Trends in conflict resolution practices to address insurgencies
Analysis of South Africa’s peacemaking efforts in Burundi, Lesotho and South Sudan
Many countries across the world are built on unstable and unsustainable foundations:
Many countries across the world are built on unstable and unsustainable foundations:
rising social and economic inequality
high unemployment
persistent levels of relative poverty
In the long term, countries must strive to ensure that all citizens develop the necessary skills, are supported with meaningful opportunities, and ensured a basic level of capital to improve their lives
The short term, however, presents significant instabilities and threats to peace, security and development
Shift from single party states into multi-party democracies, rise of coalition politics and heightened competition for political power (e.g. 3rd Term Debates)
Shift from single party states into multi-party democracies, rise of coalition politics and heightened competition for political power (e.g. 3rd Term Debates)
Challenges for political parties: Shift from liberation movements to governing parties hegemonic political parties or fragmented, identity-driven parties in coalition systems
Poor quality of governance and administrative institutions:
Inefficient policy implementation and service delivery
Small and low tax bases
Exclusive political processes and narrow policy outcomes
Diverse, Complex, and globalised forms of illicit trade
Diverse, Complex, and globalised forms of illicit trade
Estimated cost of organised crime: ~ $870 billion/year
Illicit Financial Outflows (50% of value of all illicit trade in Africa)
Tax evasion, money laundering, mispricing schemes
Total illicit financial outflows from Africa ~ $1 trillion (1970-2010)
Losses of more than $50 billion / year (Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Outflows from Africa)
Transnational Organised Crime
Narcotics, human trafficking, small arms and light weapons, maritime piracy
Wildlife and Forest Crimes
Illegal exploitation, trade, poaching of plants and animals (e.g. timber, ivory)
Changing nature of governance and civic engagement
Rise of “individual governance”
increasing pressure on the State to adapt and modrenise
Greater expectations for service delivery and efficient policy implementation
Increase in protest globally: from 2006 (59) to 2013 (112)
Why? Mismanagement of the economic crisis; high fuel and food prices; austerity; demands for ending poverty and structural inequalities; calls for improved governance and ending corruption
49% of all food-related riots btw 2006 and 2013 were in sub-saharan Africa
Burkina Faso, Burundi, DR Congo: popular protests over critical governance and constitutional debates
Driven by continued prevalence of conflict, inadequate long-term migration plans, lack of sufficient funding
Driven by continued prevalence of conflict, inadequate long-term migration plans, lack of sufficient funding
Threatens human security, affected persons vulnerable to violence and marginalization
Great pressures on affected countries and those countries hosting refugees
More than 144,000 individuals have left Burundi since April:
66,000 to Tanzania; 56,000 to Rwanda; 11,500 to DRC; 9,000 to Uganda
Mediterranean migration crisis: in 2015, 182,000 asylum seekers have crossed the sea from the African continent, with estimated 2,000 fatalities
Political, radicalised ideologies, asymmetrical approach to combat
Political, radicalised ideologies, asymmetrical approach to combat
Amorphous and opaque organisations: some highly complex and intricate, others with less coherence and strategic alignment
Whom do they represent? What are their interests?
Grievances rooted in historical inequalities, diverse manifestations and motivations for violence
Regional and global links vis-à-vis ideologies, funding and resources
“Poverty, illiteracy, high rates of unemployment
“Poverty, illiteracy, high rates of unemployment
Poor working conditions and insufficient training and capacities of law enforcement
Government institutional weaknesses, poor control of borders, low and insufficient administrative coverage of large territorial expanses
Proliferation of transnational organised crime, illicit trade, and human trafficking
Transformation of insurgent motivations beyond traditional zones of warfare (e.g. transnational motivations, asymmetric warfare)”
LIBYA
LIBYA
NIGERIA / LAKE CHAD BASIN AREA
SOMALIA / KENYA
MALI / SAHEL BELT
Disintegration of state apparatus, loss of effective control over territories and militias following regime change of Libyan Leader Qaddaffi in September 2011
Disintegration of state apparatus, loss of effective control over territories and militias following regime change of Libyan Leader Qaddaffi in September 2011
Decentralised and localised security forces and armed militias, formed along narrow identity markers, now compete with one another for power, influence and resources (e.g. oil, tax revenue from population), largely unaccountable to political structures
Deadlocked political negotiations between rival institutions (House of Representatives and General National Congress) detract from State’s administrative capacities and the effective implementation of any security sector reforms
Consequent decline in human security has contributed to further radicalisation of Libyan youth and provided a fertile breeding ground for foreign terrorist groups to establish foothold on the continent
Libya as a direct conduit for the spread of of weapons (both small arms and military grade weapons), illicit narcotics and trafficking of humans throughout North Africa and the African Sahel
Instability in Libya accelerating security challenges in neighbouring countries (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt, Sahel region) as well as in Mediterranean countries (e.g. Greece and Italy) due to unrestricted movement of weapons, persons and flow of refugees
Emergence of Boko Haram finds roots in ethnic/religious/developmental marginalisation of northern communities of Nigeria, tracing back to early 1800s
Emergence of Boko Haram finds roots in ethnic/religious/developmental marginalisation of northern communities of Nigeria, tracing back to early 1800s
Boko Haram, in its earliest incarnations, emerged in 2002 as an internally-focused movement against perceived Western influence over Nigerian government and society, specifically in terms of social and political issues; early forms of Boko Haram comprised both moderate and radicalised wings
Following failed diplomatic negotiations with former President Obsanajo in 2009 and heavy-handed security response against Boko Haram sects, movement turned radical and began undertaking conventional terrorist activities, namely through human rights violations against civilians and through destruction of state property
Severe underdevelopment and unemployment in Nigeria’s northern states, widespread corruption throughout military and Executive Administration of former President Jonathan (including accusations that some officials actively collaborated with factions of Boko Haram), contributed to Boko Haram’s enhanced capacities to mobilise young Nigerians and grow in military strength
Duration of insurgency has led to massive outflows of refugees into neighbouring countries and placed great strain on administrative and security capacities of Lake Chad Basin region. Current President Buhari has committed to defeating Boko Haram (in collaboration with Chad, Niger) under AU and UN-mandated Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF)
Boko Haram’s public pledge to ISIL more indicator of ideological overlap, mobilisation strategy, and quest to secure greater resources than explicit commitment to internationalise its conflict
Al Shabaab emanates from radicalised remnants of Islamic Courts Union, which controlled south-central Somalia from 2000 until invasion of Mogadishu by Ethiopian-led forces in January 2007
Al Shabaab emanates from radicalised remnants of Islamic Courts Union, which controlled south-central Somalia from 2000 until invasion of Mogadishu by Ethiopian-led forces in January 2007
Al-Shabaab initially focused on eliminating all external influence and interference from Somalia (including the Transitional Federal Government from 2007-2012); Al-Shabaab’s ideologies rooted in fundamentalist view of political Islam
Al-Shabaab largely adhered to Islamic fundamentalism and committed human rights abuses against Somali population, however was supported to some extent by the Somali population - members of Al Shabaab provided basic services, such as water provisions and basic security, to those under its control; however this support largely evaporated following Al-Shabaab’s decision to prevent the delivery of food aid during the famine in 2011
AMISOM peacekeeping force, together with the Somali National Army, have actively combatted Al-Shabaab both in Mogadishu and throughout southern Somalia to some degrees of success. However Al-Shabaab’s employ of asymmetric warfare heightens the complexities of permanently defeating its forces. In recent months suicide bombings and assassination attempts have increased in Mogadishu despite progress in liberating other regions of Somalia
Kenya’s decision in 2011 to actively confront Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia has accelerated the conflict in northern Kenya. Al-Shabaab has capitalised on structural, economic and socio-cultural disparities in northern Kenya to mobilise and radicalise Kenyan nationals of Somali descent to launch attacks inside of Kenya.
Despite Al-Shabaab’s public allegiance to ISIL, there is no indication that Al-Shabaab would internationalise its own activities beyond Somalia/Kenya. Somalia presents more of a concern to international peace and security as it is a channel for the free movement of illicit goods, weapons, and human trafficking.
Current dynamics in Mali rooted in decades- long contestations by Tuareg communities for greater autonomy and development focus (2012 coup d’etat was fourth Tuareg rebellion since 1960). Massive influx of arms from Libya between 2011-2012 contributed to more aggressive posturing by Tuareg communities and has been considered amongst the sparks of the uprising.
Current dynamics in Mali rooted in decades- long contestations by Tuareg communities for greater autonomy and development focus (2012 coup d’etat was fourth Tuareg rebellion since 1960). Massive influx of arms from Libya between 2011-2012 contributed to more aggressive posturing by Tuareg communities and has been considered amongst the sparks of the uprising.
Between 2012-2015, the Malian government and a number of the armed groups in northern Mali have strived to negotiate an all inclusive peace agreement that addressed the northern communities’ long-standing grievances
Agreement was signed on 15 May 2015 with a number of groups based in northern Mali
Criterion for inclusion in the peace talks was that they did not renounce the territorial integrity of Mali and did not commit any acts of terrorism
International forces have been in Mali since late 2012, starting with France (Operation Sérval), AFISMA (AU-mandated Peace Support Operation) and MINUSMA (UN-mandated Peacekeeping Force). MINUSMA’s mandate enables the mission to use “all means necessary” to ensure the restoration of state authority and the protection of civilians
Insurgent groups operating in Mali and the Sahel belt include: Ansar al-Dine, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Arica (Mujao).
Groups are increasing involved in violent attacks that target civilians, local authorities, UN peacekeepers and humanitarian organisations, active throughout the Sahel region and are linked with continental and global routes for transnational organised crime
Central African Republic/Uganda
Central African Republic/Uganda
Egypt
Sudan
Western Sahara
No definitive or undisputed conclusions from broad base of literature assessing economic impacts of insurgencies, but some important considerations do emerge:
No definitive or undisputed conclusions from broad base of literature assessing economic impacts of insurgencies, but some important considerations do emerge:
Higher industrial economic growth (as opposed to agricultural growth) is associated with lower levels of international and domestic terrorist violence, but also correlated with higher levels of suicide attacks (SW Choi, 2015)
Terrorism impacts economies through: national income losses and growth reduction, dampened foreign investment, impacts on international trade, Smaller developing economies are more economically vulnerable to terrorism than those that are richer and diversified (IMF, 2015)
International terrorism affects bilateral and multilateral trade on medium and long term horizons (over 18 months after an attack) but not in the immediate aftermath (Egger and Gassbner, 2013)
Developed countries can curtail terrorism at home by limiting unskilled labour quotas and increasing skilled labour quotas; however restrictions on unskilled labour can also increase domestic terrorism inside of the host developing country (Bandyopadhyay and Sandler, 2014)
1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism
1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism
Any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or groups of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is intended to:
Intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
Create general insurrection in a State
Any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organising, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to abvoe
1998 Prohibition of Mercenary Activities & Regulation of Certain Activities in Countries of Armed Conflict Bill (amended 2006)
1998 Prohibition of Mercenary Activities & Regulation of Certain Activities in Countries of Armed Conflict Bill (amended 2006)
Intended to regulate mercenary activities of South Africans in armed conflict, as well as regulation of issues that might foster armed conflict, such as financing mercenaries and selling of arms (nationally or internationally)
2004 Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and related Activities Act 33
Intended to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities, to legislate criminal penalties for offenses connected with terrorist activities, to give effect to international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities, and to provide for measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities
1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism
1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism
2002 AU Plan of Action for the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism
2004 Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism
African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (CAERT) and the AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation
African Anti-Terrorism Model Law
African Mechanism for Police Cooperation - AFRIPOL
AU Peace and Security Council Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism (Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa)
SADC, in cooperation with CAERT and the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre is in the process of developing a Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Southern Africa
Military-based responses
Military-based responses
Dialogue-based responses
Nationally-driven responses
Nationally-driven responses
Tunisia: ‘State of Emergency’ legislation throughout the country
Egypt: ‘State of Emergency’ legislation in the North Sinai
Kenya: targeting of Kenyans of Somali descent in Northern Kenya as means of disrupting Al-Shabaab’s networks
Continental peacekeeping forces with ‘enforcement’ based mandates
AMISOM: Somalia
MINUSMA: Mali
African Capacities for the Immediate Responses to Crises (ACIRC) - currently deployed in the DRC with South African troops
French military operations in Central African Republic and Mali
United States counterterrorism activities through proliferation of drone activities, military support bases and special task force activities
How to engage in dialogue with radicalised non-state actors
How to engage in dialogue with radicalised non-state actors
Diametrically–opposed world views and ideologies
Incompatible demands
Asymmetrical warfare
To whom in radicalised non-state actors does one speak?
Are there moderate branches with the willingness to dialogue?
Do they have a mandate to represent the organisations?
Do they have influence over the insurgent wings of their movements? And if they reach agreements, to what extent can they keep their adhere and enforce their commitments?
Comprehensive national and continental legal frameworks to restrict broad range of ‘terrorist activities’. However challenge is ensuring that all countries ratify, domesticate, and implement these frameworks
Comprehensive national and continental legal frameworks to restrict broad range of ‘terrorist activities’. However challenge is ensuring that all countries ratify, domesticate, and implement these frameworks
Lack of coordination and coherence between national initiatives and continental frameworks. Slow development of regional frameworks to combat insurgent
Need for greater intelligence sharing and collaborative efforts, especially through Continental Early Warning Systems and National and Regional focal points to the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (CAERT)
Positive example of the 2013 Nouakchott Process on the Enhancement of Security Cooperation and the Operationalization of APSA in the Sahelo-Saharan region
SADC only now undertaking efforts to develop a regional strategy
Domestic legal responses to date are important steps forward but also possess negative externalities (e.g. immigration policies and remittance legislation in South Africa)
Domestic legal responses to date are important steps forward but also possess negative externalities (e.g. immigration policies and remittance legislation in South Africa)
Complexities inherent in issues in preventing and ending insurgencies
Deep seated grievances in local communities, originating from long-term imbalances in economic development and political inclusion, are at the root of forces that lead to radical mobilisation
Overemphasis on promoting military-driven counterterrorism responses versus building local police capacities (who are frontline of day-to-day engagements) and promoting trust between communities and military structures
Traditional military responses are often aimed at promoting immediate and short-term changes without addressing the underlying forces
Forces of globalisation (free movement of ideas and information, people, goods, capital) challenge efficacy of state-centric responses to insurgent activities
Need for balance of comprehensive solutions:
multi-faceted security capacities to mitigate immediate threats;
improved policing efforts to build stronger trust and relations with all communities and promote more positive security environment;
long-term systematic efforts by government and private sector to promote equitable development and reduce unemployment rates that underlie shifts towards radicalisation
Increase in refugee populations from across the continent lead to increase migration (both legal and illegal) into South Africa, placing greater strain on South Africa’s institutions and infrastructure
Increase in refugee populations from across the continent lead to increase migration (both legal and illegal) into South Africa, placing greater strain on South Africa’s institutions and infrastructure
South Africa’s strong links with economies outside the continent, position as a continental transit hub, and policing and border management challenges contribute to the rise of organised criminal activities throughout the continent relying on South Africa (e.g. human trafficking and narcotics trade)
Greater investment in security-based responses diverts limited financial resources from other development priorities
Heightened potential for ‘lone wolf attacks’ promotes increasing militarization of police, which could indirectly contribute to heightened tensions between police and local communities
Bilateral trade unlikely to be impacted in immediate future, but over long-term horizons insurgencies may weaken the economic fundamentals of important South African trade partners (e.g. Nigeria, Kenya). Tripartite Free-Trade Agreement (COMESA, EAC, SADC) as a long-term measure to ensure free trade.
Bilateral trade unlikely to be impacted in immediate future, but over long-term horizons insurgencies may weaken the economic fundamentals of important South African trade partners (e.g. Nigeria, Kenya). Tripartite Free-Trade Agreement (COMESA, EAC, SADC) as a long-term measure to ensure free trade.
Continued incidents of terrorism throughout the continent contributes to dominant negative narratives about the continent, and may dissuade inflows of foreign direct investment and tourism into South Africa
Illicit profits secured from transnational organised crime enable armed non-state actors to sustain their activities in conflict environments (e.g. Central African Republic) and therefore promote insecurity throughout the continent
Debate over 3rd term for current President Pierre Nkurunziza
Debate over 3rd term for current President Pierre Nkurunziza
Reading of Constitution and 2000 Arusha Agreement
April-May 2015: 40+ days of civil protests in Bujumbura (civil society, religious movements, individuals) protesting against 3rd term
May 2015: failed coup attempt by select army generals
Deployed the Minister in the Presidency as Special Envoy
Sent a State Security Agency delegation led by the Deputy Minister of State Security
Participated in the East African Community summit on Burundi led by the Deputy President
Deployed an inter-departmental elections monitoring team seconded to the South African Embassy in Burundi
Continued accusations of human rights violations on all sides of the conflict
Continued accusations of human rights violations on all sides of the conflict
South Sudan FY 2015 budget: $3.76 billion; budget shortfall of $2.4 billion
$720 million/yr in oil export revenue; $480 million/yr in tax revenue
(Sudan Tribune, 2015)
1.5 million IDPs in South Sudan, 559,000 South Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries
Circulation and discussion of AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan report to disputing parties
21 January 2015: Arusha Agreement on the Reunification of the SPLM
21 January 2015: Arusha Agreement on the Reunification of the SPLM
Agreement shepherded by CCM, with support of DP Ramaphosa
Process undertaken outside of IGAD Frameworks, but identified as a targeted strategy to address a root cause
March 2015: Breakdown of IGAD-led Peace Process
Last face-to-face meeting of the principals within the peace process structures on 03 March, unable to resolve most urgent outstanding issues (3rd Phase, 8th Session)
April 2015: decision to implement ‘IGAD-Plus Process’
IGAD Mediation Team (led by Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan)
AU ad-hoc Mediation Support Team (Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa)
United Nations and European Union (Observer Role)
Troika Countries (Norway, United Kingdom, United States) (Observer Role)
China (Observer Role)
01 June 2015: Delegation of SPLM G-10 return to South Sudan for first time since detainment
01 June 2015: Delegation of SPLM G-10 return to South Sudan for first time since detainment
Returned under the auspices of the Arusha Agreement
Shepherded by DP Ramaphosa and CCM President Kinana (as guarantors of Arusha Agreement)
SPLM-IO has not participated in the recent events in support of the Arusha Agreement
August 2015: Resumption of IGAD-Plus Mediation Process:
Outstanding Negotiation Issues: leadership structure in Executive Branch; Distribution of political power between SPLM and SPLM-IO in Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei States (oil-producing region), demilitarisation of Juba under international supervision
Increasing number of defections within SPLM-IO structures at leadership and grassroots levels
Threats that if an agreement is not reached by 17 August that sanctions and trade/arms embargos will be placed upon key stakeholders on both sides of the negotiations
Constitutional crisis in 2014 requiring urgent intervention of SADC
Constitutional crisis in 2014 requiring urgent intervention of SADC
Deployment of South African police to guard installations and key political figures and promote security sector reform
Maseru Facilitation Declaration and Security Accord:
Advancing elections to early 2015
February 2015 General Elections:
No outright winner of elections: All Basotho Congress (ABC) with 40 constituencies (215,000 votes); Democratic Congress (DC) with 37 constituents (218,000 votes);
Pakalitha Mosisili of DC forms coalition government and becomes Prime Minister
Environment of increasing political insecurity
Several members of the ABC, former government officials have fled to South Africa
June 2015: assassination of Lt General Maaparankoe Mohao, a suspended former LDF commander (and a respected ex-commander of the SADC standby force)
SADC Troika Organ for Politics, Defence and Security as lead stakeholder for implementing regional peacemaking response
SADC Troika Organ for Politics, Defence and Security as lead stakeholder for implementing regional peacemaking response
South Africa as chair of SADC Troika
DP Ramaphosa as SADC Facilitator for Lesotho
July 2015: Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State of the SADC Double Troika, hosted by President Zuma in Pretoria
SADC Ministerial Organ Troika Fact-finding Mission led by Minister of Defense Nosiviwe Mapisa Ngqakula into deteriorating political and security environment
Double Troika is made up of the Republics of Zimbabwe, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Malawi and the Kingdom of Lesotho
SADC Troika established Commission of Inquiry into death of Lt Gen Mohao and created an “oversight committee” to provide early warning and facilitate a new intervention is needed
SADC to receive update and recommendations at SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, 15-16 August 2015
Willingness to engage flexibly through different points of entry and to consolidate African-led initiatives
Willingness to engage flexibly through different points of entry and to consolidate African-led initiatives
i.e. bi-lateral relations, regional economic communities, party-to-party relations
Desire for South Africa to undertake collaborative approach to peace-making efforts and to position itself as an impartial stakeholder
Clear interest of ensuring stability and promoting the peaceful resolution of disputes, as envisioned through the consolidation of the country’s African Agenda
Challenges of enforcement in mediation efforts: how to incentivize without coercing (carrots vs. sticks), which stakeholder within a peacemaking process should be responsible for ensuring compliance
Longer term challenges: continued political instability in countries where South Africa has devoted significant diplomatic and financial resources over the past two decades – structural underpinnings of conflicts suggest that sustained engagements will be required for at least the next two decades
