• Business Day (South Africa): Emerging markets

investment which would effectively exclude them from accepting directorships

for purely financial reasons.
ESTABLISH INDEPENDENT NOMINATING COMMITTEE: FOR
Caywood-Scholl votes FOR proposals to establish entirely independent nominating

committees. We believe that having an independent Nominating Committee is one

way to assure that shareholder interests will be adequately addressed.
LIMIT TENURE OF DIRECTORS: AGAINST
Caywood-Scholl does not support shareholder proposals for term limits, as

limiting tenure may force valuable, experienced directors to leave the board

solely because of their length of service. We prefer to retain the ability to

evaluate director performance, and vote on all director nominees once a year.
DIRECTOR INDEMNIFICATION AND LIABILITY PROTECTION: CASE-BY-CASE
Caywood-Scholl votes AGAINST proposals that would limit or eliminate all

liability for monetary damages, for directors and officers who violate the duty

of care. Caywood-Scholl will also vote AGAINST proposals that would expand

indemnification to cover acts, such as negligence, that are more serious

violations of fiduciary obligations than mere carelessness. If, however, a

director was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that he

reasonably believed was in the best interest of the company, and if only the

director's legal expenses would be covered, Caywood-Scholl may vote FOR

expanded coverage.
SEPARATE CHAIRMAN/CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER: CASE-BY-CASE
Caywood-Scholl votes shareholder proposals to separate Chairman and CEO

positions on a case-by-case basis, and considers the impact on management

credibility and thus the value of the company. Caywood-
D-43
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Scholl generally votes FOR shareholder proposals requiring the position of

Chairman to be filled by an independent director, because a combined title can

make it difficult for the board to remove a CEO that has under performed, and

harder to challenge a CEO's decisions. We are, however, willing to accept a

combined title for companies whose outside directors hold regularly-scheduled

non-management meetings with a powerful and independent Lead Director.
DIVERSITY OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: CASE-BY-CASE
Caywood-Scholl reviews shareholder proposals that request a company to increase

the representation of women and minorities on the board, on a case-by-case

basis. Caywood-Scholl generally votes FOR requests for reports on the company's

efforts to diversify the board, unless the board composition is reasonably

inclusive of women and minorities in relation to companies of similar size and

business, and if the board already reports on its nominating procedures and

diversity initiatives.
EXECUTIVE AND DIRECTOR COMPENSATION
STOCK INCENTIVE PLANS: CASE-BY-CASE
Caywood-Scholl reviews stock incentive plan proposals on a case-by-case basis,

to determine whether the plan is in the best interest of shareholders. We

generally support stock incentive plans that are designed to attract, retain or

encourage executives and employees, while aligning their financial interests

with those of investors. We also prefer plans that limit the transfer of

shareholder wealth to insiders, and favor stock compensation in the form of

performance-based restricted stock over fixed price option plans.
Unless there is evidence that a plan would have a positive economic impact on

shareholder value, we generally vote against plans that result in excessive

dilution, and vote against plans that contain negative provisions, such as

repricing or replacing underwater options without shareholder approval.
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS REGARDING OPTIONS EXPENSING: FOR
Caywood-Scholl generally votes FOR shareholder proposals requesting companies

to disclose the cost of stock options as an expense on their income statement,

to clarify the company's earnings and profitability to shareholders.
ELIMINATE NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTOR RETIREMENT PLANS: FOR
Caywood-Scholl generally supports proposals to eliminate retirement benefits

for non-employee directors, as such plans can create conflicts of interest by

their high value. Additionally, such benefits are often redundant, since many

directors receive pension benefits from their primary employer.
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS REGARDING EXECUTIVE PAY: CASE-BY-CASE
Caywood-Scholl generally votes FOR shareholder proposals that request

additional disclosure of executive and director pay information, provided the

information requested is relevant to shareholders' needs, would not put the

company at a competitive disadvantage relative to its industry, and is not

unduly burdensome to the company.
We also vote FOR proposals to require option repricings to be put to a

shareholder vote, and FOR proposals to require shareholder votes on

compensation plans.
Caywood-Scholl votes AGAINST shareholder proposals that seek to set absolute

levels on compensation or otherwise dictate the amount or form of compensation,

and AGAINST shareholder proposals requiring director fees to be paid in stock

only.
D-44
===============================================================================
All other shareholder proposals regarding executive and director pay are voted

on a case-by-case basis, taking into account company performance, pay level

versus peers, pay level versus industry, and long term corporate outlook.
CAPITAL STRUCTURE
CAPITAL STOCK AUTHORIZATIONS: CASE-BY-CASE
Caywood-Scholl votes proposals for an increase in authorized shares of common

or preferred stock on a case-by-case basis, after analyzing the company's

industry and performance in terms of shareholder returns. We generally vote

AGAINST stock increases that are greater than 100 percent, unless the company

has provided a specific reason for the increase. We will also vote AGAINST

proposals for increases in which the stated purpose is to reserve additional

shares to implement a poison pill. (Note: see page 10, for more on preferred

stock).
STOCK SPLITS AND DIVIDENDS: CASE-BY-CASE
Caywood-Scholl generally votes FOR management proposals to increase common

share authorization for a stock split or share dividend, provided that the

increase in shares is not excessive. We also generally vote in favor

shareholder proposals to initiate a dividend, particularly in the case of poor

performing large cap companies with stock option plans result in excessive

dilution.
MERGERS AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING
MERGERS AND RESTRUCTURINGS: CASE-BY-CASE
A merger, restructuring, or spin-off in some way affects a change in control of

the company's assets. In evaluating the merit such transactions, Caywood-Scholl

will consider the terms of each proposal and will analyze the potential long-

term value of the investment. Caywood-Scholl will support management proposals

for a merger or restructuring if the transaction appears to offer fair value,

but may oppose them if they include significant changes to corporate governance

and takeover defenses that are not in the best interest of shareholders.
PREVENT A COMPANY FROM PAYING GREENMAIL: FOR
Greenmail is the payment a corporate raider receives for his/her shares. This

payment is usually at a premium to the market price, so while greenmail can

ensure the continued independence of the company, it discriminates against

other shareholders. Caywood-Scholl will generally vote FOR anti-greenmail

provisions.
GOLDEN PARACHUTES: CASE-BY-CASE
Caywood-Scholl votes FOR shareholder proposals to require golden and tin

parachutes (executive severance agreements) to be submitted for shareholder

ratification, unless the proposal requires shareholder approval prior to

entering into employment contracts. Proposals to ratify or cancel golden or tin

parachutes are evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Caywood-Scholl will vote

AGAINST parachute proposals, when the amount exceeds three times base salary

plus guaranteed benefits.
FAIR PRICE PROVISION: AGAINST
Standard fair price provisions require that, absent board or shareholder

approval of the acquisition, the bidder must pay the remaining shareholders the

same price for their shares as was paid to buy the control shares (usually

between five and twenty percent of the outstanding shares) that triggered the

provision. An
D-45
===============================================================================
acquirer may avoid such a pricing requirement by obtaining the support of

holders of at least a majority of disinterested shares. Such provisions may be

viewed as marginally favorable to the remaining disinterested shareholders,

since achieving a simple majority vote in favor of an attractive offer may not

be difficult.
Caywood-Scholl will vote AGAINST fair price provisions, if the shareholder vote

requirement, imbedded in the provision, is greater than a majority of

disinterested shares.
Caywood-Scholl will vote FOR shareholder proposals to lower the shareholder

vote requirements imbedded in existing fair price provisions.
STATE ANTITAKEOVER STATUTES: CASE-BY-CASE
Caywood-Scholl evaluates the specific statutes at issue, including their effect

on shareholder rights and votes proposals to opt out-of-state takeover statutes

on a case-by-case basis.
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS: CASE-BY-CASE
Caywood-Scholl evaluates corporate restructuring management proposals on a

case-by-case basis. With respect to a proxy proposal that includes a spin-off,

Caywood-Scholl may consider the tax and regulatory advantages, planned use of

sale proceeds, market focus, and managerial incentives. With respect to a proxy

proposal that includes an asset sale, Caywood-Scholl may consider the impact on

the balance sheet or working capital and the value received for the asset. With

respect to a proxy proposal that includes a liquidation, Caywood-Scholl may

consider management's efforts to pursue alternatives, the appraisal value of

assets, and the compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation.
ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES AND VOTING RELATED ISSUES
POISON PILLS: CASE-BY-CASE
Caywood-Scholl votes AGAINST poison pills or (or shareholder rights plans)

proposed by a company's management. Poison pills are triggered by an unwanted

takeover attempt and cause a variety of events to occur which may make the

company financially less attractive to the suitor. Typically, directors have

enacted these plans without shareholder approval.
Caywood-Scholl will always vote FOR shareholder proposals requesting boards to

submit their pills to a shareholder vote or redeem them, as poison pills may

lead to management entrenchment and can discourage legitimate tender offers.
DUAL CLASS CAPITALIZATION WITH UNEQUAL VOTING RIGHTS: CASE-BY-CASE
Caywood-Scholl will vote AGAINST dual class exchange offers and dual class

capitalizations with unequal voting rights as they can contribute to the

entrenchment of management and allow for voting power to be concentrated in the

hands of management and other insiders. Caywood-Scholl will vote FOR proposals

to create a new class of nonvoting or subvoting common stock if intended for

purposes with minimal or no dilution to current shareholders or not designed to

preserve voting power of insiders or significant shareholders.
BLANK CHECK PREFERRED STOCK: CASE-BY-CASE
Blank check proposals authorize a class of preferred stock for which voting

rights are not established in advance, but are left to the discretion of the

Board of Directors when issued. Such proposals may give management needed

flexibility to accomplish acquisitions, mergers or financings. On the other

hand, such proposals also give the board the ability to place a block of stock

with a shareholder sympathetic to management, thereby entrenching management or

making takeovers more difficult.

Document MFPE000020070718e37d002s4

FT.com site : THE NEW OLIGARCHS: Mega-rich deploy wealth closer to home.
William Wallis

913 words

12 July 2007

Financial Times (FT.Com)

FTCOM

English

(c) 2007 The Financial Times Limited. All rights reserved
When the military ruled Nigeria, it was the generals who boasted most of the fattest bank accounts. They were careful to keep these far offshore. By contrast, eight years of civilian rule has seen the emergence of a cabal of business tycoons whose net worth amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars and in some cases far more.
The temptation for taking short cuts on the road to riches has often been as great for entrepreneurs as it has for state officials. Now, according to a former senior government official, with the state starting to relinquish control of the commanding heights of the economy, there is a greater rapprochement between the two, with money from both public and private sources blending together.
Big business and some of the banks are heavily invested in the political system, just as politicians and government appointees are invested in the Nigerian banks and businesses making money, he says. There are significant changes, however, in the way Nigeria's newly mega-rich are deploying their wealth. In the past, the wealth was hoarded in banks abroad. Today, it is mostly being poured into business enterprises within Nigeria.
Transcorp, a holding company set up with government support, epitomises the process. Both politicians and business magnates have shares in it. Ndi Okereke-Onyiuke, the head of the Nigeria Stock Exchange, chairs the Transcorp board and former president Olusegun Obasanjo has his own stake held in a blind trust, his spokeswoman recently admitted.
Since its creation in 2005 the group has accumulated oil exploration blocks, the Hilton hotel in Abuja, state telecoms company Nitel, and, most recently, shares in two oil refineries. Mr Obasanjo unabashedly promoted a blend of raw capitalism and economic nationalism using import bans and other forms of government largesse to promote select Nigerian businesses and industries. One donor official says his most effective finance minister used to return from trips abroad to find fresh Customs duty waivers had been granted in her absence.
The environment to make fortunes at home has rarely been more propitious. The oil price on which Nigeria depends for about 95 per cent of exports has been at record levels, giving the government its strongest balance sheet in years.
Meanwhile, the global tightening of money laundering laws has meant that more questionably gotten gains are now circulating within Nigeria and a slew of state assets and oil exploration licences have been on the block.
Mr Obasanjo, whose own ties to big business have come under local scrutiny - and whose chicken farm may have benefited from a ban on poultry imports imposed in 2002 - says he drew inspiration from Asia.
"I was in South Korea in the 1980s and the people who grew the South Korean economy were about six: the Daewoos of this world, the Samsungs. But they allowed it to percolate down," he said in an interview with the FT shortly before he stood down on May 29. He added that there was no reason why, within 10 years, there should not be a Nigerian among the richest three people in the world.
"Why are the others making it and we are not making it? What makes the Russians' oligarchy or whatever you call it in China in India, more different?" he asked.
Among those Nigerians already in Africa's big league, five names regularly crop up, led by the merchant-turned-industrialist Aliko Dangote. When complete, the many cement factories his Dangote group is building - or has bought from the state - will give him overwhelming dominance in domestic and potentially regional markets. Mr Dangote also dominates the distribution of sugar and salt and the manufacture of flour products. He was among the beneficiaries of the sale of the two dilapidated state-owned oil refineries in the days before Mr Obasanjo relinquished power.
Also in that deal was Femi Otedola. A licence to import and distribute diesel has given his company, Zenon, control over a commodity on which businesses depend to run generators in the absence of reliable power from the grid. Two bankers close to Mr Obasanjo, Jim Ovia of Zenith bank and Tony Elumelu of United Bank of Africa, also feature among the super-rich. Their banks have wrestled for the largest slice of government business and for ascendancy in the top industry tier.
A fifth tycoon, Mike Adenuga, had rockier relations with the former president. Since Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission began investigating him last year, he has overseen his business empire - which includes Globacom, a telecoms company, as well as a bank and oil interests - from London.
A host of other operators have climbed some way up the ladder with or without state support. In political circles it is thought unlikely that the incoming administration will challenge directly the ascendancy that Nigeria's richest businessmen have gained in various sectors. For one, many of the companies they control have listed stocks. Ordinary retail investors therefore have an interest in their continued strength.
But with most Nigerians still living in poverty, Umaru Yar'Adua, the new president, may require a gesture from the principal beneficiaries of the boom. In an interview with the FT, he says he has asked a group of "around five" tycoons to finance a low interest N50bn micro-finance fund. This will be aimed at promoting the enterprise of the little man, starved to date of credit.
57302161
Document FTCOM00020070713e37c0000r

FT REPORT - NIGERIA

Mega-rich deploy wealth closer to home - THE NEW OLIGARCHS.

By WILLIAM WALLIS

915 words

12 July 2007

Financial Times

FTFT

Surveys NIG1

Page 11

English

(c) 2007 The Financial Times Limited. All rights reserved
When the military ruled Nigeria, it was the generals who boasted most of the fattest bank accounts. They were careful to keep these far offshore. By contrast, eight years of civilian rule has seen the emergence of a cabal of business tycoons whose net worth amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars and in some cases far more.
The temptation for taking short cuts on the road to riches has often been as great for entrepreneurs as it has for state officials. Now, according to a former senior government official, with the state starting to relinquish control of the commanding heights of the economy, there is a greater rapprochement between the two, with money from both public and private sources blending together.
Big business and some of the banks are heavily invested in the political system, just as politicians and government appointees are invested in the Nigerian banks and businesses making money, he says. There are significant changes, however, in the way Nigeria's newly mega-rich are deploying their wealth. In the past, the wealth was hoarded in banks abroad. Today, it is mostly being poured into business enterprises within Nigeria.
Transcorp, a holding company set up with government support, epitomises the process. Both politicians and business magnates have shares in it. Ndi Okereke-Onyiuke, the head of the Nigeria Stock Exchange, chairs the Transcorp board and former president Olusegun Obasanjo has his own stake held in a blind trust, his spokeswoman recently admitted.
Since its creation in 2005 the group has accumulated oil exploration blocks, the Hilton hotel in Abuja, state