Three important notes about this file

2NC O/V

The aff’s appeal to community replicates the failed efforts at social integration of incongruous groups which followed the Treaty of Versailles and precipitated the Second World War

Forced multiethnic inclusion is the “disastrous experiment”- leads to intra-community resentment and anger- that’s Glowacka

The alternative is to reject the myth of community- Morin indicates this is not a cold-hearted abandonment of empathy or fraternity, but rather a protest against the forced shaping to norms which occur in communities and lead to indifference and hostility

-Identity Erasure

Communities lead to identity erasure- neutralize difference

Morin 06- prof of philosophy at the University of Alberta (Marie-Eve, “Putting Community Under Erasure: Derrida and Nancy on the Plurality of Singularities,” Culture Machine, Vol 8 (2006) http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/viewArticle/37/45//MGD)

First, communities tend to neutralise differences by treating all members as brothers, that is, as the same. The other belongs to my community only insofar as he is like me, and the 'us' -- the group of those who belong together -- appears as a homogeneous group. It is because of this tendency to homogenise that fraternity can include apparent non-brothers (such as women) and that the fraternal community can present itself as universal. The woman gets included in fraternity when she becomes a brother for humanity, that is, when she is not (completely) woman anymore. Because 'man' is the archetype of humanity and 'brother' the archetype of the relation between siblings, the woman can become human or sibling only insofar as she resembles the archetypes of 'man' or 'brother'. Fraternity as a process of universalisation is a process of inclusion, but here 'to include' means to neutralise difference. Second, communities are inscribed in a field of opposition; they define themselves in an oppositional logic, by excluding 'them,' that is, those who do not belong, those who are not 'brothers,' not 'the same'. If I can identify my brothers, then by using the same criterion, I can also identify those who are not my brothers. All groups function in the same way: they define a criterion which functions as a wall erected around the group, a wall filled with certain type of openings that let only the right elements in. Of course, some criteria of appurtenance are more inclusive than others because they are shared by more people. But no matter how inclusive a group is, it is always possible to find elements that are excluded. Thus the community of human beings excludes animals, and the community of beings in general excludes ghosts. To escape this double violence, it is necessary, according to Derrida, to cut the bond that binds me to, or excludes me from, a group. Only then will there be an experience of the other, or a relation to the other, which will respect and do justice to its otherness, its difference. Though Nancy does not criticise fraternity directly, his discussion of the interruption of myth serves the same purpose. The myth presents the community to the community itself; it is the identificatory mechanism of a community. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy explain: A myth is a fiction in the strong, active sense of shaping or moulding, or as Plato himself says, of 'plasticity': it is a fictionning, whose role is to propose, if not to impose, models and types, -- types by whose imitation an individual ' or a city, or a whole people ' can grasp and identify itself. (Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, 1991: 34) The interruption of myth means that it becomes impossible for us to represent our common origin. Because the genealogical relation rests on a phantasmatic commonality of origin, the loss of common origin means the impossibility of recognising each other as brother. In their having been interrupted, myths do not disappear, but they no longer function as the ground of communal belonging: it becomes impossible for us to gather around the narration of our common origin. The interruption does not build a community, it un-works it, that is, it lets a space open in the identification of the community with itself. This un-working is the active incompleteness of community: it prevents the community from effecting itself as work.

-Ext: Community Bad

Community is oppositional- creates war and ethnic cleansing

Norris 2k- PhD in political philosophy from UC Santa Barbara, assistant prof at UC Santa Barbara (Andrew, “Jean-Luc Nancy and the Myth of the Common,” Constellations Volume 7, No 2, 2000, Wiley//MGD)

Nancy, however, is deeply suspicious of this understanding of community. On his account, the move from the individual to the community will do us no good if the community is understood as being a subject of the same sort as the individual. In the end this will only produce a politics of identity in which different identities and interests are defined in opposition to one another. Though this is an implication of the communitarian argument that Sandel and Taylor do not emphasize, it is clearly recognized by Hegel, who argues that war is a fundamental possibility of political life, one that is not entirely regrettable. It is a fundamental possibility because the state is, vis-à-vis other states, an individual, “and individuality essentially implies negation. Hence even if a number of states make themselves into a family, this group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy.”10 And it is not an absolute evil because war allows for the display of martial courage, in which the citizen transcends his limited position and becomes one with the universal in the form of the state.11 External conflict and its possible glorification is not the only or even the most pressing danger Nancy would associate with the politics of communal identity. He argues that conceiving of the community or the state as a subject entails that we understand the community to have an identity that is immanent to it, and that needs to be brought out, and put to work. In Nancy’s terminology, the community as subject necessarily implies the community as subject-work. If one’s “true” or “higher” or “more universal” self is found in one’s shared communal identity, it becomes the work of politics to acknowledge and bring forth that immanent communal identity. This will entail not merely conflict with other political identities, but the purification of one’s own community. To realize their political identity, Serbians must unite so as to become more “truly” Serbian; doing so requires that they slough off what is not truly Serbian. Put more bluntly, it requires that they cleanse their community of foreigners, and rid themselves of the influence of such. In Nancy’s terms, people like Milosevic seek to put community “to work.” When it is not simply the blind pursuit of power or the expression of base passions, politics for such people is a matter of discovering the immanent or implicit identity of a group and setting it to work, drawing it out and allowing it to express itself in functional activity. The conception of politics as work thus relies upon and follows from the conception of community as immanent identity: “Community understood as work or through its works would presuppose that the common being, as such, be objectifiable and producible.”12

Rejecting political agency creates border-like divides between different communities

Mitropoulos and Neilson 06- **PhD from Yale, professor at the Institute for Culture and Society at the University of Western Sydney (Angela and Brett, “Cutting Democracy's Knot,” http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/viewArticle/40/48//MGD)

Therefore, alongside the democracy of the market--and in relation to European premonitions of a globally extended constitution and citizenship--there is the democracy of the border. It is well known that the border, no matter how constantly it recomposes itself, entails processes of selective inclusion as well as exclusion. But, contrary to recent insistences that the border constitutes (according to Etienne Balibar, among others) the 'non-democratic' element of the demos, democracy no less than the market is the democratic element par excellence in the foundation of citizenship and politics. This is to say, there can be no democracy without the border. Even if that border is imagined as coextensive with the circumference of the planet itself, the border as a technology of inclusion-exclusion can still function, whether as the internal demarcation between 'passive' and 'active' forms of citizenship (which can be traced in the historically parallel trajectories of the granting of citizenship to more people alongside increasing stratifications within citizenship), or in the recourse to the revocation of citizenship itself, whose criteria and rulings have by no means disappeared but, today, proliferate. This is merely to note the formal operations of citizenship laws, without having touched on the casual operations of border technologies, as they are articulated through, say, the police checkpoints in the banlieues no less than in the demands that migrants (whether this status as a migrant is legal or semantic) must continually prove their belonging. In any case, without the border, there is neither demos nor kratos. This is why Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri can call, in the final chapters of Empire (2000), for a global citizenship under the sign of 'absolute democracy'. Yet, the diplomacy that might seemingly favour the proposition of democracy as an empty placeholder for the question of 'constituent power' fails to confront the politics of the demos and the kratos that invocations of democracy set to work, not least because diplomacy is already a technique of statecraft and a form of address that distinguishes and fuses kratos and demos.