Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Readiness – Uniqueness – No Oversight Now

Status quo PMC’s lack oversight – they assume critical roles on the ground without governmental oversight.
Schwartzkopf 10 (Matt Schwartzkopf Thursday, May 13 2010 http://pmc.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/05/13/the–commission–on–wartime–contracting–part–two/)

“The issue of the Army’s commitment to aggressive and effective contract management shows up in other ways. After more than seven years of war in Southwest Asia—typically with a 1–to–1 ratio of contractor employees to warfighters—it is astonishing, but apparently true, that no one in DoD or the Army has either a department-wide or a theater-wide view of contracts, contracting activity, or the numbers and locations of contractors. And with the massive draw–down operation underway in Iraq, it is also astonishing to hear a three-star Army general confirm at our last hearing that there is no single entity with the power to monitor operational needs and order appropriate adjustments in the scope of contracts.” – Chairman Michael Thibault, April 19th This statement perfectly sums up one of the major problems the government faces with private military contracting; a lack of oversight. Though the situation is improving, oversight is still far from where it should be. The Army and Defense Department, until recently, seemed to lack the urgency to fix this problem, the same lack of urgency they were chided for by the Commission on Wartime Contracting. This sort of behavior on the government’s part has lead to publicized news stories about waste and fraud problems out in the field, with the primary blame being put on the private contractors. Contractor cooperation is a much needed aspect, but the burden lies with the government to ensure there are adequate personnel in place to oversee contractors and contracts in the field and to provide assistance to contractors when needed. The problem of oversight ranges from the top of the government to the ground level in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is no better example of oversight problems on the ground than in the Contracting Officer Representative (COR) for the Army. The COR is “a Federal employee appointed in writing, delegated limited responsibilities related to technical oversight and management of a specific contract” (COR Training Manuel). The Commission has described the COR as an “inherently governmental position” and has been rather disturbed by the fact that, often times, contractors are placed in COR roles instead of government personnel. This creates a situation where you have contractors reporting to and being accountable to other contractors in the field, not to a certified representative of the United States Government. The Contracting Officer Representative is a crucial “on the ground” link between the government and the contractors in the field. This is the person dealing with contractors and contracting needs on a daily basis and reporting back to the government on what is happening in the field. These reports are vital to ensure important contracts that are crucial to military operations are being carried out effectively and efficiently. These contracts range from the training of the Afghan National Police to ensuring our bases are provided with basic services such as electrical upkeep. As you might assume, this person undergoes years of training and has extensive experience in dealing with private contractors before being appointed to this important task. A college professor of mine once said, “assumption is a dangerous notion.” In many cases they do not undergo years of training, the training time for a COR is roughly two weeks, plus an online course.

Readiness – Uniqueness – Dependent on PMC’s Now

Dependence on PMC’s now – they were key to the initial Iraq invasion.
Kurlantzick 3 (Outsourcing the Dirty Work The military and its reliance on hired guns By Joshua Kurlantzick The American Prospect, May 2003, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/New_World_Order/Outsourcing_Dirty_Work.html)KM

The war in Iraq could not have taken place without a network of for profit contractors upon which the U.S. military has come to depend. Some 20,000 employees of private military companies (PMC’s) and of more traditional military contractors accompanied the U.S. forces in the buildup to war in the Middle East. They maintained computers and communications systems in Kuwait, Qatar and other locations, handled many aspects of logistics as the military's supply lines moved through Iraq and helped the Pentagon identify key targets in Iraq. As hostilities began, many of these PMC employees were integral to the American effort, keeping communications secure, assisting with the reopening of Iraq's southern oil fields and performing many other crucial tasks, often right behind the front lines. Brookings Institution fellow Peter W. Singer, author of the forthcoming Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, believes that the number of contract employees used by the military in this Iraq War is significantly higher than in the Gulf War. In fact, Singer estimates, the Pentagon may be using nearly 1o times as many contract employees as it did in 1991. Indeed, whereas there were fewer than 1o PMC’s in the United States two decades ago, today there are more than 30. Many are based in northern Virginia, giving them close access to Pentagon officials. Reston, Va.-based DynCorp, one of the larger companies, saw its revenues increase by more than 15 percent in 2002. According to Ed Soyster, former head of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency and now a spokesman for Alexandria, Va.-based Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), his PMC has grown from eight employees in 1988 to more than goo today. Meanwhile, shares of publicly traded PMC’s, such as DynCorp, have skyrocketed even as the broader American stock markets have tanked. This dependence on PMC’s is a relatively new phenomenon. During most of the 20th century, such organizations established reputations for brutal behavior. Hard-drinking European guns-for-hire such as "Mad" Mike Hoare took part in bloody coups in Africa. One infamous mercenary, Bob Denard, even made himself dictator of Africa's Comoros Islands. The end of the Cold War helped fuel the rise of PMC’s by reducing the need to maintain an enormous standing military capable of fighting another superpower. The Pentagon reduced the armed forces from ~ million in 199l to 1.4 million today. "Because conflicts now are more localized, smaller numbers of soldiers can win a battle, and there was more fear in the Pentagon about sending soldiers on dangerous missions, so they began turning to contractors," says PMC expert Deborah D. Avant, an associate professor at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs.