Human Rights and Prisons

3.3 The Re-introduction of Private Prisons

Concerns about rising costs, in the face of increased prisoner populations, are among the reasons leading to the reintroduction of private enterprise in prison management. The Corrections (Contract Management of Prisons) Amendment Act 2009 enables prison management to be contracted to private parties. In the 2010/11 financial round, it is estimated that $12.9mn will be dedicated to prepare for and manage contracts for private prisons (The Treasury, 2010). Related prison construction, between 2009 and 2018, is expected to cost over $1.5bn.

Thus far, two main sites will be contracted out. These will be the new prison at Wiri (a 1,000 bed male prison that is expected to be operational by 2014) and the redeveloped Mount Eden/Auckland Central Remand Prison. In the latter case, two new accommodation buildings, one being eight storeys high, opened in March 2011 and the prison is run by Serco.
The application of a business model to the running of prisons has been the subject of much debate, not least because it raises a major ethical question – to what extent should private companies profit from the pains of imprisonment? In the USA, UK and Australia, a number of firms – such as Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, Cornell Corrections, Group 4, Serco, Kalyx, and Corrections Corporation of Australia (a subsidiary of Corrections Corporations of America) – have enjoyed significant financial returns from their management of penal establishments. This situation has led many to argue that such punishments should be solely inflicted by state agencies. In New Zealand, this stance led the Labour Party to stop the contract of Australian Correctional Management (ACM), who ran the Auckland Central Remand Prison (ACRP) from 1999 to 2005.
The introduction of private prisons has raised numerous issues. These relate, among other things, to:

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  The Treatment of Prisoners – Drawing primarily on the US experience, the edited collection by Coyle et al (2003) demonstrates that private prisons have led to degrading prison conditions, the increased misuse of force, decreased security and inadequate services (relating to health, education, work and programmes for prisoners). Overall, contributors all claim that private prisons have resulted in the widescale violation of prisoners’ human rights. While the US case is generally cast as one in extremis, these charges have also been made against private prisons in Australia and the UK (George, 2003; Nathan, 2003; Taylor and Cooper, 2008, see also Inspectorate Reports). The UN’s Human Rights Committee (2010) has also shown concern at prison privatization in relation to whether private companies will meet the human rights protections accorded to New Zealand prisoners.
  

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  The Treatment of Staff – International literature is fairly consistent in terms of arguments about the treatment of staff. Private providers tend to employ fewer and younger/less experienced staff than public prisons, and privatization is regularly determined to be detrimental to staff pay and conditions (Mehigan and Rowe, 2007; Taylor and Cooper, 2008). Sachdev (2008:89) notes that ‘The evidence that the pay and conditions in private prisons are markedly inferior to those in the public sector is overwhelming and mostly uncontested’. He also presents data to show that, as a consequence of pay conditions, labour turnover rates in private prisons are ten times higher than public prisons.
  

In May 2009, the PSA surveyed its Corrections members on the issue of private prisons in New Zealand. Over 70% respondents (the survey response rate is unclear) had a strongly negative view of privatised prisons. Over half of all respondents were particularly concerned about staff safety, pay and conditions, staff turnover, costs, prison performance, prison accountability, the ability of private prisons to respond to particular groups and prison culture.

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  Costs – Concerns about prisoner and staff treatment generally revolve around the idea that private companies make expenditure cuts to secure a profit. Yet, lower costs are a key motivating factor for governments to pursue private tenders. For instance, Infrastructure Minister Bill English said that the public-private partnership in New Zealand ‘will offer savings of between 10 and 20 per cent’ over the 25-35 year life of Wiri prison (English and Collins, 2010). From the literature, data on financial benefits is rather unclear. For instance, US-based meta-analyses have found that private prisons are no more cost effective than public prisons (Lundahl et al, 2009; Pratt and Maahs, 1999). Closer to home, the Public Service Association (PSA, 2010) has argued that, between 2000 and 2005, the privatised ACRP cost $7,000 more per remand prisoner than equivalent service in the public sector.
  

Certainly, there are a number of issues at play: (i) it is very difficult to compare prisons as they each operate with different populations; (ii) privatised prisons have often tended to be remand (as in the case of ACRP) or low security establishments. This has meant that contractors are often shielded from the most resource-intensive prisoners – such as sentenced prisoners who will access expensive rehabilitation programmes or higher-security prisoners who may require increased staff interventions; (iii) private prisons may involve ‘hidden costs’ to governments – for instance, what happens if a private prison has a major disturbance?; and, finally (iv) the small number of contractors can mean that competition is quickly eroded (Mehigan and Rowe, 2007).

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  Monitoring – The previous points infer that monitoring is very important in a privatised environment. Private prison staff, like their public counterparts, have significant discretion in how they treat prisoners – from day to day interactions, to classification or early release processes. Accountability, then, is crucial. The Corrections Amendment Act 2009 does include requirements that contractors comply with relevant international obligations and standards and report regularly to the Chief Executive of Corrections on a range of matters including staff training, prison programmes, prisoner complaints, disciplinary actions, and incidents involving violence or self-inflicted injuries. Reports are provided by a fulltime prison monitor based in each contract managed prison. The Prison Inspectorate and the Office of the Ombudsmen also retain their investigative powers.
  

Yet, it is clear that not all private prisons are the same. While the lowest performing private prisons may rank amongst the worst (BBC News, 2008), the best private prisons can outperform public prisons. A few private companies have run prisons that: were regarded by monitors as very safe and humane; opened up prisoner access to ‘outsiders’; engaged in innovative programmes; and, enjoyed freedom from entrenched negative prison cultures (Mehigan and Rowe, 2007). Some of these results have, however, been short-lived. In the UK, for instance, several private prisons enjoyed good reports in their early years – new staff and new buildings contributed to relaxed and positive regimes. Over time, as cultures changed and buildings deteriorated, these prisons have faced significant problems (Shefer and Liebling, 2008).

It must also be remembered that private prisons do not reduce systemic pressures. ‘Building your way’ out of ‘overcrowding’ just does not work – principally because it leads to the increased use of imprisonment. In practice, ‘prison spaces will invariably be filled once they are built’ (Mehigan and Rowe, 2007:372). Further, companies involved in the prison ‘business’ do have a real interest in ensuring that prisoner numbers continue to rise (Feeley, 2002). And, ultimately, continual increases in prison populations, whether they are housed by state officials or private contractors, result in a range of negative outcomes, some of which are identified in this report.