Q. & A. 711 to 1707 with solved Papers css 1971 to date

parts sleven
”alhah jainst
and
if Al-
pah. .guard
1 Sjcd Asneei AW, A Short History of =The Sanaccns, P. 126.
HazratAbu Bakr (Rod. A.)
201
A column was despatched to annihilate the Bani Salim and Hawazin.
<*g(”10) Abu Bakr (Rad.A) as generalissimo was to supervise the
operations from Medina.

11) A column was kept as a reserve at metropolis.

FOR REGULATING THE CONDUCT OF OMMANDERS
At the same time that Abu Bakr (Rad.A) gave a banner to the ommander of each column, he issued gensral orders and instructions for regulating the conduct of the army in the course of perations. Every commander or Amir carried a finnan from the Haliph addressed to the belligerent tribes who had renounced Islam rolling upon them to cease fighting. The tribes in revolt were also ^sailed upon to repent and surrender themselves on the promise of a pardon. Those to whom amnesty was granted in this manner
\ =-iv;ere then received back into the fold of Islam. The Caliph further
i~ :- Hharged his commanders, before the commencement of actual
<___»»§>erations, to extend to the combatants an invitation to embrace , but should this meet with a refusal the Muslims were to resort fighting with full fury. This firman preceded the advancing host rand was proclaimed in public before the masses, after which their :sponse to the Agan, or call to prayers, became the criterion by hich the Amir could judge whether or not they were hostile. All ose tribes who did not show themselves at prayers were to be eated as enemies, in addition to the ’irrnan every commander was rovided with another document which contained instructions, ^ulations, and advice about his own conduci and a great deal of ,eful and detailed information about the conduct of the campaign. SHE REAL AIIVl OF MITIGATING HERESY
Some western writers maintain that Abu Bakr (Rad.A) «•ould not tolerate the growth of any other creed to save that of Islam the peninsula. According to utem his principal motive in sending

3 t these expeditio ns. vis, therefore, the rejuvenation of Islam by ibrce of arms, This erroneous view misled these writers to the exmnsr- ttent of ascribing the propagation of Islam to the sword and sword a}---««crs!>ne. However, a tool and dispassionate study of the situation and a cUiiimiacz^se and impartial scrutiny of the facts cannot fail to expose the hcrrr=3»-I!owness of the^e allegations. The various warring tribes of ABHOR-aabia, spurred on by a number of upstarts who wanted to fatten

202
Political a/v-’ Cultural History of Islam
their purses and carve out a career for themselves, had reverted to the traditional expedient of indulging in factions and feuds.
A major portion of those Muslims, and their relatives who lived with the tribes of the impostors, had been subjected to all manner of tortures by the apostates whose inhuman brutality seemed endless. The sufferings of those Muslims who had no one to redress their wrongs or to whom they could turn for succour weighed so heavily on Abu Bakr’s (Rad.A) mind that he was determined to restore law and order at all costs. His expeditions were themselves oerfectly warranted, indeed called for, by the grave situation. Only by so doing could Abu Bakr (Rad.A) have fulfilled his responsibilities as leader of the Muslims for it is the bounden duty of every civilised government to quell sedition and rebellion in order to establish conditions necessary for the maintenance of peace and order. After due deliberation, in the interests of order and tranquility, Abu Bakr (Rcol.A) had reluctantly to resort to arms against the insurgents and for the following reasons:
(1) Abu Bakr (Rad.A) had come to the conclusion that the restoration of order and the establishment of peace were a service not only to the community but also to God. In coveting the honour of rooting out the disruptive elements frorr Arabia his motives were in no way sectarian, just as his ambitions were in no way personal. His mission was one of Universal Peace not only to the glory of Arabia but also to the glory of God.
(2) The religious dissensions which held sway over the country at that time seemed to him to be a drastic challenge to the formation of a unified and nationalised Arabia.
(3) Impostors, in the guise of divine sages, were exploiting the credulity of all and sundry. They had gone too far in fomenting discord amongst the rank and file of the nation. Abu Bakr (Rad.A) regarded the rebels as enemies of the State and saw that a strong hand would be required to curb the malfactors.
(4) (5)
It was necessary to bring home to the people who evaded the Zakat that they must learn to subordinate their own petty interests to the wider national cause.
The time had come for the old tribal leadership to be replaced by a mature form of government-government by a central authority-but the people were being misguided by
Hazrat Abu Bakr (Rad. A.)
203
the false prophets who preached the gospel of returning to the old ways of tribal liberty and license. These false prophets had to be admonished as the revival of a creed that took little account of law and order wou’d only be detrimental to the national interests and an offence against the spirit of Islam.
(6) Abu Bakr (Rad.A) was quite willing to grant amnesty to those tribes who were truly penitent but to those who obstinately persisted in their anarchistic creed he gave no quarter. The heinous crimes and atrocities that had been perpetrated on the Muslim tribes could not be left to go unnoticed and unpunished.
(7) Abu Bakr (Rad.A), therefore, decreed that any threat of intransigence and terrorist activity was to be met with all the strength of arms that could be mustered, for^the Caliph believed that only after a thorough conquest, would the peace, that followed, be of art abiding character and a boon for all the parties concerned.