Richard Burt
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Dead Again
Final Words, “Critical Inquiry, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Winter 2007), 462 cited as “Dernier Mots” in Rue Descartes. 20005. But online it says introduction.. They go first there and at the end of Crit Inquriy (like tables of cotents in reverse) Final Words Jacques Derrida Translated by Gila Walker “Jacques wanted no rites and no orations. He knows from experience what an ordeal it is for the friend who takes on this task. He asks me to thank you for coming and to bless you. He beseeches you not to be sad, to think only of the many happy moments you gave him the chance to share with him. Smile for me, he says, as I will have smiled for you until the end. Always prefer life and constantly affirm survival… I love you and am smiling at you from wherever I am.”
Written in the present tense—dictated by Jacques—what he says—wherever he is now. The “Survie” capitalized followed by an ellipsis “ . . . . ,” with “la,” as if inserted after the fact in front of it to its upper left, and a downward angle. Space after fist name “Jacque” meant to indicate the missing last name? 
Restance is something that cannot be thought philosophically as a modification of substance, as a substance. Generally, philosophers say: “Well, something that remains, the rest, is either the residual of an operation, of a calculation, or else it’s a permanent substance, right? It remains, which means that it’s a substance.” And, well, I try to think about the rest in a different way, precisely not as a simple residue that falls and has no effects, that falls at the end of an operation, a scrap, a residue that will not be taken into account from now on. I think that the rest or the remains have to be taken into account, but not in the form of a substance. Yes, the chain: substance, presence, permanence, essence, and so on. The rest is not a substance and, for this reason, the rest is not, in a way. We have to try to think about the rest away from the authority of being, of the verb to be and of everything that depends on it: essence, existence, substance, and so on. That means to think the rest otherwise or to think the rest as another, if you will. Freddy Tellez and Bruno Mazzoldi, “The Pocket‐Size Interview with Jacques Derrida,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Winter 2007), pp. 362-388
Jacques Derrida, “The Retrait of Metaphor,” in Psyche: Invention of the Other Vol. 1, 53. Kamuf’s foreword just gives up on the possibility of anything like a bibliography with headnotes, the sort of work done by the editors of Work of Mourning, where each essay gets a headnote with its publication history. Reference my essay about the problems. These texts have accompanied, in some fashion, the works I have published over the last ten years.1 But they have also been disassociated from those works, separated, distracted. . . . Each of the essays appears to be devoted, destined, or even singularly dedicated to someone, very often to the friend, man of woman, close or distant, living or not, known or unknown . . . Certain texts seem to bear witness better than others to this quasi-epistolary situation. “Letter to a Japanese Friend, “Envoi,” “Telepathy,” “Plato’s Letter,” or “Seven Missives.” “Seven Missives,” for example, might have stood in the place of the title or preface, thanks to the play of metonymy. I made another choice. “Author’s Preface” in Psyche: Invention of the Other Vol. 1, xii “By disrupting the chronological order only once, I thought that “Psyche: Invention of the Other” might better perform this role.” Is this book Derrida’s version of the Ecrits, then? Derrida makes so much of Lacan’s reorganization of the Ecrits, the one essay out of chronological order being the Seminar on the Purloined Letter. Derrida has a note in his preface “2. When they are not simply unpublished, like the longest and the most recent among them, or unpublished in French, like a large number of them, these texts never conform exactly to their first versions, whose place of publication is noted each time.” “Author’s Preface” in Psyche: Invention of the Other Vol. 1, 413. “Permit me here to refer once again to the fragment detached from la carte postale that I titled ‘Telepathy’ (191 above).” “My Chances / Mes chances,” 368 Lacan follows Freud to the letter on this point, when he says that a letter always arrives at its destination. There is no random chance in the unconscious. “My Chances / Mes chances,” 369 “I leave you to pick up things from here.” “My Chances / Mes chances,” 376 “Two dreams of death. I offered them as hors d’oeuvres” in “Telepathy” 249 “Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time” in Margins of Philosophy, 29-68. “pilot of the ship” “This is why since I began I have been moving from aside to aside, from one vehicle to another, unable to brake or stop the bus, its automaticity or automobility. Or at least, I can brake only by letting skid, in other words, letting my control as driver slip away at certain points. I can no longer stop the vehicle or anchor the ship, master without remainder the drifting, skidding, or sideslipping [derapage] (I have pointed out somewhere that the word derapage, before its greatest metaphorical skid, has to do with a certain play of the anchor in nautical language . . .” Retrait of Metaphor 49-50 Fast and Furor: Derrida Drift Derrida doesn’t close the circle of hs works and his readings of other works and his self-citations, and even refuses a self-indexing. But he closes it by recircling in more or less the same way. Not closing is a kind of closing, or at least indissociable from it. If it were more posiitve, it would be Hegelian (synthesis). It remains a negativity that keeps it on the line with psychoanalysis and Heideggerian (the drive, detour, border—the car metaphors and anecdotes--) Not a contradiction yet to be decosntucted nor a more radcial orienttation, but acertianrecycling of survivance and sovereignty inrleation to psychonalsysis and the archive opens up a reading of recirlcings to The Post Card as well as to the Post card as an archive of circularity that makes reading a question of posthumographic. Does the poshumogrpahic mean the collapse of the postal a priori? Is prayer / addressing the same as sending? What is the difference bewteen a post card and a prayer, when it comes to prier d’insere—the back cover of The Post Card and the mention of it in interview ? We must exlcude the inifite renewal of subscriptions (Niederschriften). The number of inscriptions is finite—that’s finitude. For all acts of censorship operate on inscriptions, and substitutes of inscriptions in a system (it is even this concept of inscription which no doubt motivated the choice of the word or metaphor of censorship), and the uantity of inscriptions is finite: so one must censor. It is like a topological economy of the archive in which one has to exclude, censor, erase, destroy or dispace, visualize, condenses the archive to gains pace in the same place, in the same system, to be able to continue to store, to make space. Finitude is also sort of a low for this economy. Beast and Sovererign, 2, 156 (227) in the sisthe session, engagin with Freud One can treat responsibility as a precisely academic theme. One would exhume this archived topos, whose code would no longer be our own, along the lines of a celebration, an anniversary. Jacques Derirda, “Mochlos”, Eyes of the University, 89 “Sendoffs (for the College International de Philosophie) (1982) Eyes of the University, 216-49. “Everything begins in Belgium with a strange story of letters. Letters that are more or less purloined or detoured in their destination. . . “’Le Parjure,’ Perhaps,” Without Alibi, 175 Essays “Me—Psychonalysis” in Psyche, Invention of the Other VOl 1, 129-142 and also “Geopsychoanlaysis ‘and the rest of the world’,” Pysche, Invention of the Other VOl 1, 318-343 “The other reason concerns the place that one must recognize for Heidegger in Lacanian theory. This point was also imporant to me in my interterreation of Lacan’s Seeminar of Poe’s “Purloined Letter.”
““What I Would Have Said . . . ,” in Negotiatons: Interventons and Interviews 1971-2001 Trans. ElizabethRottenberg Standord 2002, 55-68. Jacques Derrida Chapter four title “A Marginal Note or Remark—The Two Loose Pages” in The Archaelogy of the Friviolous: Reading Condillac, John P. Leavey Jr. , university of Nebraska, 1987, 113 Read the Post Card “intratexutally” in several ways. Derrida assuems the finitude of the support vesus the infinity of reading (HC for Life “read her infinitely” 79 and textual criticism and literature (edition) on the other. He sidleines publishing and genetic criticism under the heading of the archive (Geneses Arhive)and all ediitons and adaptions under narrative and survivance of Robinson Crusoe in Beast and Sovereign 2 Unreadable takes for granted publication—another version of finitude—the egal constraints—around which Derrida reads parergonally. He reds back to ediitons, but not to manuscripts. Historicist critique based on actor network theory or systems theory or someother cosicl cirucaltion model all close down rading. So does French genetique criticism. Derrida also pays clsoe attention to publication and original occasion. Various kinds of embalming / archiving practices, self-citations and other reshelving operations of publishing histoyr. This is not find Derida is a simple logical contradiciotn but to question the way he makes sending a priori. In order to get around Heidegger (destiny) and Lacan (arrival), Derrida , in favor of chance, the aleatory, destinerrance , has to postulate that the post is sent just as the call isplaced, the phonerings. Or the phone meschnine records. So archive / ash follows—a kind offigure of what cannot be archived replaces the various things that do not get archived, like the prier d’inserer. Post card versus posthue. No linearizaiton or biogrpahical reduciton, no narrative of Derrida’s progress thatwould situate the Post Card in one place. Hegel’s irony is double: He knows htat elsewhere , objected to mnemotechnic formalism and learning “byheart.” Age of Hegel, 133 Let us come back to Matthew (Chap. 6). On three occasions there returns this truth, ike some obsessive reminder to belearned by heart. . . . It is a truth ‘to be learned by heart’ in the first place because one has the impression of having to learn it without understanding it, like a repeated and repeatable forumla (like our tout autre est tout autre just now . . . like a sealed message that can be passed to hand to hand or whispered mouth to ear). It is a matter of learning ‘by heart’ beyond any semantic comprehension. “Tout autre est tout autre,” Gift of Death, 97 "Sortie: Le reve de J.D." in your fascinating and very timely (NSA scandal) book, Sur l'ecoute: esthetique de l'espionage I am also interested in whether posthumous publication might offer a wrinkle in your account of the "panacousticon" (great neologism, by the way) in that the spy is also a ghost, a revenant ecrit that makes itself hear with the voice of the Other (autre). I think of Derrida's chapter in The Gift of Death, "tout autre est tout autre." Or has Derrida put us on hold, unable to hear "him" speak but forced to ask, as in Hamlet, "who's there?" Do we have to hold our breath? Or posthume as we breathe (Circonfession, le bete et le souverain 2)? Is l'autre a spectre? a living dead? “53 “Supposing that—Glas or The POscard havea so’seclector,; a princieple or choice or discrimination (thematic or formal) for example the two columns . . Circonfessions, 276 “36 . .and I am trying to disinterest myselffrom myselfto withdraw from death by making the “I,” to whom death is supoed to happen, gradually go away,no,to be destroyedbefore death cometo meet it, so that at the end already there should benooneleft tobe scared oflosig the worldin losing hinselg in it, andhte last of the Jews that I stillam is doing nothing here other than destroying the worldon the pretext of making truth, but just as well the instense relation to survival that wiritng is =, not driven by the desire that somethingremain after me, sine I shall not be there to enjoy it iina word, there where the point is, rather, in producing these remains and therefre te witnesses of my radical absence, t live today, here and now, this death of me, for example, the very counterexample which finally reveals the truth of the world such as it is, itself, i.e. without me, and all the more intensely to enjoy this light I am producing through the present experimentation of my possible survival, i.e. of absolute death, I tell myself this every time I am walkingin the streets of tha city I love, in which I love, on whose walls I weep myself and was weeping myself again yesterday in the sight of the rue de l’Abbe de l’Epee not long after leaving you, G., at Gatwick. Circonfession. 190-92. Cite the The Post Card on p. 89 in the caption to a cover of a notebook of 1976 concerning Elijah and circumcision. There is a photo of JD’s Macintosh with a citation below, and the words in a boc across the screen “Cette command va creer un paragraphe trop long [This command will create an paragraph tha tis too long.” Not translated. No transcription of the words blocked out by the command either. Photo of Derrida working at Ris Orangi Circonfessions, 11 you write in footnote 12, p. 152 that Derrida's "dernier mots" were read at his funeral. Do you know who read them? Did that person attribute the words to J.D. or say "quote" and "unquote" to indicate the quotation marks? Did the person offer any kind of critical commentary to explain what she or he was reading? Second, do you know anything about the "arrangements," so to speak, Derrida made to have his note, reproduced in rue descartes on p. 7 (and also in an issue of Critical Inquiry and entitled "Final Words"), do you know if Derrida arranged for it to be read? Did he plan to have it published? Or did someone else decide to publish it? Third, so you know if a title was given in rue descartes? Critical Inquiry cites the title "Derniers mots," but on p. 6 of Rue descartes, only "Jacque Derrida" is printed (at least in the online version). And table des matieres gives only "Introduction." (Btw, Critical Inquiry oddly--to my mind--translates "dernier" as "final" rather than "last," as in "Final Words.") I am struck by the quotation marks Derrida placed around the note and his use of the third person. and the lack of an addressee (preceding the remarks) or a signatory (J.D.). Derrida appears to have wanted to be spoken for from beyond the grave (d'outre tombe) like Chateaubriand's mémoires d'outre tombe with the voice of an Other, a voice citing not J.D. but a citation J.D. did not sign and hence speaking for Derrida but not in his name (since he refused to sign) or even "his" words. "Tout outre," as it were, "est tout outre." The Age of Hegel, learning by heart and mnenotechnics “philosophemes” 37 Section subtitled “The Signature: Art of Invenitng, Art of Sending”36-41 We could evoke the politics of publishing, the orders of booksellers or art merchants, studies of themarket, cultural policies, whether state-promoted or not, and the politics of research and, as we say these days, the ‘orientations’ that this poltiics imposes throughout our institutions of higher education . . . 27 Psyche: Invention of the Other Volume 1, I have just quoted my chances wiith regard to Poe’s pas de chance because what we have here is a preface or postface to “The Purveyor of truth,” to the thought of sending [la pensee de l’envoi] that gets relaunched there, to the randomness of missives ando the sendings of chance. My Chances, Psyche: Invention of the Other Volume 1, 358 “Of a Materiality Without Matter” susbtitle of typewriter ribbon Ink, Without Alibi, 128, like X without X” Derrida postals, recalls, not a single channel, as with digital in Kittler. One medium morphs into another, as it does through langauge—telephone, post office, phone card, post card, etc. Configuration of skeuomorphs as metaphors, analogues. Maurice Blanchot, The Work of Fire Trans. Charlotte Mandell Michel Butor, Dans les flammes: Chanson du mone a Madame Nu (Paris, 1988) “The good hour of the Purloined Letter,” Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, 105-06 Dying a living death being buried or swallowed up alive, is indeed, for Robinson, to be delivered over, in his body, defenseless, to the other (138) Dying alive, swallowed alive, buried alive apply both to RC and to the book (133) and to the narrative (132). Is swallowed” (eaten) already a psychoanlaytic register here? Burial cllpases into eating? A kind of auto-canaiblaizaiton of het xorpse, or zombie effect on the living (who become cannibals) ?
In Robinson Crusoe, Robinson Crusoe himself, both the Robinson Crusoe who speaks and the one keeping a journal, all that they—there are already a lot of them-might have desired is that the book, and in it the journal, outlive them: that might outlive Defoe, and the character called Robinson Crusoe. . Now this survival, thanks to which the book bearing its title has come down to us, has been read and will be read, interpreted, taught, saved, translated, reprinted, illustrated filmed, kept alive by millions of inheritors—this survival is indeed that of the living dead. (130) The book lives its beautiful death. That’s also finitude, the chance and the threat of finitude, this alliance of the living and the dead. I shall say that this finitude is survivance. Survivance is, in a sense of survival that is neither life nor death pure and simple, a sense that is not thinkable on the basis of the opposition between life and death. (130) At the end of after.life—corpse and paper—how will corpse be disposed of? No habeas corpus, no corpse for Derrida—detachment from the corpse and form paper. The dead do not read the death certificate. Then Derrida wants to wake from this reading as reanimation psycho-anthropology of cultures . . present modernity of Greco-Abrahamic Europe, like ours,. . wonder what is happening to us that is very specific . . . in the procedural organization of death as survivance, as treatment, by the family and / or the State, of the so-called dead boy, what we call a corpse.,. . . not just in the universal structure of survivance . . . but in the funeral itself, in the organized manner, in the juridical apparatus and the set of technical procedures whereby we . .deliver the corpse over to its future, prepare the future of a corpse and prepare ourselves as one says prepares a corpse. . . . this fantasmatics of dying alive or dying dead (132) And he says that there is no such thing as habeas corpus or a corpse. A dead person is one who cannot him or himself put into operation any decision concerning the future of his or her corpse. The dead person no longer has the corpse at his or her disposal, there is no longer any habeas corpus. Habeas corpus, at least, is not a habeas corpse, supposing there ever were such a thing. Habeas corpus concerns the living body and not the corpse. Supposing, I repeat, that there ever were such a habeas corpus for the living body. Because you can guess that I believe that this habeas corpus never existed and is a legal emergence, however important it may be, designates merely a way of taking into account or managing the effects of heteronomy and an irreducible non habeas corpus, And the non habeas corpus at the moment of death, shows up the truth of this non habeas corpus during the lifetime of said corpus. 144 if one extends a little the idiom and the juridical law that binds this concept and this law to England, habeas corpus [see Agamben Homo Sacer on Habeas corpus as an extension of biopolitics; Derrida also uses the “zone” metaphor in B and S vol 2] accords a sort of proprietorial sovereignty over one’s own living body. I have the property of my own body proper, that’s the habeas corpus poss as to birth, conception, birth control, medicine, experimentation, organ transplants, etc [in other words, what Foucault calls biopolitics], to limit myself to the treatment of death. I shall not even speak of the specific problems of autosopy, DNA research , etc. I shall limit myself to the decision, the choice, the alternative between bury and cremate, and its relation to the fantasy of the living dead. [Derrida doesn’tntote that the canniblas both bury and cremate the uneaten remains of their dead prisoners. The cannibals are both raw and cooked, to recall Levi-Strauss.] In the jewish community of Algeria, where people are buried, of course, with no coffin, straight intthe ground in the shroud , , to make ssure ice is not burying someone living, one plugs all the orifices and lays out the corpse on cold titles long enough fir stiffening, rigor mortis, to confirm beyond all doubt the legal or medical certification of death that in the end one does not absolutely trust. 145 Instead of starting with a fantasmatics “the fantasy of dying a living death” [a psycho-anthropological point of view] 144 leading to apoertics of inhumation ad cremation, we can start with a living corpse. Habeas corpse is the literary remains. Robinson C’s anxiety / fantasy is shared by Rousseau only in relation to the fate of his works. Rousseau stopping writing for publication. So Derrida too quickly invokes inheritance as a metaphor for textual transmission, or he boxes up what he could have unfoled but simly did not. Agamben’s Homo Sacer as he situates his account of biopolitics directly in relation to Foucault and maintains that he has radicalized Foucault. Agamben ‘s critique of liberal democracy turns in part on habeas corpus: The first recording of bare life as the new political subject is already implicit in the document that is generally placed at the foundation of modern democracy: the 1679 writ of habeas corpus . . . Nothing allows one to measure the difference between ancient and medieval freedom and the freedom at the basis of modern democracy better than this formula. It is not the free man and his statutes and prerogatives, nor even simply homo, but rather corpus that is the subject of politics. And democracy is born precisely as the assertion and presentation of this “body”: habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, “you will have to have the body to show” (124-125). Bring in de Certeau here as away of rethinking his notion of reading as sovereignty in order to make our book intelligible to history of the book people. + Chartier + Agamben equals Biopolitics of reading We should try to rediscover the movements of this reading within the body itself, which seems to stay docile and silent but mines the reading in its own way: from the nooks of all sorts of “reading rooms” (including lavatories) emerge subconscious gestures, grumblings, tics, stretchings, rustlings, unexpected noises, in short wild orchestrations of the body. But elsewhere, at its most elementary level, reading has become, over the last three centuries, a visual poem. It is no longer accompanied, as it used to be, by the murmur of a vocal articulation nor by the movement of a muscular manducation. To read without uttering the words aloud or at least mumbling them is a “modern” experience, unknown for millennia. In earlier times, the reader interiorized the text; he made his voice the body of the other; he was an actor. Today, the text no longer imposes its own rhythm on the subject, it no longer manifests itself through the reader’s voice. This withdrawal of the body, which is the condition of its autonomy, is a distancing of the text. It is the reader’s habeas corpus (175-176). Several friends recently brought to my attention a recent publication (“a pathetic Parisian tabloid in the style of Gala,” as one of them put it), whose author pontificates, without verifying anything, on what I’ve written and taught for a number of years now under the name unconditional hospitality. Obviously understanding nothing, the author even gives me, as if still back in high school, a bad grade and exclaims peremptorily in the margins of my paper: “Absurd!” Well, what can I say? . . . . note 12, 172 (Rogues) Gives several self-citations on p 173 (still n.12) and then concludes “as for the notion of sacrifice, which the same newspaper confusedly throws into the mix, I’ve written so much on the subject that a whole page of references would not suffice. One last bit of advice—uttered out of desperation: read everything! And ten, if need be, reread it!” See also “”I repeat my advice, always, always, “venture beyond the beginning,” in Post-Script to, “Post-Script: Reading ‘beyond the beginning’; or, On the Venom in Letter: Postscript and ‘Literary Supplement’” Demeure (104-08)154 Derrida, “Privilege,” in Who’s Afraid of Philosophy The possiblization of this power can also be read in the “internal” organization of Kantian discourse. 52 As for the “internal” difficulties of this machinery . . . 53
See Derrida’s note 2, p. 203 Reference to the texts of the Philosophy of Right of Berlin as well as to the political scene of the epoch is a precondition for the minimal intelligibility of this letter. We should therefore specify immediately that it is becoming increasingly clear we must speak of the “Philosophies of Right” of Berlin. This multiplicity is not simply a matter of revisions, versions, editions, or additions. Learning ‘by heart.’” (132) In other words, Derrida comes up agains the publication history only to dimssis it. Derrida citing Hegel’s letter: “if I do not die a professor of the Royal University, my contributions to the University Widows’ Fund will be entirely lost.” 127 What he learned by heart and still remembers 119 memory, the recollection of certain lifeless contrents, 132 Hegel played the lottery . . . scrap of paper 130 All that, moreover, for a widow and children about whom he already thinks posthumously and thus with the paradoxical disinterestedness of the dead?” (128) And a situation in which cannot really be determined without the simultaneous and structural cognizance of an entire textuality, consisting at least of . . . Interpreting the age of Hegel involves keeping in min this boundless textualuty . . . 137 If this ‘special report’ has more or less disappeared from the great circulation of “canonized” texts, can this be explained entirely by reasons relating to its ‘form’? It is, first of all, a letter. Of course, there is a venerable tradition of philosophical letters. But what does this tradition consist and what does it preserve? Either ‘fictive’ letters on topics . . .They are usually read as they were novels or memoirs.. . . This tradition, as we have described it. Cannot find a place of Hegel’s ‘letter.’ It is not really a ‘letter,’ although it bears the marks of one. It is less addressed to a person than to a function. 136; 137 A few years ago, in Strasbourg, I saw, or think I saw, a photo of Martin wearing short pants. Martin Heidegger. You don’t necessarily have to have trembled before Thinking or Philosophy, or to have had masters or pastors who delighted in provoking fear and promoting the delight engendered by fear, to explode in laughter on seeing the short pants of this great man who was defrocked (he too a product, if we can say that, like Hegel, of an unforgettable “Theological Seminary”). There, it wasn’t Martin himself who displayed the photograph. Rather, his brother, “the sole brother.” Also one of Heidegger’s dedications reads. The brother played this trick on him with the naive, affectionate mischievousness of some someone swelling with pride at having written a little book of family memories—“Heidegger” family memories—but who also has (perhaps) something of a (deadly) grudge against his brother in short pants. In short pants, at an age when one has not yet learned philosophy, much less thinking, there is no difference yet between two sole brothers. 126 “at least in the form of a political metaphor, the theme of a Bemachtigungstrieb, a drive for ascendancy, for power, or for possession. I tried to show elsewhere, in a long Post Card, how the word and concept of Bemachtigung,” however discreet they are and however underanalyzed by Freud’s readers, are present beginning in he Three Essays and play in Beyond a decisive role, beyond or on this side of the principles, as principal drive, if I can say that, notably in love / hate ambivalence and the unleashing of cruelty that calls up the hypothesis of originary sadism. . . there would thus be a concept of a drive that for power . . that organizes . . the whole order of what Lacan called the symbolic.” 258 Derrida, “Psychoanalysis Searches the States of Its Soul: The Impossible Beyond of a Sovereign Cruelty,” Without Alibi, 238-80; to 258. The problem of the death penalty and of sovereignty in general, of the sovereign power of the state over the life and death of citizens, this will make manifest a double resistance, both that of the world to psychoanalysis and that of psychoanalysis to itself as to the world, of psychoanalysis to psychoanalysis as being-in-the-world. Derrida, “Psychoanalysis Searches the States of Its Soul: The Impossible Beyond of a Sovereign Cruelty,” Without Alibi, 238-80; to 262. Derrida trashes Agamben, Homo Sacer, in note 26, 165 of Rogues. In one sentence. “In this text [Aristotle’s Politics], as in so many others both by Plato and Aristotle, the distinction between bios and zoe--or zen—is more than tricky or precarious; in no way does it correspond to the strict opposition on which Agamben bases the quasi-totality of his argument about sovereignty and the biopolitical in Homo Sacer (but let’s leave that for another time).” P. 24 Rogier Laporte Le carnet posthume Pun on “card” in English (not “carnet and “carte” but like “post” as mail and police in French) Phone card and postcard intersect in the anecdote Derrida tells about giving his card to the couple as he arrived back in France but not knowing if they had enough time—if there was enough money on it for them to place the call. Calling card—means telephone card now or phone card; a signature token or characteristic of a crime used by a serial criminal Telephonic and postal analogous in Ulysses Gramophone, which recalls the Post Card, or redials it. Jed Deppman, Daniel Ferrer, and Michael Groden Ed. Genetic Criticism: Texts and Avant-textes (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) Gérard Genette, Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree trans. Channa Newman University of Nebraska Press (1997) Sovereignty is analogous to the letter in being indivisible: It would be necessary to dissociate a certain unconditional independence of thought, of deconstruction, of justice, of the Humanities, of the university, and so forth from any phantasm of indivisible sovereignty and of sovereign mastery.” “The University Without Condition,” in Without Alibi, 235 “Sending” chapter 10, 108-14 in Rogues, and “To Arrive—At at the Ends of the State (and of War, and of World War),” Rogues 141-59; “revois” , p. 38 Examples of self-citation note 8, 162 Inn both cases it seemed to me more approriate to publish these texts as such in order to respectnot only the constrints and limits imposed on htem but also in their original aduiences. None of the distinguishing features provided by the original lcontexts have thus been edited out or modidfied: on such a day, in such a place, before such an audience. Only a few notes were added after the fact. N3.162 self-citations, n. 12, 173 Heideggerian deconstruction (Destruktion) never relaly opposed logicentrism or even logos. Indeed, it often, on the contrary, in the name of a more “orginary” deeper interpretation that it carried out thedeconstruction of lasical ontology or ontotheology. 2 The “deconstrction” that I attempt or that tempts me is not only distinct (in ways too numerous and too widely discussed welwwhere for me to recall here) from the one practised by Heidegger. Note 14, 173 in Rogues The next note returns to Of Grammaotlogy is in a discussion of Luther’s use of Destruktion and Heidegger as a great reader of Luther. Note 3. 174 Hence I never associated the theme of decnstruciton with the the themes s that were constantly being brought up during the discussion, themes of ‘diagonosis,” of “after” or “post,” of “death” (death of philosophy, death of metaphysics, and so on) of”completion” or “surpassing” (Uberwindung or Scritt zuruck), of the “end.” One will find no trace of such a vocabulary in nay of my texts. Note 2, 174 Rogues, “cruelty” and “sovereignty” in “Psychoanalysis Searches” Without Alibi “Psychoanalysis would be the same of that which which, without theological or other alibi, would be turned toward what is most proper to cruelty. Psychoanalysis . . . would be another name for the “without alibii.” “Psychoanalysis Searches”, Without Alibi 240 “cruelty, sovereignty, resistance” 242; “Freudian psychoanalysis” 257 Freudian psychoanalytic discurse” 258
268 (370) Can Derrida Die?" (It would be a reframing of JD's reading of Heidegger on the animal perishing but not dying (Sterben) as only Dasein can in relation to a paragraph in Being and Time on "after death," as a paragraph that follows Heidegger's distinction between demise / perish and death on which Derrida does not comment; the reframing would open up the notion of posthumographic criticism, oriented to the future, to publication--as opposed to genetic criticism, oriented to the past, to manuscripts, to unpublished materials--so that one would not pass from the disorder of an archive of papers and mss to the order of a published work but from one kind of mess to another. In other words, one would not pass.) Did I tell you I found a will--just published in English translation--that Heidegger made in the 1930s about how his works should be published posthumously? THE WISH AND THE WELL “On Preserving What is Attempted” in Mindfulness (Besinnung). trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary, Continuum, 2006, 270-78. “Nothing need be said about the ship’s voyage and goal, because it has become wholly the vehicle of surviving [Überleben] and rising above life [Über-leben].” “tranquility of Dionysus’s sea voyage as depicted on Exekias’s ancient vase.” Hans Blumenberg, Shipwreck with Spectator: Paradigm of a Metaphor for Existence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996 ), 65. Blumenberg mentions Robinson Crusoe twice, near the end of the book 75, 78. Derrid speaks of two “non-shores” in tenth session , but never enages Hdeigger’s Sojourns (even though Derida went to greece—book on Athens and photography. . This same image is on the cover of English trans. of Heidegger’s Sojourns. This piece of paper initially takes the form of a journal, of a note to self, dated in Pascal’s hand 209 It was found written on a piece of paper found in Pascal's clothing after his death. . . 209 And Pascal was only thirty-one years old when he wrote and put into his clothing the posthumous paper 210 To whom did he write this? To whom did he write in general? For there is in Pascal . . . a “do not remember me,” a ‘keep me in oblivion,’ . . . a ‘forget me’ about which one can always wonder if it is not also praying that one remember to forget and even attach oneself to the one thus praying that one not attach oneself to him. 210 “[there is no doubt, then, that the general form of the posthumous fragment by Pascal us both, indissociably, that of the prayer and of a journal for self or for other humans, other neighbors and brothers in sin], and also, [primarily, a prayer addressed to God and to Jesus his son], even though often this prayer quotes words from the the Bible . . . ,” 213
1. Ps. XXVIII, 16. --- Ces trois denieres lignes ne figurent pas sur la autographe de la Bibliotecque nationale: il est possbible cependant eq’elles aient appartenus au parchemin original.” 143. This note comes right before ?”Amen” and after the last line, “Non obliviscare sermones tuos. (143) In Honor Levi’s Oxford World’s Classics note to the “paper” entitled “The Memorial” in his edition of the Pensees and Other Writings, Levi writes “The Memorial: there exist two texts of this document, one in the hand of Pascal on paper sewn into the lining of his jacket after his death, and a second, swor, exact copy of text on parchment, itself lost, which the paper and was sewn into the jacket with it. The parchment text adds the last three lines and the scripture references. The Memorial follows as closely as possible the layout of the parchment version, which is slightly longer than the paper copy it protected when sewn into Pascal’s jacket. A special receipt was issue for the Memorial when it was deposited on 25 September 1711, to the library of the of Saint-Germain-des-Pres, demonstrating that it was considered a document apart from the fragments now known as the Pensees. The document, presumably written within hours of the experience it records, captures the moments of a movement of profound spiritual exaltation. pp. 24—45, note 178 “Opuscules—Deuxieme partie,” in Pensées et opuscules / Blaise Pascal ; publiés avec une introduction, des notices, des notes et deux fac-similés du manuscrit des Pensées ed. Léon Brunschvicg (Paris : Hachette, 1946), 142.
The survivance is broached from the moment of the first trace that is supposed to engender the writing of a book. From the first breath, this archive as survivance is at work But once again, this is the case not only for books, or for writing or for the archive in the current sense, but for everything from which the tissue of living experience is woven, through and through. A weave of survival, like death in life or life in death, a weave that does not come along to clothe a more originary existence, a life or a body or a soul that would be supposed to exist under this clothing. The Beast and Sovereign 2, pp. 131-32 (194-95) Compare the weaving / clothing metaphor to Pascal’s shirt. Derrida’s analysis of Heidegger in The Animal That Therefore I Am as well as in The Beast and Sovereign 2 focuses on Heidgger’s distinction between demise (Ableben) and dying [Sterben]: “Dasein . . . qua Dasein . . does not simply perish. We call this intermediate phenomenon its demise (Ableben). Let the term dying [Sterben] stand for the way of being in which Dasein is toward its death. Thus we can say Dasein never peishes. Dasein can suffer demise only as long as it dies.” But Derrida does not comment on a paragraph on “after death” on the same page The ontological analysis of being toward the end . . . does not anticipate any existentiell stance toward death. If death is defined as the “end” of Dasein, that is, of being-in-the-world, no ontic decision has been made as to whether “after death” another being [Sein] is still possible, either higher or lower, whether Dasein “lives on” or even, “outliving itself,” is “immortal.” Nor is anything decided ontically about the otherwordly and its ossibility, any more than about “this worldly,” as of norms and rules for behavior toward death should be proposed for edification.” But our analysis of death remains purely “this-worldly”in that it interprets the phenomenon solely with respect to the question of how it enters into each and every Dasein as its possibility-of-being. We cannot even ask with any methodological assurance about what is after death until death is understood in its full ontological essence. Whether such a question presents a possible theoretical question at all is not to be decided here. The this-world ontological interpretation of death comes before any ontic, other-worldly speculation . . . The existential analsyis is methodologically prior to questions of a biology, psychology, theodicy,and theology of death. P 238; 239 (248); see the end of the last sentence of the note on “’problems of life’”at the bottom of page 239, after the last sentence of the body of the text. Kittler, Post Card, 180 Yüklə 1,02 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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