Almost Like a Play’: Discretion and the Health Care Innovation Working Group Emmet Collins

‘Almost Like a Play’: Discretion and the Health Care Innovation Working Group
Emmet Collins¹, Carleton University

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Paper presented to the 2015 meeting of the Canadian Association of Programs in Public Administration, May 25-26 in Toronto, Ontario.
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Introduction

The study of federalism and intergovernmental relations has a rich history in Canadian political science. Many of Canada’s best-known political scientists have written on the topic (see for instance Simeon 1972, Smiley 1974). Despite this attention, certain aspects of federalism remain understudied in Canada. One such aspect is the role of informal relations in intergovernmental relations (IGR). Various authors have recognized that informal relations are important (Dupré 1985, Inwood et al 2011), but this is where the existing literature leaves us. As an “under-institutionalized” federation (Cameron and Simeon 2002), Canadian IGR frequently rely on ad-hoc, informal relations in order to produce work. These relations constitute a potentially important form of discretion among Canadian civil servants working in IGR. This is certainly the impression that the existing literature leaves us with.

Part of a larger work which explores the issue of informal relations in IGR, this paper uses a study of the Health Care Innovation Working Group (HCIWG or the working group) to garner a better sense of the role and importance of informal relations. Using Ostrom’s theory of Institutional Analysis and Development, I attempt to reconcile the inherently individual nature of informal relations with the broader institutional context of federalism in Canada. I argue that in the case of intergovernmental relations, contextual factors limit the space for informal relations and create major constraints on the exercise of discretion. This is not to suggest that they are unimportant, but that in the case of IGR, other factors have a significant limiting impact. Informal relations are important in creating positive work environments and in enabling rapid communication, but do not appear to have substantial policy impacts.

The paper is structured in the following way. I begin with a literature review which covers the role of informality in bureaucracies generally and within Canadian intergovernmental relations specifically. This is followed by section which defines terms and explores the theoretical framework which frames this paper: Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD). I then bring in the specific case study around which the paper is centered, the Health Care Innovation Working Group. The working group is described and analyzed from the perspective of practitioners². Finally, the IAD framework is applied to the HCIWG, uncovering the ‘rules’ that govern informal relations in that context.

Understanding informality

The issue of informality in how organizations work is one that has been recognized by scholars working in a wide variety of fields, going back at least to the 1930s with the work of Chester Barnard (1938, see also Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939). Central to any discussion of how bureaucracy (public or private) operates is the recognition that human interactions often exist outside the boundaries of formal rules. Thus, the behaviour of individuals in and around formal structures constitutes an important area of study. This topic has been covered in a wide variety of fields, from sociology to psychology to business and public administration (see, for a sample: Blau 1956, Paulson and Naquin, 2004; Larson, 1997, 1998; Morand, 1995; Innes et al, 2007; Michel, 2012). It has also been of interest to political scientists, particularly since the ‘neo-institutionalist turn’ forced scholars to attempt to reconcile individual agency with the importance of institutional structures in shaping behaviour.

This issue is even more apparent in Canadian politics, and IGR specifically. Recognition of the importance of informality in intergovernmental relations, whether it is referred to as informal relations, rules, or norms, has been evident in Canadian political science literature going back to authors like Kernaghan (1985) and Dupré (1985). While earlier scholars of federalism were not ignorant of the informal element of federal-provincial relations, their focus was more commonly on broad institutional questions of federalism, rather than the administrative, functional elements of federalism (see for instance Smiley 1974, Cairns 1977). Moreover, the “mega-constitutional” period (roughly 1968-1992) ensured that many authors were focused on the highest level of executive summitry and the numerous constitutional questions at issue (see Simeon 1972 [2006], Banting and Simeon 1983). As a result, when the more relational elements of federalism were addressed, they tended to focus on relations between those at the top, that is to say premiers and the prime minister. The high drama of the 1982 constitution and the subsequent Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords provided ample reason to focus on those actors (see Russell 1992 [2004], Monahan 1991).

Since the 1980s, however, there has been an increasing recognition of the importance of functional federalism and its ad-hoc nature, particularly in the post-1995 referendum era of ‘non-constitutional renewal’ (Lazar 1997). Cameron and Simeon (2002) for instance, argue that “the institutions of intergovernmental relations in Canada remain, compared with some other federations, relatively ad hoc and under institutionalized.” (50). In this context, scholars such as Janice Stein (2006) have referred to the importance of informal relations, arguing that federalism is “given life” by informal networks, and that “social glue –shared norms, shared values, long-standing ties of friendship… often underpins highly functional networks” (53, see also Lazar 2004, Leslie et al 2005).

Arguably the most comprehensive look at Canadian intergovernmental relations comes from the 2011 book Intergovernmental Policy Capacity in Canada by Gregory Inwood, Carolyn Johns and Patricia O’Reilly. A recurring theme in the book, and in their earlier work (Johns et al, 2006, 2007) is the importance of informal relations to IGR (according to the numerous IGR officials they interviewed). However, the authors note the limitations of studying informal relations: “questions about the role of both formal relations and informal relationships in IPC [Intergovernmental Policy Capacity] are not easily answered” (2011: 468). Inwood et al’s work stands out because it is the most thorough survey of Canadian IGR ever conducted. Yet even they are forced to conclude that “These informal networks and relations are not easily studied.” (Johns et al, 2007: 34). Moreover, they also note that “many officials argued that there are limits to both leadership and trust, and would agree with the official who stated that “capacity within the intergovernmental system is not ensured by the level of warmth between officials””. (Ibid: 35).

Here, the problem with the existing literature clearly manifested; informal relations are recognized as important, but not so important as to overcome certain institutional factors. Thus, we are ultimately left with a somewhat unsatisfying answer to what may be a crucial part of the intergovernmental policy process in Canada.