Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

party model in which centralisation was to be the main principle ruing the
country. The country was ruled by the Politburo of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia ” (Popovski 1995: 187). When the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia collapsed at the end of the Cold War, regional leaders
had played the ethnic card and mobilised against central control by the
communist party.

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Federal theory in the analysis of the Ethiopian federal system
What relevance does the discussion on the theoretical approaches above have
for the analysis of the Ethiopian federal system? How can the theoretical
approaches be used to guide the exploration of federalism and federation in
Ethiopia? First of all, the discussion has provided a clarification of the central
concepts of federalism and federation. A federation, which is a specific
institutional arrangement, is based on a normative foundation, federalism. But
as Riker and Burgess have demonstrated, the political use of federalism is not
necessarily guided by ideological considerations, but rather by pragmatic
decisions to expand territory or maintain unity. Following Riker’s arguments, I
should examine the circumstances under which the federal bargain was offered.
Why did the ruling coalition decide to offer the federal bargain, and why did
those who were offered the bargain decide to accept it? These points underline
the need to go beyond political rhetoric and manifests to understand why
federalism is introduced in a state. When Ethiopian federalism is analysed, I
need to include not only the country’s political leadership’s justification for the
introduction of federalism, but also the historical and political settings and the
opposition forces’ views on it. In this way, the underlying power relations that
are essential in the determination of Ethiopia’s state reconstruction could be
revealed.
The elaboration on what a federation is, the institutional arrangement of a
federal state, is helpful in my analysis of the Ethiopian federal system de jure.
My first research question is, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, to
determine how the Ethiopian federal model corresponds or conflicts with the
central principles of federalism and the dominant practices of federal systems.
Following King’s minimalist definition of federations, I shall be able to
determine whether the Ethiopian state should be defined as a federal state or
not. Furthermore, the discussion on the institutional features of federations will
be a guide for exploring the formal institutional framework of the Ethiopian
system. How is regional representation in the central government arranged?
How have the Ethiopians decided to solve the dilemma of equality of
representation for citizens versus regions in the second chamber? What are the
rules for altering the constitutionally guaranteed rules of representation?
The points made by Livingston, Tarlton and Riker demonstrate that the
understanding of federal systems is incomplete with a focus exclusively on legal
and institutional features. Intervening social, economic and political variables
are essential in determining the functioning of a federation. These theoretical
considerations will be important in my attempts to answer the second of my
research questions: What are the de facto relations between the federal and
regional levels of government in Ethiopia and what determines the nature of
these relations? Tarlton, through his theory on symmerty and asymmetry,
points out that the degree of commitment to the federation and autonomy from
the centre varies greatly among the constituent units in a federal system. His
theory will be the basis for my exploration of the various federal units in
Ethiopia, their economic, social and political situation and how this affects
their relationship to the federal centre and the federation as a whole. The fiscal

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relations between regional and federal level will be specifically addressed. What
solution does the Ethiopian government seek in order to strike a balance
between equalising horizontal imbalances and enhancing regional autonomy
when fiscal relations are determined?
Riker claims that the organisational structures of political parties are the
single most important factor in determining the character of federal systems.
Decentralised party systems will create decentralised federations, and
centralised party systems will make federations centralised. Riker’s theory is
hard to test through empirical studies because he does not provide any methods
or variables for measuring the degree of centralisation and decentralisation of