-money laundering measures that are likely to compromise bank secrecy and client anonymity and, thus, hurt the German - sometimes murky - banking business. Erstwhile rampant government intervention is now mitigated or outright prohibited by the European Union.

Thus, German Laender were forced, by the European Commission, to partly abolish, between 2002-5, their guarantees to the Landesbanken (regional development banks) and Sparkassen (thrifts). German diversification to Austria and central and east Europe provided only temporary respite. As the EU enlarged and digested the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in May 2004 - German franchises there came under the uncompromising remit of the Commission once more.

In general, Germans fared worse than Austrians in their extraterritorial banking ventures. Less cosmopolitan, with less exposure to the parts of the former Habsburg Empire, and struggling with a stagnant domestic economy - German banks found it difficult to turn central European banks around as successfully as the likes of the Austrian Erste Bank did. They did make inroads into niche structured financing markets in north Europe and the USA - but these seem to be random excursions rather a studied shift of business emphasis.

On the bright side, Moody's - though it maintained a negative outlook on German banking until recently - noted, as early as November 2001, that the banks' "intrinsic financial strength and diversified operating base". Tax reform and the hesitant introduction of private pensions are also cause for restrained optimism.

Pursuant to the purchase of Drsedner Bank by Allianz, Moody's welcomed the emergence of bancassurance and Allfinanz models - financial services one stop shops. German banks are also positioned to reap the benefits of their considerable investments in e-commerce, technology, and the restructuring of their branch networks.

The Depression on 1929-1936 may have started with the meltdown of capital markets, especially that of Wall Street - but it was exacerbated by the collapse of the concatenated international banking system. The world today is even more integrated. The collapse of one or more major German banks can result in dire consequences and not only in the euro zone. The IMF says as much in its "World Economic Outlook" published on September 25, 2002.

The Germans deny this prognosis - and the diagnosis - vehemently. Bundesbank President Ernst Welteke - a board member of the European Central Bank - spent the better part of October 2002 implausibly denying any crisis in German banking. These are mere "structural problems in the weak phase", he told a press conference. Nothing consolidation can't solve.

It is this consistent refusal to confront reality that is the most worrisome. In the short to medium term, German banks are likely to outlive the storm. In the process, they will lose their iron grip on the domestic market as customer loyalty dissipates and foreign competition increases. If they do not confront their plight with honesty and open-mindedness, they may well be reduced to glorified back-office extensions of the global giants.

Bankruptcy and Liquidation

Close to 1.6 million Americans filed for personal bankruptcy (mostly under chapter 7) in 2004 - nine times as many (per capita) as did the denizens of the United Kingdom (with 35,898 insolvencies). The figure in the USA 25 years ago was 300,000. Bankruptcy has no doubt become a growth industry. This surge was prompted by both promiscuous legislation (in 1978) and concurrent pro-debtor (anti-usury) decisions in the Supreme Court.

Under chapter 7, for instance, cars and homes are exempt assets, untouchable by indignant creditors. Even under chapter 13, debt repayments are rescheduled and spread over 5 years to cover only a fraction of the original credit.

A new reform bill, passed in both the Senate and the House of Representatives in April 2005 seeks to reverse the trend by making going financial belly up a bit less easy. The Economist noted that:

"While consumers do carry more debt than they used to, the amount of income devoted to servicing that debt has not gone up that much, thanks to falling interest rates and longer maturities. Other factors must be at work; plausible candidates include greater income volatility, legalised gambling, bigger medical bills, increased advertising by lawyers offering to help people in debt, and a cultural shift that has destigmatised bankruptcy."

Personal bankruptcies are rare outside the United States. Besides being stigmatized, such debtors surrender most of their income and virtually all their assets to their creditors. If the money they borrowed was spent frivolously or recklessly - or if they have a tainted credit history - borrowers are unlikely to be granted bankruptcy protection to start with.

Still, personal bankruptcies are dwarfed by corporate ones. In the plutocracy that the United States is fast becoming, corporations and their directors remain largely shielded from the consequences of the profligacy and malfeasance of their management.

The new bill merely curtails bonus schemes to executives and key personnel in firms under reorganization and introduces bankruptcy trustees where the management is suspected of fraud. Compare this to Britain where managers are responsible for corporate debts they knowingly incurred while the firm was insolvent.

Moreover, debts owed by individuals to firms take precedence over all other forms of personal financial obligations. In other words, as The Economist notes: "The new treatment of secured car loans could put child-support and alimony payments behind GM’s finance arm in the queue."

It all starts by defaulting on an obligation. Money owed to creditors or to suppliers is not paid on time, interest payments due on bank loans or on corporate bonds issued to the public are withheld. It may be a temporary problem - or a permanent one.

As time goes by, the creditors gear up and litigate in a court of law or in a court of arbitration. This leads to a "technical or equity insolvency" status.

But this is not the only way a company can be rendered insolvent. It could also run liabilities which outweigh its assets. This is called "bankruptcy insolvency". True, there is a debate raging as to what is the best method to appraise the firm's assets and its liabilities. Should these appraisals be based on market prices - or on book value?

There is no one decisive answer. In most cases, there is strong reliance on the figures in the balance sheet.

If the negotiations with the creditors of the company (as to how to settle the dispute arising from the company's default) fails, the company itself can file (ask the court) for bankruptcy in a "voluntary bankruptcy filing".

Enter the court. It is only one player (albeit, the most important one) in this unfolding, complex drama. The court does not participate directly in the script.

Court officials are appointed. They work hand in hand with the representatives of the creditors (mostly lawyers) and with the management and the owners of the defunct company.

They face a tough decision: should they liquidate the company? In other words, should they terminate its business life by (among other acts) selling its assets?

The proceeds of the sale of the assets are divided (as "bankruptcy dividend") among the creditors. It makes sense to choose this route only if the (money) value yielded by liquidation exceeds the money the company, as a going concern, as a living, functioning, entity, can generate.

The company can, thus, go into "straight bankruptcy". The secured creditors then receive the value of the property which was used to secure their debt (the "collateral", or the "mortgage, lien"). Sometimes, they receive the property itself - if it is not easy to liquidate (sell) it.

Once the assets of the company are sold, the first to be fully paid off are the secured creditors. Only then are the priority creditors paid (wholly or partially).

The priority creditors include administrative debts, unpaid wages (up to a given limit per worker), uninsured pension claims, taxes, rents, etc.

And only if any money is left after all these payments it is proportionally doled out to the unsecured creditors.

The USA had many versions of bankruptcy laws. There was the 1938 Bankruptcy Act, which was followed by amended versions in 1978, 1984, 1994, and, lately, in 2005.

Each state has modified the Federal Law to fit its special, local conditions.

Still, a few things - the spirit of the law and its philosophy - are common to all the versions. Arguably, the most famous procedure is named after the chapter in the law in which it is described, Chapter 11. Following is a brief discussion of chapter 11 intended to demonstrate this spirit and this philosophy.

This chapter allows for a mechanism called "reorganization". It must be approved by two thirds of all classes of creditors and then, again, it could be voluntary (initiated by the company) or involuntary (initiated by one to three of its creditors).

The American legislator set the following goals in the bankruptcy laws:

1. 
   To provide a fair and equitable treatment to the holders of various classes of securities of the firm (shares of different kinds and bonds of different types).
   

2. 
   To eliminate burdensome debt obligations, which obstruct the proper functioning of the firm and hinder its chances to recover and ever repay its debts to its creditors.
   

3. 
   To make sure that the new claims received by the creditors (instead of the old, discredited, ones) equal, at least, what they would have received in liquidation.
   

Examples of such new claims: owners of debentures of the firm can receive, instead, new, long term bonds (known as reorganization bonds, whose interest is payable only from profits).

Owners of subordinated debentures will, probably, become shareholders and shareholders in the insolvent firm usually receive no new claims.

The chapter dealing with reorganization (the famous "Chapter 11") allows for "arrangements" to be made between debtor and creditors: an extension or reduction of the debts.

If the company is traded in a stock exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the USA advises the court as to the best procedure to adopt in case of reorganization.

What chapter 11 teaches us is that:

American Law leans in favor of maintaining the company as an ongoing concern. A whole is larger than the sum of its parts - and a living business is sometimes worth more than the sum of its assets, sold separately.

A more in-depth study of the bankruptcy laws shows that they prescribe three ways to tackle a state of malignant insolvency which threatens the well being and the continued functioning of the firm: