Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

party, and the various ethno-regional parts had marginal de facto
independence from the centre. Does this argument imply that also the Ethiopian
federation is a sham?
As wee saw in chapter 4 of this analysis, the Ethiopian federation was
introduced in an undemocratic manner. There was no genuine bargaining
between different political forces, and the federal constitution was practically
imposed from above by the ruling party. The study of the functioning of the
federal system revealed that the ruling party uses force and intimidation to
control regional affairs. Due to these circumstances, it is possible to argue that

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the Ethiopian federation can be seen as a result of and is maintained by
coercion from above. Accordingly, if we follow the argument above, the
Ethiopian polity should not be defined as genuinely federal.
A question that remains to be answered is whether the Ethiopian
government is subject to the law or not. Does the central government ignore the
constitutional provisions that regulate its activities or does it respect the
principle of constitutionalism? The formal framework for the Ethiopian
federation ensures that the government cannot act without taking the law into
consideration. The regional representation at federal level cannot be changed
without violating the constitution. My studies have not been able to observe
any formal violations of these provisions. The ruling EPRDF has so far
refrained from changing the constitution unilaterally to adapt it to its own
needs. But as we have seen in the studies of the more informal and
uninstitutionalised practices, the ruling party’s actions have practically
undermined the true representation of the regional units in the central decision
making process. A final judgement on the Ethiopian government’s commitment
to constitutionalism, however, should be made after observing the process of
constitutional amendment and the EPRDF’s respect for the constitutional
provisions in the longer run.
Smith (1995) argues that federal projects might take a variety of forms
which simply cannot be confined to late modern democracies. He stresses that
federal states with undemocratic practices may develop into more democratic
forms as the time goes by. Thus, it could be counterproductive to disqualify
states as federal just because they do not fulfil the criteria of democratic
governance from the start. His points are also valid in the Ethiopian context.
The Ethiopian federal system will continuously change, all according to the
political circumstances in the country. The undemocratic character of EPRDF is
not necessarily a permanent phenomenon. Both internal and external political
events might change its relations to the opposition forces and to the allies in the
regional governments, which finally might alter the federal-regional relations.
Due to this, the federalisation of Ethiopia should be seen as a process in
constant change, and not as a fixed system. Whether this process would lead to
further centralisation or more genuine regional autonomy remains to be seen.