Premier Debate 2016 September/October ld brief

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NEG—Advantage CPs

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EIA CP

CP: Require strict environmental impact assessments should be required; increased public awareness solves the rest

IEA 15 ["Technology Roadmap: Nuclear Energy." IEA Technology Roadmaps (n.d.): n. pag. 2015. Web. 8 Aug. 2016] [Premier]

For the siting and analyses, environmental impact assessment (EIA) processes should be carried out (see Box 12). It should also be mentioned that when an operator wants to operate a facility beyond the original design lifetime, or when the design conditions change (for instance, due to power uprates), an EIA should be performed again to take into account the new operating and environment conditions. At all stages of siting, stakeholder involvement in the decision-making process is necessary. Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, renewed attention has been paid to the vulnerability of existing (and future) sites with respect to the possibility of major earthquakes and flooding, whether from tsunamis or other causes (dam breaks, extreme precipitation events). This may reduce the number of possible new sites that a country can select for its nuclear programme. Another aspect that has received more attention is the particular case of multi-unit sites, i.e. sites that accommodate several nuclear reactors. Building several hundreds of GW of new capacity by 2050 will require the extension of existing sites to accommodate additional units, if the sites are suitable, as well as the assessment and selection of new sites. For countries that already have nuclear power plants (NPPs), it is often easier to consider building nuclear facilities on existing sites as local communities are already informed about the risks and benefits of nuclear energy.

IFNEC CP

Text: All countries already or considering developing nuclear power should join the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation.

It creates networks for nuclear power without having to establish domestic facilities, educates countries on the safe and proper use of nuclear power—solves prolif and warming.

WNA 15 [World Nuclear Association; Information on nuclear energy and the nuclear fuel cycle; August 2015; “International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation”; http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/international-framework-for-nuclear-energy-coopera.aspx; [PREMIER]]

The International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC), formerly the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), aims to accelerate the development and deployment of advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies while providing greater disincentives to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. GNEP was initiated by the USA early in 2006, but picked up on concerns and proposals from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Russia. The vision was for a global network of nuclear fuel cycle facilities all under IAEA control or at least supervision. Domestically in the USA, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) was based on the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI), and while GNEP faltered with the advent of the Barack Obama administration in Washington from 2008, the AFCI was being funded at higher levels than before for R&D "on proliferation-resistant fuel cycles and waste reduction strategies." Two significant new elements in the strategy were new reprocessing technologies which separate all transuranic elements together (and not plutonium on its own), and advanced burner (fast) reactors to consume the result of this while generating power. However, this then disappeared from the US Department of Energy (DOE) budget. GNEP was set up as both a research and technology development initiative and an international policy initiative. It addresses the questions of how to use sensitive technologies responsibly in a way that protects global security, and also how to manage and recycle wastes more effectively and securely. The USA had a policy in place since 1977 which ruled out reprocessing used fuel, on non-proliferation grounds. Under GNEP/IFNEC, reprocessing is to be a means of avoiding proliferation, as well as addressing problems concerning high-level wastes. Accordingly, the DOE briefly set out to develop advanced fuel cycle technologies on a commercial scale. As more countries consider nuclear power, it is important that they develop the infrastructure capabilities necessary for such an undertaking. As with GNEP, IFNEC partners are working with the IAEA to provide guidance for assessing countries' infrastructure needs and for helping to meet those needs. For countries that have no existing nuclear power infrastructure, IFNEC partners can share knowledge and experience to enable developing countries to make informed policy decisions on whether, when, and how to pursue nuclear power without any need to establish sensitive fuel cycle facilities themselves. With the USA taking a lower profile and effectively relinquishing leadership from 2009, the partners are focused on collaboration to make nuclear energy more widely accessible in accordance with safety, security and non-proliferation objectives, as an effective measure to counter global warming, and to improve global energy security. A change of name to International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC) was adopted in June 2010, along with a new draft vision statement, which read: "The Framework provides a forum for cooperation among participating states to explore mutually beneficial approaches to ensure the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes proceeds in a manner that is efficient, safe, secure, and supports non-proliferation and safeguards." By some accounts, this envisages "cradle to grave" fuel management as central, along with assurance of fuel supply.In mid-2015 the technical secretariat transferred from the DOE to the OECD NEA which will play a similar role as with the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) and the Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP).

Solves efficiency and cost.

Eliminates extra plutonium—solves terror and war.

An early priority was seen to be the development of new reprocessing technologies to enable recycling of most of the used fuel. One of the concerns when reprocessing used nuclear fuel is ensuring that separated fissile material is not used to create a weapon. One chemical reprocessing technology – PUREX – has been employed for over half a century, having been developed in wartime for military use (see page on Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel). This has resulted in the accumulation of 240 tonnes of separated reactor-grade plutonium around the world (though some has been used in the fabrication of mixed oxide fuel). While this is not suitable for weapons use, it is still regarded as a proliferation concern. New reprocessing technologies are designed to combine the plutonium with some uranium and possibly with minor actinides (neptunium, americium and curium), rendering it impractical to use the plutonium in the manufacture of weapons. GNEP/IFNEC creates a framework where states that currently employ reprocessing technologies can collaborate to design and deploy advanced separations and fuel fabrication techniques that do not result in the accumulation of separated pure plutonium.

Solves waste—prevents eco collapse.

User responsibility. The radioactive wastes from the nuclear fuel recycling centre could be considered as processed waste belonging to the user nation that sent its used nuclear fuel to the recycling centre. These wastes might then be shipped back to that user nation for final disposal.

Supplier responsibility. The nation hosting the recycling centre might retain the waste or, if a different supplier nation had manufactured the original fuel, all wastes arising from the original fuel could be considered the responsibility of that fuel supplier nation.

Third-party responsibility. A disposal facility might be sited in a country that is, in particular cases, neither the supplier nor the user, but is using its technological capability and geological suitability to manage the safe delivery of a commercially and environmentally valuable service.

The IFNEC program is considering the ownership and final disposal of waste, but this discussion has not yet reached beyond the preliminary stages. The second and third conceptual options for waste disposal would require one or more international radioactive waste final disposal facilities (see page on International Nuclear Waste Disposal Concepts), and serious discussion of those options will begin only when nations enter into real consideration of the sensitive issue of the hosting of such facilities.

Makes Reactors smaller and safer—Solves Accidents.

Finally, IFNEC is concerned to foster the development of 'grid-appropriate reactors', i.e. smaller units (perhaps 50-350 MWe) for electricity grids of up to 3 GWe. These should incorporate advanced features including safety, simplicity of operation, long-life fuel loads, intrinsic proliferation-resistance and security3. In mid-2014 Jordan hosted a small modular reactors workshop to consider how SMRs could be effectively deployed in specific types of markets while identifying key challenges and opportunities.

International organizations and regulatory frameworks solve (?)

IEA 15 ["Technology Roadmap: Nuclear Energy." IEA Technology Roadmaps (n.d.): n. pag. 2015. Web. 8 Aug. 2016] [Premier]

Regulators, whether in newcomer countries or established nuclear countries, should be strong and independent. They need to have sufficient, well-qualified and resourced staff to carry out their missions (NEA, 2014a). There is an important role for international organisations to promote efficient regulation, harmonise requirements and share experience (see Box 11). In particular, peer review processes, whether among operators or among regulators, is seen as an effective process to improve the overall level of nuclear safety. The nuclear industry is sometimes concerned about the risk of over-regulation, through the multiplication or duplication of regulatory requirements. Better co-ordination and harmonisation of these requirements is needed in order to have an efficient regulation of the industry. Finally, to accelerate the deployment of new technologies, licensing frameworks should be flexible enough to regulate such technologies in a risk-informed manner. The United States is addressing this challenge for SMRs through the DOE’s Licensing Technical Support programme, which supports the development of certification and licensing requirements for US-based SMR projects. Similar initiatives should be launched in other countries, for SMR and advanced technologies such as Gen IV designs, so as to facilitate the deployment of these technologies once they have been demonstrated. It should be noted, however, that there are examples of regulatory regimes around the world (United Kingdom and Canada) whose frameworks already contain this flexibility and are prepared to address SMRs and Gen IV technologies. In general, greater international collaboration is needed so that a design approved in one major nuclear-competent country can be built elsewhere with a minimum of duplicated effort and time.

Education CP

Education and professional mobility initiatives solve safety & security

IEA 15 ["Technology Roadmap: Nuclear Energy." IEA Technology Roadmaps (n.d.): n. pag. 2015. Web. 8 Aug. 2016] [Premier]

In parallel to an increased globalisation of the nuclear industry, there has been an increase in the internationalisation of R&D. This is to a large extent due to decreasing R&D budgets at national levels, which encourages research organisations to pool resources, share experimental facilities and carry out projects at the international level. There are a number of international and bilateral initiatives focused on collaborative research, education, training and knowledge management, including the Sustainable Nuclear Energy Technology Platform in the European Union, which gathers industry, research and academia, or the Generation IV International Forum, which provides a framework for international R&D on Gen IV systems. The NEA itself provides support to international projects such as code validation benchmarks or safety-related experiments. The global nuclear industry is acutely aware of the need to ensure a high level of nuclear skills development in existing and newcomer countries and has well-developed training programmes that are shared across countries, providing an important source of nuclear training. In addition, global partnerships such as the World Nuclear University (WNU) and the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) have been developed to enhance international education and training for the development of nuclear energy. WNU was created in 2003 with the support of the IAEA, OECD/NEA, WANO and WNA to provide global guidance on preparing the future generation of nuclear industry leaders and to enhance nuclear education worldwide. WNU activities include the Summer Institute (a six-week intensive course for future nuclear leaders), the Radiation Technologies School (a two-week course for future leaders in the radiation and radioisotope field) and a one-week course focused on key issues in the nuclear industry today. These courses are offered in host countries where significant interest exists for the development of nuclear energy8. Training events are held in partnership with other organisations and trainers come from industry, government and academia. The WNA provides administrative support to the WNU. To date, almost 900 professionals have attended the Summer Institute, while 200 have attended the Radiation Technologies School and approximately 6 000 have benefited from the one-week training courses. Mobility of nuclear literate workers across borders will be particularly important both in terms of providing sufficient specialised nuclear workers (such as nuclear engineers and welders) as well as facilitating a transfer of expertise to newcomer countries. The UK skills passport and French ticketing system provide a good basis for developing mutual recognition of qualifications from one country to another and help to support workforce mobility.

Prolif CP

Implement the following regulations to stop nuclear proliferation

Rauf 03 [Tariq Rauf, Head of the Verification and Security Policy Coordination Office at the International Atomic Energy Agency, “PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE: POLITICAL FACTORS,” International Conference held in Vienna, organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency, June 23, 2003] [Premier]

The following extrinsic measures, inter alia, were identified: ʊ States’ commitments, obligations and policies with regard to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. These measures would include all relevant legal instruments, such as the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. Although these treaties do not form an insurmountable barrier to proliferation, verification activities by the IAEA have overwhelmingly guaranteed compliance. In the case of the NPT, only once has a party made use of its right to withdraw from the Treaty. In addition, such legal commitments provide for continuity in the international non-proliferation regime by transcending government changes in States party to the Treaty. Nevertheless, it should be noted that many of these measures work best as long as conditions remain static. History has shown that many of the non-proliferation policies of States and arrangements between States may change over time. National export control legislation and co-operative arrangements, particularly those that limit nuclear energy use to peaceful purposes, constitute efficient extrinsic measures. The Zangger Committee, for instance, has developed common understandings concerning the interpretation and implementation of Article III.2 of the NPT, which regulates the provision of special material and equipment to States. In the same way, the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group have established, through their “trigger lists”, export control principles designed to minimize the proliferation risk of nuclear exports. ʊ Agreements between exporting and importing States to limit the use of nuclear energy systems to agreed purposes. This could be supported by an agreement between exporting and importing States that guarantees supplies of nuclear fuel or services. These measures include (1) bilateral arrangements for supply and return of nuclear fuel and other components of a nuclear energy system; (2) bilateral agreements governing the reexport of a nuclear energy system or its components by an importer; and (3) guarantees by a nuclear exporter of commercially attractive supplies of fresh fuel and waste management services over the life-cycle of the nuclear energy system, thus reducing the need of the importer to develop indigenous enrichment or reprocessing technologies. Several countries have laws and regulations that limit the spread of sensitive knowledge or prevent the export of such knowledge and of sensitive equipment and materials in case certain conditions are not met. Many States do not export unless the recipient country has indeed accepted full scope safeguards. ʊ Commercial, legal or institutional arrangements that control access to nuclear material and nuclear energy systems. These measures could include (1) the existence of a legal framework to ensure that operators of nuclear energy systems are subject to specific requirements governing the use of those systems and associated materials; (2) common legal provisions to be incorporated in all contracts involving nuclear energy systems; and (3) multi-national ownership, management or control of nuclear energy systems. ʊ The application of IAEA verification and, as appropriate, regional, bilateral and national measures. These measures include the application of safeguards, for the detection – and deterrence – of diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material. The Agency’s verification activities under the NPT are based on the comprehensive safeguards agreements that follow the INFCIRC/153 model agreement. Additional legal authority allowing the IAEA to implement further verification measures is conferred by the additional protocols to the safeguards agreements. The Agency’s strengthened safeguards system has a confidence-building function that strongly contributes to proliferation resistance. Naturally, for a verification system to be efficient and therefore credible, it requires adequate funding, technical competence and, as noted in the INPRO Report, an adequate number of sensitive and reliable measurement instruments and sensors. ʊ Legal and institutional arrangements to address violations of nuclear non-proliferation or peaceful-use undertakings. These measures could include (1) a credible system of reporting verification conclusions in a timely manner; (2) reliable institutional arrangements for bringing evidence of violations before the international community; and (3) the existence of an effective international response mechanism. 3. CONCLUSION The extrinsic measures mentioned above would be greatly complemented by intrinsic proliferation resistance features. Whereas the possibility of applying safeguards to and controlling exports of future nuclear energy systems will continue to play an important part – it is unlikely that we will have a fully proliferation-resistant system based only on extrinsic features. Thus, the development and implementation of intrinsic features should be encouraged. Proliferation resistance measures, both intrinsic and extrinsic, could help ensure that future nuclear energy systems will continue to be an unattractive means to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapon programme, thus guaranteeing that lack of trust does not result in technologydenial. The benefits of enhancing proliferation resistance are not limited to the field of international security; by facilitating the access of developing States to nuclear technologies, proliferation resistance also could play a fundamental role in the field of development. Finally, to ensure the widest possible acceptance and support for the concepts, principles and technologies for proliferation resistance, it is essential that “proliferation resistant” technologies be developed in as transparent and inclusive a manner, and as co-operatively, as possible.

Safeguards CP

Prolif must be reduced by increased IAEA standards and multilateral checks

Pedraza 12

Jorge Morales Pedraza, consultant on international affairs, ambassador to the IAEA for 26 yrs, degree in math and economy sciences, former professor, Energy Science, Engineering and Technology : Nuclear Power: Current and Future Role in the World Electricity Generation : Current and Future Role in the World Electricity Generation, New York. [Premier]

Nuclear power should be expanded in the world only if the risk of proliferation from operation of the commercial nuclear fuel cycle is made acceptably small. How to achieve this goal? First, the international community should strengthen the application of the IAEA safeguards system to all states by putting into force, for all of them, the IAEA Additional Protocol. Second, the international community should adopt a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle. The international community must adopt all necessary measures to prevent the acquisition of weapons-usable material, either by diversion (in the case of plutonium) or by misuse of nuclear fuel cycle facilities (including related facilities, such as research reactors or hot cells) now operating in different countries. However, it is important to stress that the adoption of a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle should be done in a way that respect the right of any states to develop their own nuclear fuel cycle but under full IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol.

Free Market CP

Investors look for short-term gains, but nuke power is a long-term capital-intensive investment, so the free market would avoid it

Pedraza 12

Many countries had privatized government owned energy utilities, following a privatization policy of public companies promoting by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) within the current economic development policy promoted by these two organizations. Others have decided to keep the energy sector within the public sector of the country. One of the objectives to be achieved with the privatization of public utilities, according with the opinion of those that support a privatization policy, is to make them operate under conditions that are more commercial. However, the adoption of this privatization policy could limit these utilities to seek funds only in the commercial money markets, with their stronger emphasis on short-term returns on investment. This may means that capital-intensive plants such as nuclear power plants will not be favored by utilities planning to construct these types of plants without government support. This is an important element that needs to be carefully study when the nuclear option is being under consideration for its possible inclusion in the energy balance of any country.

Nuclear power isn’t competitive-subsidizing and supporting it just wastes money, and the government has to insure and clean up for accidents.

Gottfried 6 [Kurt; "Climate Change and Nuclear Power." Social Research: An International Quarterly 73.3 (2006): 1011-1024. Project MUSE. Web. 8 Aug. 2016. .][Premier]

In the United States and in other countries where power generation is not a government function, the market can, in principle, decide whether nuclear power is economically viable. Here “in principle” alludes to familiar conditions required to create an unbiased market, and in addition to the special circumstances that stem from the unique dangers that attend nuclear power. First, the fact that no new plants have been built in the United States for more than two decades demonstrates that nuclear power has not been an attractive investment. (The claim that this is due to the licensing process is a red herring.) That would change were the US government to impose a sufficiently high price on putting carbon into the atmosphere either by a carbon tax or by creating an obligatory carbon emission cap-and-trade regime. Such restrictions on carbon emission would, of course, be of advantage to all sources of energy that do not add carbon to the atmosphere, and will almost certainly be necessary if the climate challenge is to be met. It remains to be seen Climate Change and Nuclear Power 1021 whether a regime that would suffice to make other noncarbon and carbon-neutral energy sources competitive will also suffice to do so for nuclear power, but that is a question that the market can, in principle, settle. Second, the market can only give a legitimate evaluation of the economic viability of nuclear power if the government refrains from favoring it over other energy sources by means of subsidies. Thus far the American nuclear power industry has not been competitive despite the fact that since World War II the US government has spent about h alf its total energy R&D budget on nuclear power, taken responsibility for nuclear w aste, and, through the Price-Anderson Act, has insured the industry against m ajor accidents. Many advocates for an expansion of nuclear pow er seek a continuation of Price-Anderson and o ther subsidies. In doing so they are adm itting th a t nuclear pow er is not com petitive now or in th e near-term . A sufficiently h ig h price on carbon em ission would, of course, change this picture. In th e A m erican setting, therefore, th e question o f w h eth er nuclear pow er is an econom ically viable contributor to cutting GHG em ission can, aside from a critical caveat, be settled by the m arket if all m eans o f reducing GHG em issions are treated equally in term s of subsidies and/or a price on carbon emissions. The critical caveat stem s from th e unique dangers posed by n uclear power, w hich th e m ark et cannot adequately assess because the conventional m eaning o f “cost-effective” does not apply to nuclear power. In the last analysis, any m ajor catastrophe arising from nuclear pow er would becom e the responsibility of the governm ent—th a t is, of the nation as a whole. No m atter who bears legal responsibility, only the nation as a w hole can deal w ith a disaster o f Katrina or 9/11 proportions, not to m ention w hat could easily be m uch m ore dire if a nuclear explosion or a large radioactive release w ere the cause. The m arket knows this, and does not count such risks in evaluating the econom ic viability of any technology th at could produce a calam ity of catastrophic proportions. Hence the level o f com m itm ent to an expansion of nuclear power 1022 social research is a profoundly political and n o t an econom ic decision in the U nited States and o ther democracies, w here the energy supply is governed by an ostensibly free m arket.

Fusion CP

Hybrid fusion-fission reactors solve – zero chance of accidents

Pedraza 12

The nuclear fusion has been the power ideal for more than half century, but the problems that have being impeding until now the use of this type of energy for electricity production are not been solved in a satisfactory manner and for this reason, the use of fusion technology for the generation of electricity is not yet ready to be used commercially and will not so at least until 2050. According with several experts‘ opinions, it is expected that nuclear fusion will not be available for the production of electricity before 2050. The USA, that reduced significantly basic research in nuclear fusion some years ago, has now announced that the Laboratory Lawrence Livermore has begun fusion tests on May 2009. The tests will be extended until 2012 and the objective of it is to demonstrate that it is possible to generate thermonuclear energy. Why takes so long time to obtain specific results in this field. The answer is the following: The physics of the fusion is very difficult and the technology that there is to develop to prove the physical theoretical principles experimentally is also very complex and expensive, and all this demands long time‖, assures Mr. Diaz the Blonde, head of Investigation and Development of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in California, USA. According to Diaz of the Blonde, ―we hoped that a power gain of the order of a factor of 10 takes place. But this is not sufficient, which causes that it is precise a mixed system fusion and fission, a concept that already formulated Andrei Sakharov. It is a very interesting alternative and it allows closing the cycle of the nuclear energy of a very safe form, since the part of the fission is not the normal one (it requires a critical mass of nuclear fuel neither uranium enrichment nor reprocessing of the radioactive waste), reason why the probability of a accident like the Chernobyl one is zero. The hybrids of fusion and fission can be a power alternative from 2025. These characteristics, plus the fact that in our concept the power gains are enormous and very high amounts of electricity of base without emitting CO 2 can be produced, allow us to think that this will be a very interesting thing in the midterm‖. According to the calculations of Diaz of the Blonde, at least 10 more years are needed to construct the prototype of a commercial plant that generates energy using the fusion technology. However, there is a great expectation in using hybrids of fusion and fission technologies to produce energy and this could be ready in the second quarter of the 21 th century. In the opinion of Diaz of the Blonde, the power model of the future must be mixed, with combinations of sources, including the improvement of the current renewable energies systems and the advance in the use of the fusion and the fission technologies. The scientist community is conscious of the distrusts that the nuclear energy provoke between the public opinion and, for this reason, the concept of fusion-fission by confinement has tremendous advantages and could allows [us] to think about the possibility of expanding the nuclear energy in a safe form in the future reducing the volume of radioactive waste volume.

Phase Out

A phase out is not a prohibition

Plumer 6-17

Brad Plumer, “Sweden decides it’s not so easy to give up nuclear power” on June 17, 2016, 9:40 a.m. ET http://www.vox.com/2016/6/17/11950440/sweden-nuclear-power [Premier]

A 2015 study in Energy Policy found that a premature shutdown would raise Sweden’s system costs "disproportionately." Another study in The European Physical Journal Plus found that replacing the entire nuclear fleet with wind and gas would cause Sweden’s electricity CO2 emissions to double. Swedish industry groups — heavy electricity users like Volvo or steelmaker SSAB — lobbied to save the reactors. Ultimately, the prospect of a premature shutdown seemed too daunting. Last Friday, Sweden’s governing Social Democrats and Greens reached a deal with the opposition to scrap the tax on nuclear power over the next two years, giving the existing reactors some room to avoid early closure. They also agreed to permit utilities to build up to 10 reactors at existing sites to replace the ones coming offline in the coming decade. Shortly after the agreement, Vattenfall approved safety upgrades at the three reactors at Forsmark, enabling the plants to continue operating well past 2020. The government still has a goal of 100 percent renewable energy by 2040, but the agreement states this doesn’t necessarily rule out nuclear: "This is a goal, not a cut-off date that would prohibit nuclear power, and it does not mean either the end a closure of nuclear power." According to the Financial Times, Energy Minister Ibrahim Baylan said of the deal: "This is a traditional Swedish compromise." There’s still no guarantee that Sweden's utilities will actually build new nuclear plants. These plants remain extremely costly to construct. Next door in Finland, the French state company Areva is building a 1,720-megawatt reactor now estimated to cost some $9.5 billion — three times the original price, thanks to delays and overruns. More recently (and controversially), a Finnish consortium decided to partner with Russia’s Rosatom to build a separate reactor in Pyhäjoki in the hopes of lowering costs. It’s unclear what direction Sweden might go for new plants, but it can’t move forward unless the economics work out. The government isn't offering subsidies for new builds, and wholesale prices are extraordinarily low right now. So some analysts are skeptical that we'll see a future boom.

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