Nsa affirmative

Answers to US not modelled

(___)

(__) Domestic surveillance limits are modelled.

Deeks, Associate Professor, University of Virginia Law School, 2015
(Ashley.. "An International Legal Framework for Surveillance." Virginia Journal of International Law 55 (2015): 2014-53)

In considering the inspiration for the norms that should emerge, the Article argues that the most promising source of new international norms is domestic law. Domestic laws can and do serve as the basis for international legal developments, particularly in the face of highly politicized issues, non-reciprocal incentive structures, issue complexity, and different conceptions of the proper legal framework — all of which are present in the surveillance debate.5 Further, domestic surveillance laws have been test-driven in the real world and reflect concerted efforts by particular polities to balance liberty and security. As a result, the Article draws from the domestic surveillance laws of various states to extract six procedural principles that states should adopt on the international plane. The norms that first emerge will not immediately constitute customary international law (“CIL”), but will serve as the grain of sand around which the pearl of CIL can form.

In effect, this Article rejects both an aggressively cynical approach to foreign surveillance and an unduly optimistic view that states will converge around robust international privacy protections in the short term. The cynics assume that whatever pressures currently exist to modify the status quo will diminish in short order, overtaken by subsequent geopolitical crises.

6 The optimists argue that states should develop the substantive principle of privacy contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and have robust aspirations for what that principle should contain.7 Both of these approaches are flawed, normatively and predictively. The cynics underestimate both the enduring nature of human rights pressures on states and the benefits to states of creating new international legal rules in this area. The optimists underestimate the difficulty of agreeing on concrete, substantive norms in a multilateral setting among states with varied incentives. For this reason, states should focus first on establishing procedural limitations that reduce (though not eliminate) differences between their treatment of citizens and foreigners.

Answers to Democracy doesn’t solve war

(___)

(__) Democracy incrementally reduces the risk of war and systemic harms

Rummel, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, 2007
(R.J., 9/7, Why Freedom? Let Me Count the Reasons, http://freedomspeace.blogspot.com/2007/09/why-freedom-let-me-count-reasons.html,)

Democratically free people do not make war on each other Why? The diverse groups, cross-national bonds, social links, and shared values of democratic peoples sew them together; and shared liberal values dispose them toward peaceful negotiation and compromise with each other. It is as though the people of democratic nations were one society This truth that democracies do not make war on each other provides a solution for eliminating war from the world: globalize democratic freedom Second: The less free the people within any two nations are, the bloodier and more destructive the wars between them; the greater their freedom, the less likely such wars become And third: The more freedom the people of a nation have, the less bloody and destructive their wars What this means is that we do not have to wait for all, or almost all nations to become liberal democracies to reduce the severity of war. As we promote freedom, as the people of more and more nations gain greater human rights and political liberties, as those people without any freedom become partly free, we will decrease the bloodiness of the world’s wars. We have already seen this in the sharp decrease in world violence with the great increase in the number of democracies. In short: Increasing freedom in the world decreases the death toll of its wars. Surely, whatever reduces and then finally ends the scourge of war in our history, without causing a greater evil, must be a moral good. And this is freedom In conclusion, then, we have wondrous human freedom as a moral force for the good. Freedom produces social justice, creates wealth and prosperity, minimizes violence, saves human lives, and is a solution to war. In two words, it creates human security. Moreover, and most important: People should not be free only because it is good for them. They should be free because it is their right as human beings In opposition to freedom is power, its antagonist. While freedom is a right, the power to govern is a privilege granted by a people to those they elect and hold responsible for its use. Too often, however, thugs seize control of a people with their guns and use them to make their power total and absolute. Where freedom produces wealth and prosperity, such absolute power causes impoverishment and famine. Where freedom minimizes internal violence, eliminates genocide and mass murder, and solves the problem of war, such absolute power unleashes internal violence, murders millions, and produces the bloodiest wars. In short, power kills; absolute power kills absolutely.

Answers to USA Freedom Act Solves

(___)

(__) Reforming PRISM is more important than metadata and the USA Freedom Act.

Kaplan, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, 2015
(Fred, 6-8-2015, "One Thing About the NSA That Should Still Worry Us," Slate Magazine, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2015/06/the_national_security_agency_s_surveillance_and_the_usa_freedom_act_the.html)

For now, surveillance through telephone metadata is pretty sparse. In 2012, the NSA queried the database for 288 U.S. telephone numbers. As a result of those queries, the agency passed just 12 tips to the FBI. None of those tips led to the capture of a single terrorist or the halting of a terrorist plot. In fact, according to President Obama’s independent commission on NSA reform, the telephone metadata program has never had any impact on countering terrorism.

A separate program called PRISM—authorized under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act—lets the NSA track foreign terrorists and adversaries by intercepting their Internet traffic as it zips through U.S.–based servers. (Because of the nature of the technology, about 80 percent of the world’s Internet traffic passes through U.S. servers at some point.) PRISM was another highly classified NSA program that Snowden uncovered. The Washington Post and the Guardian made it the subject of their Day 2 Snowden stories (right after the revelations about telephone metadata). Yet PRISM isn’t touched at all by the USA Freedom Act, nor does any serious politician propose overhauling it. This is the case, even though PRISM data-mining is a much bigger program than telephone metadata ever was, and it’s potentially more intrusive, since it’s hard to know whether, at first glance, an IP address belongs to an American or a foreigner.

Answers to USA Freedom Act Solves

(__) Section 702 needs to be limited, the Freedom Act did not go far enough.

Vladeck, co-editor-in-chief of Just Security and Law Professor at American University, 2015,
(Stephen,6-1-2015, "Forget the Patriot Act – Here Are the Privacy Violations You Should Be Worried About," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/01/section-215-patriot-act-expires-surveillance-continues-fisa-court-metadata/)

To put the matter bluntly, whereas the Section 215 debate has addressed whether the government can collect our phone records, Executive Order 12333 and the 2008 FISA Amendments Act allow the government to collect a lot of what we’re actually saying, whether on the phone, in our emails, or even to our search engines.

There is no question that, from a privacy perspective, these programs are far more pernicious than what’s been pegged to Section 215. There is also no question that such collection raises even graver constitutional questions than the phone records program. Whereas there is an open debate over our expectation of privacy in the metadata we voluntarily provide to our phone companies, there’s no doubt that we have an expectation of privacy in the content of our private communications.Why, then, has all the fuss been around Section 215 and the phone records program, while the far more troubling surveillance authorities provided by Executive Order 12333 and the 2008 FISA Amendments Act have flown under the radar? Part of it may be because of the complexities described above. After all, it’s easy for people on the street to understand what it means when the government is collecting our phone records; it’s not nearly as obvious why we should be bothered by violations of minimization requirements. Part of it may also have to do with the government’s perceived intent. Maybe it seems more troubling when the government is intentionally collecting our phone records, as opposed to “incidentally” (albeit knowingly) collecting the contents of our communications. And technology may play a role, too; how many senders of emails know where the server is located on which the message is ultimately stored? If we don’t realize how easily our communications might get bundled with those of non-citizens outside the United States, we might not be worried about surveillance targeted at them. But whatever the reason for our myopic focus on Section 215, it has not only obscured the larger privacy concerns raised by these other authorities, but also the deeper lessons we should have taken away from Snowden’s revelations. However much we might tolerate, or even embrace, the need for secret government surveillance programs, it is all-but-inevitable that those programs will be stretched to — and beyond — their legal limits. That’s why it’s important not only to place substantive limits upon the government’s surveillance authorities, but also to ensure that they are subject to meaningful external oversight and accountability as well. And that’s why the denouement of Section 215 debate has been so disappointing. This should have been a conversation not just about the full range of government surveillance powers, including Executive Order 12333 and the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, but also about the role of the FISA Court and of congressional oversight in supervising those authorities. Instead, it devolved into an over-heated debate over an over-emphasized program. Congress has tended to a paper cut, while it ignored the internal bleeding. Not only does the expiration of Section 215 have no effect on the substance of other surveillance authorities, it also has no effect on their oversight and accountability.