Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Afghan Instability – Nuclear War

Afghan failure leads to Al-Qaeda nukes – Most likely scenario and it swamps alt causes
Biddle 9 (Stephen Biddle senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. July - August 2009 issue: Is It Worth It? The Difficult Case for War in Afghanistan http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=617 TBC 6/24/10)

The more important U.S. interest is indirect: to prevent chaos in Afghanistan from destabilizing Pakistan. With a population of 173 million (five times Afghanistan’s), a GDP of more than $160 billion (more than ten times Afghanistan’s) and a functional nuclear arsenal of perhaps twenty to fifty warheads, Pakistan is a much more dangerous prospective state sanctuary for al-Qaeda. Furthermore, the likelihood of government collapse in Pakistan, which would enable the establishment of such a sanctuary, may be in the same ballpark as Afghanistan, at least in the medium to long term. Pakistan is already at war with internal Islamist insurgents allied to al-Qaeda, and that war is not going well. Should the Pakistani insurgency succeed in collapsing the state or even just in toppling the current civilian government, the risk of nuclear weapons falling into al-Qaeda’s hands would rise sharply. In fact, given the difficulties terrorists face in acquiring usable nuclear weapons, Pakistani state collapse may be the likeliest scenario leading to a nuclear-armed al-Qaeda. Pakistani state collapse, moreover, is a danger over which the United States has only limited influence. We have uneven and historically fraught relations with the Pakistani military and intelligence services, and our ties with the civilian government of the moment can be no more efficacious than that government’s own sway over the country. The United States is too unpopular with the Pakistani public to have any meaningful prospect of deploying major ground forces there to assist the government in counterinsurgency. U.S. air strikes can harass insurgents and terrorists within Pakistan, but the inevitable collateral damage arouses harsh public opposition that could itself threaten the weak government’s stability. U.S. aid is easily (and routinely) diverted to purposes other than countering Islamist insurgents, such as the maintenance of military counterweights to India, graft and patronage, or even support for Islamist groups seen by Pakistani authorities as potential allies against India. U.S. assistance to Pakistan can—and should—be made conditional on progress in countering insurgents, but if these conditions are too harsh, Pakistan might reject the terms, thus removing our leverage in the process. Demanding conditions that the Pakistani government ultimately accepts but cannot reasonably fulfill only sets the stage for recrimination and misunderstanding. If we cannot reliably influence Pakistan for the better, we should at least heed the Hippocratic Oath: Do no harm. With so little actual leverage, we cannot afford to make the problem any worse than it already is. And failure in Afghanistan would make the problem in Pakistan much harder. The Taliban are a transnational Pashtun movement active on both sides of the Durand Line and are closely associated with other Pakistani insurgents. They constitute an important threat to the regime in Islamabad in rough proportion to the regime’s inherent weaknesses (which are many and varied). If the Taliban regained control of the Afghan state, their ability to use the state’s resources to destabilize the secular government in Pakistan would increase the risk of state collapse there. Analysts have made much of the threat that Pakistani Taliban base camps pose to the stability of the government in Kabul, but the danger works both ways: Instability in Afghanistan also poses a serious threat to the secular civilian government in Pakistan. This is the single greatest U.S. interest in Afghanistan: to prevent it from aggravating Pakistan’s internal problems and magnifying the danger of an al-Qaeda nuclear-armed sanctuary there.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – China Econ

Collapse of Afghanistan would destroy the NATO alliance, destabilize the region, including Pakistan with their nukes, and would harm china’s economy

Patel 9 (Nirav- research analyst at CSIS, M.A. internt’l rel @ Georgetown, 4-1-9, Small Wars Journal) ET

Afghanistan is not only an Article 5 mission for NATO, but also represents a major test for the organization. Despite beliefs among many in the U.S. national security community that failure for NATO-members to take a lead in Afghanistan operations will sound the death knell for the Alliance; it seems more likely that Afghanistan will impel a major strategic reassessment of the function of NATO. Regardless, these debates often induce policy paralysis and are part of a condition that frames American strategic engagement through a transatlantic perspective. In many ways, cooperating with Europe has almost become an a priori issue of diplomatic protocol and a pillar of politically correct behavior. If America is to succeed in Afghanistan it must begin to think beyond how Europe fits into the equation and start a process of better integrating emerging powers, particularly China into its strategic process. One just needs to look at a map of the region to understand how instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan can destabilize the entire region. Transnational terrorist groups who enjoy safety in the lawless frontiers of Central Asia have exploited weaknesses in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan which has spilled over into the hinterlands of China. This fear has not gone unnoticed in China where its leaders have taken unprecedented acts (afforded by their autocratic system) to counter radical groups and separatists in its Uighur dominated provinces. Witness the rigidity of Chinese counter-terror policies in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic games. Perhaps most worrisome to Beijing is the prospect of Pakistan’s weak central government being unable to secure its nuclear weapons --- a strategic concern not only for America but the world. China also views Afghanistan as a promising future business partner. To date, China has linked the largest foreign direct investment project in the history of Afghanistan by winning rights to develop the Aynak copper field. The contract valued at $3.5 billion USD not only demonstrates Chinese willingness to invest in Afghanistan but also its deep pockets and capital. Moreover, Chinese investments could compliment coalition efforts to jumpstart Afghanistan’s economy. Jonathan Landay, an award winning journalist with the McClatchy group notes, “China's investment in Aynak dovetails with the administration's emerging strategy for ending the war in part by delivering on unfulfilled vows to better the lives of the poor Afghans who constitute the vast majority of the Taliban's foot soldiers.” Beijing also sees vast opportunities in developing roads, bridges, and other critical infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. China – as evinced by recent stories highlighting its tremendous capital wealth – is a potentially prime partner in footing the bill for expensive reconstruction operations which hold the key for the future of Afghanistan’s stability. The global financial crisis, however, has made it evident that resource scarcity and domestic political will in the U.S. will eventually limit the amount of assistance the U.S. and Europe can pledge overseas. As the focus turns to support internal economic development in both Europe and the United States public support for Afghanistan is decreasing.
China economic decline would cause WWIII asian style

Strait Times 3 (UCLA Prof, June 27, Strait Times¸ http://www.straitstimes.com.sg/commentary/...,197074,00.html ) ET

But imagine a China disintegrating - on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency prompting, much less outright military invasion - because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and other places with poor border controls, which don't want them and can't handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of World War II Revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia - once occupied by Japan - into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for Kashmir. Then you can say hello to World War III, Asia-style. That's why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth - the very direction the White House now seems to prefer. If neo-conservatives really care about Mr Bush, they ought to find their common sense and get off his back. He has enough on his plate with Iraq. In the final analysis, neo-conservative insanity is more of a danger to the Bush presidency than China.