To oversee Policing in their Province, Sec 205 of the Constitution provides that: The National Police Service must be structured to function in the National, Provincial and where appropriate, local spheres of government.
National Legislation must establish the powers and functions of the Police Service which will enable it to discharge its responsibilities effectively, taking into account the requirements of the Provinces.
As prescribed by the National Legislation and subject to the power of the National commissioner to exercise control over and manage the Police Service in terms of subsection 2.
The Provincial Commissioner must report to the Provincial Legislature annually on Policing in the Province, and must send a copy of the report to the National Commissioner
If the Provincial Commissioner has lost the confidence of the Provincial Executive, that Executive may institute appropriate proceedings for the removal or transfer of or disciplinary action against that Commissioner in accordance with the National Legislation.
Schedule 4 provides for functional areas of concurrent National and Provincial Legislative Competence PART A, police to the extent that the provisions of chapter 11 of the Constitution confer upon the Provincial Legislatures legislative competence.
It is therefore submitted that the Legislature should avoid a situation where there could be a gap or lacuna in as far as the DPCI is accountable to the Provincial Commissioner and the Provincial Government.
If it is not specified, the DPCI may become a "monster" that is only accountable to the National Commissioner with no consideration for the Provincial needs as envisaged in the Constitution. It may be necessary to state in the Act that DPCI will at the Provincial level liaise, report or be accountable to the Provincial Director who in turn will report, liaise or account to the Provincial Commissioner.
Criticism Of Section 17 & 18 Of the SAPS Amendment Bill
Section 17 provides that expenditure in connection with the Administration and Functioning of the DPCI must be defrayed from monies appropriated by Parliament for this purpose to the Departmental vote in terms of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999).
Section 18 provides that the National Commissioner shall be Accounting Officer for the monies referred to in subsection 17.
I find it difficult to understand the basis of a separate budget for a unit that is part of SAPS. There are many units within the SAPS, and they don’t have any separate budget. The clause may run to the spirit of a single unified police service under one command and direction.
If the unit has a separate stand–alone budget it may affect the spirit of unity at SAPS, the unit might see itself as operating outside the unified police service.
It is true that the unit may require a huge budget but that does not need to be legislated on. The National Commissioner and the Ministry must be granted the opportunity and the right to receive an increased budget for the SAPS and utilize their budgeting discretion to distribute resources amongst the Department as they deem appropriate depending on the needs of the various units including the DPCI.
Transfer Of Functions And Redeployment Of Special Investigations
All functions and powers performed by the DOS will be transferred to DPCI.
This provision ensures that investigations and other work in progress will be transferred from DSO to DPCI. All persons other than the Prosecutors will be transferred to the SAPS in accordance with the Labour Relations Act.
The Bill provides that the allocated budget and assets and liabilities of DOS must be transferred to the DPCI in accordance with section 42 of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999.
The Registrar of Deeds must make the necessary entries and endorsements for the transfer of any property in terms of this section.
The above sections, once against premises that an independent, stand-alone entity is being created.
It is my submission that this would create more problems and confusions.
It seems the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations (DPCI) seems to be created as something in between a public entity and as part of Police Service. Such institutions are very problematic from the accounting point of view, and create all sorts of dilemma’s; inter alia
Who procures goods and services on behalf of the unit? It should be noted that the unit’s budget could run into millions of Rands.
Does the unit appoint its admin staff or SAPS employ and second staff?
Can they own property in their own name?
Can they be sued?
Can they incur liability?
If a wrong is committed, who do you sue, SAPS or DPCI?
Do they handle their own finances subject to the National Commissioner being the accounting officers?
Do they operate within the SAPS’ offices or they rent their own places?
Do they develop or create their own policies, rulings, orders, etc.
In light of the above concern, it appears to me that the Bill should be made simply by incorporating DSO members into DPCI and they fall under SAPS and the existing procedures and budgetary considerations be left to the police.
DSO 233
ANCYL – KZN See DSO 175
DSO 234
MKVA - same as DSO 130
DSO 235
SACP - KZN
Supports the disbanding of the DSO:
The decision to disband the DSO is legitimate and necessary in order to strengthen the fight against crime.
According to the SACP – KZN, the findings of the Khampepe Commission support the disbandment of the DSO.
Problems in the DSO are not procedural but are structural and they therefore need to be addressed structurally (by dissolving the structure).
Illegal gathering of intelligence (not only crime intelligence but political intelligence as well) has put the security of the country in jeopardy.
The Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence found that the DSO illegally produced the Special Browse Mole Report, and that has never been denied or disputed by the DSO.
Suspects investigated by the DSO face political and criminal investigations.
Plea-bargaining with criminals is condemnable.
Scorpions are law unto themselves.
DSO uses “Hollywood style raids” and violates human rights.
Dissolution of the DSO is a step towards revamping the country’s Criminal Justice System
DSO 236
Comfort Ngidi – see DSO 232
DSO 237
Radley Keys – see DSO 230
DSO 238
M. Gcabo (AIC)15
Opposes the disbanding of the DSO:
“[T]he AIC feels strongly that it is important to remind the people of South Africa that the ANC in Parliament passes any piece of legislation it sets its mind on regardless of the views of the majority of the people.” The Communities of Matatiele, Merafong and Moutse have experienced this.
The public hearings were “an elaborate charade to provide cover for the unconstitutional pressing ahead with the legislation by the ANC.” The process has been the waist of taxpayers’ money, and it also amounts to abuse of power.
The AIC acknowledges that the DSO may be wrong in its discharge of power but its independence needs to be maintained.
AIC does not support the Bills.
DSO 239
Mandla Zikhali
Supports the disbanding of the DSO:
DSO failed in carrying out its mandate.
Community lost confidence in DSO.
DSO should be incorporated in the SAPS.
DSO 240
EM Ngubane
Supports the disbanding of the DSO:
The decision to deal with the problems of the DSO was taken more than five years ago, and the current process seeks to implement that decision.
The reason that led to the establishment of the DSO in the first place was organised crime, which existed then and it still does today.
The debate should be about relocating the DSO not dissolving it.
Relocation of the DSO is necessary because it is inline with the Constitution.
After relocation, there won’t be any tension among law enforcement agencies.
The Browse Mole saga is a lesson not to be repeated.
There were serious oversights when the DSO was being established:
Failure to anticipate tensions between the SAPS and DSO.
Lack of vetting mechanisms to minimise anti-transformation forces from infiltrating the DSO.
Failure to have a code of professional conduct.
DSO 241
African Movement for Democracy (ADM) (Roman Landrost)
Supports the disbanding of the DSO:
Supports the dissolution of the DSO and its incorporation to the SAPS.
DSO 242
SANCO - T Tsikwe
Supports the disbanding of the DSO:
DSO failed to fulfil its mandate
DSO places National security at risk by engaging foreign intelligence agencies in their work, and also by outsourcing most of their work to private companies that have not been vetted.
DSO investigates less that 5% of organised crime that takes place in the country.
Paying DSO members 40% more than SAPS members is unfair.
DSO 243 (See also DSO 62)
CSVR (Further Submission)
Oppose disbandment of the DSO:
However, the focus of this submission on request of the Chairpesons to look at:
The Equality Clause (section 9(1) of the Constitution)
This section embodies the principle of equality before the law. Linked to the principle of the rule of law (section 1(c).
Particular aspect of the equality clause relating to the concern that people in positions of power in South Africa should be subject to the operation of the law, and that no-one should be exempt from the operation of the law irrespective of their wealth, status or power in society.
The closure of the DSO impacts on equality before the law in the following ways:
Accountability:
SAPS is large and thus difficult to subject to scrutiny and oversight. Few accountability agencies (e.g. ICD, parliament etc) have been able to subject the SAPS to meaningful scrutiny.
In contrast, the DSO has been relatively effective in subjecting the SAPS to scrutiny. Therefore disbandment of this structure reduces the accountability and degree to which SAPS members, especially at senor level are subject to the law.
Police corruption:
SAPS suffers from a severe problem of corruption and the SAPS Anti-Corruption Unit was closed in 2002.
Units involvement in investigating organised crime are highly vulnerable to corruption.
The DSO was effectively the only agency outside of the SAPS with the capacity to investigate organised crime and high level police corruption. Therefore, the closure of the DSO weakens the already weak mechanisms for responding to police corruption in SA.
Other official corruption and organised crime:
Closure of the DSO potentially weakens the legal accountability of other senior officials of state.
One reason for this is because the power to initiate criminal investigations s centralised in one agency (i.e. the SAPS).
Senior officials in this agency (the SAPS) are subject to the influence of senior officials and politicians.
Existing SAPS culture is of deference to political authority which takes precedence over the need to uphold the law; accentuated by a culture of intimidation and arbitrary censure within the organisation.
In contrast, current culture in the DSO has in part upheld the principle of equality before the law and if there were transgressions in this regard this cannot be rectified by incorporating DSO members into the SAPS.
Respect for the law and trust in government institutions:
On balance, the DSO were one of the few institutions that inspired confident in the integrity of the legal system, and the principle of equality before the law, though it should be noted that the DSO was not ‘blemish free’.
Thus closure of the DSO will further weaken respect for the law and trust in governmental institutions.
Values and culture of law enforcement:
Closure of the DSO sends the message to all law enfacement agencies that those who subject high level political and government officials to investigative scrutiny will be punished.
This undermines the potential for cultivating a culture within law enforcement agencies that supports the principles of quality before the law and other constitutional principles.
Recommendations: In order to counteract these negative effects of closure of the DSO the following policy measures should be taken encapsulated:
Seek to reduce the scope for manipulation of the CJS by reducing the concentration of power and establishing check and balances over the authority to initiate investigations.
Seek to reduce the scope for manipulation of the CJS by discouraging inappropriate interference in decisions relating to investigation.
Ensure that the CJ agencies are supportive of the principle of equality before the law and nurture among their members a confidence about this.
Strengthen measures to address police corruption.
Seek to ensure that there are effective investigations into organised crime.
Strengthen the response to crime and in particular violent crime more generally.
The ICD
In practice, the ICD is focused on the investigation of deaths in police custody and as a result of police action; and complaints against the police. Neither of these areas have much to do with police corruption.
Internationally bodies such as the ICD do not usually have investigation of police corruption as there core mandate. The ICD has never been empowered to play a significant anti-corruption role and does not have the authority, independence, systems, capacity or resources to deal with police corruption at a high level or the political consequences thereof.
Thus in the light of the generalised need to strengthen the ICD, SAPS own inadequacies in responding to police corruption, and the fact that the closure of the DSO will further weaken measure to address police corruption the following recommendations are made:
Clarification of the overall framework and roles of different bodies. Responsibility for criminality on the part of the police should primarily be located within the police itself.
An oversight body such as the ICD should essentially function as a check on the police to ensure that they are adequately addressing such problems. The ICD needs to be capacitated if it is to play this role including by:
Increasing the status of the Executive Director.
Redefining the identity, role and mandate of the ICD.
Clarifying the powers of the ICD to confirm its authority to intervene in matters falling within its mandate.
Obliging the SAPS to report to Parliament on how it has responded to cases referred to it by the ICD, recommendations for disciplinary action made by the ICD and other recommendations by the ICD.
Strengthening provision in the SAPS in terms of obligations to report certain events to the ICD.
Dramatically strengthening the corruption investigating capacity of the ICD.
A comprehensive consultation process is required regarding the possible restructuring of the ICD.
Measures to strengthen the SAPS Amendment Bill.
See clause by clause section.
DSO 244
Mr and Mrs R Little
Oppose disbandment of the DSO:
All South Africans are affected by crime.
There is a failure of leadership.
DSO 245
J van Rensburg
Oppose disbandment of the DSO:
DSO more successful than the SAPS.
No reason to make a more successful structure part of a less successful one.
Perception is that the DSO is less susceptible to corruption.
Political reasons motivate decision.
DSO 246
A du Plessis
Oppose disbandment of the DSO:
To protect Jacob Zuma and other high profile politicians.
DSO ?
Advocate Thembi Burhali - Gauteng
Supports the disbanding of the DSO:
Agree with Khampepe that law enforcement is not an exclusive function of the police but disagree that section 179(2) of the constitution read with section 20 of the NPA Act permits the prosecution authority to have law enforcement or an investigative directorate within its structures. The prosecutorial powers are distinct from law enforcement powers. Section 179(2)(b) clearly restricts incidental functions of the prosecution authority to the institution and conducting of criminal proceedings and not criminal investigations. Criminal proceedings only commence after arrest when the accused is brought before court. Before arrest investigations are strictly in the arena of law enforcement. During this process the prosecutor’s role is only to guide an investigation. These critical roles must be kept separately primarily in legislation to avoid conflict of interests. The anomaly must be removed once and for all.
On the NPA Amendment Bill:
By not repealing the entire provisions for investigative directorates within the NPA the amendment is creating potential for yet another Polokwane. It serves no further legitimate purpose to introduce a role for the Cabinet Minister responsible for policing as this acknowledges that the investigative units are intended to be agents of law enforcement.
On the SAPS Amendment Bill:
Oppose sections 16A and B as they place the control of the resources in the new Directorate under authorities within the police structures. Argues that relocation in the police should only give a home to this directorate as part of law enforcement but that the Directorate should retain its retain its separate and exclusive identity which in itself spells out its inherent independence.
Suggest that the provisions of section 7 of the NPA Act as well as any other provisions of the act that related to the establishment of the DSO be used appropriately to establish the directorate as envisaged in section 16 of the Bill.
Provision be made for a proclamation by the President to amend the mandate of the directorate from time to time or as the need arises so that there is room for flexibility in addressing non static but pragmatic criminal activity trends that presents themselves as priority crimes. Any crime can turn to be a serious and organized crime but such serious and organized crime may not necessarily be a priority crime in a particular period.
With regard to accountability, suggests that an Investigating Director or a CEO reporting directly to the Minister of Safety and Security or reporting to a Board (that is representative of critical stakeholders).
Rejects the idea of an additional inter-ministerial committee. This is a revival of a dead horse that has never worked
Regarding section 28(1) inquiries in the NPA Act as well as the provisions of section 16 B(7)(a). The enquiry is a quasi-judicial process aimed at obtaining credible witness evidence for court purposes. To remove the obligation to answer incriminating questions removes the underlying purpose of such enquiries.
Troika is a methodology that seeks to harmonize or synergize investigations, intelligence and prosecutions. It is an invaluable tool in a fight against crime. It has become an international trend and it can be used anywhere. In the NPA Troika was abused and reformulated as an illegitimate basis for prosecutor-led investigations, as opposed to prosecution driven investigations. This reformulation elevated the status of prosecutors above that of investigators and removed the traditional role of prosecutors namely; guiding investigations such that they are prosecution driven. This role of the prosecutor can sufficiently be performed by in-house specialist legal advisors who will liaise with the prosecutor to ensure that there is common understanding and mutual consensus as to the quality of evidence in the docket from the beginning to the end of the investigation. Critical to the success of troika, however, is co-location of critical resources.
The Asset Forfeiture Unit in the NPA derives its powers directly from POCA (Prevention of Organised Crime Act) and is dependent on the DSO for its investigative resource. It has no prosecutorial function and appears also to be misplaced in the prosecuting authority. Should it not be simultaneously relocated to law enforcement?
1 Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
2 Police and Civil Rights Union
3 Institute for Democracy in South Africa.
4 Institute for Security Studies
5 Democratic Alliance.
6 Independent Democrats.
7 South African Democratic Teachers Union
8 African Christian Democratic Party
9 Congress of South African Trade Unions
10 South African Communist Party
11 United Democratic Movement
12 South African Students’ Congress
13 South African National Civil Organisation
14 Pan African Congress
15 African Independent Congress
Research Unit | Author Name: Christine Silkstone & Mpumelelo Mpisi Author Contact Details: 021 4038215
Research Unit | Author Name: Christine Silkstone & Mpumelelo Mpisi Author Contact Details: 021 4038215