Federalism

particularly in the field of education. The Canadian province of Ontario, for 
example, makes provision for separate English- and French-language school 
boards, and for secular and Catholic school boards for each language. By this 
means, the French-speaking and English-speaking communities, as well as both 
Catholic and non-Catholic citizens, are able to exercise some cultural autonomy 
over education.
Proportional representation
One way of encouraging such accommodation at the centre is to adopt a system 
of proportional representation for legislative elections. Electoral systems that 
award seats on the basis of a plurality or a majority of the votes cast in single-
member districts are likely to exaggerate any differences in voting patterns 
between regions. If a majority of the people in a particular region tend to vote 
against the party in power at the centre, this is likely to have two undesirable 
consequences: first, the party in power at the centre will have little incentive to 
pay attention to the needs and interests of the region in question—if it cannot 
win a plurality of the votes, it matters little whether it alienates all voters or only 
the majority of them; second, the parliamentary delegation of the party in power 
at the centre is likely to have few or no members representing the region in 
question and is therefore likely to become increasingly out of touch. This is a 
recipe for alienation. Proportional representation can address these two problems. 
The governing party at the centre might only win a minority of votes in the 
region, but those votes will count in terms of winning seats, giving the party 
(a) an incentive to pay attention to that region; and (b) a block of members of 
parliament elected from that region who understand the region’s needs.
Minority veto powers
Another possibility is to grant cultural, religious, ethnic or linguistic minorities 
veto powers at the centre. In Kosovo, 20 of the 120 parliamentary seats are 
reserved for national minorities. The members representing these minorities have 
the right to veto laws concerning their ‘vital interests’, including: municipal 

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46 International IDEA
Federalism
government, community rights, language laws, cultural heritage, freedom of 
religion, education and public holidays (Constitution of Kosovo 2008, article 81). 
The representatives of these minorities also have reserved ministerial portfolios 
and reserved seats on the Judicial Council and the Central Election Commission. 
In Cyprus, the Constitution of 1960 provided for the election of a Greek-
Christian president and a Turkish-Muslim vice president, elected by their 
respective communities, who would each possess veto power over certain 
governmental decisions and legislation. Neither of these solutions has worked 
entirely as intended, but if there is enough goodwill and trust to make such 
mechanisms workable, they might enable communal autonomy and recognition 
to be realized even in a small state where territorial federalism would be 
impractical.