Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

Conclusion: a two track federalisation process?
This chapter has shown that the Ethiopian federation is composed of regional
states with very different ethnic composition, socio-economic development and
political situation. Accordingly, the various federal units have very different
relations to the central government, both fiscally and politically. One of the
assumptions in Tarlton’s theory of symmetry and asymmetry in federal states
(1965) is that the more a federation is asymmetrical, the more would the
central government interfere in the federal units to keep the federation together.
The federalisation process in Ethiopia partly complies with this assumption.
The descriptions of the regional states above have shown that degree of central
party and federal state interference in regional affairs varies greatly among the
federal units. It seems like the more physically, economically and politically
peripheral the federal units are, the stronger is the central interference. A clear
two-track pattern appears, where the four lowland regions are administrative
rather than federal units because of the strong central intervention, while the
four EPRDF regions in the highlands at least formally have fulfilled the
conditions to be classified as federal units, and apparently have functioning
regional governments.
By all means, the four lowland regions, Benishangul-Gumuz , Gambella,
Afar and Somali, have the weakest regional government and the lowest level of
socio-economic development. They are the largest beneficiaries of the federal
grants and subsidies, and their own revenue sources cannot sustain the region
at all. The political parties in power in these regions are not members of the
ruling coalition, but are nevertheless controlled by it. The way federal
government, through Regional Affairs Department, intervenes in the regions,
leads to a situation where the four lowland regions’ chances of self-
administration are severely restricted.
The four EPRDF-member states in the highlands, Tigray, Amhara, SNNPRS
and Oromyia, are all federal units with a higher, generally more sustainable
socio-economic development than the lowland regions. On average, they
manage to finance 20-30 per cent of their own expenditures, and have a
reasonably good increase in own revenue collection capacity. Although these
regions too rely heavily on financial assistance from the centre, they are
improving their self-administrative capacities. Unlike the lowland regions, they
manage to sustain themselves with manpower and administrative personnel,
and do not rely on direct guidance from the Regional Affairs Department.
Thus, the regional governments of these states are formally autonomous and

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appear to be full-blooded federal units. Nonetheless, the informal and
uninstitutionalised intervention of the central EPRDF/TPLF cadres in regional
affairs restricts the regional governments’ opportunities to act independently of
central level.
Addis Ababa, Harari and Diredawa have all a special status in the Ethiopian
federation, and should be considered as anomalies not fitting into the pattern of
the other federal units. The common denominators for these units are that they
have a small territory, are multiethnic and urban, and have a relatively high
level of socio-economic development. Addis Ababa and Diredawa are
administrative regions and do not have the same right to national self-
determination as the other units. Harari distinguishes itself from the other non-
EPRDF units, the lowlands regions, by being relatively free from direct
interference from Regional Affairs Department.
The analysis of the structures in the ruling party has demonstrated that
EPRDF’s network of partner organisations and affiliates controls the
governments in all the regional states in the Ethiopian federation. The EPRDF
is essentially a centralised party, where party officials at all levels are
accountable to the hierarchy above. Additionally, borders between the party
and the state bureaucracy are blurred, and this enables the party to utilise the
state administration for its own purposes. The upward accountability and
centralisation of party structures are essentially contradictory to the federal
division of power. Although the regional states in Ethiopia are both financially
and socio-economically weak, it is first of all the centralised party structures
which undermine the federal units ability to act independently from the centre.
The studies of Tigray and SNNPRS contribute to a more nuanced
description of the two-track federalisation process in Ethiopia and have further
underlined the importance of party interests in the process. Despite the fact that
both Tigray and SNNPRS are run by EPRDF member parties and are
considered to have relatively sustainable socio-economic and financial
development, there is a large difference in the status of the two regional states.
The extreme ethnic heterogeneity of SNNPRS is of course a variable that makes
this region different from Tigray and the other regions. But my analysis of the
southern region has demonstrated that the weak EPRDF party in the region has
made the regional government subordinated to the central party apparatus,
and its running daily regional affairs has been dominated by centrally assigned