Explanation of advantages— Science Diplomacy

US icebreakers are necessary for exploiting polar zones and research

Mervis 6

(Jeffery reports on science policy in the United States and around the world in an effort to explain to scientists how government works, “U.S. Needs New Icebreakers, Report Tells Congress” in Science, New Series, Vol. 314, No. 5796 (Oct. 6, 2006), p. 33//sd)

Despite the United States's growing economic, military, and scientific interests in the polar regions, for the past 2 years the National Science Foundation (NSF) has relied on a rented Russian icebreaker to make sure that the U.S. research stations in Antarctica don't run out of fuel. The need to have a former Cold War archrival protect U.S. strategic interests is more than simple irony, however. A new report by the National Academies says that it's unacceptable and that the federal government should build and deploy two new icebreakers in the next decade to make sure that the United States has full and timely access to the region. But finding the political will-and the money to get the job done is another matter. The report, from a panel of the Polar Research Board that was chaired by com puter engineer Anita Jones of the Univer sity of Virginia in Charlottesville, scolds the government for allowing the current four-ship U.S. icebreaking fleet to deteriorate and rec ommends that the Bush Administration review its recent decision to shift management and fiscal responsibilities for icebreaking from the Coast Guard, where they have historically resided, to NSF, which coordinates U.S. polar research and runs the Antarctic program (Science, 16 December 2005, p. 1753). Jones says the $1.4 billion cost of two new ships is a small price to pay to ensure U.S. access to both polar regions, noting for exam ple that accelerated melting of sea ice has focused new global interest on the Arctic. "I'm concerned about the diminishing capacity of our current fleet," says Repre sentative Don Young (R-AK), chair of the House Transportation Committee, whose Coast Guard and maritime subcommittee held a hearing last week on the academies' report. The Alaskan legislator, who had requested the report, noted that global warming presents an unprecedented opportunity for the United States to develop shipping lanes and natural resources in the Arctic, and that he's been frustrated by the inaction of the Bush Administration in ren ovating the icebreaking fleet: "Maybe this report will help." One major issue for the panel is the coun try's ability to maintain open water each winter for oil tankers to resupply McMurdo Station, the largest of the three U.S. stations on the Antarctic continent and the staging area for activity at the South Pole. The main stays of the U.S. fleet are the Polar Sea and Polar Star, the world's most powerful non nuclear icebreakers. Both are now at the end of their expected 30-year life spans. Their increasing fragility, combined with unusu ally thick pack ice in the Antarctic, forced NSF to rent the Russian icebreaker Krasin for several weeks during the past two win ters. (The Coast Guard also operates the With a little help ... Russian icebreaker Krasin clears path to NSF base. Healy, a 7-year-old research icebreaker used mainly for Arctic missions, and NSF leases the Nathaniel B. Palmer, which has limited icebreaking capabilities, for Antarctic research cruises.) NSF has lined up a Swedish icebreaker for this winter's Antarctic chores. "Congress likes to wait until there's a crisis, and unfortunately, that's what it has come to," says Representative Frank LoBiondo (R-NJ), chair of the maritime subcommittee. Mead Treadwell, chair of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission and a witness at the hearing, hopes the report will help the scientific community pressure the Bush Administration to address the issue. "The first step would be $30 million in the [president's 2008 budget request] for a design study," says Treadwell. "If it's not there, then we'll have to start screaming."

Arctic mapping is a prerequisite to Outer Continental Shelf development—more icebreakers are key to the effort

Cohen et al 8

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. Visiting Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation Lajos F. Szaszdi, Ph.D, World Politics Military Legislative Assistant at United States Senate Jim Dolbow Lieutenant at U.S. Coast Guard Reserve “The New Cold War: Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic” pg online at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/10/the-new-cold-war-reviving-the-us-presence-in-the-arctic//sd)

The U.S. relies on its sovereign power and diplomacy when pursuing territorial claims in the Arctic. The United States is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) and therefore is not bound by any procedures and determinations concluded through LOST instruments. Instead, the U.S. is pursuing its claims "as an independent, sovereign nation," relying in part on Harry S. Truman's Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, which declares that any hydrocarbon or other resources discovered beneath the U.S. continental shelf are the property of the United States.[25] The U.S. can defend its rights and claims through bilateral negotiations and in the multilateral venues such as through the Arctic Ocean Conference in May 2008, which met in Ilulissat, Greenland. Many have argued, including the Bush Administration, that the U.S. will not have leverage or a "seat at the table" to pursue or defend its Arctic claims on condition that the U.S. is not a party to LOST. However, U.S. attendance at the conference in Ilulissat significantly weakened this argument. Even though the U.S. is not a LOST party, other Arctic nations "are unable to assert credible claims on U.S. territory in the Arctic or anywhere else in the world" because President Truman already secured U.S. rights to Arctic resources with his proclamation.[26] Yet to protect its rights, the U.S. needs to know how far its claims stretch into the Arctic Ocean. The U.S. has been mapping the bottom of the Arctic Ocean and the Outer Continental Shelf since 2003.[27] Mapping is essential to determining the extent of the U.S. OCS and determining whether the U.S. has any legitimate claims to territory beyond its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. Despite ongoing U.S. efforts to chart the bottom of the Arctic Ocean, mapping efforts have been inadequate. According to a National Research Council report in 2007, the U.S. continental shelf and the Northwest Passage have not yet been entirely mapped.[28] Mapping is also important for disputing any conflicting claims by other Arctic nations. For example, the U.S. and Canada have likely claimed some of the same parts of the continental shelf.[29] Mapping data will also help to determine whether Russian claims conflict with U.S. and Canadian claims. The expedition undertaken by the icebreaker USCGC Healy in the Chukchi Sea focused on surveying an area 400 to 600 miles north of Alaska and cost about $1.2 million—a pittance compared to the billions of dollars of Arctic natural resources that are at stake. The survey indicated that the foot or lowest part of the Alaskan continental shelf stretches more than 100 miles beyond what was previously thought, thus expanding the U.S. claim.[30] The U.S. requires a modern flotilla of icebreakers to conduct mapping and to sustain U.S. claims. The U.S. currently has only three icebreakers that belong to the Coast Guard, of which only the Healy (commissioned in 2000) is relatively new. The other two icebreakers, while heavier than the Healy and thus capable of breaking through thicker ice, are at the end of their designed service life after operating for about 30 years. Yet even if the U.S. begins now, it will be eight to 10 years before a new icebreaker can enter service, and no money has been allocated to build a new-generation heavy icebreaker

Nuclear icebreaker tech establishes Arctic territory and unlocks hydrocarbon potential

Ebinger and Zambetakis 9

(Charles K. Ebinger is the director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, which is housed within the institution’s Foreign Policy program. Previously, Ebinger served as a senior advisor at the International Resources Group where he advised over 50 governments on various aspects of their energy policies, specializing in institutional and economic restructuring of their utility sectors. Ebinger has special expertise in South Asia, the Middle East and Africa, but has also worked in the Far East, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Latin America. Evie Zambetakis is co-Director of the Counselors Program and Director of the Energy and Environment Discussion Group for YPFP. She works on energy security geopolitics at The Brookings Institution. She holds a M.A. in International Security with a focus on energy security from the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, and a B.A. in Political Science with a focus on international relations from Rice University, where she conducted research on energy issues for the Energy Department at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. “The geopolitics of Arctic melt” pg online at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/11/arctic%20melt%20ebinger%20zambetakis/11_arctic_melt_ebinger_zambetakis//sd)

The potential hydrocarbon bonanza of the Arctic holds much potential economic benefit for indigenous communities and the Arctic states they call home. Although detailed information on Arctic petroleum resources remains limited, according to the USGS report it appears that the ratio of natural gas to oil in the region's hydrocarbon resources is approximately three to one. While the Arctic may have tremendous potential in the long run its contribution to energy resources in the short term should not be overestimated, as other areas are cheaper, less contentious and less technologically challenging to exploit. The technology required to recover Arctic resources year-round is not readily available, and will not become so in the short term. Transport difficulties add to the problems to be overcome. Natural gas requires pipelines or expensive and complex liquefaction infrastructure. The former is the less likely option, because pipelines would have to cover very large distances. With technological breakthroughs in the development of shale oil resources in the lower 48 states over the last several years, meanwhile, US natural gas reserves have nearly quadrupled. Technology is a key barrier to Arctic access in other ways. Icebreakers, many nuclear powered, are necessary for presence and power projection in the region year-round. The various Arctic nations have widely divergent capabilities. For example, Russia has 20 icebreakers; Canada has 12, and is working on budgeting for S more; the US has, to all intents and purposes, just one functional icebreaker. These ships take eight to ten years to build, and cost approximately 1 billion each. The global economic crisis has, however, put a strain on budgets, and icebreaker fleets are unlikely to expand rapidly in the short term. Nonetheless, even if the US started building tomorrow it would long remain far behind other Arctic states such as Russia and Canada, taking decades and at least $20 billion to catch up. In the light of forecast increases in shipping traffic in Arctic waters, the Arctic Council conducted an Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment in 2009,4 calling for mandatory regulations on ship construction standards, which are currently voluntary and vary greatly among countries. The International Maritime Organization (1MO) is discussing whether to adopt the recommendations of the assessment. A final decision may be made soon. Much of the geology supporting the presence of hydrocarbons in the Arctic is already located within the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the Arctic littoral states.1* Therefore, an extension of a state's continental shelf beyond its EEZ may not necessarily yield that much more oil and gas. The perception of strategic finds, however, can be enough to motivate territorial claims, and fuels the use of hyperbole like 'scramble for the Arctic' with reference to what is otherwise an orderly process following international laws and norms. In addition to hydrocarbon resources, new shipping routes opened up as the Arctic ice vanishes will reduce substantially the maritime distances between Europe and Asia, while also providing strategic alternatives to other countries such as Japan, which would have an interest in Arctic access owing to its current dependence on shipping through the Strait of Malacca for most of its energy supplies. Use of the North-West Passage over North America could shorten shipping routes between Asia and the US east coast by 5,000 miles. However, even though Canada is a strong ally of the US, there are disputes between the two countries over the waters of the Canadian archipelago, which Canada claims are internal waters not subject to the conventions of 'innocent passage*,16 while the US regards them as a strait for international navigation, through which ships should be allowed to pass without interference by Canadian authorities. While neither country wishes to see the issue loom larger in their bilateral relations and both prefer at the moment to agree to disagree, under the current position all US Coast Guard vessels are designated as research vessels, which are therefore required to request transit permission from the Canadian government.17 This is not a long-term solution, however. If the waterway does indeed become ever more ice-free in the future, Canada will be forced formally to resolve its dispute with the United States over the status of the North West Passage. The Northern Sea Route over Eurasia is also important since it shortens shipping routes between northern Europe and north-east Asia by 40 per cent compared with the existing routes through the Suez or Panama canals, and takes thousands of miles off maritime routes round Africa or Latin America. While experts have diverse views over which new maritime passage will become more important, there is a fledgling consensus that the Northern Sea Route will open sooner than the North-West Passage—a contention bolstered by the passage of the German ships this year. As well as shorter shipping times, the potential benefits of an ice-free Arctic throughway include the ability to avoid dangerous chokepoints beset by piracy, and lower transportation costs. However, despite optimistic public perceptions often shaped by the mainstream media, the potential risks may actually counter and delay perceived benefits. These routes will not necessarily be more efficient. Ice-capable ships, required for the transit of Arctic waters, are more expensive to build and procure, and burn much more fuel, than those currently used for longdistance transport. Likewise, while Arctic ice melt may be accelerating, year-to-year variations can still occur, meaning that passages open one year may be closed the next. The uncertainty of when and whether passages are open increases the risk of commercial cargoes incurring large demurrage charges if they are late in arriving at final destinations, thereby offsetting some of the cost advantages of shorter routes. Finally, the potential for dangerous weather patterns to emerge in warming waters, combined with difficult-to-navigate broken ice and the lack of adequate maritime traffic management, make Arctic transit a treacherous undertaking even under the best of conditions. Hydrocarbon prices and concerns about energy security are key drivers in accelerating interest in the Arctic, since high energy prices will generate new technological developments that are difficult to justify' with prices even at current levels. New technology, especially that which allows drilling in deep water, also potentially opens vast areas of the Arctic to oil and gas exploration. New technology that can withstand ice flows will be of special benefit to Russia, since most of the waters along the Northern Sea Route are relatively shallow with huge sedimentary basins extending up to 200 or 300 miles offshore. Conducting business in the Arctic requires specialized ice-capable equipment, ranging from drilling and transportation infrastructure to established refuelling depots. To the extent that high energy prices support these costly projects, they will accelerate commercial interest in the region. Domestic and global economic conditions will also affect the progress, scale and feasibility of major Arctic projects and efforts. Canada, for example, has already cut back on its proposed Arctic expenditures.

Methane hydrates are melting now – that leads to massive methane blowouts that guarantee global extinction – extraction solves

Light 12 (Malcolm, PhD from the University of London, “Charting Mankind’s Arctic Methane Emission Exponential Expressway to Total Extinction in the Next 50 Years”, http://arctic-news.blogspot.com/2012/08/charting-mankinds-expressway-to-extinction.html // AK)

Unless immediate and concerted action is taken by governments and oil companies to depressurize the Arctic subsea methane reserves by extracting the methane, liquefying it and selling it as a green house gas energy source, rising sea levels will breach the Thames Barrier by 2029 flooding London. The base of the Washington Monument (D.C.) will be inundated by 2031. Total global deglaciation will finally cause the sea level to rise up the lower 35% of the Washington Monument by 2051 (68.3 m or 224 feet above present sea level). Introduction Recent atmospheric methane observations (May 01, 2012) at Barrow Point Alaska show extreme methane concentrations as high as 2500 ppb (2.5 ppm Methane, Figure 1)(Generated by ESRL/GMD May 01, 2012 from Carana, 2012b). The present atmospheric methane concentration at Point Barrow exceeds all previous measurements in the Arctic and if it represented the mean atmospheric concentration after an extended period of subsea Arctic methane emission (10 to 20 years) at a methane global warming potential (GWP) of 100 (Dessus et al. 2008) it would be equal to a 2.5 degrees C mean global temperature increase and a methane-carbon output of some 6 Gt. This would be equivalent to adding and extra 250 ppm of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere or about 2/3 of the present carbon dioxide content. The rising light Arctic methane migration routes have been interpreted on the Hippo profile in Figure 2a (from Wofsy et al. et al. 2009) using the inflexion points on the temperature and methane concentration profiles similar to the system used to identify deep oceanic current trends using salinity and temperature data (Tharp and Frankel, 1986). The light Arctic methane is rising almost vertically up to the stratosphere between 60o North and the North Pole. This is consistent with the methane rising in the same way as hydrogen with respect to the cold dry polar air because it has almost half the density of air at STP(Engineering Toolbox, 2011) (methane in wet air may be transported horizontally by storm systems). In addition because methane has a global warming potential of close to 100 during the first 15 to 20 years of its life (Dessus et al. 2001) it will preferentially warm up and expand compared to the other atmospheric gases and thus drop even further in density making it much lighter than the air. This methane rises into the upper stratosphere where it is trapped below the hydrogen against which it has an upper diffuse boundary as shown by the fall off in methane concentration between 40 km and 50 km altitude (Figure 2a after Nassar et al. 2005). It is clear from the flattening of the methane concentration trend in the stratosphere between 30 km and 47 km (Nassar et al. 2005) that this probably represents an expanding, world encompassing methane global warming veil (Figure 2a after Nassar et al. 2005). This stratospheric methane is above the ozone layer and it appears entirely stable between 30 km and 40 km where it shows little change (Figure 2a after Nassar et al. 2005). It is therefore very likely that the methane global warming veil will form a giant reservoir for quickly rising low density methane emitted into the dry Arctic atmosphere by progressive destabilization of subsea Arctic methane hydrates (Light, 2011, 2012) combined with smaller amounts of methane formed by methanogenesis (Allen and Allen, 1990; Lopatin 1971). Much of the dry, light methane is able to bypass the ozone layer unimpeded in a tropospheric - stratospheric circulation system to be discussed later. There is a transition zone from about 60o to 65o North where the methane begins to spiral outwards from the Arctic region towards the mid latitudes and upwards towards the stratosphere to reach the base of the ozone layer where it is being mixed into the stratosphere by giant vortices active at different times (Light 2012; NSIDC 2011a). The continuous vertical motion of the methane in the Arctic region as it rises to the stratosphere between 60o to 65o North which has a lateral motion impressed on it at lower latitudes must set up a methane partial pressure - concentration gradient between the Arctic surface atmospheric methane emissions and the stratospheric methane global warming veil. Therefore any marked increase in the surface methane concentration and partial pressure should be marked by similar increases in the upper stratosphere within the methane global warming veil. A further consequence of the light methane rising like hydrogen into the upper stratosphere where it forms a stable zone beneath the hydrogen between 30 km and 50 km height, is that this methane is never recorded in the mean global warming gas measurements made at Mauna Loa. We therefore have a completely separate high reservoir for methane, which at the moment we only have vague information on and it may contain sufficient methane gas to multiply the Mauna Loa readings by a considerable amount. Graphic Display of The Effects of the Methane Warming Veil Figure 2b is a graphic display of the atmosphere from 0 to 55 km altitude versus increasing Arctic atmospheric methane concentration reaching up to 6000 ppb (6 ppmv methane). The troposphere, tropopause, stratosphere, stratopause, mesosphere, and ozone layer are from Heicklen, 1976. The various events related to global warming (droughts, water stress, coral bleaching and death, deglaciation, sea level rise and major global extinction) are from Parry et al. 2007. Figure 2b has been designed to graphically portray the growth of the subsea Arctic atmospheric methane as new observations become available and how this build up strengthens the methane concentration in the stratosphere where it forms a world encompassing methane global warming veil at an altitude of 30 km to 47 km. Figure 2b will be used to progressively chart mankind's Arctic methane emission, exponential expressway to extinction within the next half century. As the light-rising Arctic methane is spread around the world by the Arctic stratospheric vortex system (NSIDC 2011a), it can be expected to lead to more ozone and water vapor in the stratosphere, both of which will add to the greenhouse effect and thus cause temperatures to increase globally. In the Arctic, where there is very little water vapour in the atmosphere, the ozone layer may well be further depleted, because the rising methane behaves like a chloro-fluoro-hydrocarbon (CFC) under the action of sunlight increasing the damaging effects of ultraviolet radiation on the Earth’s surface (Engineering Toolbox, 2011; Anitei, 2007). Large abrupt releases of methane in the Arctic lead to high local concentrations of methane in the atmosphere and hydroxyl depletion, making that methane will persist longer at its highest warming potential, i.e. of over 100 times that of carbon dioxide. (Carana, 2011a). The presence of a large hole in the Arctic ozone layer in 2011 is most likely a result of this same process of ozone depletion caused by a buildup of greenhouse gases from the massive upward transfer of methane from the Arctic emission zones through the lower stratosphere up into the stratospheric veil between 30 km and 47 km height (Science Daily, 2011). Anomalous Arctic Atmospheric Methane Concentrations The extremely high content of atmospheric methane measured in May 2012 at Barrow Point Alaska (2500 ppb) represents a very dangerous turn of events in the Arctic and further substantiates the claim that the whole Arctic has now become a latent subsea methane hydrate sourced blowout zone which will require immediate remedial action if there is any faint hope of containing the now fast increasing (exponential) rates of methane eruptions into the atmosphere (Light 2012c - Angels proposal; see end of this text). The exponential increase in the Arctic atmospheric methane content from the destabilization of the subsea methane hydrates is defined by the exponential decrease in the volume of Arctic sea ice caused by the resulting global warming due to the build up of the atmospheric methane (Carana, 2012d). The exponential increase in the Arctic atmospheric methane is also implied by an exponential decrease in the continent wide reflectivity (albedo) of the Greenland ice cap caused by increasing rates of surface melting (Figure 3; NASA Mod 10A1 data, from Carana, 2012c). Albedo data for Greenland shows that it will become free of a continuous snow cover by about 2014, so that the underlying old ice cover which has low reflectivity will be totally exposed to the sun in the summer (Carana, 2012c). This darker material will become a major heat absorber after 2014 starting the fast melt down of the Greenland ice cap and this process will probably affect the older ice in the floating Arctic sea ice fields. The Arctic ocean will also become free of sea ice by 2015 exposing the low reflectivity ocean water directly to the sun, causing a high rate of temperature rise in Arctic waters and the consequent destabilization of shelf and slope methane hydrates releasing large volumes of methane into the atmosphere (Carana, 2012d; AIRS data Yurganov, 2012). As a consequence, the enhanced global warming will melt the global ice sheets at a fast increasing rate causing the sea level to begin rising at 15.182 cm/yr in the first few years after 2015 giving an accurate way of gauging the worldwide continental ice loss (Figure 3). This sudden increase in the rate of sea level rise will mark the last moment mankind will have to take control of the Arctic wide blowout of methane into the atmosphere and a massive effort must be made by governments and oil companies to stem the flow of the erupting subsea methane in the Arctic before this time. The loss of complete snow cover in Greenland precedes the loss of the sea ice cap in the Arctic by a year which may be due to the more extreme weather conditions that usually prevail over continents than over the sea which moderates the weather. Methane and Ozone Circulation The components of the atmosphere undergo diffusion by a number of processes. The mean speed of horizontal displacement of the stratosphere around the Earth is known to be about 120 km/hr from the Krakatoa eruption in 1883 (Heicklen, 1976). Winds also transfer material northward and southward in the stratosphere in quite a different pattern to that of the tropospheric wind flows (Heicklen, 1976). Mean wind velocities within the global methane warming veil and above it (36 km to 91 km altitude) are some 48 m/sec during the day and 56 m/sec at night (Olivier 1942, 1948). Large latitudinal variations in the atmospheric density at 100 km altitude require meridional flows of 10 to 50 m/sec (Heicklen, 1976). At subarctic latitudes at the height of the global methane warming veil (30 km to 50 km altitude) the ozone concentration lies between 1.7 to 1.9*10^12 molecules/cc to 5.4*10^10 molecules/cc and does not vary during the day (Heicklen, 1976). The sub-arctic ozone reaches a maximum in the lower stratosphere in winter at an altitude of 17 km to 19 km (7.7*10^12 molecules/cc) and in summer at an altitude of 18 km to 19 km (5.1*10^12 molecules/cc)(Heicklen, 1976). The seasonal variation of ozone in the stratosphere in Arctic latitudes is caused by a circulation transfer system which moves ozone from the upper stratosphere in equatorial and mid-latitudes to the Arctic lower stratosphere during the winter (Heicklen, 1976). The stored Arctic lower stratospheric ozone is lost in the summer by chemical dissociation when it moves downwards or by photosynthetic destruction if it moves upwards (Heicklen, 1976). The Hippo methane concentration and temperature profiles shown in Figures 2a and 2b extend from the surface to some 14.4 km altitude and from the North Pole southwards across the Equator to a latitude of -40o south (Wofsy et al. 2009). As already described the methane flow trends on Hippo methane concentration and temperature profiles have been interpreted in detail using a similar system to that used by the Meteor expedition in determining deep ocean circulation patterns from salinity and temperature data (Figure 2a - see Tharp and Frankel, 1986). Methane erupted from destabilizing methane hydrates in the subsea Arctic and of methanogenic origin has almost half the density of air at STP in dry Arctic conditions and is seen to be rising vertically to the top of the Troposphere between 70o North and the North Pole on the Hippo methane concentration profiles (Engineering Toolbox, 2011; Wofsy et al. 2009 ). On the Hippo data, at latitudes less than 70o North, the rising methane clouds are being spun out and laterally spread in the middle and upper troposphere and upper stratosphere by stratospheric vortices (NSIDC, 2011a). The methane appears to be entering the lower stratosphere in the low latitudes between 25o North and the equator which it then overlaps and is carried into the Southern Hemisphere to almost -40o South (Figure 2a)(Light 2011c). In the equatorial regions the growth of the methane global warming veil will amplify the effects of El Nino in the Pacific further enhancing its deleterious effects on the climate. As this vertically and laterally migrating methane enters the stratosphere in equatorial and mid-latitude positions it is helping to displace the equatorial and mid-latitude ozone which migrates downwards and northwards towards the north pole (Heicklen, 1976) to complete the cycle. The methane may be partly drawn up into the lower and upper stratosphere by a global pressure differential set up by the poleward and downward motion of the ozone (Heicklen, 1976) Once the methane has entered the stratosphere and has helped to displace some of the ozone, it is able to accumulate in the upper stratosphere beneath the hydrogen as a continuous stable layer between 30 and 47 km forming a world wide global warming veil (Figures 2a and 2b; Light 2011c). In the Arctic region methane has been shown to rise nearly vertically and is locally charging the global warming veil in addition to methane that has diffused from mid latitude and equatorial regions. There must therefore exist a partial pressure gradient between the Arctic surface methane anomalies and the upper stratosphere methane global warming veil such that any increase of the surface methane concentration and partial pressure should lead to a transfer of methane into the upper stratosphere and to a similar increase in the partial pressure and concentration of the methane there. The methane partial pressure gradient that exists between the anomalous Arctic ocean surface methane emissions and the stratospheric methane global warming veil at 30 km to 47 km height is partly controlled by the complex motions and reactions of the Arctic ozone layer which separates the troposphere from the upper stratosphere and shows little variation in the day or between summer and winter (Heicklen, 1976). Consequently the concentration of the methane in the upper stratospheric global warming veil should track the increase of Arctic atmospheric methane to some degree and knowledge of the latter can allow absolute maximum estimates to be made on the magnitude of the former. This will give a rough estimate of what the highest value the methane concentration is likely to reach within the global warming veil within the Arctic area. This is a worst case scenario which has to be assumed in order to prevent Murphy’s law being operative (i.e. if anything can go wrong, it will go wrong in estimating the maximum methane value). An alternative is to view this solution of the methane concentration in the global warming veil as German over-engineering in order to eliminate any possible errors in the estimate of the maximum value. My Father, a Saxon would have commended me on this approach. This is precisely what mainstream world climatologists have failed to do in their modeling of the effects of Arctic methane hydrate emissions on the mean heat balance of the atmosphere and why we are now facing such a severe climatic catastrophe from which we may very likely not escape. Let us hope and pray that the Merlin Lidar methane detection satellite does not find methane magnitudes in the Arctic global warming methane veil (30 km – 47 km altitude) at the levels predicted in this paper, when it is launched in 2014. The maximum global methane veil concentration in the mid latitudes (30o to 60o North) between 30 km and 40 km altitude was estimated by occultation at some 0.97 ppmv methane (970 ppb) between February to April, 2004 (Nassar et al. 2005). In 2004 - 2005 the Arctic atmosphere at Point Barrow, Alaska reached an anomalous maximum of some 2.014 ppmv methane (2014 ppb)(Carana, 2012e). This means that the most extreme methane concentration anomalies in the Arctic (Point Barrow) are leading the maximum concentration in the global warming methane veil by some 1.044 ppmv methane (1044 ppb). Consequently as a first rule of thumb assuming that the vertical methane partial pressure gradient has remained relatively unchanged, we can estimate the maximum methane concentration within the Arctic methane global warming veil between 30 km and 47 km height by subtracting 1.044 ppmv methane (1044 ppb) from measured surface Arctic atmospheric value at the same time. High methane concentrations of 2 ppmv (2000 ppb) were being reached in the Arctic in 2011 (position a. in Figure 2b) similar to those recorded in 2004 – 2005 at Point Barrow Alaska (Carana, 2012e). It is therefore likely that by 2011 that the maximum concentration of methane in the methane global warming veil had remained relatively unchanged since 2004. This is consistent with the start of major methane emissions in the Arctic in August 2010 as recorded at the Svalbard station and in the East Siberian Shelf in 2011 which would not have given the emitted gases sufficient time to reach the upper stratosphere(Light, 2012a, Shakova et al. 2010a, b and c). On May 01, 2012 an atmospheric methane concentration of 2.5 ppmv (2500 ppb) was recorded at Point Barrow indicating an increase in the maximum methane concentration anomaly of 0.5 ppmv methane (500 ppb) in one year (yellow spike on Figure 1; position b. in Figure 2b)(ESRL/GMO graph from Carana 2012b). We can therefore predict conservatively that the maximum concentration of the methane in the Arctic stratospheric methane global warming veil between 30 km and 47 km altitude may be as high as 1.456 ppmv methane (1456 ppb) (= 2500 -1044 ppmv) (position b. in Figure 2b)(ESRL/GMO graph from Carana 2012b). Assuming that the maximum Arctic surface atmospheric methane content continues to increase now at a rate of 0.5 ppmv (500 ppb) each year we can roughly predict that by 2013 it will have reached 3 ppmv (3000 ppb) and by 2014, 3.5 ppmv (3500 ppb) which is when the Merlin Lidar methane detection satellite will be launched (Ehret, 2010). Using the previous method of predicting the maximum likely methane content in the Arctic methane global warming veil between 30 km and 47 km altitude, the maximum for 2013 is 1.956 ppmv methane (1956 ppb)(position c. in Figure 2b) and for 2014 is 2.456 ppmv methane (2456 ppb) (position d. in Figure 2b). This means that by the time the Merlin Lidar satellite is launched the Arctic Ocean will have emited sufficient methane to have surpassed the 2oC anomaly limit. Once the entire atmospheric mean exceeds a 2oC temperature increase it will precipitate fast deglaciation, the start of widespread inundation of worldwide coastlines, extensive droughts and water stress for billions of people (Figure 2b)(after Parry et al. 2007). This high predicted concentration of methane in the Arctic methane global warming veil in 2014 is consistent with the exponentially falling albedo data for the Greenland ice cap which suggests that major melting will begin in 2014 (Carana, 2012c). The exponential reduction in volume of the Arctic sea ice to zero in 2015 (Carana, 2012d) will precipitate a massive increase in the release of Arctic subsea methane from destabilization of the methane hydrates as the dark ice free Arctic ocean absorbs large quantities of heat from the sun (Light, 2012a). MERLIN Lidar Satellite The MERLIN lidar satellite (Methane Remote Sensing Lidar Mission) , which is a joint collaboration between France and Germany will orbit the Earth at 650 km altitude and will be able to detect the methane concentration in the atmosphere from 50 km altitude to the surface of the Earth (Ehret, 2010). The Lidar methane detection instrument was jointly developed by DLR (Deutches Zentrum für Luft –und Raumfahrt), ADLARES GmBH and E. ON Ruhrgas AG (Ehret, 2010). This satellite is scheduled to be launched sometime in 2014 (Ehret, 2010) and will be the first time that real time data will be able to detect the concentration of methane within the world encompassing methane global warming veil between 30 km and 47 km altitude and give us the first detailed picture of the size of the beast we are dealing with. Previous indications of this layer in the mid latitudes was made using occultation (Nassar et al. 2005) The high anomalous atmospheric methane contents recorded this year (May 01) at Barrow Point Alaska (see Figure 2b, Carana 2012b) and the fact that they may be linked via a stable partial pressure gradient with increased maximum methane contents in the world encompassing global warming veil (estimated at ca 1456 ppb methane) makes it imperative that the Merlin lidar satellite be launched as soon as is feasibly possible so we can get a clear idea of how high the Earth’s stratospheric methane concentrations are. The Merlin satellite will continuously give us real time information on the size of the stratospheric methane global warming veil that is gathering its strength in the upper atmosphere. This information shows how extremely serious the Arctic methane emission problem is and how urgently we need to measure the status of the Arctic stratospheric methane global warming veil between 30 km and 47 km height. An early warning of high methane contents in the methane global warming veil will give humanity time to react to the existing and new threats that are developing in the Arctic. Methane detecting Lidar instruments could also be installed immediately on the International Space Station to give us early warning of the methane build up in the stratosphere and act as a back up in case the Merlin satellite fails. Sea Level Rise The progressive rise in sea level from 2015 is shown on Figures 3, 4 and 5. Figures 4 and 5 are simplified versions of Figures 7, 8 and 9 in Light 2012a and Figures 12 and 13 in Light 2012c. The various events related to global warming (droughts, water stress, coral bleaching and death, deglaciation, sea level rise and major global extinction) are from Parry et al. 2007. At the time of total worldwide deglaciation, the sea level is estimated to rise some 68.3 metres (224 feet) (Wales, 2012) The maximum time of inundation of various coastal cities, coastlines and coastal barriers is shown on Table 1 (after Hillen et al. 2010; Hargraves, 2012). Rising sea levels will breach the Thames Barrier by 2029 flooding London. The base of the Washington Monument (D.C.) will be inundated by 2031. Total global deglaciation > will cause the sea level to rise up the lower 35% of the Washington Monument by 2051 (68.3 m or 224 feet above present sea level). Because of the massive increase in the strength of the storm systems and waves, high rise buildings in many of the coastal city centers will suffer irreparable damage and collapse so that the core zones of the cities will be represented by a massive pile of wave pulverised debris. Unfortunately by that time a large portion of sea life will be extinct and the city debris fields will not form a haven for coral reefs. The seas will probably still be occupied by the long lasting giant jellyfish (such as are now fished off Japan), rays and sharks (living respectively since 670, 415 and 380 million years ago) and the sea floor by coeolocanths (living since 400 million years ago)(Calder, 1984). The city rubble zones will probably be occupied by predatory fish (living since 425 million years ago)(Calder 1984). Life will also continue in the vicinity of oceanic black smokers so long as the oceans remain below boiling point. ANGELS Proposal If left alone the subsea Arctic methane hydrates will explosively destabilize on their own due to global warming and produce a massive Arctic wide methane “blowout” that will lead to humanity’s total extinction, probably before the middle of this century (Light 2012 a, b and c). AIRS atmospheric methane concentration data between 2008 and 2012 (Yurganov 2012) show that the Arctic has already entered the early stages of a subsea methane “blowout” so we need to step in as soon as we can (e.g. 2015) to prevent it escalating any further (Light 2012c). The Arctic Natural Gas Extraction, Liquefaction & Sales (ANGELS) Proposal aims to reduce the threat of large, abrupt releases of methane in the Arctic, by extracting methane from Arctic methane hydrates prone to destabilization (Light, 2012c). After the Arctic sea ice has gone (probably around 2015) we propose that a large consortium of oil and gas companies/governments set up drilling platforms near the regions of maximum subsea methane emissions and drill a whole series of shallow directional production drill holes into the subsea subpermafrost “free methane” reservoir in order to depressurize it in a controlled manner (Light 2012c). This methane will be produced to the surface, liquefied, stored and transported on LNG tankers as a “green energy” source to all nations, totally replacing oil and coal as the major energy source (Light 2012c). The subsea methane reserves are so large that they can supply the entire earth’s energy needs for several hundreds of years (Light 2012c). By sufficiently depressurizing the Arctic subsea subpermafrost methane it will be possible to draw down Arctic ocean water through the old eruption sites and fracture systems and destabilize the methane hydrates in a controlled way thus shutting down the entire Arctic subsea methane blowout (Light 2012c).

Arctic resources reduce US energy dependency

Cohen et al 8

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. Visiting Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation Lajos F. Szaszdi, Ph.D, World Politics Military Legislative Assistant at United States Senate Jim Dolbow Lieutenant at U.S. Coast Guard Reserve “The New Cold War: Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic” pg online at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/10/the-new-cold-war-reviving-the-us-presence-in-the-arctic//sd)

To enhance U.S. energy security, America should expand domestic oil production. America remains the only oil-producing nation on earth that has placed a significant amount of its reserves out of reach.[10] Until recently, potentially large U.S. natural gas deposits have been off limits.[11] For instance, ANWR holds potential reserves of about 10 billion barrels of petroleum.[12] Such reserves could lead to an additional 1 million barrels per day in domestic production, which could be transported south through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, which has a spare capacity of 1 million barrels per day. An additional 1 million barrels per day would save the U.S. $123 billion in petroleum imports, create $7.7 billion in new economic activity, and generate 128,000 new jobs.[13] Methane Hydrates. Large methane hydrate deposits are located on the deep seabed of the Arctic Ocean.[14] Methane hydrates are a solid form of natural gas and have 3,000 times the concentration of methane found in the atmosphere.[15] While no technology currently exists to mine methane clusters, the capability appears to be just over the horizon. The U.S. and Japan have agreed to cooperate in researching and developing commercial methane hydrate processing with the goal of selling gas from methane hydrates by 2018.[16] The South Korean Ministry of Energy has also announced that it will work with the U.S. in exploring and developing methane hydrate deposits to develop a commercially viable energy source. Seoul is also hoping to participate in the U.S.-sponsored Alaska North Slope project in 2009 to test the viability of using methane hydrates as an energy source.[17] Global Oil Supply and the Demand "Crunch." Arctic oil and gas resources have become increasingly important given the tight energy market. Escalating demand for energy in 2001–2008, stagnating supply, political instability, growing resource nationalism, terrorism, and ethnic conflict have combined into a perfect storm of a global supply and demand crunch.[18] This crunch has been reflected in high oil prices ($147 per barrel in July). While oil prices have since retreated to less than $70 per barrel due to the financial crisis, global energy markets are expected to remain tight for the long-term as the fundamentals remain largely the same (i.e., rising demand in emerging markets and flattening supply). While these trends bode ill for energy security, the resources in the Arctic offer a glimmer of hope. U.S. Energy Supplies. Developing oil deposits in the Arctic is strategically important because the region is not beset by religious, ethnic, or social strife and resource nationalism that plague oil-producing countries in the Middle East, West Africa, and Latin America. One way to reduce U.S. dependency on foreign oil is to develop Arctic oil fields. Such development would lower prices in the international oil market, even after accounting for the time lag for bringing new oil fields online. Moreover, the rich oil and gas deposits in Alaska's North Slope and in the U.S. offshore Arctic territories could further increase U.S. energy supply by guaranteeing availability of additional domestic energy supplies in the time of a national emergency.[19] Liquefied Natural Gas. U.S. demand for natural gas is growing because generating electric power using natural gas is cleaner and more efficient than with coal or oil. Natural gas production in the U.S. and Canada has not kept pace with the rising demand and is "flattening out" or declining.[20] In 2004, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan saw increased imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a solution, or "price-pressure safety valve," to reduce prices and fill the gap from diminishing North American gas supply.[21] However, LNG imports have so far proven expensive in meeting growing demand. The price of natural gas abroad is nearly double the price in the U.S., so LNG flows to other buyers who are willing to pay higher prices, such as in Japan. As Royal Dutch Shell's executive director of gas and power Linda Cook suggested, U.S. domestic production of natural gas could run 15–20 billion cubic feet per day below domestic demand by 2025.[22] However, augmented LNG production from the Arctic could help to meet future demand and to reduce gas prices in the domestic market, which would benefit industry and consumers.

Oil dependence creates multiple scenarios for war – energy chokepoints hold the US hostage and are potential sites for conflict

Klare 12

(Michael, is a Five Colleges professor of Peace and World Security Studies, whose department is located at Hampshire College, defense correspondent of The Nation magazine, and author of Resource Wars and Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Petroleum Dependency (Metropolitan). Klare also teaches at Amherst College, Smith College, Mount Holyoke College, and the University of Massachusetts Amherst. “Our looming energy wars” pg online at http://www.salon.com/2012/01/10/our_looming_energy_wars///sd)

Welcome to an edgy world where a single incident at an energy “chokepoint” could set a region aflame, provoking bloody encounters, boosting oil prices and putting the global economy at risk. With energy demand on the rise and sources of supply dwindling, we are, in fact, entering a new epoch — the Geo-Energy Era — in which disputes over vital resources will dominate world affairs. In 2012 and beyond, energy and conflict will be bound ever more tightly together, lending increasing importance to the key geographical flashpoints in our resource-constrained world. Take the Strait of Hormuz, already making headlines and shaking energy markets as 2012 begins. Connecting the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, it lacks imposing geographical features like the Rock of Gibraltar or the Golden Gate Bridge. In an energy-conscious world, however, it may possess greater strategic significance than any passageway on the planet. Every day, according to the U.S. Department of Energy, tankers carrying some 17 million barrels of oil — representing 20 percent of the world’s daily supply — pass through this vital artery. So last month, when a senior Iranian official threatened to block the strait in response to Washington’s tough new economic sanctions, oil prices instantly soared. While the U.S. military has vowed to keep the strait open, doubts about the safety of future oil shipments and worries about a potentially unending, nerve-jangling crisis involving Washington, Tehran and Tel Aviv have energy experts predicting high oil prices for months to come, meaning further woes for a slowing global economy. The Strait of Hormuz is, however, only one of several hot spots where energy, politics and geography are likely to mix in dangerous ways in 2012 and beyond. Keep your eye as well on the East and South China Seas, the Caspian Sea basin and an energy-rich Arctic that is losing its sea ice. In all of these places, countries are disputing control over the production and transportation of energy, and arguing about national boundaries and/or rights of passage. In the years to come, the location of energy supplies and of energy supply routes — pipelines, oil ports and tanker routes — will be pivotal landmarks on the global strategic map. Key producing areas, like the Persian Gulf, will remain critically important, but so will oil chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca (between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea) and the “sea lines of communication,” or SLOCs (as naval strategists like to call them) connecting producing areas to overseas markets. More and more, the major powers led by the United States, Russia and China will restructure their militaries to fight in such locales. You can already see this in the elaborate Defense Strategic Guidance document, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership,” unveiled at the Pentagon on January 5th by President Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. While envisioning a smaller Army and Marine Corps, it calls for increased emphasis on air and naval capabilities, especially those geared to the protection or control of international energy and trade networks. Though it tepidly reaffirmed historic American ties to Europe and the Middle East, overwhelming emphasis was placed on bolstering U.S. power in “the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean and South Asia.” In the new Geo-Energy Era, the control of energy and of its transport to market will lie at the heart of recurring global crises. This year, keep your eyes on three energy hot spots in particular: the Strait of Hormuz, the South China Sea and the Caspian Sea basin. The Strait of Hormuz A narrow stretch of water separating Iran from Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the strait is the sole maritime link between the oil-rich Persian Gulf region and the rest of the world. A striking percentage of the oil produced by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE is carried by tanker through this passageway on a daily basis, making it (in the words of the Department of Energy) “the world’s most important oil chokepoint.” Some analysts believe that any sustained blockage in the strait could trigger a 50 percent increase in the price of oil and trigger a full-scale global recession or depression. American leaders have long viewed the Strait as a strategic fixture in their global plans that must be defended at any cost. It was an outlook first voiced by President Jimmy Carter in January 1980, on the heels of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan which had, he told Congress, “brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world’s oil must flow.” The American response, he insisted, must be unequivocal: any attempt by a hostile power to block the waterway would henceforth be viewed as “an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America,” and “repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” Much has changed in the Gulf region since Carter issued his famous decree, known since as the Carter Doctrine, and established the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to guard the Strait — but not Washington’s determination to ensure the unhindered flow of oil there. Indeed, President Obama has made it clear that, even if CENTCOM ground forces were to leave Afghanistan, as they have Iraq, there would be no reduction in the command’s air and naval presence in the greater Gulf area. It is conceivable that the Iranians will put Washington’s capabilities to the test. On December 27th, Iran’s first vice president Mohammad-Reza Rahimi said, “If [the Americans] impose sanctions on Iran’s oil exports, then even one drop of oil cannot flow from the Strait of Hormuz.” Similar statements have since been made by other senior officials (and contradicted as well by yet others). In addition, the Iranians recently conducted elaborate naval exercises in the Arabian Sea near the eastern mouth of the strait, and more such maneuvers are said to be forthcoming. At the same time, the commanding general of Iran’s army suggested that the USS John C. Stennis, an American aircraft carrier just leaving the Gulf, should not return. “The Islamic Republic of Iran,” he added ominously, “will not repeat its warning.” Might the Iranians actually block the strait? Many analysts believe that the statements by Rahimi and his colleagues are bluster and bluff meant to rattle Western leaders, send oil prices higher and win future concessions if negotiations ever recommence over their country’s nuclear program. Economic conditions in Iran are, however, becoming more desperate, and it is always possible that the country’s hard-pressed hardline leaders may feel the urge to take some dramatic action, even if it invites a powerful U.S. counterstrike. Whatever the case, the Strait of Hormuz will remain a focus of international attention in 2012, with global oil prices closely following the rise and fall of tensions there. The South China Sea The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed portion of the western Pacific bounded by China to the north, Vietnam to the west, the Philippines to the east and the island of Borneo (shared by Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia) to the south. The sea also incorporates two largely uninhabited island chains, the Paracels and the Spratlys. Long an important fishing ground, it has also been a major avenue for commercial shipping between East Asia and Europe, the Middle East and Africa. More recently, it acquired significance as a potential source of oil and natural gas, large reserves of which are now believed to lie in subsea areas surrounding the Paracels and Spratlys. With the discovery of oil and gas deposits, the South China Sea has been transformed into a cockpit of international friction. At least some islands in this energy-rich area are claimed by every one of the surrounding countries, including China — which claims them all, and has demonstrated a willingness to use military force to assert dominance in the region. Not surprisingly, this has put it in conflict with the other claimants, including several with close military ties to the United States. As a result, what started out as a regional matter, involving China and various members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has become a prospective tussle between the world’s two leading powers. To press their claims, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines have all sought to work collectively through ASEAN, believing a multilateral approach will give them greater negotiating clout than one-on-one dealings with China. For their part, the Chinese have insisted that all disputes must be resolved bilaterally, a situation in which they can more easily bring their economic and military power to bear. Previously preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has now entered the fray, offering full-throated support to the ASEAN countries in their efforts to negotiate en masse with Beijing. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi promptly warned the United States not to interfere. Any such move “will only make matters worse and the resolution more difficult,” he declared. The result was an instant war of words between Beijing and Washington. During a visit to the Chinese capital in July 2011, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen delivered a barely concealed threat when it came to possible future military action. “The worry, among others that I have,” he commented, “is that the ongoing incidents could spark a miscalculation, and an outbreak that no one anticipated.” To drive the point home, the United States has conducted a series of conspicuous military exercises in the South China Sea, including some joint maneuvers with ships from Vietnam and the Philippines. Not to be outdone, China responded with naval maneuvers of its own. It’s a perfect formula for future “incidents” at sea. The South China Sea has long been on the radar screens of those who follow Asian affairs, but it only attracted global attention when, in November, President Obama traveled to Australia and announced, with remarkable bluntness, a new U.S. strategy aimed at confronting Chinese power in Asia and the Pacific. “As we plan and budget for the future,” he told members of the Australian Parliament in Canberra, “we will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region.” A key feature of this effort would be to ensure “maritime security” in the South China Sea. While in Australia, President Obama also announced the establishment of a new U.S. base at Darwin on that country’s northern coast, as well as expanded military ties with Indonesia and the Philippines. In January, the president similarly placed special emphasis on projecting U.S. power in the region when he went to the Pentagon to discuss changes in the American military posture in the world. Beijing will undoubtedly take its own set of steps, no less belligerent, to protect its growing interests in the South China Sea. Where this will lead remains, of course, unknown. After the Strait of Hormuz, however, the South China Sea may be the global energy chokepoint where small mistakes or provocations could lead to bigger confrontations in 2012 and beyond. The Caspian Sea Basin The Caspian Sea is an inland body of water bordered by Russia, Iran and three former republics of the USSR: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In the immediate area as well are the former Soviet lands of Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. All of these old SSRs are, to one degree or another, attempting to assert their autonomy from Moscow and establish independent ties with the United States, the European Union, Iran, Turkey and, increasingly, China. All are wracked by internal schisms and/or involved in border disputes with their neighbors. The region would be a hotbed of potential conflict even if the Caspian basin did not harbor some of the world’s largest undeveloped reserves of oil and natural gas, which could easily bring it to a boil. This is not the first time that the Caspian has been viewed as a major source of oil, and so potential conflict. In the late nineteenth century, the region around the city of Baku — then part of the Russian empire, now in Azerbaijan — was a prolific source of petroleum and so a major strategic prize. Future Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin first gained notoriety there as a leader of militant oil workers, and Hitler sought to capture it during his ill-fated 1941 invasion of the USSR. After World War II, however, the region lost its importance as an oil producer when Baku’s onshore fields dried up. Now, fresh discoveries are being made in offshore areas of the Caspian itself and in previously undeveloped areas of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. According to energy giant BP, the Caspian area harbors as much as 48 billion barrels of oil (mostly buried in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) and 449 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (with the largest supply in Turkmenistan). This puts the region ahead of North and South America in total gas reserves and Asia in oil reserves. But producing all this energy and delivering it to foreign markets will be a monumental task. The region’s energy infrastructure is woefully inadequate and the Caspian itself provides no maritime outlet to other seas, so all that oil and gas must travel by pipeline or rail. Russia, long the dominant power in the region, is pursuing control over the transportation routes by which Caspian oil and gas will reach markets. It is upgrading Soviet-era pipelines that link the former SSRs to Russia or building new ones and, to achieve a near monopoly over the marketing of all this energy, bringing traditional diplomacy, strong-arm tactics and outright bribery to bear on regional leaders (many of whom once served in the Soviet bureaucracy) to ship their energy via Russia. As recounted in my book ”Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet,” Washington sought to thwart these efforts by sponsoring the construction of alternative pipelines that avoid Russian territory, crossing Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to the Mediterranean (notably the BTC, or Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline), while Beijing is building its own pipelines linking the Caspian area to western China. All of these pipelines cross through areas of ethnic unrest and pass near various contested regions like rebellious Chechnya and breakaway South Ossetia. As a result, both China and the U.S. have wedded their pipeline operations to military assistance for countries along the routes. Fearful of an American presence, military or otherwise, in the former territories of the Soviet Union, Russia has responded with military moves of its own, including its brief August 2008 war with Georgia, which took place along the BTC route. Given the magnitude of the Caspian’s oil and gas reserves, many energy firms are planning new production operations in the region, along with the pipelines needed to bring the oil and gas to market. The European Union, for example, hopes to build a new natural gas pipeline called Nabucco from Azerbaijan through Turkey to Austria. Russia has proposed a competing conduit called South Stream. All of these efforts involve the geopolitical interests of major powers, ensuring that the Caspian region will remain a potential source of international crisis and conflict. In the new Geo-Energy Era, the Strait of Hormuz, the South China Sea and the Caspian Basin hardly stand alone as potential energy flashpoints. The East China Sea, where China and Japan are contending for a contested undersea natural gas field, is another, as are the waters surrounding the Falkland Islands, where both Britain and Argentina hold claims to undersea oil reserves, as will be the globally warming Arctic whose resources are claimed by many countries. One thing is certain: wherever the sparks may fly, there’s oil in the water and danger at hand in 2012.