The challenge of poverty
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The challenge of poverty The inheritance: SBRs under apartheid SBRs during the transition to democracy State and business in practice in post-apartheid South Africa The other priority: Black Economic Empowerment Some lessons for SBRs and pro-poor growth 1. The challenge of poverty Poverty is widespread in post-apartheid SA 24% of population have per capita incomes < US$1/day taking into account purchasing power Lower than rest of Africa, but high in relation to GDP per capita , and despite economic growth Poverty rate = 50% in Kenya, 15% in Chile, 5% in Malaysia GDP per capita in 1994 = > 6 times higher than in 1930 Due to severe inequality in distribution of income Gini coefficient for distribution of income ≈ 0.7 Under apartheid, inequality was highly racialised In 1994, average income per capita for ‘white’ people was 12 times that of ‘black’ people Life expectancy at birth was approximately one decade longer for white people than for African people Poverty rooted in landlessness and unemployment Unemployment rate peaked at 40% (by broad measure) in early 2000s But poverty is mitigated by highly redistributive welfare system Social assistance programmes amount to 3.5% of GDP 1. The challenge of poverty The context was promising: 1994: first democratic elections African National Congress (ANC) won votes of almost all poor citizens ANC election slogan = “A Better Life For All” ANC committed to mixed economy Long period of sustained economic growth Outcomes have been disappointing Unemployment rates have risen Poverty rates rose then fell (and are surely rising again now) The main reason why poverty fell was increased public expenditure on social assistance, not pro-poor growth 2. The inheritance: SBRs under apartheid Business at the end of apartheid: Ownership and control concentrated in white South Africans Highly concentrated: 1985 Anglo-American controlled >½ of capitalisation of Johannesburg Stock Exchange Top 5 corporate groups controlled >80% Harry Oppenheimer (top right): Anglo-American, based in mining Anton Rupert (bottom right): Rembrandt, beneficiary of apartheid government patronage = a “hierarchical market economy”: co-ordination problems solved through concentrated and hierarchical ownership (Schneider)? No: Underestimates roles, power and autonomy of state Capital = largely reactive, operating within but not challenging constraints (with some capital subservient to state to benefit from patronage) 3. SBRs during the transition to democracy In 1980s, capital defied the state and made overtures to ANC in exile Consultative Business Forum worked with pro-ANC leaders inside SA, and after 1990 with the ANC Facilitated Peace Accord between apartheid government and ANC Institutionalisation of business-labour relationship Negotiations over industrial disputes led to National Economic Forum (NEF), which provided the basis for, after 1994, the National Economic, Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) = tripartite and corporatist Some ANC leaders began to appreciate the weaknesses of the state But resilient view within ANC that business needed to be ‘transformed’ 4. State and business in practice after apartheid Formally: business appears well-organised: Bilateral institutions provide for state-business dialogue Presidential ‘working groups’ with South African and global capital (under Mbeki) Trilateral, corporatlist institutions provide for dialogue In practice: institutions and relationships are very uneven Relationship good between business and National Treasury Relationship bad between business and presidency (under Mbeki), business and labour department, etc Institutionalised SBRs are focused on big business Informal SBRs are uneven The growth path not = a topic for substantive deliberation 1998 Jobs Summit and 2003 Growth and Development Summit = cosmetic 5. The other priority: Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Close links between political elite and new black economic elite Patrice Motsepe (top right) = 2nd richest person in SA (after Nicky Oppenheimer) wealth in mining primarily net worth (after financial crash) of US$1.3 bn One brother-in-law is a senior member of the government; another brother-in-law is Cyril Ramaphosa (bottom right), former ANC general-secretary and himself a very wealthy businessman BEE promoted through preferential public sector procurement Sectoral charters specify targets for transfer of ownership and control E.g. mining houses must transfer 15% of shares by 2014 to retain mining rights And sourcing from BEE companies BEE deals worth $15bn in 2007: Black South Africans, through BEE deals and pension funds, now own approx. 20-25% of shares listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, or approximately one-half of the share owned by white South Africans Corruption is very widespread 6. Some lessons Is SA an example of a strong or healthy SBR? E.g. Taylor points to a state-business ‘growth coalition ’ in SA Not SBRs in SA are, in general, fragile and superficial They are highly racialised: no embedded autonomy; social distance between state and economic elite Little substantive deliberation between state and business, because state has not wanted to listen to white business elites Strong SBR re ANC <> black businessmen. Not Pro-poor growth requires reducing unemployment among mostly unskilled workers, i.e. a growth path that is more intensive of unskilled labour ANC government has little incentive to challenge its ally, organised labour The state pays some attention to growth, but little to pro-poor growth ANC = party of (dependent) black business, also party of organised labour, also party of urban and rural poor The state throws its weight around in terms of regulating some aspects of business (esp. employment relations and BEE) Business = largely reactive to the ANC, just as before 1994 it was largely reactive to the National Party Little likelihood of a sustainable, developmental or pro-poor growth coalition = e.g. of path dependence? If so, why? Dostları ilə paylaş:
