Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

“Offering the federal bargain”
During the transitional conference in July 1991, “the federal bargain” (Riker
1965) was offered for the first time. A model akin to a federation
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was offered
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The model offered at the transitional conference was not strictly federal, in a sense that the
regional autonomy and representation at the central level had no constitutional guarantees.

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as a solution to the problems of state reconstruction in Ethiopia. The right to
self-determination for the nationalities was the cornerstone of the transitional
charter. Every “nation, nationality and people” obtained the right to promote
its own culture, history and language and administer its own affairs in addition
to participating in the central government. The right to independence was also
affirmed, if nations, nationalities and peoples were convinced that the above
rights were denied they had the chance to seek secession (Transitional Period
Charter of Ethiopia, Negarit Gazeta No.1 1991, Article 2). By including both
decentralisation and the right to secession, the TPLF showed commitment to a
unified Ethiopia at the same time as they left the possibility of exit open. When
the Ethiopian constitution was ratified at the end of 1994, it was the second
time “the federal bargain” was on the legal agenda in Ethiopia. The principles
declared in the transitional charter were confirmed in a final organic law.
Decentralist federalism – a functionalist argument
The new government, in the words of the transitional president Meles Zenawi,
justified the adoption of the principles of the transitional charter in this way:
From a purely legal point of view, what we were trying to do was to stop
the war, and start the process of peaceful competition, peaceful expression
of political opinion, and so forth. The key cause of the war all over the
country was the issue of nationalities. Any solution that did not address
them did not address the issue of peace and war. […] People were fighting
for the right to use their language, to use their culture, to administer
themselves. So without guaranteeing these rights it was not possible to
stop the war, or prevent another one coming up.
The other dimension is that of democratisation of society. When you open
up, how are people going to express themselves? People were already
expressing themselves even at the early stage before the conference in
terms of nationalities. There were so many nationality-based
organisations. That is representation of a certain sentiment.” (Meles
Zenawi, quoted in Vaughan 1994: 56)
According to this statement, the EPRDF argues for the introduction of a federal
system as a way of maintaining unity and averting the disintegration of the
country. Federalism is not seen as an end in itself, but serves the function of
creating a viable Ethiopian state and facilitating the development of democracy.
The argument is that if the different nationalities did not obtain any kind of
autonomy, Ethiopia would soon erupt into war again. This is a kind of
decentralist or balanced federalism (King 1982:22) which is based on the
assumptions that people express their political aspirations along ethnic lines,
and that the abolition of a strong central government and the empowerment of
lower ethnically defined units will ensure stability. The fact that a large part of
the movements that fought against the previous regime were ethnically based
Constitutionally guaranteed representation is the criterion for a system to be called federal,
according to King’s definition of a federation (King 1982: 77)

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and that so many different nationality-based organisations participated in the
transitional conference in July 1991 might seem to support Meles Zenawi’s
assumption that people express their political aspirations along ethnic lines. But
as Vaughan (1994:57) has pointed out, the non-ethnic movements that had
fought against the Derg were largely excluded from the conference and the
organisations that actually participated were actively encouraged to organise
on a nationality basis. Many of the nationality-based organisations did not
have any popular base or prehistory before the conference was initiated.
A federal pact?
A crucial aspect of decentralist and balanced federalist ideologies is that the
federal bargain should be based on a covenant or a pact, where the various
political forces in the country voluntarily agree to make arrangements for
power sharing and devolution of power (Elazar 1987). In the Ethiopian
context, does the transitional charter and the arrangements made during the
transitional conference reflect such a pact? As studies of the conference have
shown, there were minimal discussions on the issues around the principle of
national self-determination and devolution of power along ethnic lines
(Vaughan 1994:51, Young 1997:194). It is known that the OLF and the
EPRDF had talks before the conference started, sorting out the major principles
of the charter together (Leencho Lata 1999: xviii). The two organisations had
a common interest in securing the principle of national self-determination in a
“pre-conference consensus” (Vaughan 1994:35), and the EPRDF needed a
strategic ally in defending the charter against other organisations. The fact that
Eritrea got its de facto independence from Ethiopia after the London talks in
May 1991 was also seen as a way of cementing the principle of national self-
determination before it was discussed at the conference in July. The outcome of
the transitional conference, the transitional charter, is therefore more a result of
an agenda predetermined by the EPRDF and partly by the OLF, rather than a
pact between all the organisations that participated in the conference.
In 1993, the TGE established a Constitutional Commission to prepare a
draft for submission to a specially elected Constitutional Assembly. President
Meles Zenawi urged the broadest possible participation in this project “in
order to promote civic education, experience democracy and exercise self-
determination”. Despite various attempts from the government to invite public
discussion, there was little meaningful public participatory debate, particularly
on the issues of ethnic self-determination (Paul 2000:286). The Constitutional
Commission invited international experts to comment on the different aspects
of the constitutional draft, and this resulted in an international symposium held
in Addis Ababa in May 1993. Later, the TGE published a booklet called
“Discussions on Basic Constitutional Concepts” as a part of a nation wide civic
education programme (TGE: Constitutional Commission 1993). Critics of this
booklet claimed that it did not present general ideas on constitutionalism and
democracy, but was rather an expression of “the ERPDF’s ethnic ethic” and a
“strong civic lesson in the primacy of the ethnic groups in the proposed
constitution” (Vestal 1996:23). As a part of the civic education programme,
there were open meetings in the kebele, the urban dwellers’ associations and the

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rural peasants’ associations, which are the lowest units in the Ethiopian
administrative system. The exact number of people participating in these
meetings is controversial, some claiming that only five per cent of the
population took part (Abbink 1995:155), while others argue that “no more
than 30 percent of the citizenry participated throughout the nation” (Vestal
1996:24). But the results of the discussions did not have any substantial impact
on the final draft of the constitution. The EPRDF’s attempts to consult the
people in the drafting process might have been a way of making the
constitutional process look more participatory and the Commission more
accountable, but in the end, they were not very successful in reaching this aim.
Opposition parties withdrew from the process and the elections to the
Constitutional Assembly. Thus, the EPRDF controlled the Constitutional
Commission, the elections and the final ratification in the assembly.
It is apparent that the process behind the new constitution was even less
inclusive and participatory than the process behind the transitional charter.
Although the transitional conference was marked by a “one-party dynamic”
(Vaughan 1994:60), at least several political parties, organisations and
individuals participated, and the fiercest competitor of the EPRDF, the OLF,
was an important part in the process. In the constitutional process, the EPRDF
totally dominated the scene. It is therefore impossible to conclude that the final
confirmation of the federal solution through the constitution was based on a
pact or covenant between contending political forces. The lack of broader