Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Hollow Forces Adv. – I/L – Causes Insurgency

And, the use of Afghanis by PMC’s fuels the funding of the insurgency

Tierney 10 (John, Chair of National Security of foreign affairs in US House of reps, US Congress, june 10, P.2) ET

The private security companies that protect the convoys are frequently involved in armed conflict with alleged insurgents, rival security providers, and other criminal elements. The security providers report having lost hundreds of men over the course of the last year alone, though the veracity of these reports is difficult to judge. Many of the firefights purportedly last for hours and involve significant firepower and frequent civilian casualties. Indeed, in an interview with the Subcommittee staff, the leading convoy security commander in Afghanistan said that he spent $1.5 million on ammunition per month. From one perspective, the HNT contract works quite well: the HNT providers supply almost all U.S. forward operating bases and combat outposts across a difficult and hostile terrain while only rarely needing the assistance of U.S. troops. Nearly all of the risk on the supply chain is borne by contractors, their local Afghan truck drivers, and the private security companies that defend them. During the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989), by contrast, its army devoted a substantial portion of its total force structure to defending its supply chain. The HNT contract allows the United States to dedicate a greater proportion of its troops to other counterinsurgency priorities instead of logistics.

But outsourcing the supply chain in Afghanistan to contractors has also had significant unintended consequences. The HNT contract fuels warlordism, extortion, and corruption, and it may be a significant source of funding for insurgents. In other words, the logistics contract has an outsized strategic impact on U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. The Department of Defense has been largely blind to the potential strategic consequences of its supply chain contingency contracting. U.S. military logisticians have little visibility into what happens to their trucks on the road and virtually no understanding of how security is actually provided. When HNT contractors self-reported to the military that they were being extorted by warlords for protection payments for safe passage and that these payments were “funding the insurgency,” they were largely met with indifference and inaction.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Afghanistan Forces Solve

Local forces key to Afghanistan war
Atlantic Council 9( Policy and Analysis magazine, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/where-are-local-forces-afghanistan-and-iraq,07/09/09)

General Nicholson and others say that the long-term success of the operation hinges on the performance of the Afghan security forces, which will have to take over eventually from the American troops.

General Nicholson said the American force of almost 4,000 had been joined by about 400 effective Afghan soldiers.“The net increase in Afghan security forces is zero” since the brigade arrived a few months ago, he said. The lack of Afghan forces “is absolutely our Achilles’ heel,” added Capt. Brian Huysman, commander of Company C of the First Battalion, Fifth Marines in Nawa.Captain Huysman said the Afghan forces were critically important in establishing trust and communication with citizens. “We can’t read these people; we’re different,” he said. “They’re not going to tell us the truth. We’ll never get to build and transition” — the last phase of the operation — “unless we have the Afghans.”
Local militias solve – troop training
NYTimes 8(12/24/08 , http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/24/world/asia/24afghan.html)

The formation of the militias is at least a partial answer to the question of how American commanders intend to wrest back the initiative from the Taliban over the next 12 months. While some elected officials in the United States have suggested that the Americans and Afghans might try to exploit fissures in the Taliban, possibly breaking off some groups that can be reconciled, the plan for the militias — coupled with the influx of fresh American forces — suggests that American commanders intend to squeeze the Taliban first. American and Afghan officials say they intend to set up local militias of 100 to 200 fighters in each provincial district, with the fighters being drawn from the villages where they live. (Wardak has eight districts.) To help ensure the dependability of each fighter, the Americans and Afghans are planning to rely on local leaders, like tribal chiefs and clerics, to choose the militiamen for them. Those militiamen will be given a brief period of training, along with weapons like assault rifles and grenade launchers, and communication gear, said Abdul Rahim Wardak, the Afghan defense minister.

Local militia effective in Afghanistan war

 

Chandrasekaran 10 ( Rajiv ,Washington Post Staff Writer, 4/27/10 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/26/AR2010042604215.html)

Then, beginning in late February, a small detachment of U.S. Special Forces soldiers organized nearly two dozen villagers into an armed Afghan-style neighborhood watch group. These days, the bazaar is thriving. The schoolhouse has reopened. People in the area have become confident enough to report Taliban activity to the village defense force and the police. As a consequence, insurgent attacks have nearly ceased and U.S. soldiers have not hit a single roadside bomb in the area in two months, according to the detachment. "Everyone feels safer now," said Nasarullah, one of two gray-bearded tribal elders in charge of the village force. "Nobody worries about getting killed anymore." The rapid and profound changes have generated excitement among top U.S. military officials in Afghanistan, fueling hope that such groups could reverse insurgent gains by providing the population a degree of protection that the police, the Afghan army and even international military forces have been unable to deliver.