Full text of "Narrative of the war with China in 1860; to which is added the account of a short residence with the Tai-ping rebels at Nankin and a voyage from thence to Hankow"

would almost seem that they suspected some ulterior motives on Sang-ko-lin-sin's part. From all previously found documents emanating from his pen, and from his general reputation, there cannot be any doubt regarding his mental ability and ordinarily sound views upon military matters and public business in general. He made a great mistake certainly in not fortifying Peh-tang as strongly as he had fortified Takoo, but this to a certain extent may have arisen from want of men and means; but in the paper which he drew up regarding the general defences of the coast-line, and the chances of their being successfully attacked by the barbarians — to which I have previously referred

— his views were most able, and the opinions therein set forth of the certainty of our complete overthrow and failure, were based most fairly upon military grounds, and would have been given under similar circumstances by any man who was ignorant of our

superiority in guns and discipline.

Knowing the great strength of his position, he was naturally confident of victory. He had a very large force of cavalry — an arm which he fancied it to be impossible we should be furnished with; he had numbers of guns in position, to which, in the general

Chinese ignorance regarding field artillery, he thought we should be able to reply only with small arms. With such data before him, surely it is not surprising that he should be confident of success! Indeed, so powerful and ample must his resources have appeared

to him, that it was no wonder he regarded our being able to effect a landing at Peh-tang as rather a matter of indifference, so sure and certain must our final annihilation have seemed to be. The man who could argue as clearly and with such soundness of logic, was not likely to be blind to the insurmountable objections to the proposal which, upon the fall of the forts, he urged so pressingly upon his Imperial master: for the Emperor to leave his capital at such a critical moment, and fly away across the frontier of China Proper, was as objectionable and faulty in a political point of view, as, regarded in a military light, it was untenable. It afforded the Chinese Commander-in-Chief no advantage

whatever as to position, whilst, morally, it must have had a most prejudicial effect upon the minds of his Tartar soldiers. The arguments which he urges in favour of such a step were, that its adoption would facilitate measures being taken for attacking and destroying the barbarians; that it would place him at liberty to choose his own time and place of attack, to advance or retire as events occurred; that, should any fighting take place near Tung-chow, the minds of the people in Pekin would be greatly agitated, and that, in the event of a reverse, the numerous merchants there would take to flight. Amidst such a commotion, should the courage of the soldiers fail, the Emperor's person would not be safe; and his Majesty's presence in the capital at such a moment might not only impede the execution of the necessary defensive arrangements, but even fill with alarm the

Celestial mind itself. Of his ultimate success he was still confident; he had made all the necessary dispositions of his troops along the road from Tien-tsin to Tung-chow; and he hoped, by sweeping from off the earth the vile brood, to redeem his previous shortcomings. The forts, he said, he had lost from the unforeseen explosion of the powder magazines in them, not from any want of energy in their defence. In conclusion, he prays that his Majesty may order the princes of the Six Leagues to repair with their most

efficient troops at once to Pekin.

So peculiar did he evidently consider the advice he was tendering, that he said "he did not venture to forward his memorial by the regular express," but sent it sealed by the hands of a special messenger, to be delivered in person to his Majesty.

Surely there is much in this letter which will strike even the most superficial reader as suspicious. The lameness of the arguments urged in favour of the hunting tour being only equalled by the cleverness with which he avails himself of the known weakness and cowardice of his master, to hint in such a marked manner at the personal danger to which his Majesty will be exposed, should he turn a deaf ear to the advice of "his slave."

Unless such was the case, why not send it through the usual channel of communication? Why the secrecy of sending it sealed by a confidential messenger, to be delivered into the Emperor's own hands?

No man appreciated more the importance attached by every one in China to the possession of Pekin, than Sang-ko-lin-sin himself. He must have been aware that, if once we took it, all China would consider the war over, and hail us as victors; that, even at the last moment of our assaulting the place (so vast was its circumference, and so numerically weak were we), we could never block up all the exits from it, and thus

prevent the Emperor's escape; that nothing would serve to establish public confidence, or to strengthen the hearts of its defenders, more than the presence of the father of his people on the spot. His wished-for freedom of action was all a myth, as was proved by

his subsequent conduct, when twice he gave us battle upon the road to Pekin. He was too able a general not to be aware that if he had fought us twenty times, instead of twice, it must each time have been on that line, or else at the capital itself. Even granting that his knowledge of war pointed out to him the advantages which, in a military point of view, he might gain by forsaking the city and taking up a menacing position upon our line of communications, as Koutousof did at Moscow, still he must have felt that, politically, such a policy would be fatal to the cause. China and Russia are totally different countries;

nor was the ancient capital of the latter country, like Pekin, the seat of general government. The loss of Madrid or Paris has never been considered to involve the conquest of the country. The possession of European capitals by invaders has never been looked upon by the population of those countries as the outward emblem and unanswerable proof of complete conquest, whilst to every Chinaman the capture of Pekin by any foreigner would be the most convincing of all other proofs that the Mantchoo dynasty had ceased to reign. Under such circumstances the grand struggle must always have taken place in or about Pekin; his wished-for "freedom of action" was simply a military phrase meaning nothing. His insight into human nature was great, and he seemed to possess a clear idea of the working of Hien-fung's dastardly mind, when he appealed to his sense of personal risk. This latter consideration seems to have had far greater weight with him than all the serious objections to his departure which were raised by every minister to whom at this distressing juncture he appealed for advice. Every argument which would have had weight with any ruler but the basest of cowards, was brought forward by the various ministers of state, who, also appreciating the power which fear had upon their sovereign's mind, followed in the summing up of their memorials Sang-

ko-lin-sin's example, and urged in their turn the dangers to which his Majesty would be exposed personally by flying from his capital and seeking refuge in Jeho.

No doubt they exaggerated those dangers in order to strike the greater terror into their pusillanimous ruler. They dilated upon the vast numbers of robbers, infesting not only the neighbourhood of Jeho but the road to it, where the police could not be expected to be perfect, when such turmoil was rife everywhere else. They urged that, owing to the falling off in the yielding of the mines, the people had become so impoverished about Jeho, that they frequently banded together in very large numbers, and not only robbed

traders and officials, but created great disturbances in the neighbouring districts; that beyond the Hoo-pe-kow pass in the Great Wall, there were "numbers of Russian barbarians, some of whom have been for a long time pretending to deliver communications at Pekin for the furtherance of some treacherous designs;" that if the strong fortifications of Pekin were not considered sufficient security, surely much

less could any be found in the open and unprotected hunting-grounds beyond the wall; if the barbarians have been able to reach Tien-tsin, what is to prevent them from penetrating to the Loan river at Jeho? Having thus tried to impress upon the mind of "the sacred Son of Heaven" the dangers to be encountered at Jeho, they go on to point out the great

inconvenience and discomfort to which the "Governor and Tranquilliser of the Universe" would be subject during his journey in the "still hot weather of autumn." As no such journey had been undertaken for forty years, all the Imperial palaces along the line of route, having been so long unused, had fallen into disrepair, and were consequently uninhabitable. An escort of at least 10,000 persons would be required for the journey, for whom it would be impossible to provide supplies on the road, and consequently numbers of them would desert, and, falling in with the numerous banditti who prowl about those regions wherever they please, would lead to serious disturbances. Jeho was the constant resort of the Mongol tribes, to whom it had always been customary upon the visit of former Emperors to bestow presents, amounting to tens of millions of taels, which the present financial difficulties would not admit of, and without doing which it might be difficult to soothe the discontent of those tributaries.

In this manner they appealed to his Majesty's sense of personal risk and inconvenience, whilst they put forward, in a startlingly straightforward manner, the

political objections to his journey, urging their arguments upon him with a force and plainness of speech which few European ministers could presume to use with their sovereigns, and in a manner the very opposite to all our preconceived notions of Chinese

court etiquette or the style of address usual from the Mandarins to their despotic Emperor. The papers which fell into our hands were memorials from various ministers of state, all signed by several others who agreed in the substance of them. One was countersigned by as many as seventy-six ministers; that of the earliest date was from Kia-ching, and signed by twenty-five others, dated the 9th September.

It was evidently written in answer to a communication from the Emperor, in which he had demanded an opinion upon Sang-ko-lin-sin's advice, enclosing a copy

at the same time of the memorial from that general.

Rumours of the intended flight of his Majesty had been in circulation for some time previous at Pekin; and so when his Majesty declared that he intended proceeding to Tung-chow and taking command of the army in person, the ministers appear to have seen

through the artifice, and perceived that such was only an excuse for his departure, and that once on the move he would follow his general's advice and make quickly for Jeho.

In another paper from the minister Tsuien-king, dated four days later, the most sarcastic censure is poured forth upon a proposed plan which had emanated from the

Celestial mind, which was that, assembling a large force, he should take up a position to the north of Pekin. "They admired the awe-inspiring demeanour and the well-devised strategy thus displayed. But the common people are extremely slow of comprehension; they easily suspect and with difficulty are led to appreciate; they will say that as the barbarians are to the south-eastward of the capital, Tung-chow should be the position from which to support Sang-ko-lin-sin; that a position to the north of Pekin would be without the general line of operations; that what was undertaken under the semblance of strategy would in reality be flight. If his Majesty was in such a critical time careless of the preservation of his empire and only regardful of his personal safety, where could such be more securely assured to him than within the thick and lofty walls of Pekin?" One and all of these memorials denote with startling plainness what should be the Emperor's line of conduct at such a critical conjuncture, and urge that at such times of public danger, "the man of heroic conduct is prepared to die at his post."— "Your Majesty is well aware of the maxim, that the prince is bound to sacrifice himself for his country; but far be it from your ministers at such a time as this to desire to wound your Majesty's feelings by adverting to such thoughts." — "In what light does your Majesty regard your people,

and the altars of your Gods? Will you cast away the inheritance of your ancestors like a damaged shoe? What would history say of your Majesty for a thousand future generations." No sovereign hitherto has ever gone on a hunting tour in times of danger. Such a journey would then greatly endanger the whole state, and compromise the reigning dynasty; his departure would occasion the most serious disorders within the

capital and lead to a revolution. All people, they said, throughout the empire then looked to the throne, as to the centre from which all plans for safety must emanate; the minds of people, they added, will become disturbed, shaking the courage of the troops and inspiring the rebels with renewed energy; the capital "is the honourable seat of majesty, and at such a moment especially the sovereign ought to remain within it;" to leave it would embolden the barbarians to make fresh enterprises, and should peace be negotiated, the great distance of Jeho from Pekin would cause considerable delay in communicating with his Majesty there. Although, the barbarians' vessels had reached Tien-tsin, yet that was a long distance from Pekin; their force was only 10,000, whilst the army under Sang-ko-lin-sin numbered 30,000, and men, women, and children were ready to fight for their tutelary gods. "The danger was most threatening," and "a puff of breath

is now sufficient to decide the balance in which hangs the loss or preservation of the succession of your ancestors and the repose of the deities." The advice which they with one accord give is that an Imperial decree should at once announce his Majesty's determination of awaiting events at his capital, which it was requested might at once be placed in the highest state of defence. "When Te-tsung of the Tang dynasty (a.d. 790) made a public confession of error " the mutineers returned at once to obedience, and if his present Majesty would but follow a similar plan, and publicly acknowledge his mistake in having intended to leave the capital, it would reassure the troubled minds of his subjects. As it had been talked of paying the barbarians 20,000,000 of taels, how much better it would be to devote the portion which had been demanded down in ready money to gaining over those treacherous Chinese mercenaries who constituted such a considerable portion of the barbarians' army. To purchase peace by paying the invaders for retiring, would only occasion fresh demands for more money; no peace should under any

circumstances be granted until the "vile horde" had been defeated in battle. His late Imperial Majesty, in his last will, spoke with shame of having concluded a peace with the English barbarians. For the better fulfilment of these plans his Majesty is over and over

again besought to return to Pekin, and thus appease the popular anxiety, "maintain the dignity of the throne and pacify the spirits of your ancestors." Since the establishment of the present dynasty, 200 years ago, providence had guarded the humane government.

Should his Majesty now disregard the council of his ministers, it must surely hereafter produce in him "bitter but unavailing regret."

All these memorials and the advice which they endeavoured to inculcate are closely interlarded with historical allusions to past times, some to events of many

centuries back. It will be seen from these papers, the pith of which I have dotted down above, that one and all of the ministers viewed Sang-ko-lin-sin's recommendation as the most pernicious step which could be taken, and express their opinions thereon so strongly as actually to border upon impertinence. Surely, when such was apparently the universal light in which all Chinese politicians regarded the Jeho tour, Sang-ko-lin-sin must have had some underhand and hidden object before him in recommending it. For a long time he had been steadily rising in power and influence, and his position was so influential after his grand defeat of the rebels, when they advanced upon Tien-tsin, that it aroused the jealousy of all the court, and caused his offer of leading down an army to Nankin, and

retaking that important city, to be rejected, not from any doubts as to his ability to fulfil what he planned, but simply from a dread that such a victory would place the entire power of the empire in his hands and consequently open to him a rapid path to the throne.

Usurpations of such a nature are not unfamiliar to the Chinese people, and so great have been the reverses experienced since 1840 by the present dynasty, that it has long since ceased to carry with it any great respect, and consequently any strong attachment on the part of the Chinese people. Sang-ko-lin-sin's name has been, since his victory over us in 1859, a proverb for might in war throughout the length and breadth of the country, and upon him all eyes were turned for salvation when the barbarians, having forced their way up to Tien-tsin, threatened the capital, and as was universally believed, the very liberties of the empire. For him the throne was an easy goal. If once he could succeed in inducing the reigning king to forfeit for ever any little remaining respect which the people still entertained for the crown by being the first to fly before the invaders of his country, and if he could also defeat in open field the small body of barbarians, then, upon their march

northward, the assumption of Imperial robes would be but the easiest part of his plan to accomplish. This to me is certainly the best solution of what otherwise appears the most incomprehensible advice which a sincere and loyal subject could under the circumstances have given to his sovereign.

CHAP. X.
Negotiations For The Surrender Of Pekin. Release Of Messrs. Loch, Parkes, And Other Prisoners Made By The Chinese. Narrative Of The Circumstances Connected With Their Capture. Arrival Of The French Army In Front Of Pekin. Preparations For Assaulting The Fortifications Of That City. Surrender Of The An-Ting Gate And Its Occupation By The Allied Troops. Military Funeral Of The British Subjects Who Had Been Murdered By The Chinese.

Upon the 7th October a letter was received from the Prince of Kung, signed by Mr. Parkes. It was dated the day before, and should have reached us that same afternoon, but the bearer, whilst on the road to our camp, had met with our army when on the march, and taking fright, had turned back. The letter promised the return of all prisoners by the 8th October. There was a tone of nervous anxiety in it, which had not characterised any of his former communications. A verbal answer was sent back, intimating that Mr.

Wade would meet a deputy without the city walls, at four o'clock in the afternoon.

The appointed interview took place, Hang-ki having been, according to his own statement, lowered from the top of the city walls in a basket, as all the gates were blockaded up. He informed Mr. Wade that the Prince of Kung had accompanied the army in its retreat the day before, taking most of the prisoners with him, but that most positively those still remaining in Pekin should be sent to our camp upon the following day.

Mr. Wade had previously drawn up a paper stating the conditions upon which we would spare Pekin. The immediate surrender of a gate was declared indispensable for the security of our ambassador, when he entered the capital; the treacherous capture of our

people upon the 18th of September having rendered some such guarantee necessary as a precautionary measure. This request was most unpalatable, and for some time resisted by Hang-ki; but as Mr. Wade was unbending, Hang-ki at last acceded to it.

Upon the 8th October, Messrs. Loch, Parkes, a sowar of Probyn's Horse, M. l'Escayrac de Lauture, and four French soldiers, were sent into our head-quarters; upon the 12th October, one French soldier and eight sowars; and upon the 14th October

two more sowars. Those were the only survivors of the twenty-six English and thirteen French subjects treacherously captured under the most flagrant disregard to all international law. There is truly no term in our language which so essentially describes

the Chinese rulers as the word barbarian, which they use so universally as an opprobrious epithet when alluding to any people so happily fortunate as to be of any other nation than China. The gloomiest page of history does not disclose any more melancholy tale than that told by one and all of those who returned. The refinement of torture and unmeaning cruelty to which they had been subject, and the wanton disregard for all feelings of humanity evinced towards them, would almost cause one to doubt the humanism of

their jailors, and to class them amongst some fearful species of ogre, which not only fed upon man, but loved to destroy him for mere destruction's sake. The substance of their sad story is as follows: —

Upon Captain Brabazon and Mr. Loch's arrival at Tung-chow (for which place I have previously mentioned their having started from our army, some little time before the action of the 18th September commenced), they found that Mr. Parkes was engaged in a conference with the Prince of I, and that Messrs. Bowlby and De Norman were in the city searching for some building which would serve as a suitable residence for Lord Elgin during his stay in that place. The escort was at the Yamun, in which all had passed the previous night, and it was immediately ordered to saddle and prepare for leaving. Messengers were despatched into the city for those who were sight-seeing there; and when all were collected, they started at a brisk pace in the direction of our army. During the interview with the Prince of I, Mr. Parkes was struck with the altered demeanour of his Highness towards him, which was also evinced by the loud talking and unceremonious conduct of those about him. Mr. Parkes had entered his presence intending to carry everything, as usual, with a high hand; but upon demanding, "why, in direct violation of their previous agreement, a large army was in the field, almost surrounding our forces, and in possession of an entrenched position, where a number of guns had been lately mounted," the Prince showed none of that eagerness to allay suspicions or remove unfavourable impressions which, upon all former occasions, had characterised his manner of speaking or writing.

The party reached Chang-kia-wan without any molestation, although there were large bodies of troops about. A party of Tartar horsemen were soon, however, discovered to be following them; and, as it was not thought advisable to appear running away from them, the pace of going was changed from a canter to a fast walk. The Tartars immediately assimilated their pace to theirs, and some of them were perceived blowing the matches of their matchlocks. Proceeding along the regular roadway, until they had reached an old watch-tower which stood about half way between our army and Chang-kia-wan, they found their further progress arrested by a body of infantry, drawn up upon the road. The Chinese officer in charge was not particularly uncivil, but distinctly informed Mr. Parkes that he could not be allowed to pass until he had obtained the general's permission. Upon learning that the general was close at hand, Mr. Parkes, accompanied by Mr. Loch and a sowar, carrying a flag of truce, proceeded in the direction where the Chinese general was said to be. All this occurred just as the firing commenced upon Colonel Walker and his party.