International relations are based on patriarchal norms – states are constructed and legitimized through masculinity making violence inevitable

Western Feminism

Western feminism is limited in its applicability—it was instrumental in exporting global capitalism and imperialism to places like China

Shih 06

Shu-Mei Shih (an interdisciplinary scholar situated in the intersection

between ethnic studies, area studies, and comparative literature.), “Complicities of Western Feminism”, 2006, The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, Women's Studies Quarterly Vol. 34, No. 1/2, The Global & the Intimate (Spring - Summer, 2006), pp. 79-81
For a scholar situated ambiguously vis-a-vis so-called Western knowledge, a sincere appreciation of this powerful and timely essay by Hester Eistenstein does not come without a vague feeling of unease. There are so many points of agreement with the essay, such as the call for a more sharply anticapitalist feminist practice; there are also so many points of recognition - that, yes, similar experiences have been shared by many feminists, white or otherwise. But the feeling of unease does not fade away. A cynical way to explain this uneasiness is to say that by now it is obligatory for a woman of color to be skeptical of any internal debates within liberal feminism, including the soul-searching kind. But the fact of the matter is that this uneasiness is also, for lack of a better description, an existential condition for many women of color feminists. Reading Eisenstein's essay for me is akin to looking through a transparent or one-way mirror; where Eisenstein sees a mirror on her side I see a window from the other side looking in. I can see and read her essay from this side of the window with agreement and recognition, but the essay on the other side of the transparent mirror does not look back at me, nor does the mirror give my reflection back to me. Transparent mirrors are usually used for the opposite form of hierarchy where the gazed at is the object of scrutiny or surveillance by the gazer from the position of power, but here it is the one looked at that has the power of visibility as well as attraction. This is not to say that I am not an American or a Westernized subject. I live and work in the United States, and I may be counted as much a Westerner as anyone else, even though I don't have the "natural" look of a Westerner. American feminist tradition is as much my own as it is Eisenstein's, but our degree of ownership, whether self-recognized or recognized by others, is dramatically different, and we might claim different aspects of that tradition more as our own than we might other aspects. My relationship to the mainstream of this tradition, therefore, has always required a double consciousness on my part. The premise of this double consciousness is that there is no doubt that American feminism has contributed to the well-being of many women in the country on the one hand, and that this feminism is severely limited by its own class and race determinations on the other. For those women situated on the bottom end of the economic spectrum, there is no doubt that liberal feminism as social practice has always been intimately connected to and enhanced by capitalist development. For these women, there is no feminism without a political economy of feminism as a lived experience. A similar double consciousness can be seen in many third world feminists as well: importing American feminist ideas can be empowering for their causes within their local patriarchal societies, but these feminist ideas are limiting and limited in local application on the one hand, and the "original" owners of these ideas tend to be patronizing toward third world women on the other. A leading Chinese feminist, Li Xiaojiang, first incorporated Western feminism in order to criticize the hidden male-norm in socialist gender equality in China; thus Western liberal feminism for her was synonymous with something more modern and more advanced. When the unofficial demise of socialism gave way to the reentrenchment of gender hierarchy in all aspects of Chinese society, Western feminism should have found a verdant soil for its dissemination but for the socialist consciousness of someone like Li, who has instead voiced a strong criticism of the imperial and universalistic presumptions of Western feminism. There is no doubt that the reentry of Western feminism, as with its first appearance in early twentieth-century China, was conjunctural to China's enthusiastic (re)entry into global capitalism. Western feminism is part and parcel of capitalist modernity. Similarly, feminists and women activists in Taiwan, situated in a quickly modernizing and almost hyperdemocratized country, have always been reluctant to criticize Western feminism because they needed it as ammunition to challenge local patriarchal practices. Since their opponents' major criticism against them is precisely that feminism is a Western product that does not fit the situation in Taiwan, their major endeavor had to be to justify this feminism as universal and applicable to Taiwan and necessary in its becoming a more modern, advanced, and equitable nation. The fact that Taiwan has a relatively weak socialist feminist tradition also explains why a critique of Western feminism is not prevalent there. For Taiwan as well, then, Western feminism is a by-product of capitalism, modernity, and to use a term recently sullied by the Bush administration, democracy. When we consider the fact that Taiwan is a de facto colony of the United States, per Perry Anderson, we must also be cognizant of the colonial and neocolonial production and dissemination of Western knowledge, of which American feminism is a part. To put it differently, American feminism is able to travel to these places precisely because of the unprecedented spread of capitalist and modernist forms of socioeconomic, political, and cultural organization. Hence I find myself asking: Why is it such a revelation that American feminism has always been complicit with capitalism as well as modernity?

Realism Inevitable

Realism is inevitable – states will constantly strive to be the strongest and preclude other states from altering the balance of power.

Mearsheimer 1 [John J. Prof. of Poli Sci at U Chicago. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Pg 1-3] JL

Alas, the claim that security competition and war between the great powers have been purged from the international system is wrong. Indeed, there is much evidence that the promise of everlasting peace among the great powers was stillborn. Consider, for example, that even though the Soviet threat has disappeared, the United States still maintains about one hundred thousand troops in Europe and roughly the same number in Northeast Asia. It does so because it recognizes that dangerous rivalries would probably emerge among the major powers in these regions if U.S. troops were withdrawn. Moreover, almost every European state, including the United Kingdom and France, still harbors deep-seated, albeit muted, fears that a Germany unchecked by American power might behave aggressively; fear of Japan in Northeast Asia is probably even more profound, and it is certainly more frequently expressed. Finally, the possibility of a clash between China and the United States over Taiwan is hardly remote. This is not to say that such a war is likely, but the possibility reminds us that the threat of great-power war has not disappeared. The sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way. Although the intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power. The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system. There are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price.3 At times, the costs and risks of trying to shift the balance of power are too great, forcing great powers to wait for more favorable circumstances. But the desire for more power does not go away, unless a state achieves the ultimate goal of hegemony. Since no state is likely to achieve global hegemony, however, the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition. This unrelenting pursuit of power means that great powers are inclined to look for opportunities to alter the distribution of world power in their favor. They will seize these opportunities if they have the necessary capability. Simply pill, great powers are primed for offense. But not only does .real power seek to gain power at the expense of other states, it also thwart rivals bent on gaining power at its expense. Thus, a great power will defend the balance of power when looming change favors another state, and it will try to undermine the balance when the direction of change is in its own favor. Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to he secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other, Three features of the international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) the absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from each other, 2) the fact that states always have some offensive military capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other slates’ intentions. Given this fear—which can never be wholly eliminated—states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival. Indeed, the best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon, because no other state can seriously threaten such a mighty power.

Violence is inevitable—it’s human nature.

Thayer 4 (Bradley, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Study at Missouri State University, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict, AD: 7-11-9) BL

In chapter 2, I explain how evolutionary theory contributes to the realist theory of international relations and to rational choice analysis. First, realism, like the Darwinian view of the natural world, submits that international relations is a competitive and dangerous realm, where statesmen must strive to protect the interests of their state before the interests of others or international society. Traditional realist arguments rest principally on one of two discrete ultimate causes, or intellectual foundations of the theory. The first is Reinhold Niebuhr's argument that humans are evil. The second, anchored in the thought of Thomas Hobbes and Hans Morgenthau, is that humans possess an innate animus dominandi - a drive to dominate. From these foundations, Niebuhr and Morgenthau argue that what is true for the individual is also true of the state: because individuals are evil or possess a drive to dominate so too do states because their leaders are individuals who have these motivations. argue that realists have a much stronger foundation for the realist argument than that used by either Morgenthau or Niebuhr. My intent is to present an alternative ultimate cause of classical realism: evolutionary theory. The use of evolutionary theory allows realism to be scientifically grounded for the first time, because evolution explains egoism. Thus a scientific explanation provides a better foundation for their arguments than either theology or metaphysics. Moreover, evolutionary theory can anchor the branch of realism termed offensive realism and advanced most forcefully by John Mearsheimer. He argues that the anarchy of the international system, the fact that there is no world government, forces leaders of states to strive to maximize their relative power in order to be secure. I argue that theorists of international relations must recognize that human evolution occurred in an anarchic environment and that this explains why leaders act as offensive realism predicts. Humans evolved in anarchic conditions, and the implications of this are profound for theories of human behavior. It is also important to note at this point that my argument does not depend upon "anarchy" as it is traditionally used in the discipline - as the ordering principle of the post-1648 Westphalian state system. When human evolution is used to ground offensive realism, it immediately becomes a more powerful theory than is currently recognized. It explains more than just state behavior; it begins to explain human behavior. It applies equally to non-state actors, be they individuals, tribes, or organizations. Moreover, it explains this behavior before the creation of the modern state system. Offensive realists do not need an anarchic state system to advance their argument. They only need humans. Thus, their argument applies equally well before or after 1648, whenever humans form groups, be they tribes in Papua New Guinea, conflicting city-states in ancient Greece, organizations like the Catholic Church, or contemporary states in international relations.