The Revenge of Athena Science, Exploitation and the Third World The Revenge of Athena
The Technical Language of Indian Sastras vis i vis Formal Languages
Yüklə 1,92 Mb.
|
- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- References and Notes
- Volume, N. Delhi, 1974, p. 307.
The Technical Language of Indian Sastras vis i vis Formal Languages In conclusion, the main point I wish to focus upon is the power and potentiality of the technical language that has been developed in the Indian tradition as the basic tool for logical analysis. This discussion of Indian logic has perhaps indicated how the Indian logicians, instead of seeking to develop contentindependent and purely symbolic formal languages as in the West, have sought to develop a technical or precision language founded on the natural language Sanskrit which avoids all possible inexactness and ambiguities. By means of this procedure of parishkara (refinement) the Indian logicians achieve precision, and also bring out clearly the logical structure of a cognition, the structure of which has an unambiguous representation in their technical or sastric language. Thus the technical language developed by the Indian logicians is indeed one of their major achievements a fact which was not realized by the modern scholarship on Indian logic till recently '41 partly because many of the comparable techniques in western logic are perhaps less than a century old. It is now generally recognized that the technical language developed by the Indian logicians allows them to achieve much of what is supposed to be achieved via the symbolic or formal languages of modern mathematical logic. According to one scholar: Navya nyaya [the modern school of Indian logic started by Gangesa Upadhyaya in fourteenth century] never invented the use of symbols. It invented instead a wonderfully complex system of clich6s by which it expresses a great deal that we would never think of expressing without symbols .46 Another scholar describes it thus: The technical language of Navya nyaya is not I suspect so much a language as the groping for a kind of picture of the universe of individuals in their relationships with one another . . . There seems to be a kind of continuity extending from vague, ambiguous, inaccurate ordinary languages through languages filled with technical terms, to clear unambiguous, accurate maps of the kind exemplified by the mathematical physicists' formulas ... The Naiyayikas style, it may be conjectured, is not intended for the purpose of communicating more easily, any more than the mathematicians' is; it is intended rather to provide a simple accurate framework for the presentation of the world as it really is. In short, the Navya nyaya aim is not so far away from the apparent aim of those contemporary philosophers of this day and age in the West, who wish by use of techniques of symbolic logic to find a simple and accurate way of setting forth the picture of the world presented by the natural sciences .41 It is necessary to emphasize that these estimates of the technical or precision language employed in Indian logic seem to miss altogether the basic methodological principles inherent in the Indian approach. It appears to us that Indian logicians (instead of landing up somewhere in the 'continuum extending from vague . . . ordinary languages . . . to clear . . . mathematical physicists' formulas') deliberately avoided the purely symbolic and content independent formal languages, just as they avoided postulation or use of ideal entities such as proposition, sense as distinguished from reference, logical truth as distinguished from material truth, etc. In striving to provide a logical analysis of cognitions, the Indian philosophers did not confine their analysis to a study of sentences or their meanings. However, at the same time, Indian tradition does not start with any pronounced contempt for the ordinary or natural languages. While it surely recognizes the imperfections in the natural languages as vehicles for logical discourse, the attempt in Indian tradition has been mainly to evolve a technical or precision language which is constructed on the basis of the natural language, Sanskrit, and which is free of whatever ambiguities, inaccuracies, vagueness, that the natural language might have. This technical language is so constructed as to easily reveal the logical structures which are not so transparent and often ambiguous in a natural language, but at the same time has a rich structure and interpretability which it inherits from the natural language from which it is constructed. Perhaps, to a large extent, it was the strong foundation laid by the Paninian analysis of Sanskrit language, which enabled the Indian scientists and philosophers to, firstly, achieve a knowledge representation of all natural language utterances in terms of a technical language (thereby systematizing also the use of the natural language itself); and secondly, systematically to refine the natural language itself into a technical language with a transparent logical structure which could serve as a suitable vehicle for all precise and technical discourse. The Indian approach of converting the ordinary discourse by pariskara (refinement) into a technical discourse, suitable for systematization and logical analysis of knowledge, indeed appears to be in conformity with the larger philosophical and methodological principles which have governed Indian thought all through. Instead of looking for ideal, context free, and purely symbolic or formal languages which have no relation with natural languages, as possible tools for attaining 'perfect' logical rigour, the Indian tradition sets out to refine systematically the natural language Sanskrit to free it of all known ambiguities and inaccuracies and arrive at a technical language which can reveal the logical structure of a cognition as accurately as possible. In this sense, the process of pariskara is an evolving and even context dependent process depending on the demands of a particular problem and the kind of ambiguities needed to be resolved. Our Sastrakaras always leave the options open for further pariskaras to be done as and when subtler problems need to be tackled. This is how, for instance the technique of insertion of paryapti was developed during the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries .41 The above features of the Indian approach need to be clearly contrasted with what has been sought to be achieved by the purely, symbolic or formal language systems developed in the western tradition and to what extent they have been successful so far. We shall here merely quote a recent estimate49: Traditional propositional logic is limited by two factors. Only truth functional connective has been studied and among these only those that are relevant to mathematics have been studied systematically. Originally logic was conceived of as a tool to study the logical properties of natural language. By translating arguments in natural language into propositional calculus one hoped to obtain the arguments in a more perspicuous form, where it would be easier to see whether they were valid. However, the translation turned out to be difficult; natural language with its vagueness and ambiguity had to be transferred into a somewhat arbitrarily chosen unambiguous system of formal representation. Since such a system was considered a great advantage in other respects, logic became increasingly estranged from the study of natural language. We still have not discovered how best to study and formalize non truth functional relations between sentences.50 What estimates such as the above reveal is that while the modern western formal logic might have some relevance for providing foundational rigour to arguments in modern mathematics, it has so far totally failed in explicating logical relations between sentences as used in ordinary language or in most scientific and philosophical argumentation. When it comes to the foundations of mathematices itself, it has now become common knowledge that the formal and logical approaches being developed from the turn of last century have helped little in rendering them secure. Formal methods, whatever their philosophical short comings, got wide acceptance in the western tradition as they professed to free the ordinary discourse of all vagueness and ambiguity and provide logical rigour. What the Indian tradition seems to show is that one need not sacrifice the richness or the content of natural languages in order to achieve clarity, precision or logical rigour. In fact, in developing a technical or precision language based on the natural language Sanskrit, the Indian shastrakaras seem to have evolved a very powerful tool for the formulation of scientific theories, a tool very different from the modern mathematical logic or the attendant formal systems, and which needs to be investigated in much greater detail for its power and potential. A clear comprehension of the basic methodologies as outlined in the sastras of Kanada and Panini will also help us in rediscovering the foundations of all Indian sastras and restore the vitality and creativity that they seem to have displayed all through history. References and Notes
Compared with the logic of the ancient Greeks, Indian logic is not very impressive ... The development of Indian logic was severely handicapped by the failure of its logicians to make use of variables. As a result, no logical principles could be stated directly. Finally in Indian thought logical topics were not always separated from metaphysical and epistemological topics (on the nature of being and knowledge respectively ... Both in the West and in the East, the origin of logic is associated with an interest in the grammar of language and the methodology of argument and discussion, be it in the context of law, religion or philosophy. More is needed, however, for the development of logic. It appears that logic can thrive only in a culture that upholds the conviction that controversies should be settled by the force of reason rather than by the orthodoxy of a dogma or the tradition of a prejudice. This is why logic has made much greater progress in the West than in the East. As another example we may present the following evaluation of the Indian tradition in mathematics by a contemporary historian of mathematics (Morris Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times, Oxford, 1972; 190). As our survey indicates, the Hindus were interested in and contributed to the arithmetical and computational aspects of mathematics rather than to the deductive patterns. Their name for mathematics was ganita, which means 'the science of calculation'. There is much good procedure and technical facility, but no evidence that they considered proof at all. They had rules, but apparently no logical scruples. Moreover, no general methods, or new view points were arrived at in any one of the mathematics.
ingh, 'A comparative Study of Foundations of Mathematics in India, China and the Modern West', PPST Bulletin 9 (1985) pp. 53 73; and Chhatrapati Singh, 'The Philosophical Foundations of a General Theory of Numbers', paper presented at the NISTADS Conference, Delhi 1984.
(Proponent) ... There cannot be any means of knowledge to establish a non entity (i.e. a fiction, avasta). If it could be established by some means of knowledge it ceases to be non entity. Opponent: If so then your talk about the non entity becomes selfcontradictory. Proponent: Does this self contradiction point out that there is a means of knowledge to establish the non entity? Or (second question) does it reject the prohibitive statement that we should not talk about non entity? Or (third question) does it imply that we must concede such statements (about non entity) which are inauthenticated, i.e. not established by any means of knowledge? The first alternative is not tenable. Even a thousand of selfcontradictions cannot conceivably show that (the non entity like) . . . rabbit's horn ... is amenable to (a means of knowledge, such as) perception and inference. If it could, what is the use of this silly fight over the nature of non entities? The second alternative is acceptable to us, because we admit only valid means if knowledge. Opponent: If the prohibitive statement is rejected, no statement with regard to non entities will be possible. Proponent: What else can we do but remain silent in regard to a matter where statement of any kind will be logically incongruent? Silence is better in such cases ... You yourself may please consider as to who is the better of the two: One who is making statements about entities that cannot be established by any means of knowledge? Or, the other person who remains speechless (on such occasions)? Opponent: But although you are a wise man, you have not remained silent yourself. You on the other hand have made a prohibitive statement with regard to our talk about non entities. Proponent: True, in order to avoid a self contradictory object not established by any means of knowledge, you have conceded that one can make statements about the non existent. Similarly, in order not to allow any statement about the non entities in our discourse on the means of knowledge, we concede that a self contradictory statement (prohibiting the use of non entities) is possible, although it is not supported by any means of knowledge. If you treated both the cases in the same manner, we would not have said
anything about non entities (We have made the above self contradictory statement because you first raised the question). (cited from B. K. Motilal: Logic Language and Reality, New Delhi 1985, pp. 103 4). I consider the above passage to be a remarkably clear statement of the Indian logicians' position that they would rather live with selfcontradiction than accept the existence of entities which are inaccessible to any (direct) means of knowledge (as demanded by those who argue for the validity of 'indirect proof' as a means of knowledge). The Indian logician would however prefer to avoid these self contradictions by refusing to admit these Aprasiddha entities into his discourse altogether.
[In Indian logic) what is negated is an object which is the second term of dyadic relation ... Let us consider the form a (Rb) . . . What can be negated is V as the second term of the relation 'R'. To say 'that the counter positiveness resident in b is limited by the limiting relation R' is equivalent to saying that 'b is the second term of the relation R'. So what is negated is b as the second member of relation R . . . Nyaya theory of negation ... cannot be said to be a term negation, or a sentence negation, or a propositional function negation in the usual sense of these terms [in western logic].
19 Appropriate Technology A Reassessment Amulya Kumar N. Reddy Over the past thirty five to forty years, a large number of countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, achieved political independence, and set out on the path of economic transformation. A large number of industries were established: modernization included the introduction of western food, clothing and houses, hospitals, universities, cars, airlines, telephones, radio, television. At the same time, many of these countries sought to modernize their agriculture, particularly through the so called Green Revolution based on high yielding varieties and large inputs of fertilizer, pesticides, water. The Gross National Product (a measure of the amount of goods and services produced by the country) has shown impressive increases in most of the these countries. This pattern of transformation was inspired by a simple belief, namely, all that a backward country needs to do to develop is to retrace the path followed by the industrialized countries and to adopt the goals which they pursued. In particular, the aim should be to maximize growth in the volume of goods and services, that is, to maximize the GNP. By implementing such a strategy, it was assumed that the acute poverty of the masses in developing countries would be eliminated by the benefits of growth trickling down to the poorest sections of society. By now, sufficient time has elapsed to see the results of such a growth and trickle down strategy. The main result has been the consolidation of small islands of urban splendour amidst vast oceans of rural misery, and the perpetuation and aggravation of what has been termed a 'dual society' a small politically powerful elite (constituting a mere 10 15 per cent of the population and consisting of industrialists, landlords, bureaucrats, professionals and white collar labour) living in conspicuous affluence amidst the abject poverty of the politically weak masses. Recent history also shows that, in most of these backward countries, the greater the industrialization on the pattern of the advanced countries, the greater the polarization into a dual society, and the wider the gap between the elite and the masses. It is not even clear that the percentage of people below the poverty line has decreased. The sole beneficiaries of a dual society are the sections of society belonging to the elite. It is reasonable therefore to infer that it has deliberately sought to perpetuate such a society. My submission, in this article, is that a major instrument of the elite has been technology, which has been liberally imported from the industrialized countries and sometimes naturalized by a process of imitation and adaptation in the well known import substitution drives. To substantiate the submission, it is necessary to understand the interaction between technology and society. The basic feature of this interaction is that the pattern of technology is shaped by, and in turn shapes, the society in which this technology is generated and sustained. More specifically, technology responds to social wants which are in turn modified and transformed by technology through a causal chain, or rather causal spiral. The relevant conclusions which emerge from the technology society interaction scheme are the following: 1. All social wants are not necessarily responded to by the institutions responsible for the generation of technology, namely the educational, scientific and technological institutions. There is a process of filtering these wants, so that only some of them are transmitted as demands upon technological capability, and the rest are bypassed by these institutions. In other words, there are ignored wants which institutions do not seek to satisfy by research and development. The filtering process is usually operated by decision makers, firstly, in the bodies which control the research and development institutions (decision makers in government, agencies and corporations), and secondly, in the institutions themselves. These decision makers are either conscious agents of political, social and economic forces, or are unconsciously influenced by these very forces. In untempered market economies, only wants which can be backed up by purchasing power become articulated as demands upon the research and development institutions, and the remaining wants are bypassed, however much they may correspond to the basic minimum needs of underprivileged people. Thus, like all commodities in these economies, technology too is a commodity catering to the demands of those who can purchase it, and ignoring those who cannot afford it. 2. The generation and dissemination of technology involves the so called innovation chain which is the sequence of steps by which an idea or concept is converted into a product or process. This sequence of steps varies with the circumstances, but can often be schematically represented thus: Formulation of research and development objective idea research and development pilot plant trial market survey scale up production/ product engineering plant fabrication product or process. 3. It is essential to note that socio economic constraints and environmental considerations (if any) enter the process in an incipient form even at the stage of formulation of the research objective and then loom over the chain at several stages. These constraints are in the form of preferences or guidelines or paradigms, for example, 'Seek economies of scale!'; 'Facilitate centralized, mass production!'; 'Save labour!'; 'Automate as much as possible!'; 'Don't worry as much about capital and energy (in the days before the energy crisis) as about productivity and growth!'; 'Treat pollution effluents or emissions as externalities!'. Above all, 'Modernize!' meaning 'westernize!' 4. Thus, every technology that emerges from the innovation chain already has engrained into it the socio economic objectives and environmental considerations which decision makers and actors in the innovation chain introduced into the process of generating that technology. Further, at a previous stage in the spiral (cf. 1. above), the very decision to respond to a particular social want by generating the necessary technology is the result of a deliberate filtering process wielded by decision makers. 5. The technology that emerges from the innovation chain will become an input, along with land, labour and capital, to establish an industry or agriculture or a service if and only if the aforesaid socio economic and environmental constraints are satisfied. Thus, it is not only the technical efficiency of the technology, but also its consistency with the socio economic values of the society, which determine whether a technology will be deployed and utilized. 6. Social wants are not static. The products and services that are produced create new social wants, and in this process the manipulation of wants through advertising, for example, plays a major role, and thus the spiral: Social wants products/services new social wants . . . The interaction between society and technology on the lines described above has an important implication. Every pattern of technology is socially conditioned it is a product of its times and circumstances and it bears the stamp of its origin and nurture. It is in this sense that technology can be considered to resemble genetic material which, given a favourable milieu, tries to replicate that society. The replication is neither automatic nor inevitable; it is successful only when a host of factors are favourable hence, the argument is not tantamount to technological determinism. Further, it has been emphasized that technology itself is socially conditioned, therefore technology is not viewed as an autonomous factor and a motive force outside society. Of course, all this would be obvious to an archeologist who must proceed from the material products, the tools, artifacts and so on, to reconstruct a vanished society and its culture, or to a social anthropologist who cannot but consider technology industry/agriculture society interactions. Yüklə 1,92 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
|