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, which analyses the changes to the domestic gas prices over the last 5 years.

241^ Finkel Review, above n 56, 110, which also estimates the cost of electricity to range from $60/MWh to $140/MWh, depending on the capacity factor of the plant, based on a gas price of $9/GJ. Cf Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’), Gas Inquiry 2017-2020 (Interim Report, September 2017) 19 (‘ACCC Gas Enquiry’), where the ACCC’s estimates a price range of $10-16/GJ for corporate and institutional gas purchasers.

242^ Australian Government, Domestic Gas Strategy – Australian Government Policy and Actions (2015) 2-3. For example, both the mining of onshore conventional and coal seam gas is prohibited in Victoria under the Resources Amendment Legislation (Fracking Ban) Act 2017 (Vic).

243^ Finkel Review, above n 56, 105, 116.

244^ Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 (Cth) ss 13GB-GH.

245^ ACCC Gas Inquiry, above n 240, 14. See also Australian Energy Market Operator, Update to Gas Statement of Opportunities (September 2017), where AEMO forecasts a 54 peta joules shortfall in 2018.

246^ ACCC Gas Inquiry, above n 240, 22.

247^ Although falling short of a formal domestic reservation policy on the Australian east coast, a heads of agreement has been signed between the federal government and each of the LNG exporters; see Heads of Agreement dated 3 October 2017 between the Australian Government, GLNG Operations Pty Ltd, Australia Pacific LNG and Shell Australia.

248^ Although the sovereign risk is often cited as an argument against government intervention, given the relatively short nature of corporate memory, its impact is often overstated.

249^ The cost of battery storage is forecast to decline and may become economical in the future, see generally, IRENA, Battery Storage for Renewables: Market Status and Technology Outlook (January 2015).

250^ AEMC Review, above n 70, 59.

251^ Frontier Economics Report 2016, above n 221, 66.

252^ Ibid at 65-67.

253^ Finkel Review, above n 56, 97.

254^ For the political backdrop, see generally Adam Morton, ‘Government Killed Emissions Scheme Despite Knowing it Could Save $15billion off Electricity Bill’ Sydney Morning Herald (online), 8 December 2017 .

255^ CCA Review 2016, above n 81, 110.

256^ For example, see Michelle Grattan, ‘Turnbull Government Rules out an Emissions Intensity Scheme’ The Conversation (online), 7 December 2016 .

257^ For instance, the Business Council of Australia also joined calls for an EIS, see Gabrielle Chan, ‘Australia’s Peak Business Lobby Calls for Emissions Intensity Scheme’ The Guardian (online), 16 March 2017 .

258^ Finkel Review, above n 56, 89. Similarly, the Joint Report also recommended the adoption of a low emissions target (‘LET’) scheme, see Joint Report, above n 163, 43-44.

259^ Both mechanisms are flexible to deal with changes in emissions reduction target; see also Finkel Review, above n 56, 95 which notes the importance of having a set of rules to provide confidence to investors that future adjustments will not be arbitrarily applied to alter returns on investment.

260^ Jacobs’ Modelling Report, above n 55, 23.

261^ Ibid 23-24.

262^ Finkel Review, above n 56, 90-91. Interestingly the ‘business as usual’ price outcomes were worse for consumers than either the CET or EIS; see also Australian Energy Council, Submission to the Independent Review into the Future Security of the National Electricity Market - Finkel Review (3 March 2017) 1, where the Australian Energy Council rightly contends that ‘the cost of sustained policy inaction is now higher than the cost of efficient and durable policy action’.

263^ Finkel Review, above n 56, 92.

264^ Ibid 96.

265^ Ibid.

266^ COAG Energy Council, Security, Reliability, Affordability and Sustainability of the National Electricity Market (accessed 7 December 2017) .

267^ See generally, Neil Gunningham, ‘Environmental Law, Regulation and Governance’, above n 27, 206-209.

268^ The efficacy of a carbon tax will not be considered in this thesis, a topic which has been the subject of much analysis elsewhere; for example, see CCA Review 2016, above n 81, 59-64 for a consideration of a carbon tax compared to other market mechanisms; see also, CCA Policy Options Paper, above n 82, 30-42. Notably, 18 countries have implemented or are scheduled to implement a carbon tax as the main emissions reduction policy instrument, see Kossoy et al, above n 220, 22-27.

269^ CCA Review 2016, above n 81, 58.

270^ AEMC Review, above n 70, x –xiv.

271^ Ibid 52.

272^ Ibid 46.

273^ Ibid 42.

274^ Ibid 40.

275^ Australian Government, Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Contract for Closure – Program Administrative Guidelines (30 September 2011) 2.

276^ Ibid.

277^ Incidentally, generators such as Playford B, Collinsville and Hazelwood, have all since retired without the assistance of closure payments.

278^ See AEMC Review, above n 70, 40.

279^ Frank Jotzo and Salim Mazouz, ‘Brown Coal Exit: A Market Mechanism for Regulated Closure of Highly Emissions Intensive Power Stations’ (Working Paper 1510, Centre for Climate Economic & Policy, Australian National University, November 2015) 9-10.

280^ Finkel Review, above n 56, 97.

281^ Jacobs’ Modelling Report, above n 55, 12-13.

282^ Ibid at 75. The CCA also considered the merits of regulated closures and concluded that it ‘represented a high cost policy when implemented in isolation’, see CCA Review 2016, above n 81, 116.

283^ Finkel Review, above n 56, 97. Interestingly, in the United Kingdom, the government has announced its intention to phase out unabated coal-fired generators by 2025, see United Kingdom Department of Business, Energy and Industry Strategy, The Clean Growth Strategy – Leading the Way to a Low Carbon Future (October 2017) 99. Similar announcements were made by the Canadian Government to phase out thermal generation by 2030, see Environment and Climate Change Canada, Canada and the United Kingdom Announce a Global Alliance on Coal Phase-out (October 11 2017)