Premier Debate 2016 September/October ld brief

AFF—Cap

Harms

Nuclear power will continue the problem of energy over consumption and will not come cheap

Verbruggen 08 [Aviel Verbruggen, Full professor at the University of Antwerp, Energy & Environmental Economist, "Renewable and nuclear power: A common future?" Energy Policy 36, 2008, 4036–4047] [Premier]

The myths of nuclear power as cheap and abundant (first wave), as solution for the oil crisis (second wave), as salvation against climate change (third wave, brought in position today), do not stand the test of reality and of the sustainability criteria (Table 2). On the diagnosis of the life-support system crisis, occasioned mainly by the over-use of commercial energy sources, nuclear and efficiency/renewable power diverge in opinion. As a corollary, their basic prescriptions/remedies for the obese energy patient diverge: nuclear power expansion is the continuation/extension of supplying overdoses, while efficiency/renewable power is the remedy for past and present obesity by a healthy diet with an adapted programme of exercising. I miss the imagination to see what the goal and meaning can be of combining fat and sugar bulk food with a cure of healthy dieting. When such combining takes place, the effects are mostly clear: obesity overcrowds health, because the former is bulky and uncontrolled and the latter requires understanding, self-control and permanent monitoring. The bulky approach of the past is not fitted to develop the slim and lean solutions of the future, efficiency and renewable energy need. Although nuclear power is advertised as cheap, IEA identifies as the second barrier nuclear plans face, following public acceptance, that ‘investment costs based on current technology (including working capital during the construction period, waste treatment and decommissioning) are high’ (IEA, 2006a, p. 134). ‘Capital cost reduction can be achieved through improved construction methods, reduced construction time, design improvement, standardization, building multiple units on the same site and improving project management’ (IEA, 2006a, p. 242). ‘Serial production (red.: of the Gen III+1700 MW plants) may enable further cost reductions’ (IEA, 2006a, p. 134). ‘‘Large scale, serial production, multiple units on the same site’’ were the success factors of the French nuclear programme of the 1970–1980s that finally jammed in the overcapacity of the 1990s. Every success factor also implies its own risk: the loss of a single large-scale unit is a high loss, serial production often is beset by serial faults and multiple units on the same site can cause domino effects (see the loss of the four units at Chernobyl). But it is not our task to think in nuclear logic. Our point is that this expansive approach is contradictory to the essential attributes the new energy policy must adopt: lean, efficient, flexible and adaptive. The over-supply of commercial energy during the last decades has turned our economies and societies in energy-addicted, obese patients. It has put our development on a non-sustainable track with looming climate change and nuclear risks at the horizon. Continuing this ‘‘business-as-usual’’ is a one-way ticket to catastrophe.

Nuclear power results in higher energy prices-screws the poor

IEA 15 ["Technology Roadmap: Nuclear Energy." IEA Technology Roadmaps (n.d.): n. pag. 2015. Web. [Premier]

The United States has the largest nuclear fleet of any country in the world. The first new build projects in more than 30 years are currently underway at the VC Summer and Vogtle sites in Georgia and South Carolina (each with two Gen III AP1000 units), with the first unit expected to be operating by the end of 2017. All new build projects in the country have been limited to regulated electricity markets, which are more favourable in terms of providing a stable long-term policy framework for capital-intensive projects such as nuclear, for they allow utilities to pass construction costs on to customers through rate adjustments.

AFF—Colonialism

The global move to nuclear power puts developing countries at risk – there’s a double standard where only developed nations have the best safety standards

Schneider et al 11

Mycle – consultant and project coordinator, Antony Frogatt – consultant, Steve Thomas – prof of energy policy @ Greenwich University, “Nuclear Power in a Post-Fukushima World 25 Years After the Chernobyl Accident” World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2010-11, http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/2011MSC-WorldNuclearReport-V3.pdf [Premier]

The UAE project also raises serious safety issues. In 2010, AREVA’s Lauvergeon told a French National Assembly Committee that “the outcome of the UAE bid poses fundamental questions about the nature of the world nuclear market and the level of safety requirements for reactors that will still be operating in 2050 or 2070.” She raised the specter of “a nuclear [market] at two speeds”: a high-tech, high-safety mode for developed countries and a lower-safety mode for emerging countries. “The most stringent safety standards are in the U.S. and Europe,” Lauvergeon said. “In Europe we couldn’t construct the Korean reactor. Are American and European safety standards going to become international standards, or not?”4 The negotiating of nuclear orders at a political level is also troubling. The UAE order was placed before the country had a functioning safety regulator, meaning that politicians effectively have decided that the Korean design will be licensable. Meanwhile, if South Africa decides to buy a Chinese or Korean reactor, what will the South African regulatory body do if it is not comfortable with licensing reactors that fall well below the standards required in Europe? If the Fukushima accident does reveal significant inadequacies in earlier designs, however, the renewed interest in older designs may well prove short-lived.