Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Hollow Forces Adv. – Link – Afghan Retention

Most American PMC’s in Afghanistan hire locals to work.
Schwartz 9 (“Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis” Moshe Schwartz Specialist in Defense Acquisition December 14, 2009 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf)

An analysis of contractor data appears to indicate differences in how DOD uses contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, contractors made up 62% of DOD’s combined uniformed and contractor personnel workforce in Afghanistan compared to 47% of the workforce in Iraq. In addition, 75% of contractors in Afghanistan are local nationals compared to only 26% in Iraq (see Table 2 and Table 4). Some analysts contend that understanding these differences–and why they occur–could help DOD to strategically plan for the management and use of contractors in future operations. For example, had DOD understood the extent to which it would rely on private security contractors in Iraq, DOD might have put in place a more robust oversight and coordination mechanism earlier. 26
PMF’s drain from local areas – high pay incentivizes people to quitting jobs and joining security firms.
Nassar 8 (“Privatising war”, Galal Nassar, 2008, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/899/focus.htm)KM

PMFs in Iraq are equipped with or have access to the most sophisticated military equipment (armoured four–wheel vehicles, helicopters, super computers and various satellite surveillance, positioning and guidance services). They offer very attractive incentives, more than enough to tempt individuals into quitting their jobs at home as truck drivers, prison wardens or private security guards and seeking employment in a PMF that will send them to the world's most violent hotspots. Pay ranges from $500 to $1,500 a day, whereas an ordinary career army soldier earns around $3,000 a month and an Iraqi policeman earns less than $400 per month. Such figures cast new light on ways Iraq is being drained of its national resources. Consider, too, that private security firms represent $100 billion worth of contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan and that one of these companies –– a British one –– increased its revolving capital from ¨554,000 in 2003, before the war on Iraq, to ¨62 million in 2005.
PMC undermine the training of Afghan police through carelessness
Huffington Post 4/19 (19 APR 2010 http://huffpostfund.org/stories/2010/04/auditor-finds-poor-controls-expenses-afghan-police-program-0)

The private contractor that trains the Afghan police force, a U.S. military program long criticized for wasting money, has failed to document millions of dollars in expenses, according to a leading defense audit agency. A November 2009 audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency, made public Friday by a Senate subcommittee on contracting oversight, uncovered serious deficiencies in how DynCorp International tracks payroll, bills from subcontractors, cost vouchers and millions of dollars in labor costs. In sum, the audit found many of DynCorp’s billing and financial controls to be inadequate. The audit is notable for providing the first hard look at the company’s financial accountability in Afghanistan, where since 2004 it has played a key role training the Afghan National Police. This effort is critical to the drawdown of U.S. troops.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Link – Afghan Retention

PMC’s hollow out Afghan army and police – destroying Afghan governance
Honda 10 (Rep. Michael M. June 10 chairman of the Congressional Progressive Caucus' Afghanistan Taskforce http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/10/our-longest-war/

I have similar concerns with the sustainability of U.S.-led training of Afghanistan's security forces. Recent reports show attrition rates in the Afghanistan National Police at a whopping 70 percent, surpassing equally untenable attrition rates within the National Army. In allocating hundreds of billions of dollars toward a training curriculum for Afghan security forces - without good monitoring and evaluation - it is difficult to change to a more efficient tack. It makes it much more difficult to stem the attrition trends of former Afghan army and police foot soldiers, who once made $200 per month as government employees, as they leave for private security contractors who pay several hundred dollars per day. It makes it much more difficult to evaluate why violent attacks on U.S. troops are on the rise and why the Marjah offensive fell far short in providing security and stability. Without this necessary evaluation, we will continue to implement ineffective strategies indefinitely. Finally, our good-governance approach is equally ill-footed. In recent past, we have circumvented Afghanistan's central government on most governance strategies (80 percent of all military and nonmilitary aid bypassed the government) colluding, ironically, with known warlords and corrupt figures. Now we're trying to team up with President Hamid Karzai, yet we continue to undermine his authority by building parallel local structures that rival the highly effective, government-run National Solidarity Program's Community Development Councils. To add insult to injury, U.S. and foreign contractors who offer substantially higher salaries snatch up the best and brightest of the Afghan government's young recruits, leaving Kabul with little self-governing potential and heavily reliant on international consultants.

PMC’s steal from Afghan forces and undermine US mission
Jordan 10 (Bryant June 18th Defense Tech Chief Investigative Correspondent http://defensetech.org/2010/06/18/big-bucks-lure-crack-afghan-troops-to-private-security-firms/ TBC 6/25/10)

Private security companies working under Defense Department contracts in Afghanistan are siphoning off some of the best and brightest from that country’s security and police forces, Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee says. That’s the finding of a committee investigation into private security contractors in Afghanistan. The reason the Afghans are taking the contract jobs is simple — money. “Many of them are recruited by higher-paying private security firms,” Levin said in a statement released during Gen. David Petraeus’ testimony to the committee. Levin said he is concerned that the U.S.‘s own contracting practices may be harming the war effort by luring away from the Afghan forces that are expected to take over the fight many of its best people. He also noted that private security contractors often draw from militia forces, thereby “empowering local powerbrokers and warlords who operate outside the government’s control.” Levin said Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. military leader in Afghanistan, has acknowledged there are problems with the contracting practices and that the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force would assess what needs to be done to reform them.