Blake Invitational 1 Kamiak nb aff

Aff Plan Death Penalty (SV FW)

Framework:

The ROB is to vote for the policy that best reduces oppression.

Curry 14, Tommy, The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century, Victory Briefs, 2014,

Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory "Ideal Theory as Ideology," Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that "ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); since ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, against factual/descriptive issues." At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically-the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy "problem" by an audience-is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one "necessarily has to abstract away from certain features" of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: "What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual," so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of "thought" is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our "theories" seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon-meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

Prefer additionally:

Ideal theory strips away particularities making ethics inaccessible and epistemologically skewed

Mills 05, Charles, 2005, Ideal Theory" as Ideology,

The crucial common claim-whether couched in terms of ideology and fetishism, or androcentrism, or white normativity-is that all theorizing, both moral and nonmoral, takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by concepts, assumptions, norms, values, and framing perspectives that reflect the experience and group interests of the privileged group (whether the bourgeoisie, or men, or whites). So a simple empiricism will not work as a cognitive strategy; one has to be self-conscious about the concepts that "spontaneously" occur to one, since many of these concepts will not arise naturally but as the result of social structures and hegemonic ideational patterns. In particular, it will often be the case that dominant concepts will obscure certain crucial realities, blocking them from sight, or naturalizing them, while on the other hand, concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether in terms of concepts of the self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of the social, it will be necessary to scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the way the boundaries are drawn. This is, of course, the burden of standpoint theory-that certain realities tend to be more visible from the perspective of the subordinated than the privileged (Harding 2003). The thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group. In its ignoring of oppression, ideal theory also ignores the consequences of oppression. If societies are not oppressive, or if in modeling them we can abstract away from oppression and assume moral cognizers of roughly equal skill, then the paradigmatic moral agent can be featureless. No theory is required about the particular group-based obstacles that may block the vision of a particular group. By contrast, nonideal theory recognizes that people will typically be cognitively affected by their social location, so that on both the macro and the more local level, the descriptive concepts arrived at may be misleading.

Non-ideal theory necessitates consequentialism since instead of following rules that assume an already equal playing field; we take steps to correct material injustice.

2. No act omission distinction for states means means based theories collapse to consequentialism.

Sunstein and Vermule 05Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule. The University of Chicago Law School. "Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life‐Life Tradeoffs." JOHN M. OLIN LAW and ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 239. The Chicago Working Paper Series. March 2005

In our view, both the argument from causation and the argument from intention go wrong by overlooking the distinctive features of government as a moral agent. Whatever the general status of the act-omission distinction as a matter of moral philosophy,38 the distinction is least impressive when applied to government.39 The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything, or refusing to act.40 Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private actionfor example, private killing-becomes obscure when the government formally forbids private action, but chooses a set of policy instruments that do not adequately or fully discourage it.

3 Moral substitutability is true and only consequentialism explains it.

Sinnott-Armstrong '92 Walter, Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives, 6, Ethics, AN ARGUMENT FOR CONSEQUENTIALISM

fulfillment of a promise and not because of its consequences."2 Such deontologists claim in effect that if I promise to mow the grass, there is a moral reason for me to mow the grass and this moral reason is constituted by the fact that mowing the grass fulfills my promise. This reason exists regardless of the consequences of mowing the grass even though it might be overridden by certain bad consequences. However if this is why I have a moral reason to mow the grass then even if I cannot mow the grass without starting my mower and starting the mower would enable me to mow the grass it still would not follow that l have any moral reason to start my mower since I did not promise to start my mower and starting my mower does not fulfill my promise. Thus a moral theory cannot explain moral substitutability ii it claims that properties like this provide moral reasons. Of course this argument is too simple to be conclusive by itself since deontologists will have many responses. The question is whether any response is adequate. I will argue that no response can meet the basic challenge. A deontologist might respond that his moral theory includes not only the principle that there is a moral reason to keep one's promises but also another principle that there is a moral reason to do whatever is a necessary enabler for what there is a moral reason to do. This other principle just is the principle of moral substitutability. So of course. I agree that it is true. However, the question is why it is true. This new principle is very different from the substantive principles in a deontological theory. So it cries out for an explanation. ii a deontologist simply adds this new principle to the substantive principles in his theory. he has done nothing to explain why the new principle is true. It would be ad hoc to tack it on solely in order to yield moral reasons like the moral reason to start the mower. in order to explain or justify moral substitutability. A deontologist needs to show how this principle coheres in some deeper way with the substantive principles of the theory. That is what deontologists cannot do. A second response is that l misdescribed the property that provides the moral reason. Deontologists might admit that the reason to mow the lawn is not that this fulfills a promise. but they can claim instead that the moral reason to mow the lawn is that this is a necessary enabler for keeping a promise. They can then claim that there is a moral reason to start the mower. because starting the mower is also a necessary enabler for keeping my promise. Again. I agree that these reasons exist. But the question is why. This deontologist needs to explain why the moral reason has to be that the act is a necessary enabler for fulfilling a promise instead of just that the act does fulfill a promise. Ii there is no moral reason to keep a promise. it is hard to understand why there is any moral reason to do what is a necessary enabler for keeping a promise. Furthermore, deontologists claim that the crucial act is not about consequences but directly about promises. My moral reason is supposed to arise from what I said before my act and not from consequences alter my act. However, what I said was "I promise to mow the grass'. I did not say. 'l promise to do what is a necessary enabler for mowing the grass.' Thus I did not promise to do what is a necessary enabler for keeping the promise. What I promised was only to keep the promise. Because of this deontologists who base moral reasons directly on promises cannot explain why there is not only a moral reason to do what I promised to do (mow the grass) but also a moral reason to do what i did not promise to do (start the mower). Deontologists might try to defend the claim that moral reasons are based on promises by claiming that promise keeping is intrinsically good and there is a moral reason to do what is a necessary enabler of what is intrinsically good. However, this response runs into two problems. First, on this theory, the reason to keep a promise is a reason to do what is itself intrinsically good, but the reason to start the mower is not a reason to do what is intrinsically good. Since these reasons are so different, they are derived in different ways. This creates an incoherence or lack of unity, which is avoided in other theories. Second, this response conflicts with a basic theme in deontological theories. If my promise keeping is intrinsically good, your promise keeping is just as intrinsically good. But then, if what gives me a moral reason to keep my promise is that I have a moral reason to do whatever is intrinsically good, I have just as much moral reason to do what is a necessary enabler for you to keep your promise. And, if my breaking my promise is a necessary enabler for two other people to keep their promises, then my moral reason to break my promise is stronger than my moral reason to keep it (other things being equal). This undermines the basic deontological claim that my reasons derive in a special way from my promises.13 So this response explains moral sub- stitutability at the expense of giving up deontology.

4 Actor specificity: A Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action. B States lack wills or intentions since policies are collective actions. C No act-omission distinction-governments are responsible for everything in the public sphere so inaction is implicit authorization of action: they have to yes/no bills, which means everything collapse to aggregation. D No intent-foresight distinction--by willing any action with knowledge that it could cause X harm, we necessarily intend X to happen because we could always decide not to act. Thus, means-based frameworks devolve to the aff.

Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out util calc indicts since they're empirically denied and link turns them because the alt would be no action.

Plan:

Resolved: the state supreme courts ought to abolish the use of plea bargaining in cases where the prosecutor files a notice of intent to seek the death penalty by ruling it constitutionally invalid. New York is normal means. I reserve the right to clarify. Bruce 17:

J. Alexandra Bruce, The author is a 2017 Juris Doctor candidate at The University of Mississippi School of Law and will serve as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Rhesa H. Barkesdale of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for the 2017-2018 term. She received Bachelor of Arts degrees in Public Relations and Political Science from The University of Alabama. Prior to pursuing a legal education, the author worked in political fundraising and public policy in Washington, D.C. "The Exercise of Constitutional Rights, A Crime Punishable By Death" University of Mississippi School of Law, 2017 RE

Procedurally Barring Pleas Contingent on Avoiding Death The seriousness of the offense or the sufficiency of the evidence to convey proof of guilt appropriately governs Prosecutorial determinations of whether to seek the death penalty in a particular case.206 This system should parallel a jury's decision to avoid a death sentence because the offense lacks the seriousness necessary to mandate a death sentence, or the evidence does not demonstrate guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.207 States have analyzed the constitutional burdens inherent to plea negotiations in death - eligible cases.208 The state of New York mandates a "notice of intent to seek the death penalty" be filed in order for a death sentence to be imposed.209 Once the notice has been filed, plea negotiations are barred.210 The New York Supreme Court holds pleas to a sentence less than death-where a death notice is filed-constitutionally invalid.211 The state of New York prohibits prosecutors continued bargaining with defendants following a pending notice to seek death.212 Relying on the Jackson decision, the court determined plea negotiations that forced the defendant to choose between accepting a plea and preceding a trial in which a death sentence was possible proved to unreasonably burden the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.213 This approach does not bar all plea negotiations in capital cases. Where the prosecutor restrains from filing intent to seek death, the defendant may plead guilty.214 Those defendants not facing the possibility of death may plead to a sentence of life-without-parole.215 Currently, political and financial components vastly impact the prosecutions pursuit of a death sentence. 216 Procedurally narrowing prosecutors' ability to plea bargain post the pursuit of death suppresses the improper and coercive use of the penalty in negotiations. The modification would further mandate death is sought only where the prosecution holds a reasonable belief the sentence could be obtained from a jury.

Offense:

J. Alexandra Bruce, The author is a 2017 Juris Doctor candidate at The University of Mississippi School of Law and will serve as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Rhesa H. Barkesdale of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for the 2017-2018 term. She received Bachelor of Arts degrees in Public Relations and Political Science from The University of Alabama. Prior to pursuing a legal education, the author worked in political fundraising and public policy in Washington, D.C. "The Exercise of Constitutional Rights, A Crime Punishable By Death" University of Mississippi School of Law, 2017 RE

Ethical Limitations on Leveraging Death Prosecutorial pressure on the defendant is inherent to plea bargaining.217 This pressure is not without limits.218 Certain pressures are improper. 219 Plea bargaining, centered on the avoidance of death, is appropriately prohibited by limiting the prosecutorial practice of maintaining overwhelming leverage by employing the threat of execution.220 State courts have considered the constitutionality of prosecutorial attempts to leverage plea negotiations with the threat of the death penalty; to force life contingent on the defendant's acceptance of the prosecution's guilty plea.221 Courts have found that merely withdrawing a notice to seek the death penalty prior to entering the defendant's plea raises similar constitutional concerns as bargaining with a defendant facing a pending death notice.222 Though the state of New York bars particular plea bargaining practices in cases where the prosecution has conveyed an intent to seek a death penalty, courts do not go so far as to consider the pleas "per se invalid."223 Courts continue to center their analysis of the constitutionality of pleas in death-eligible cases on the evidenced that the defendant's plea proved to be a "voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action."224 Prohibiting plea negotiations after the filing of a notice to seek death preserves the limitation on prosecutors' utilization of the death penalty as pressure in plea negotiations.225 Additionally, prosecutors need be ethically barred from attempts to facilitate negotiations contingent on the withdrawal of the filing. 226 These procedural and ethical modifications would appropriately suppress prosecutorial utilization of the threat of a death sentence as leverage in plea negotiations.2

Use of the death penalty as leverage is inherently coercive and forces innocents to plead guilty-empirics prove. Bruce 17:

J. Alexandra Bruce, The author is a 2017 Juris Doctor candidate at The University of Mississippi School of Law and will serve as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Rhesa H. Barkesdale of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for the 2017-2018 term. She received Bachelor of Arts degrees in Public Relations and Political Science from The University of Alabama. Prior to pursuing a legal education, the author worked in political fundraising and public policy in Washington, D.C. "The Exercise of Constitutional Rights, A Crime Punishable By Death" University of Mississippi School of Law, 2017 RE

B. The Threat of Death Overcomes the Choice of the Defendant The constitution prohibits courts and government actors from obtaining or further using coerced confessions.106 The State is required to prove all statements obtained are voluntary, free of coercion, and a product of the free will of the accused.107 Decisions to plea must be shown to be a "free exercise of the defendant's will."108 Coercion undoubtedly manifests through physical violence and torture.109 Although, actual violence is not required to prove coercion.110 Physiological coercion is recognized and prohibited.111 A "credible threat" of violence is sufficient to prove a statement coerced.112 Threatening a defendant's life with the death penalty does not inevitably overcome the free will of the defendant.113 The defendant maintains the ability to consider the options of pleading guilty and avoiding any possible death sentence or going forward to death-penalty trial.114 The Fifth and Sixth Amendments' clear suppression of coercive tactics generates great controversy in the reasonableness of plea negotiations conducted in death-eligible cases.115 Confessions coerced through violence or threats of violence are constitutionally invalid,116 yet the Court fails to find a constitutional prohibition on prosecutors' use of the threat of a possible death sentence to induce a defendant to accept a guilty plea.117 Conversely, constitutionality is vulnerable where prosecutors influence the defendant's choice with the threat of execution, specifically to induce a guilty plea.118 Pleas accepted through plea bargaining where a prosecutor utilizes the death penalty only to maintain leverage "unfairly burden" the defendants decision making. 119 This threat is involuntary where it overcomes "the will of the defendant."120 Demonstrating the defendant made a conscious choice to accept a particular guilty plea fails to prove the plea was constitutionally voluntary.121 The method of leveraging plea negotiations with the threat of execution122 is psychologically coercive, hindering the exercise of free will just as severely as physical torture.123 The threat of the death penalty along with promises of leniency may create an "atmosphere of intimidation" that overcomes the free will of the defendant.124 The Court condemns any practices proving "likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice."125 The lack of limitations on this practice forced many capital defendants to face a difficult choice to either risk the possibility of death through exercising their right to a trial, or waive their constitutional rights by pleading guilty to avoid any possibility of execution.126 The prosecution maintains the ability to encourage and even pressure defendants to plead guilty.127 The coupling of these two criminal justice tools has led prosecutors utilize the death penalty to "force pleas and to force them quickly."128 The practice leaves defense attorneys to counsel clients-post the filing of a death notice-to accept a plea and maintain that the guilty plea is "knowingly, freely, and voluntarily" in order to avoid death.129 These pleas remain constitutionally valid.130 C. Death Penalty Threats in Plea Negotiations Increase Wrongful Convictions Permitting the death penalty to be utilized as a prosecutorial bargaining chip unreasonably pressures innocent defendants to plead guilty. 131 Accused parties are encouraged to plead guilty for the sole purpose of saving their lives.132 In Alford, the Court held pleas voluntary even where defendants maintain their innocence while pleading guilty in an effort to escape the threat of execution.133 Unsurprisingly, a possible death sentence encourages defendants to both falsely confess and furnish false testimony.134 Plea bargaining in death penalty cases is consumed by the life or death choice.135 Where similar facts and evidence would guide the defense attorney to advise their client against the acceptance a plea, death forces the defense counsel to advise accepting any penalty to save their client's life.136 Recent exonerations, of individuals who confessed in order to avoid the possibility of a death sentence, are indicative of the increase in false confessions and wrongful convictions inherent to employing the death penalty as leverage during plea negotiations.137 The Court's continued interpretation of pleas accepted for the sole purpose of avoiding death as constitutionally valid facilitates these very exonerations. This Further undermines the true purpose and effectiveness of the death penalty.

And, this means vicious criminals get off with life in prison and the death penalty is reserved only for those who refuse plea bargains. Bruce 17:

J. Alexandra Bruce, The author is a 2017 Juris Doctor candidate at The University of Mississippi School of Law and will serve as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Rhesa H. Barkesdale of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for the 2017-2018 term. She received Bachelor of Arts degrees in Public Relations and Political Science from The University of Alabama. Prior to pursuing a legal education, the author worked in political fundraising and public policy in Washington, D.C. "The Exercise of Constitutional Rights, A Crime Punishable By Death" University of Mississippi School of Law, 2017 RE

C. Death Reserved for those Defendants who Refuse to Plead Guilty The United States maintains the death penalty to execute a small number of the convicted killers.63 The death penalty is appropriate only where the state has carefully weighed "aggravating and mitigating circumstances." 64 Over 250,000 homicides occurred from 1977 until 1989.65 Juries sentenced just 3,300 of the defendants convicted in these cases to death.66 The State executed only 120 of these death row inmates.67 The death penalty is not inherent to the crime of murder, but appropriately considered only where the crime is "so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death."68 Nonetheless, many of the United States' most heinous criminals have avoided execution by simply participating with the prosecution, and waiving their constitutional rights. Gary Leon Ridgeway -The Green River Killer-is the most prolific serial killer in American history.69 He murdered 48 people and terrorized a community.70 In the current system killers like Ridgeway are able to avoid the death sentence. The ability to plea allowed Ridgeway to avoid execution by pleading guilty and agreeing to assist in locating the remains of many of his victims.71 In the office of the "deadliest D.A." prosecutors stated "Every time we ask for the death penalty, it's because we think it's appropriate."72 The office is clear that the penalty is not sought unless the prosecutor "intends to get it,"73 but is willing to negotiate a plea in exchange for a lesser sentence in almost every case.74 This plea bargaining practices effectively reserves death sentences for only for those defendants who refuse to accept guilty pleas, proceed to trial.75 The prosecution pursues the death penalty in almost every case that goes to trial, but the sentence is overwhelmingly avoidable so long as a guilty plea is accepted and constitutional rights forgone.76 Individuals are awarded with the escape of execution in exchange for pleading guilty and waiving their constitutional rights. This effectively forces the death penalty to penalize only those defendants whom refuse to plead guilty, ignoring the inherent crime.

The plan would deter prosecutors from pursuing the death penalty. Bruce 17:

J. Alexandra Bruce, The author is a 2017 Juris Doctor candidate at The University of Mississippi School of Law and will serve as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Rhesa H. Barkesdale of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for the 2017-2018 term. She received Bachelor of Arts degrees in Public Relations and Political Science from The University of Alabama. Prior to pursuing a legal education, the author worked in political fundraising and public policy in Washington, D.C. "The Exercise of Constitutional Rights, A Crime Punishable By Death" University of Mississippi School of Law, 2017 RE

Prosecutors coerce pleas when employing the threat of execution to encourage various defendants to plea, while lacking the resources necessary to proceed to a death penalty trial in each of the defendant's cases.97 Unlike defendants, prosecutors are conscious of the improbability cases will proceed to trail and fully understand the inadequate resources available to try every capital defendant. 98 This deceptive practice overcomes the defendant's intelligent decision making power, rendering the plea involuntary.99 In the state with the overwhelming majority of executions -Texas- prosecutors admit they are willing to offer pleas "in even the most aggravated cases" because of the financial burdens inherent to capital cases.100 Similarly, Philadelphia prosecutors request the death penalty in almost every capital case that goes to trial, but remove that possibility for almost all defendants agreeing to plea.101 Improper Coercion manifests in the prosecutorial practice of improperly introducing the threat of execution to induce defendants' acceptance of guilty pleas.102 The pleas would fail to maintain constitutional validity.103 These actions convey an inappropriate interference with the defendant's choice to plea104 suggesting the plea should not meet the standards of the voluntariness doctrine and be withdrawn.105

And, use of the death penalty disproportionately affects marginalized groups. Love 12:

David A Love, 1-3-2012, "The racial bias of the US death penalty," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/jan/03/racial-bias-us-death-penalty RE

But this is nothing new: race and capital punishment in the US have always been inseparable. According to the Washington-based Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC), 56 of death row inmates are black or Hispanic. However, although racial minorities comprise half of all murder victims nationwide, a far greater proportion (77) of the victims in capital convictions were white. The racial identity of the murder victim is thus a leading factor in determining who receives a death sentence in America. Amnesty International also reports that 20 of blacks nationwide were convicted by all-white juries. Given the over-representation of black and Hispanic prisoners on death row, it is hardly surprising that of the 139 capital convicts found innocent since 1973, 61 have been of color. The disparities multiply: nationally, Alabama ranks 23rd in population, but second in executions in 2011. In Alabama, African-Americans are 27 of the population, yet comprise 63 of the prisoners. And while 65 of murders involve black victims, 80 of death sentences involve white victims. Further, according to the Equal Justice Initiative, 60 of black death row prisoners were convicted of killing a white person, although cases involving black defendants and white murder victims represent a mere 6 of the murders in Alabama. In the past 10 years, 23 Alabama death penalty cases have been overturned because prosecutors had illegally struck black people from the juries. Alabama has no black appellate judges, and only one black prosecutor. And nationally, 98 of prosecutors are white. If the death penalty is highly racialised, it is a regional and local phenomenon as well. Over three quarters of executions take place in the states of the former Confederacy (including 35 in Texas alone) with their history of racial violence, lynching and arbitrary Black Codes and Jim Crow laws, which sanctioned death for blacks for certain offenses. In death penalty states, the decision to seek the death penalty takes place on the county level at the discretion of the district attorney. Only 10 of the 3,148 counties in America have returned a single death sentence; a mere 1 of counties returned one or more death sentences per year. According to data from DPIC, 15 US counties accounted for 30 of the executions since 1976 - which is less than 1 of counties in the country, and less than 1 of the total counties in all death penalty states. Nine of these counties are in Texas, and three are in Alabama.

\