Federal political system resolve the problem of premature dissolutions of government in

3.4 
Doctrine of State Necessity 
The discussion of state necessity is important for this thesis. As shown in Chapter 
4, the judicial recourse to the doctrine of necessity in Pakistan appears to be at the 
apex of a pyramid and the factors leading to it are what appears to be the missing 
key factors of democratic federalism. 
129
Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (OUP, 2004) 3. 
130
ibid. The most important piece of legislation of all of these, for the purposes of this thesis, was the 
1935 Act which can be construed as an evolution of previous Acts. It was also in place at the time of 
the creation of Pakistan and so served as the constitutional instrument in the pre-constitutional era.
According to the 1935 Act, the executive enjoyed extraordinary legislative and executive powers, 
including the power to dismiss the prime minister. 
131
Sultana Tasneem, 'Montesquieu's Doctrine of Separation of Powers: A Case Study of Pakistan' 
(2012) 28(2) Journal of European Studies 55. 
132
ibid. 

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36 
Necessity is a common law doctrine that provides a justification for otherwise illegal 
government actions during an emergency.
133
It therefore bridges the gap between 
what the law allows the government to do and the government's actual response to 
an emergency: 'It has no relevance where emergency state['s] action is taken 
pursuant to specific statutory or constitutional [authorisation]'.
134
According to Schmitt, a state of exception is similar to a state of emergency 
(necessity) but based in the sovereign's ability to transcend the rule of law in the 
name of the public good. Schmitt argues that no legal factor such as a political 
system or constitution can govern an extreme case of emergency or state of 
exception.
135
According to Schmitt, legal factors cannot be applied to chaos, they 
require a 'homogeneous medium'.
136
In an emergency, the application of the laws 
through the usual administrative and judicial channels leads to chaotic 
consequences.
137
In the light of Schmitt's assertion, the sovereign in the case of Pakistan would be 
the person or institution that invokes necessity, and therefore the state of exception 
is the same, in practice, as a circumstance in which a state of necessity 
determination is justified. 
According to Schmitt, the issue is whether it is possible to establish legal conditions 
for declaring a state of emergency along with constraints.
138
If the decision of 
declaring an emergency is not subject to any legal constraint it becomes 
discretionary.
139
Therefore if the judges in Pakistan will always endorse the actions 
of the politicians or the military, it in effect creates discretionary power in the 
Pakistani judiciary, in the absence of the factors such as separation of powers 
discussed further in Chapter 4. 
133
Manby v. Scott, I Lev. 4 (1672), 'the law for necessity dispenses with things which otherwise are 
not lawful to be done. . . ' in Mark M. Stavsky, 'The Doctrine of State Necessity in Pakistan' (1983) 
16(2) Cornell International Law Journal 341. 
134
Mark M. Stavsky, 'The Doctrine of State Necessity in Pakistan' (1983) 16(2) Cornell International 
Law Journal 341. 
135
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (G Schwab tr, 
University of Chicago Press 2005) 11. 
136
ibid 13. 
137
ibid. 
138
Lars Vinx, 'Carl Schmitt' (2014) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
accessed 24 October 2018. 
139
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (G Schwab tr, 
University of Chicago Press 2005) 13. 

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37 
Schmitt believes it to be impossible to anticipate the nature of future emergencies 
and predict a solution. In his view it is not important to have a law in place that 
determines who can take a decision in the state of exception:
140
'There can be a 
'sovereign authority, even where such an authority is not recognized by 
constitutional law'.
141
The quotation above seems to suggest a highly realist or cynical analysis in that it 
depends who has the greatest power (possibly the military). All that matters is 
whether there exists a person or institution (i.e. a sovereign) with the ability to take 
a decision on the exception. The sovereign's act of suspending the law does not 
require legal recognition since 'the law's applicability itself depends on a situation 
of normality secured by the sovereign'.
142
This situation, when seen through the 
lens of the constitutional history of Pakistan, leaves the country in an untenable 
position. In theory the armed forces of Pakistan are subordinate to the government, 
but history has proved otherwise, for example, in the case of the three military 
regimes described in Chapter 4. 
Schmitt believes that the act of emergency must be supported by a sufficiently large 
and powerful constituency, otherwise such acts could hardly possess the factual 
capability to suspend the law and to act successfully against the perceived 
emergency.
143
Most of the time, dictators in Pakistan have initially ratified their act 
of dissolution through the judiciary in the name of necessity,
144
then formed a 
government with a sufficiently large and powerful constituency,
145
albeit one which 
is un-representative of the country as a whole and in particular, certain provinces 
that have only a minority of the population. 
The Latin maxim necessitas legem non habet (i.e. 'necessity has no law') used in the 
cases mentioned in Chapter 4 was interpreted by Giorgio Agamben in setting out 
his theory of state of exception in two different ways, i.e. 'necessity does not 
recognize any law' and 'necessity creates its own law' (nécessité fait loi).
146
He argues 
140
ibid 5. 
141
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (G Schwab tr, 
University of Chicago Press 2005) 12. 
142
ibid. 
143
ibid 5. 
144
For example in the Nusrat Bhutto case [1977] PLD [1977] SC 657 and Syed Zafar Ali Shah case 
[2000] PLD [2000] SC 869,
145
For example, Zia's PML (now PMLN) and Musharraf's PMLQ. 
146
Giorgio Agamben, 'Chapter 1: The State of Exception as a Paradigm of Government' in State of