Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Readiness – I/L – US Retention

PMC’s create a cycle where military talent is hired away which creates demand for more PMC’s who steal more talent.
Cotton et al 10 (Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q Burkhart, Megan Zander–Cotugno, Edward O’Connell, Michael Webber, “Hired Guns”, RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG987.pdf)KM

Th e diff erence in pay between private security contractors and troops is a recurring theme in interviews, anecdotal accounts, and analyses of how contractors are aff ecting the military. Christopher Spearin, for instance, notes that the employment decisions of special operations forces (SOF) are aff ected mainly by remuneration and operational tempo, and that private sector employment off ers both better remuneration and more moderate operational tempo than military employment (Spearin, 2006). In July 2005, former SOF personnel in Iraq were earning approximately $12,000–$13,000 per month. In contrast, some private security contractors were being paid as much as $33,000 per month (GAO, 2005). At the same time, the Global War on Terrorism has only increased the operational tempo for U.S. special forces, which had already seen a threefold increase from 1991 to 1997 in the number of soldiers deployed every week. Employment with private security fi rms off ers a more fl exible schedule, with better leave options and greater choice of deployment locations (Spearin, 2006). Arguments have been made that the comparatively desirable work conditions off ered by the private security industry have the unintended side eff ect of reducing rates of military retention. Because private security fi rms generally hire only those with at least some former military experience, military retention rates (or continuation rates, as noted below), rather than recruitment rates, can off er some insight into the question of a tug–of–war between the military and private sector over skilled personnel. As Ralph Peters, a retired Army offi cer and frequent commentator on military issues, suggested in 2007, Th e disgraceful cycle works like this: Contractors hire away military talent. Th e military fi nds itself short of skilled workers, so contractors get more contracts. With more money, they hire away more uniformed talent (quoted in Lardner, 2007, p. 3).

High salaries of PMC’s create tradeoffs with military retention.
Isenberg 4 (David Isenberg Research Report 2004, BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL, http://www.scribd.com/doc/9572460/Private–Military–Companies–in–Iraq)km

The lure of higher salaries is causing an exodus of U.S. and British special forces to PMC’s just as these military forces are being asked to play an increasing role in combating terrorism and helping to conduct nation–building operations worldwide. Competition over elite troops from private companies is so intense that the U.S. and British military commanders are formulating new pay, benefits, and educational incentives to try to retain them.

Readiness – I/L – US Retention

PMC’s hurt readiness – they divert soldiers to the private sector and lack the same military discipline that makes an army effective.
Gulam 10 (‘The rise and rise of Private Military Companies’ By Hyder Gulam, BA, BN, LLB, Post Grad Dip (Advanced Clinical Nursing), March 12, 2010 http://www.peaceopstraining.org/theses/gulam.pdf)KM

A 1991 RAND report looking at private provision of professional military education programs in the U.S. found no cost savings. Privatising training may actually undermine the U.S. military’s potential for military engagement. When the U.S. government poured funds for training into PMC’s rather than into its armed forces, it buoyed private expertise over public expertise. It also altered the career aspiration of military personnel, adding the private sector into consideration and highlighting to the armed force that training was ‘not a core task’.114 Employing PMC’s reduces the need to involve both Parliament and the Australian public in foreign policy. Using private contractors may make foreign operations easier in the short run, because politicians do not have to make the case to send ‘our boys (and girls)’overseas into harms way.115 The other problem is that PMC’s might gain access to classified information or defence forces training manuals or equipment. The presence of PMC’s in other countries could also cause confusion between their activities and official activities being conducted by Government agencies or the military in those countries.116 PMC’s often have a weak command structure and disciplinary problems. Unlike State armed forces, where the legitimacy of command rests unquestioningly in its officers, PMC’s are often characterised by requiring that commanders prove their strength. The imposition of military discipline within PMC’s has generally required violence.117 The deterrence on wrongdoing – military discipline law – does not really operate. Regular military personnel are subject to courts–martial or international law, but for PMC employees it is not clear what law applies.

Readiness – I/L – US Retention

PMC’s hurt military retention – people leave their jobs to get better pay at PMC’s.
Isenberg 4 (David Isenberg Research Report 2004, BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL, http://www.scribd.com/doc/9572460/Private–Military–Companies–in–Iraq)km

The lure of higher salaries is reportedly causing an exodus of the U.S. military’s most seasoned members of Special Operation Forces (SOF) to higher-paying civilian security jobs in places like Baghdad and Kabul, just as the special forces are being asked to play an increasingly pivotal role in combating terror and helping to conduct nation–building operations worldwide. Of course the same problem exists in many other areas of military specialism, such as information technology. Why work in the Army’s tech operations when you can get a job at three times the remuneration in the private sector? Reportedly, exhausted American and British special forces personnel are resigning in record numbers and taking highly-paid jobs as private security guards in Iraq and Afghanistan. Competition over elite troops from private companies is so intense that the U.S. Special Operations Command has formulated new pay, benefits, and educational incentives to try to retain them. “Competition with the civilian world has never been greater,” said Gen. Bryan "Doug" Brown, commander of the 49,000–strong U.S. Special Operations Command, in congressional testimony.59 Senior enlisted members of the Army Green Berets or Navy Seals with 20 years or more experience now earn about $50,000 in base pay, and can retire with a $23,000 pension. But private security companies, whose services are in growing demand in Iraq and Afghanistan, are offering salaries of $100,000 to nearly $200,000 a year to the most experienced of them.60 But there is no guarantee beyond the contracted period and it is only paid when deployed, i.e., two on, one off – only paid in effect two–thirds of the annual sum. Similarly, British officials say more than 300 soldiers have left the armed forces in six months to take up lucrative jobs with private companies such as Olive Security, Armour Security, Global and USDID.61 In particular, the demand from PMC’s operating in Iraq for former Special Air Service and Special Boat Service soldiers is such that between May 2003 and December 2004, between 40 and 60 men are expected to have sought premature voluntary release from the army and Royal Marines. In operational terms, this could mean that the equivalent of one entire Sabre squadron out of a total of six in the SAS and SBS is on its way to seek its fortune in the new Iraq.62 According to one British press report there are more ex–SAS soldiers acting as advisers for “private military companies” than currently serving in the elite, 300–man regiment based near Hereford. More than 40 regular SAS soldiers are understood to have applied to leave the Army in the last year, many because of the lure of short–term contracts in Iraq.63
PMC pay is skewed which exacerbates retention problems and creates competition with the military.
Isenberg 4 (David Isenberg Research Report 2004, BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL, http://www.scribd.com/doc/9572460/Private–Military–Companies–in–Iraq)km

As an article in Fortune magazine noted, once the big PMC’s started competing for contracts in Iraq the economics of the industry changed: They lured many of the firms’ finest with what mercenaries respond to best: money. Standard wages for PSD (personal security detail) pros were previously running about $ 300 a day, according to people who know this market. Once Blackwater started recruiting for its first big job, guarding Paul Bremer, the rate shot up to $ 600 a day. Global Risk no longer had a lock on the market for Gurkhas, whose monthly wages rose from $ 800 to as high as $ 2,000 today. The big firms didn’t grab all the business by any means, but they squeezed the margins and exacerbated small firms’ biggest problem: a shortage of people with management skills.64 Largely lost in all the usual media blather about “supporting our boys” is the fact that the migration of active duty soldiers to the PMC sector reflects an obsolete military pay system, at least in the United States. As one former U.S. marine wrote: Paying civilians to play soldier makes no sense. Today the United States employs between 7,000 and 17,000 civilians in infantry roles. The pay is extraordinary, hovering between $500 per day and $1,000 per day for everything from site security (for government compounds throughout Iraq) to convoy/company security to personal security (for dignitaries). This money comes tax-free in a combat zone. There are four problems here: morale deflation, gross monetary waste, tactical confusion, and direct competition for a tiny talent pool. Soldiers look at security contractors and think: Why the hell is he making eight times my salary for performing the same job? Is the military that pock–marked with overage and inefficiency? Using bottom–up cost–accounting, the military is essentially buying out its most experienced soldiers and luring them out of the active ranks (if Stop– Loss is ever lifted, that is) with rich contracts, even as it desperately seeks new recruits. Worse, it’s paying introduction fees to private security companies like Dynacorps and Blackwater for the people it recruited in the first place. How in the world did this happen?