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(14 July 1934)
603. P. M. H. Bell, France and Britain 1900-1940 (London: Longman, 1996), 182. 604 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-6, D. 54-1, F. 97-1 (23 November 1934). At the same time, both Foreign Minister of Romania Titulescu and Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia Yetvich declared that they agreed with Laval on the need for an alliance treaty between France and Turkey similar to that concluded between France and Yugoslavia. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri , A. IV-6, D. 54, F. 100-3 (25 February 1934). 605 Ayın Tarihi 10 (September 1934): 115-6. 606 Cumhuriyet (28 and 29 November 1934). 607 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A.. IV-16-b, D. 65, F. 5-17 (27 January 1935). 608 Pierre Milza, Mussolini (Paris, Fayard, 1999), 650-54. 609 Martin Clark, Modern Italy (London: Longman, 1996), 281. According to the Italian diplomats in Ankara, the French-Italian agreement prevented Turkey from playing off France and Italy against each other. ASMAE, Busta 15/1, Turchia 1935 (16 August 1935). 610 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 4367/950/67(29 June 1935) 611 PRO FO 371/ 19500, R 1719/302/67 (8 March 1935). 612 PRO FO 371/ 19500, R 1719/302/67 (8 March 1935). 613 Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932-1939, 1ere Série (1932-1935) Vol. IX (Paris: Imprie Nationale: 1980): 572-73. 614 PRO FO 371/ 19500, R 1719/302/67 (8 March 1935). 615 PRO FO 371/ 19500, R 1719/302/67 (8 March 1935). 616 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 2051/950/67 (25 March 1935). 617 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67 (23 August 1935). 618 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67 (23 August 1935). 619 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5366/950/67 (4 September 1935). 620 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67, f. 221. 621 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67(23 August 1935).and R 5366/950/67(4 September 1935). 622 PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67(23 August 1935).and R 5366/950/67(4 September 1935). 623 Spasov, “Les Projets d’un Pacte…,“ 12 624 Clarke III, Russia and Italy Against Hitler...., 172-179. 625 ASMAE, Busta 11/1, Turchia 1934 (7.12.1934). Lojacano argued that the Soviet Union, as a Black Sea power, provoked the Turks into objecting to the fortification of Leros.. 626 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-6, d. 54-1, F.90-1(15 October 1934) 627ASMAE, Busta 15/1, Turchia 1935 (16 August 1935). In fact, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras thought that if an entente was concluded between Italy and Yugoslavia, the Balkan Entente would not carry any weight and Turkey would be isolated. Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932-1939, 1ere Série (1932-1935) Vol. IX (Paris: Imprie Nationale: 1980), 424-25. 628 Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…,118 629 See Robert Mallet, The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism: 1935-1940 (London: Frank Cass, 1998). 630 Michaelis, “Italy’s Mediterranean Strategy…,” 49. 631 Hasan Pulur (ed.), Muhafızı Atatürk’ü Anlatıyor: Emekli General İsmail Hakkı Tekçe’nin Anıları, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2000), 56-57. 632 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, AIV-18b, D-74-2, F1-194 (10 July 1934). 633 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, AIV-18b, D-74-2, F1-194 (10 July 1934). 634 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 6, Athens, (28 January 1935). 635 PRO FO 371 19039 E1213/1213/44 (10 February 1935). 636 Interview with Şemsettin Bargut, Captain (Ret.), Turkish Navy (13 April 2001), Ankara. 637 BCA 238.605.2 (7 October 1934). 638 Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Zoraki Diplomat, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984), 88-89. 639 Büyüktuğrul served with Italian Navy as a “trainee” for almost two years from 1931 to 1933. For his views, see Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu I…, 243-315. 640 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Ankara (1 November 1935). 641 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Ankara (1 November 1935). 642 BCA, 59.89.19 (15 November 1935). 643 Wight, Power Politics…, 644 Hariciye Vekaleti Yıllığı 1959…, 11. 645 BCA, 266.798.6 (24 September 1935). 646 Kazım Karabekir, İngiltere, İtalya ve Habeş Harbi, (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1995). The book was originally published in 1935. 647 BCA 266.798.8 (1 October 1935). 648 BCA 68.451.8 (15 November 1935). 649 BCA 68.451.8 (6 January 1935). 650 See, Raditsa, “Venizelos and the Struggle…, “119-130. 651 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 42. 652 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 75-94.. 653 Published memoirs of naval officers mention an interesting contingency planning ordered, though much later, by Chief of Staff Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak regarding Rhodes. The late Admiral Büyüktuğrul recalls when and how he received an order to form and train a regiment to be employed for capturing Rhodes in anticipation of proliferation of the Second World War to Turkey’s vicinity. The order was given on 15 November 1940, just three days after the Italian fleet was put out of action by the raid of British aircraft. However, the plan was subsequently shelved, when Chief of Staff changed his mind about capturing Rhodes as quickly as he had come up with the idea. Afif Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu II…, 434. 654 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 95-96. 655 Cited in Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 105. 656 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…,128. 657 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 174. 658 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 163-194 659 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Ankara (8 March 1936). 660 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Ankara (8 March 1936). 661 BCA 238.606.7 (4 September 1935). 662 Tan (14 February 1936). See also, [Büyüktuğrul], Yirminci yüz yılda… 663 Tan (5 November 1935). 664 Krastjo Mancev, “Le Conflit Italo-Ethiopien et l’Entente Balkanique”, Etudes Balkaniques 21 (1986): 50. 665 This convention ensured reciprocal military aid between Turkey, Romania and Yugoslavia in the case of aggression against any party. Mancev, “Le Conflit Italo-Ethiopien…,” 53. For Romania’s opinion on the military evolution of Turkey, see Dimitru Preda, “Romanian Diplomatic Documents on the Political-Military Evolution of Turkey During Atatürk (1923-1938)” in XIX. International Colloquium of Military History (İstanbul: Acta, 1993), 163-186. 666 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 62. 667 Preda, “Romanian Diplomatic Documents…” 668 Boia, Romania’s Diplomatic Relations…, 198 and 201. 669 Romania’s Diplomatic Relations…, 202. Greek delegate had not received authority to sign the statement. 670 Rebecca Haynes, Romanian Policy towards Germany, 1936-1940 (NY: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000), 6. 671 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul (9 April 1936). 672 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul (9 April 1936). 673 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul (9 April 1936). 674 PRO FO 371/ 19168 J 9177/1/1 (3 December 1935). 675 PRO FO 371/ 19168 J 9177/1/1(3 December 1935). 676 Ayın Tarihi 24 (October 1935): 79-80, and PRO FO 37119034, E 6600/1213/44 (31 October 1935). 677 Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy…, 161. 678 PRO FO 371/ 19034 E 6600/1213/44 (31 October 1935). 679 PRO FO 371/ 20093 E 2583/2583/44 (12 April 1936) 680 PRO FO 371/ 20093 E 2583/2583/44(12 April 1936) 681 ASMAE, Busta 19/1, Turchia 1936 (11 January 1936). 682 ASMAE, Busta 19/1, Turchia 1936 (3 September 1936). In fact, in 1936, Mussolini stated that Italy had to be strong and armed in order to revise old treaties and impose its rules on the world. 683 PRO FO 371/ 20093 E 2583/2583/44 (12 April 1936). 684 Cited in Ayın Tarihi 27 (March 1936): 45. 685 Koçak, Türk-Alman İlişkileri…, 188-189. 686 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 4, Bucharest (1 May 1936). 687 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 4, Bucharest (1 May 1936). 688 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-18-b, D. 74, F. 1-21 (22 July 1936) 689 PRO FO 371/ 20072, E 269/26/44 (24 March 1936). 690 The Soviet Union was the first country which replied to the Turkish demand. 691 Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932-1939, Vol. II, 501. 692 Spasov, “Les Projets d’un Pacte…,“ 15. 693 Spasov, “Le Projets d’un Pacte…,” 18. 694 Spasov, “Le Projets d’un Pacte…,” 18. 695 Spasov, “Le Projets d’un Pacte…,” 16. In January 1937, London signed a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with Italy. By this agreement, Britain accepted that the Mediterranean was of vital interest to Italy. John F. Coverdale, Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 200. 696 In January and March 1937, Belgrade respectively signed pacts with Sofia and Rome. 697 Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 210. 698 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul (19 May 1937). 699 McKercher, “Old Diplomacy and New…,” 84. 700 McKercher, “Old Diplomacy and New…,” 110-112. 701 Between 1922 and 1934, the Italian navy built 119 new units that totaled 244,500 tons, including seven heavy cruisers, 12 light cruisers, 12 scouts, 28 destroyers, six torpedo boats, 15 ocean-going submarines and 39 medium submarines. Rimanelli, Italy between Europe and the Mediterranean…, 543. 702 PRO FO 371/17966, E6915/3652/44 (15 November 1934). 703 Brock Millman, “Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy: 1934-1942,” Middle Eastern Studies 31/3 (July 1995): 485-489. 704 SHM, Carton 1BB7/169 Compte Rendu De Rensignements (Turquie) No. 4 (18 April 1934) and No. 6 (4 May 1934). 705 SHM, Carton 1BB7/169 Compte Rendu De Rensignements (Turquie) No. 8 (8 July 1934). 706 PRO FO 371 17966 E6915/3652/44 (11 November 1934) 707 PRO FO371/19040, E3039/3039/44 (10 May 1935). 708 ASMAE, Busta 13/6 Turchia 1934 (18 May 1934). 709 PRO FO 371 17964 E7047/2462/44 (23 November 1934) 710 Özgüldür, Türk-Alman İlişkileri…, 89. 711 Metel, Türk Denizaltıcılık…, 58-75. 712 SHM, Carton 1BB2/91, Bulletin de Rensignements, No. 491 (1-15 April 1936): D-18. 713 Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy…, 146-154. Johannes Glasneck, Türkiye’de Faşist Alman Propogandası, trans. A. Gelen (Ankara: Onur Yayınları, n.d.p.), 65. 714 Metel, Türk Denizaltıcılık…, 56-57. 715 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul (10 March 1937). 716 Çoker, Bahriyemizin Yakın…, 132-157. 717 Mustafa Hergüner, “Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Yabancı Ülkelere Yaptığı İlk Geziler,” Askeri Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi 1(2) (August 2003): 157. 718 PRO FO 371 20029 E5702/1373/44 (9 September 1936). 719 Interview with Captain Bargut, (13 April 2001). Captain Bargut served as the communications officer on board Zafer during the Turkish fleet’s Malta visit in 1936. For these destroyers see, Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War II (New York: Crescent Books, 1998), 250-253; ed. Cem Gürdeniz, Cumhuriyet Donanması- Fleet of the Republic: 1923-2000 (İstanbul: Seyir Hidrografi ve Oşinografi Daire Başkanlığı, 2000), 21. 720 Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu I…, 327 721 BCA 77.66.11, (19 July 1937). 722 BCA 48.307.20 (13 August 1937). 723 Among the first to have noticed the Spanish vessels in the port of Istanbul were German naval instructors of the Naval War Academy. Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu I…, 383. 724 BCA 78.77.14 (24 August 1934). 725 BCA 78.77.15 (9 September 1937). 726 Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu I…, 393. 727 Brock Millman, The Ill-Made Alliance: Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1934-1940 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University, 1998), 92-93. 728 For the heated exchange of views between the President and the Prime Minister on the issue, see Hasan Rıza Soyak, Atatürk’ten Hatıralar, Vol. II (n.p.p.: Yapı Kredi Bankası Yayınları, 1973), 657-682 729 Peter Gretton, “The Nyon Conference – The Naval Aspect,” The English Historical Review 90/354, (January 1975): 107-108. 730 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, AIV-6, D-54, F102-63 (12 September 1937); 731 Milan L. Hauber, “Stalin’s Big Fleet Program,” Naval War College Review 57/2, (Spring 2004): 110. 732 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, AIV-6, D-54, F102-63 (12 September 1937); Metel, Atatürk ve Donanma…, 150-151; Büyüktuğrul, Büyük Atamız…, 161. 733 See also Güçlü, “The Nyon Arragement...” 53-70. 734 The naval policy advocated by President Atatürk during the Nyon Conference might be taken as a sign of consistency in his thinking. A British diplomatic document quoted him to as having said earlier: “Turkey would do her best to stay out of any future war, but if she did have to go to it would be on the side which held the command of the sea.” PRO FO 371 16987 E6297/6297/44 (21 October 1933). 735 “International Observers at Gibraltar,” The Times (17 April 1937). 736 BCA 73.23.19 “Government Decree No. 6254” (25 March 1937). 737 Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…,19. 738 Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…,141. 739 PRO FO 371/20861, E1578/315/44, Minute (12 March 1937). 740 Felix Gilbert, “Ciano and his Ambassadors,” in The Diplomats 1919-1939, ed. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University, 1994), 529. 741 Glyn Stone, The British Government and the Sale of Arms to the Lesser European Powers, 1936-1939, Diplomacy and Statecraft 14/2 (2003): 241-242 742 PRO FO 371/20072, E269/26/44 (13 January 1936). 743 Glasneck, Türkiye’de Faşist Alman…, 78. 744 Sir Vice-Marshal Arthur S. Gould Lee, Special Duties: Reminiscences of a Royal Air Force Staff Officer in the Balkans, Turkey and the Middle East (London: Sampson Low, [1946]), 8-10. See also Gary Leiser “The Turkish Air Force, 1939-1945: the Rise of a Minor Power, Middle Eastern Studies 26/3 (July 1990), 383-395. 745 Joseph A. Maiolo, “Anglo-Soviet Naval Armaments Diplomacy Before the Second World War,” English Historical Review 501, (April 2008): 362. 746 “Anglo-Turkish Talks: Naval Agreement Proposed,” The Times, (15 December 1936). 747 PRO FO 371/20865, E1399/528/44 (4 March 1937). 748 Ernest Andrade Jr., “The Cruiser Controversy in Naval Limitations Negotiations, 1922-1936,” Military Affairs 48/3 (July 1984): 113-120; Richard W. Fanning, Peace and Disarmament: Naval Rivalry and Arms Control, 1922-1933 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 155. 749 Dick Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989): 104-105 and 127-128. In the post-Washington Treaty naval negotiations, the British position revolved around the classification of cruisers. In British naval understanding, “Washington standard types,” armed with eight-inch guns, constituted an offensive class of cruisers while the six-inch gun cruisers were, for all intents and purposes, of a defensive type. In support of this proposed distinction between offensive and defensive types, British naval experts argued that an eight-inch gun provided an offensive quality that was two-and-a-half times that of a six-inch-gun. Indeed, for the British, cruisers lighter than 10,000 tons and armed with six-inch-guns were ideal weapons for trade defense and the protection of imperial communications since they were cheaper to build and maintain than the Washington standard types. Affordability was an important consideration as Britain needed a large number of such cruisers for its imperial requirements. On the other hand, the United States was contemplating an extensive building program involving eight-inch-gun cruisers. For the British, such a building program presented the risk of rendering their six-inch-gun cruisers obsolete and resulting in a deterioration of British naval strength relative to that of the United States. Richardson argues that “in reality, the whole British case had devolved from the intention of the Sea Lords to control the size of cruisers in an attempt to improve Britain’s maritime position.” 750 However, cost estimates showed that an 8,000-ton eight-inch-gun cruiser required an extra 445,000 pounds sterling to build and 29,000 pounds sterling more every year to maintain than a 6,000 ton six-inch gun cruiser. Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament…, 172-173. 751 PRO FO 371/20865, E1399/528/44 (4 March 1937). 752 PRO 371/21929 E1193/135/44 (16 February 1938). Ankara also sought to acquire new units from Germany. Particularly due to the British reluctance, Turkey asked Germany to build a 10,000-ton cruiser by 1942. However, Berlin turned down the Turkish request, as the German shipbuilders were fully booked with the orders for the German Navy. Glasneck, Türkiye’de Faşist Alman…, 73. 753 PRO ADM 116/4198 M02082/38 (12 March 1938). 754 See Stone, “The British Government and the Sale…,” 237-270. 755 PRO ADM 116/4198 M02082/38 (12 March 1938). 756 PRO FO371/21918 E2274/67/44 (14 April 1938). 757 Quoted in Stone, “The British Government and the Sale…,” 258 758 Deringil, “Aspects of Continuity...” 42. 759 Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish..., 152. 760 Dilek Barlas, “Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean: Opportunities and Limits for Middle Power Activism in the 1930s,” Journal of Contemporary History 40/3 (July 2005): 442. 761 On Eyre Crowe’s memorandum, see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 192-193. 762 Selim Deringil, “Aspects of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdülhamid II and İsmet İnönü,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 4/1 (Summer 1987): 41. 763 Aksakal, “’Not by those books...” 516. 764 NARA, RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 1, Ankara (1 November 1934). 765 See Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy… 766 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 1, Ankara (1 November 1934). 767 Cf. Jung and Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads..., 136. 768 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 10, Ankara (27 August 1938). 769 NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 10, Ankara (27 August 1938). Yüklə 0,95 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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