Pritchard properties (pty) ltd V koulis 986 (2) sa (A) 1986 (2) sa p1

Contract - Tacit terms and warranties - When to be inferred - Court entitled to assume, in absence of indications to contrary, that parties to G agreement typical men of affairs, contracting on honest and equal footing, without hidden motives and reservations - When, however, facts show that one or other had special knowledge which would probably have had bearing on his state of mind, such fact cannot simply be ignored, for otherwise enquiry into existence of tacit term a matter of invention, not intention.

[zHNz] Headnote : Kopnota

H A company, S (Pty) Ltd, in February 1988 purchased from the respondent certain land on which it intended to develop a residential township. After the conclusion of the sale and the payment of a portion of the purchase price, S (Pty) Ltd discovered that a plan existed for the construction of a provincial road across the land it had purchased, which, if implemented, would impede the development of the contemplated township. S (Pty) Ltd I declined to pay the balance of the purchase price, upon which the respondent as seller instituted action in a Local Division against S (Pty) Ltd for the payment of the said balance. At the same time S (Pty) Ltd in the same Court launched motion proceedings against the respondent for an order confirming its cancellation of the sale and for repayment of the sum already paid. The Court in the application proceedings granted an order referring the matter to trial, with the direction that S (Pty) Ltd was to seek its relief by counterclaim to the respondent's action - a J consolidation, in effect, of the two proceedings. S (Pty) Ltd in its plea

1994 (3) SA p132

A relied, in the main, on certain tacit warranties which it alleged had been breached by the respondent, with the consequence that S (Pty) Ltd had cancelled the agreement and suffered the damages which it detailed in its counterclaim. The respondent filed a replication to the plea and a plea to the counterclaim, denying the existence of the tacit terms, their breaches, the validity of the cancellation and any liability for losses allegedly suffered by the defendant. S (Pty) Ltd was liquidated during the course of the exchange of pleadings and the appellant, in terms of a B scheme of arrangement, was appointed as receiver for the creditors of S (Pty) Ltd. At the trial the respondent applied for a postponement, which was refused, whereafter his attorneys withdrew. The trial proceeded by default and the Court found in the appellant's favour, holding that he had established the tacit term alleged and suffered the damages claimed by him. The appellant then applied for leave to appeal against both the refusal of the postponement and the judgment granted by default. Leave was C denied in respect of the refusal of the postponement and a further petition to the Chief Justice also failed. In respect of the judgment granted by default, leave to appeal was granted. The appeal came before a Full Bench of a Provincial Division, which granted absolution from the instance in respect of appellant's counterclaim. An application, this time by the appellant, for special leave to appeal to the Appellate Division was granted on petition.

The tacit term relied on by the appellant was that 'the plaintiff D (respondent) warranted that no obstacle existed which might reasonably delay, interfere with or limit the establishment of a black residential township on the property' (para 2 (b) (iii) (aa) of the plea), alternatively that 'he knew of no obstacle which might reasonably have the effects aforesaid' (para 2 (b) (iii) (bb) of the plea). The appellant in his plea alleged that the town planners engaged by S (Pty) Ltd 'had, as agents of the plaintiff (respondent), been informed by letter by the Director of Roads during December 1987 that 'the proposed township was affected by the E planning of the . . . road and that further steps in relation to the township should be withheld until the planning of the road had been finalised'. It was further alleged that 'the said information and its consequences were such as to constitute an obstacle which might reasonably delay, interfere with or limit the development of the . . township'. According to the appellant the tacit term relied upon was an imputed rather than actual one, in other words that it was designed to provide for F a situation which S (Pty) Ltd had not foreseen at the time the contract was concluded but for which the agreement would clearly have catered had it been so foreseen. The Appellate Division, after having set out the basic principles relating to actual and imputed tacit terms,

Held , that the tacit term pleaded was, to begin with, not readily reconcilable with the scheme of the agreement: it purported to saddle the respondent with a responsibility and to tie him to a time schedule in connection with the establishment of the township when, with one G exception, the agreement otherwise placed no such obligation on him and, as seller, he retained no direct interest in the development of the township as such. (At 139I-140A.)

Held , further, that there was accordingly no incentive for the respondent to agree to the obligations foisted on him in terms of the alleged tacit term. (At 140A.)

Held , further, that there was in addition a fundamental inconsistency in the appellant's approach: he sought to rely on an imputed tacit term, ie one that arises when both parties would have regulated a certain situation H had they thought about it in the manner suggested, yet at the same time he alleged that the respondent must have been aware of the obstacles to the development of the township created by the prospect of the road. (At 140A/B-B/C.)

Held , further, that if the respondent had been so aware there could be no room for the importation of a tacit term into the contract, for two reasons: first, an imputed tacit term is only read into the contract if I both parties overlooked or failed to anticipate the event in question, but in this instance the respondent, on the appellant's approach, was aware of the true state of affairs and deliberately remained silent in order to obtain a contractual advantage, so that an intention based on absence of appreciation could not be attributed to him; and, second, it was inconceivable that the respondent would have agreed to a warranty along the lines suggested if he had been briefed about possible difficulties in the way of the development of the township. (At 140D-F.)

Held , further, as to the contention that the above was not a legitimate J line of reasoning in

1994 (3) SA p133

A the light of the dictum in Administrator, Transvaal v Industrial & Commercial Timber & Supply Co Ltd 1932 AD 25 at 33, that this dictum , to the extent that it fostered the impression that the enquiry was directed at the intention not of the actual parties but of archetypes of reasonable men, was an oversimplification: when the facts show that one party or the other had special knowledge which would probably have had a bearing on his state of mind, that fact cannot simply be ignored, for otherwise the enquiry as to the existence of the tacit term becomes a matter of invention, not intention. (At 140F/G and 141C-C/D, D-D/E.) B

Held , further, that, if the position was, as contended by the appellant, that the respondent had been aware of the instruction contained in the letter of the Director of Roads, whether he deliberately withheld that information from the appellant or not, it could well be a factor refuting rather than supporting the existence of a tacit warranty along the lines suggested by the appellant in para 2 (b) (iii) of the plea, in which event the appellant would be confined to his defences and remedies based on C misrepresentation. (At 141E/F-F/G.)

Held , further, that the probabilities in the instant case were not such as to defeat the respondent's denial of any personal knowledge of that letter or of any circumstance which could interfere with the appellant's programme for the marketing of the properties in the proposed township, and that if the respondent had indeed been unaware of any such impending disruption of the appellant's plans, it was unlikely that he would have D committed himself to the tacit warranty suggested by the appellant in para 2 (b) (iii) (aa) of the plea: why should he have been prepared to guarantee a state of affairs of which he had no certainty at the time, over which he had no control and which could conceivably plunge him into an abyss of debt? (At 141G-H.)

Held , further, that there was no evidence to suggest that the point raised in para 2 (b) (iii) (aa) had occurred to anyone, nor could one be confident that if the question had been posed to the parties, the answer would inevitably have been 'of course the warranty in para 2 (b) (iii) (aa) would E have been furnished, we did not trouble to say that, it is too clear'. (At 142B-B/C and D/E.)

Held , further, as for the warranty proposed in para 2 (b) (iii) (bb) of the plea, that, if the respondent had been unaware of any obstacle which might interfere with the establishment of the township, as was likely on the facts, the said warranty had not been breached and hence fell away, with the result that it could be disregarded. (At 142E/F and G.) F

Held , further, that there were other reasons for rejecting the warranty proposed in para 2 (b) (iii) (aa) : because the warranty conferred a benefit only on the party in whose favour it is stipulated, such a warranty was ex hypothesi not essential to give 'business efficacy' to the agreement; in addition the mere possibility of a road which might in future traverse the property would not as such affect the operation of the agreement, but would only become a reality if expropriation in fact took place - a post-contractual event which might or might not have contractual repercussions. (At 142G/H and H/I-I/J.) G

Held , further, that another consideration having a bearing on the probabilities was the appellant's failure to mention the alleged warranty at the first opportunity (mention thereof was first made in the plea): the very fact that a term supposedly so obvious as to speak for itself escaped the attention of the appellant at the earlier stages of the proceedings was an indication that it was nothing more than an afterthought when it was eventually mooted. (At 143B/C and C/D-D/E.) H

Held , further, that there were also the difficulties experienced by the appellant with the formulation of the tacit term: a term so obvious as to occur as a matter of course would most likely be uncomplicated and capable of ready definition, whereas in the instant case a number of terms were pleaded with a number of alternatives. (At 143D/E and E/F.)

Held , further that, because parties who choose to commit themselves to I paper can be expected to cover all the aspects that matter, the Courts are slow to import a tacit term into a written contract, and that this was such a case: not a single compelling reason had been advanced why the tacit terms suggested by the appellant should be drafted into the contract. (At 143H-I.) Appeal dismissed with costs.

The decision in the Transvaal Provincial Division in Voges v Wilkins NO (as duly appointed Receiver for the Creditors of Stronghold Construction (Pty) Ltd) 1992 (4) SA 764 (T) confirmed. J

[zCIz] Case Information

Appeal from a decision of a Full Bench in the Transvaal Provincial

1994 (3) SA p134

NIENABER JA

A Division (Stafford J, Hartzenberg J and Swart J), reported at 1992 (4) SA 764. The facts appear from the judgment of Nienaber JA.

H Z Slomowitz SC (with him N N Lazarus) for the appellant referred to the following authorities: Naude v Harrison 1925 CPD 84 at 90; Wright v Pandell 1949 (2) SA 279 (C) at 285; Bell v Ramsay 1929 NPD 265 at 272; B Dutch Reformed Church Council v Crocker 1953 (4) SA 53 (C) at 62; Van der Merwe v Viljoen 1953 (1) SA 60 (A) at 65D; Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 937G-H; Magwaza v Heenan 1979 (2) SA 1019 (A) ; Wulfsohn Formalities in Respect of Contracts of Sale of Land Act at 75; Marshall v LMM Investments (Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 55 (T) ; Kaplan v Fountain Park (Pty) Ltd C 1972 (4) SA 193 (T) at 196A-C; Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 1973 (3) SA 397 (A) at 416H, 418A; Barkett v SA National Trust & Assurance Co Ltd 1951 (2) SA 353 (A) at 360H; Rahim v Minister of Justice 1964 (4) SA 630 (A) at 637A; Elliott Bros (EL) (Pty) Ltd v Smith 1958 (3) SA 858 (E) at 863D; Atlantic Harvesters of Namibia (Pty) Ltd v Unterweser Rederei GmbH of Bremen 1986 (4) SA 865 (C) at 874I-J; Mkwanazi v Van der Merwe and Another 1970 (1) SA 609 (A) at 631G-632A. D

P J van R Henning SC (with him L J van der Merwe) for the respondent referred to the following authorities: Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 (2) SA 814 (A) at 838G-H; Jafta v Minister of Law and Order and Others 1991 (2) SA 286 (A) at 296B; Hermannsberg Mission Society v The Minister of Native Affairs and Others 1910 TPD 832 at 837; Standard E Canners and Packers Ltd v Bezuidenhout 1955 (1) SA 601 (T) at 602H, 603H; Hoffmann and Zeffertt The South African Law of Evidence 4th ed at 152; De Villiers and Macintosh The Law of Agency in South Africa 3rd ed at 225; Botha v Smit 1976 (4) SA 885 (A) at 889B-890G; Price NO v Allied-JBS Building Society 1980 (3) SA 874 (A) at 881H-882A; Naudé v Harrison 1925 F CPD 84 at 90; Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 1973 (3) SA 397 (A) at 418A; Delfs v Kuehne & Nagel (Pty) Ltd 1990 (1) SA 822 (A) at 827B-828A; Minister van Landbou-Tegniese Dienste v Scholtz 1971 (3) SA 188 (A) at 208G-210B; Rapp and Maister v Aronowsky 1943 WLD 68 at 74-5; Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 937G-H; Union Government (Minister of Railways) v Faux Ltd 1916 G AD 105 at 112; Microutsicos and Another v Swart 1949 (3) SA 715 (A) at 730; Nel v Cloete 1972 (2) SA 150 (A) at 159E-H; Ponisammy and Another v Versailles Estates (Pty) Ltd 1973 (1) SA 372 (A) at 389C; Wessels Law of Contract para 2860 fn 7; Van Zijl Steyn Mora Debitoris at 63; De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 5th ed at 162; Mkwanazi v Van der Merwe H and Another 1970 (1) SA 609 (A) at 631G-632A; Erasmus v Davis 1969 (2) SA 1 (A) at 22H; Versfeld v South African Citrus Farms Ltd 1930 AD 452 at 460; Atlantic Harvesters of Namibia (Pty) Ltd v Unterweser Reederei GmbH of Bremen 1986 (4) SA 865 (C) at 874I-J.

Cur adv vult . I

Postea (March 29).

[zJDz] Judgment

Nienaber JA: The fate of this appeal hinges on the proof of a tacit term in one or other of the forms pleaded by the appellant.

J The appellant is the receiver for creditors of a company, Stronghold

1994 (3) SA p135

NIENABER JA

A Construction (Pty) Ltd, hereinafter referred to as 'Stronghold'. On 22 February 1988 Stronghold, then not yet in liquidation, purchased some 14 hectares of land known as portion 186 of the farm Vlakplaas 138 IR situated near Vosloorus township, Boksburg, from the respondent for R570000. Stronghold's business consisted of the development of B residential townships for black communities, the construction of housing and the sale of improved and unimproved stands. After the conclusion of the sale and the payment of a portion of the purchase price, it was discovered by Stronghold that a plan existed for the construction of a provincial road across the parcel of land it had purchased which, if implemented, would impede the development of the contemplated black C township. After some negotiations and a considerable exchange of correspondence, Stronghold declined to pay the balance of the purchase price owing in terms of the deed of sale. This refusal resulted in two separate initiatives. The seller, the respondent, instituted action against Stronghold in the Witwatersrand Local Division under Case No 89/6123 for the payment of the balance of the purchase price. More or less D contemporaneously Stronghold, in the same Court, launched motion proceedings against the respondent under case No 89/4136 for an order confirming its cancellation of the sale and for repayment of the sums paid to the respondent, amounting to R350 000. Each party opposed the other. In the application proceedings the Court eventually granted an order by E consent referring the matter to trial, with the direction that Stronghold was to seek its relief by way of a counterclaim to the respondent's action - a consolidation, in effect, of the two proceedings. To avoid confusion I shall henceforth refer to the seller, the respondent in the appeal, as the plaintiff and to the purchaser, Stronghold, currently represented by the appellant, as the defendant. F

The defendant, in its plea to the plaintiff's particulars of claim, relied, in the main, on certain tacit warranties which it alleged had been breached by the plaintiff. In consequence, so it alleged, the defendant had cancelled the agreement between the parties during December 1988, alternatively March 1989, alternatively by means of the plea itself, and suffered heavy damages which it detailed in its counterclaim. The G plaintiff, in turn, filed a replication to the plea and a plea to the counterclaim, denying the existence of the alleged tacit terms, their breaches, the validity of the cancellation and any liability for losses allegedly suffered by the defendant.

During the course of the exchange of pleadings Stronghold was liquidated H but the liquidation was in turn superseded by a scheme of arrangement, with a corresponding adjustment of the appellant's position as Stronghold's representative from liquidator to receiver.

On the date set down for trial the plaintiff appeared through counsel and applied for a postponement. After a lengthy debate the application was dismissed. Counsel thereupon withdrew and the trial proceeded in the I plaintiff's absence. The Court (Marais J) insisted on proof by the defendant of the existence of the tacit terms pleaded, the breaches thereof and the quantum of the resultant damages. Evidence was in due course led in support of the defendant's counterclaim. At its conclusion Marais J, in a terse judgment, found in the defendant's favour. He said:

    'I merely say that as a result of having heard the evidence I am satisfied J that the

1994 (3) SA p136

NIENABER JA

    A defendant has established the tacit term set out in para 2 (b) (iii) (aa) of the defendant's plea and a breach thereof. I am also satisfied that the defendant in consequence of such breach has suffered the damages claimed in the counterclaim in para 2 (a) . In fact it appears to me that the defendant has established a greater amount, but the claim is limited to that amount.'

B (The term referred to is quoted later in this judgment.)

The following order was accordingly made:

    '1. In respect of the plaintiff's claim in convention I grant absolution from the instance with costs.

    2. In respect of the defendant's claim in reconvention I grant judgment for payment of R4 396 976 as damages. On that figure the defendant C will be entitled to interest at the rate of 18,5% from date of judgment to date of payment.

    3. The defendant will be awarded the costs of the claim in reconvention. Those costs will include the qualifying fees of Messrs Kline, Collard, Bleibaum and Rosarin.

    4. The costs of the motion proceedings which were reserved in case No 89/4136 are awarded to the defendant. D

    5. The costs awarded to the defendant will include the costs consequent upon the employment of two counsel where two counsel were in fact employed. The award of costs of two counsel will also apply to the motion proceedings.'

The plaintiff thereupon applied for leave to appeal against both the E refusal of the postponement and the judgment granted by default. Such leave was denied in respect of the refusal of the postponement. A petition addressed to the Chief Justice on that issue was likewise unsuccessful, thereby in effect confirming the order absolving the plaintiff from the instance with costs. Leave was however granted by the Court a quo in respect of the judgment granted by default.

F That appeal was prosecuted before the Full Court of the Transvaal Provincial Division. It succeeded. The judgment of Stafford J (with whom Hartzenberg J and Swart J agreed) is reported (cf Voges v Wilkins NO (as duly appointed Receiver for the Creditors of Stronghold Construction (Pty) Ltd) 1992 (4) SA 764 (T) ). The order of Marais J was altered to read:

    G 'Absolution from the instance in respect of defendant's counterclaim with costs and the defendant is ordered to pay the costs of the application No 89/4136, including the costs of two counsel where two counsel were employed.'

An application, this time by the defendant, for special leave to appeal to this Court was granted on petition. Hence this appeal. It is not directed H against the order of the Court a quo relating to the costs of application No 89/4136 or against the costs of the appeal to the Full Court.

The paramount issue is the alleged tacit term. A tacit term, one so self-evident as to go without saying, can be actual or imputed. It is actual if both parties thought about a matter which is pertinent but did I not bother to declare their assent. It is imputed if they would have assented about such a matter if only they had thought about it - which they did not do because they overlooked a present fact or failed to anticipate a future one. Being unspoken, a tacit term is invariably a matter of inference. It is an inference as to what both parties must or would have had in mind. The inference must be a necessary one: after all, if several conceivable terms are all equally plausible, none of them can J be said to be axiomatic. The

1994 (3) SA p137

NIENABER JA

A inference can be drawn from the express terms and from admissible evidence of surrounding circumstances. The onus to prove the material from which the inference is to be drawn rests on the party seeking to rely on the tacit term. The practical test for determining what the parties would necessarily have agreed on the issue in dispute is the celebrated B bystander test. Since one may assume that the parties to a commercial contract are intent on concluding a contract which functions efficiently, a term will readily be imported into a contract if it is necessary to ensure its business efficacy; conversely, it is unlikely that the parties would have been unanimous on both the need for and the content of a term, not expressed, when such a term is not necessary to render the contract C fully functional. The above propositions, all in point, are established by or follow from numerous decisions of our Courts (see, for instance Rapp and Maister v Aronovsky 1943 WLD 68 at 75; Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) ; Delfs v Kuehne & Nagel (Pty) Ltd 1990 (1) SA 822 (A) ). D

Before turning to the tacit terms at issue it is necessary to refer to the express ones. Clause 3 provides for the payment of the purchase price in three instalments, the first on the date of signature of the agreement, the second on 25 March 1988 and the balance

    '. . . in cash on date of approval of the layout plan of the township on E the property by the Surveyor-General. If payment does not take place by 31 May 1988 the purchase price will increase by R10 000 (ten thousand rand) per month or part thereof calculated pro rata. Full payment will however take place by not later than 31 October 1988.'