War on Drugs Add-On – Warlords Module (3/3)
War on drugs is key to stability in Afghanistan.
Biehl 9 (Jonathan, “Counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan: a way to success or a meaningless cause”, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA512380, date accessed: 6/21/2010) AJK
The CN effort contributes to four of the stability sectors in the model: security, justice and reconciliation, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure. “Efforts in security focus on establishing a stable security environment and developing legitimate institutions and infrastructure to maintain that environment” (Department of the Army 2008, 2-6). The justice and reconciliation sector encompasses far more that policing, civil law and order, and the court systems of a state (Department of the Army 2008, 2-6). This sector is supported by eight key elements, one of which is: effective and scrupulous law enforcement institutions responsive to civil authority and respectful to human rights and dignity (Department of the Army 2008, 2-7). As of now, Afghan LE is unable to do this. “Governance is the states’ ability to serve the citizens 57 58 through the rules, processes and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority” (Department of the Army 2008, 2-8). This is not possible with a narco-based economy with corrupt government officials. In regards to economic stabilization, “much of the broader success achieved in stability operations begins at the local level as intervening actors engage the populace with modest economic and governance programs” (Department of the Army 2008, 2-8). The responsibility for reducing Afghanistan’s economic and social dependence on the cultivation and processing of opium poppies rests with the Afghan government. “Widespread instability--a direct result of that insurgency--makes it almost impossible for Afghan leaders to implement a counter-narcotics strategy” (Wood 2009, 51).
Instability in Afghanistan leads to nuclear war.
Wesley 10 (Michael, Exec. Director of the Lowy Institute for Int. Policy. Professor of Int. Relt’s @ Griffith U, Feb. 25 2010 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/02/25/A–stable–Afghanistan–Why–we–should–care.aspx)IM
We do have an interest in the future of domestic stability within Afghanistan, but we need to think much more clearly about which countries build and guarantee that stability. An Afghan state built just by the US and its allies will be inherently unstable because, as we demonstrated after the Soviet Union withdrew, we have little stomach for any continued strategic involvement in the region. Pakistan, India and China, on the other hand, have deep and enduring strategic interests there, and their competition would soon undermine anything ISAF and NATO leave behind. Understanding the dynamics of strategic competition among Asia's rising behemoths has to be the first step in trying to figure out how to mitigate it. Great power competition in the twenty-first century will be different because of the depth and extent of the dependence of national economies on the global economy. National economies are now less self–sufficient and more vulnerable to the disruption of trading and investment relations than at any time in history. What stops great power confrontations getting out of hand these days is not so much the fear of nuclear annihilation as the fear of global economic ruin – and the resulting national ruin.The danger is that in the heat of the competition, the great powers will lose sight of this fact. This is why instability and weakness in Afghanistan is so dangerous – because in the fog of proxy war, intensely jealous great powers will assume their rivals have the upper hand and redouble their own efforts to exert influence and control, leading to a vast, very likely nuclear, conflict. To avoid the worst possible outcome, all three rivals must be engaged in the process of building a stable Afghanistan – and collectively guaranteeing it. The most realistic route is to actively involve the SCO in the future of Afghanistan while broadening that organisation to include India and Pakistan. This solution ties the stability of the northern and southern tiers of Central Asia to each other, thereby broadening the stakes of those involved. The one hope and one fear that bind China and Russia together are also remarkably relevant to the SCO's proposed new members.
War on Drugs Add-On – Uniqueness – Funded by PMC’s
PMC’s fund warlords and cannot handle the job
Ferdinando 6/23 (Lisa, 23 June 2010, “US Defense Officials Questioned About Afghan Trucking Contract”, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/usa/US–Defense–Officials–Questioned–About–Afghan–Trucking–Contract–96960954.html)KFC
U.S. Defense Department officials say they take any allegation of corruption and wrongdoing seriously in response to a congressional report saying tens of millions of dollars in U.S. taxpayers' money have been paid as extortion money to Afghan warlords, public officials and even the Taliban to make sure U.S. supply convoys get to their destinations. The six–month investigation looked into the Department of Defense's $2.16 billion Afghan Host Nation Trucking contract that delivers 70 percent of the food, water, ammunition, weapons, and fuel used by American troops in Afghanistan. The chairman of the subcommittee, John Tierney, a Democrat from Massachusetts, says American taxpayers are feeding what he called a protection racket in Afghanistan and that the military appears to have ignored complaints by contractors who said they were being extorted. "This contract appears to have fueled warlordism, extortion, corruption, and maybe even funded the enemy," he said. Tierney says the report, done by the staff of the majority Democrats on the subcommittee, shows the Department of Defense's systematic failure of management and oversight of contractors. He says contractors had realized they could not manage and oversee the security that would be needed to move millions of dollars of critical supplies along extremely dangerous routes.
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