The republic of uganda in the supreme court of uganda at kampala

LOYALTY OF MAJOR RABWONI OKWIR

The second complaint is about the harassment, intimidation, brutal and degrading mistreatment of retired Major Rabwoni Okwir, the petitioner’s National Task Force leader for youths and students. On 1 9/1/2001, according to his affidavit, he went to Rukungiri District to consult petitioner’s agents and supporters. He was arrested twice at different meetings. At the last venue, Rugyeyo Sub-county, no less than 1 2 guns were pointed at him and the other group in the rally. The soldiers under Captain Ndahura threatened to shoot Rabwoni because of campaigning for the petitioner. The meeting was dispersed. On 1 9/2/200 1 he was forced to sign a false statement to the effect that he had deserted the petitioner.

On 20/2/2001 at Entebbe following a confrontation between him and the Petitioner on the one hand and on the other hand, the military police, led by Capt. Rwakitarate and the UPDF, ending in that degrading treatment. I call the arrest degrading because before Rabwoni was arrested on 20/2/2001 he was seized and carried by several soldiers who threw him onto a pickup. They beat him and sat upon him. I believe Rabwoni’s story that he was forced to sign the false statement on 19/2/2001 withdrawing his support for the Petitioner; I am not convinced by the contents of the affidavit of Lt. Col. Mayombo and Major General Tinyefuza that Rabwoni Okwir was in the petitioner’s camp to spy on the camp. If that were so, he could not have continued to denounce the 1st Respondent and Lt. Col. Mayombo even when he is in the United Kingdom as his affidavit suggests. The contents in Rabwoni’s affidavit and the story of Henry Muhwezi’s experience support the inference that the Petitioner’s agents, particularly in Western Uganda, were being brutally forced to denounce the Petitioner.

The claim that Rabwoni Okwir was arrested and detained because of his (Okwiri’s) own safety is very far-fetched and as unsound as it is incredible and ridiculous. The evidence of Major Okwir, Hon. Winnie Byanyima and that of the Petitioner about the arrest and humiliation of Okwir at Entebbe Airport is for all- purposes and intents corroborated by the first Respondent in his affidavit and in many respects, if only indirectly by, Major Gen. Tinyefuza, Lt. Col. Mayombo who swore affidavits to support the first Respondent. Rabwoni in his affidavit narrates the suffering he went through from the time of his arrest at Entebbe on 20th February until he left the country on 27/2/2001. He had meetings on 20tI and 21st while restricted, with Mayombo Tinyefuza, Odongo Jeje and Elly Tumwine who made him make the false statement purporting that he had withdrawn support for the petitioner. He asserts that on 21/2/2001, the first respondent spoke to him on telephone from Gulu and tried to convince Rabwoni to leave “that wrong group” and promised to take care of Rabwoni’s interest if he went abroad. The first respondent admits he had a telephone conversation with Rabwoni but denied that he tried to convince Rabwoni as stated. First Respondent then advised Rabwoni to get leave of the speaker to go abroad so that Rabwoni continues to draw his parliamentary allowance. The first respondent said that in talking to Rabwoni, he wanted to find out who between Tinyefuza and Rabwoni told the truth, concerning the statement of the withdrawal. Here there are some points to note. We are not told who initiated the telephone talk. Second I do not see a sound reason why the first respondent was interested in knowing who between Rabwoni and Tinyefuza was telling the truth about whether Rabwoni had said that he was or he was not withdrawing from the petitioner’s task force. In the circumstances prevailing at the time and considering what Rabwoni had been subjected to in Rukungiri on 19/1/2001 and 19/2/2001 when he went there to address supporters of the petitioner, I think that the first respondent would have been happier to hear that Rabwoni, who was one of the top leaders of the petitioner’s National Task Force, being in charge of youths and students, had deserted the petitioner. I doubt very much if there is any leader who would not want to have youth and students on his side. I also think that it fits in well if arrangements were made at that time for Rabwoni who was, apparently becoming more and more controversial and perhaps unwilling to leave the petitioner to go out of Uganda. I would therefore, with the greatest respect to the first respondent, prefer the version given by Rabwoni to that given by the first Respondent. From the look of things it is apparent that Lt. Col. Mayombo, Major General Tinyefuza and Major Generals Elly Tumwine and Odongo Jeje would prefer that the first Respondent should win the presidential election. It would be natural for them to do what is possible to make Rabwoni desert the petitioner. I am not persuaded that whatever the four senior army officers did, they did it for nothing outside the creation of smooth passage for the success of the first Respondent in the presidential election.

The affidavit of many witnesses’ leaves no doubt in my mind that the campaign of humiliation, intimidation, violence and terror was deliberate and was aimed at disabling the Petitioner personally or through his agents and representatives from affective electioneering and campaigning. This humiliation, intimidation, violence and terror were so much that the Petitioner had to personally ask chairman Kasujja to intervene.

I have perused the affidavits of John Kisembo, former Inspector General of Police, of Lt. Col. Mayombo and of Major General Jeje Odongo including his (Jeje Odongo’s) press release dated 9U March, 2001. With the greatest respect due to such high-ranking officers, I am not satisfied, nor am I persuaded, that there was real security need to involve the army and the Presidential Protection Unit in the election in the manner shown. Nor do I find the so-called inadequacy of the police a satisfactory reason. I take it that because the army had been used since 1987 in the Currency Reform exercise, in 1989 during NRC expansion, in 1992, during the RCs elections, in 1996 during Presidential and the Parliamentary elections, and during the referendum of 2000 election, it was taken as routine to deploy the army.

Further because some senior Army officers are said to have campaigned for the first Respondent, who as President and is the Commander-in-Chief of the UPDF, I am not surprised by the contents of the affidavits of the senior UPDF and PPU officers. The army is a disciplined force in which disciple and loyalty is expected among the rank and file.

The commander of the army could hardly be expected to say, nay deny, that there was need to deploy the army. In his press release, the Army Commander correctly admits that the electoral laws do not authorise the army to be involved in the electoral process. He invoked Art.209 of the Constitution as the route through which the army enters the exercise of election. This was also the reasoning of the Solicitor- General. I disagree completely. Art.209 has nothing to do with civil elections.

The Army commander says that in 1998 a joint anti-terrorism National Security Task Force was formed to fight urban terrorism. That there was intelligence information suggesting that some negative forces against peace were planning assassinations, riots, demonstrations and acts of violence, looting and other criminal acts. There is a possibility that such information was received. There is yet another possibility that the information may not have justified the actions and decisions taken. The conduct of PPU and UPDF in many parts of the country raises doubts about why deployment was ordered and effected. The expression “intelligence information” is amorphous. It can be misused, if it is remembered that the agencies who gather the information are said to be involved in supporting a particular candidate. These agencies are the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence, ISO and ESO who are said to be involved. Moreover, if there had been threats since 1998, I would expect that there should be more recruitment of more personnel in and training of the police and special branch to equip these institutions for such tasks.

There is ample evidence in affidavits to show that the PPU and UPDF were not confined in barracks or in one place or few places where the first Respondent, as President, was electioneering. Captain Ndahura who is part of the PPU in his affidavit admits that PPU was deployed throughout the country. The complaints about army involvement and involvement by other security personnel spread across many parts of Uganda. For the foregoing reasons, I find it irresistible to infer that the deployment of UPDF and PPU was for purposes of frustrating the campaign of the petitioner and for promoting the candidature of the 1st Respondent and the objective was achieved. If there is any single factor that I can say had influence on the election, it was the deployment of the UPDF and PPU. They had substantial effect on the election result.