Blake Invitational 1 Kamiak nb aff

14 Walton JA Neg

https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/Walton/Alayof+Neg

CP Reforms

Counterplan Text: aff actor should

-require formal threshold charges for punishment

-extend pre-trial rights to those who accept plea bargaining

-release all exculpatory evidence

Solves the case and the root cause of aff impacts.

Rappaport 16 ~Jay Rappaport, Plea Bargaining: An Unfair Deal, from Roosevelt Review of the Roosevelt Institute at Columbia University, 2016, pg 24, https://issuu.com/columbiaroosevelt/docs/roosevelt'review'2016~~ SJ MC

An attainable way to solve many of the problems of plea bargaining would be to

AND

bargaining position. Criminal justice reform movements are plea bargaining reform's biggest ally.

Plea Bargaining is not the problem - it's essential to our system. The larger issue is the coercive power imbalances involved - the CP resolves these.

Caldwell 11 ~Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System H. Mitchell Caldwell, Fall 2011, Volume 61, Issue 1, Article 2, https://scholarship.law.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/andhttpsredir=1andarticle=1003andcontext=lawreview~~

By itself, plea bargaining is not the problem. Quite the contrary, it

AND

unethical abuse of the unique bargaining positions that needs to be eradicated.97

Theory_All

Interp - Aff must defend that nations in have an obligation to provide development assistance to countries. To clarify, they may not specify a group within a nation or nations to give it.

Interp - The aff must specify how development assistance is allocated in their plan

text. To clarify, they need to indicate where wealthy nations will give assistance

Interp - The aff must only operate under comparative worlds.

Interp - Must spec countries

Interp - can't read multiple pre-fiat voting issues

Interpretation: both debaters must disclose at least the following from all broken positions read at TOC bid distributing tournaments: first, complete tag lines to all cards; second, first 3 words and last 3 words of all cards; third, the standard used to delineate what counts as offense and not offense with the claims to the warrants for that standard and fourth, taglines to all evidence read.

*15 Lakeville South EH Aff

https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/Lakeville+South/Harvanko+Aff

Nothing Disclosed

*15 Lakeville South EH Neg

https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/Lakeville+South/Harvanko+Neg

Nothing Disclosed

16 Valley CT Aff

https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/Valley/ThomasMcGinnis+Aff

Aff Kantian Punishment

The endorsement of truth through reason is the only innately motivating feature of any system of ethics.

Tubert, Ariela. “Constitutive arguments.” Philosophy Compass, 5/8, 2010, pp. 656-666.

"One may think ... certain rational requirements."

There is no a priori morally relevant distinction among persons.

Godofsky, Jessica. “Future generations and the right to survival: a deontological analysis of the moral obligations of present to future people.” TCNJ Journal of Student Scholarship, vol. XII, April 2010.

"Indeed, human beings ... right to survival."

All ethical systems are governed by the law of noncontradiction.

Gahringer, Robert. “Moral law.” Ethics, Vol. 63, No. 4, July 1953, pp. 300-304.

"Within any deductive ... the larger sense"

Thus, any choice that positions some as subject to treatment as a mere means fails the categorical imperative.

Reiman, Jeffrey. “Justice, civilization, and the death penalty: answering van den Haag.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 14, no. 2, Spring 1985, pp. 115-148.

"I call the ... the relevant ways"

Punishment is rendered moral by the individual’s decision to voluntarily defect from the requirement.

Hill, Thomas. “Kant on wrongdoing, desert, and punishment.” Law and Philosophy, vol. 18, No. 4, July 1999, pp. 407-441.

"Moral duties are ... to respect it."

Punishments are rendered obligatory because and only because of desert — that is, the agent ratifies the treatment by expressing contradictory maxims underlying decision to treat others as mere means.

McCloskey, H.J. “Utilitarian and retributive punishment.” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 64, no. 3, February 16, 1967, pp. 91-110.

"These criticisms of ... what he deserves"

In both cases, the purpose of the system is to provide undeserved punishment.

Kipnis, Kenneth. “Plea bargaining: a critic’s rejoinder.” Law and Society Review, Winter 1979.

"Justice in punishment ... of plea bargaining."

Rather, it is that those engaging in the bargaining process necessarily do so with the intent to assign punishment not based on desert.

Kipnis, Kenneth. “Plea bargaining: a critic’s rejoinder.” Law and Society Review, Winter 1979.

"Bargains are out ... justice system itself."

In the case of guilty defendants they knowingly lie that they have committed an offense lesser than their actual crime; in the case of innocent defendants they lie claiming that they committed a crime when they have not.

Kipnis, Kenneth. “Plea bargaining: a critic’s rejoinder.” Law and Society Review, Winter 1979.

"Plea bargaining should ... ‘plea’ of guilty."

Aff Race

Oppression frustrates all ethics because it excludes its targets from ethical consideration. It must be challenged through discourse.

Winter, Deborah, and Leighton, Dana. “Structural violence.” In D. J. Christie, R. V. Wagner, and D. D. Winter (Eds.), Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century. New York: Prentice-Hall, 2001.

“Finally, to recognize ... appreciation of diversity.”

Oppression dominates the identities of those who suffer from it, excluding them from agency.

Gonick, Lev and Isaac Prilleltensky. “Polities change, oppression remains: on the psychology and politics of oppression.” Political Psychology, vol. 17, no. 1, March 1996, pp. 127-148.

“According to our ... Browne and Finkelhor, 1986).”

Rejecting oppression comes before normative ethics because disregarding lived experience in favor of ethical abstraction is itself a form of oppression.

Halewood, Peter. “White men can’t jump: critical epistemologies, embodiment, and the praxis of legal scholarship.” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, vol. 7, No. 1, 1995.

“Where we are ... tradition) with masculinity.”

State policies grounded in ideal ethical theories of social contract and retributive justice seek to legitimate criminal justice but the on-the-ground reality is that the system is actively hostile to subordinated groups.

Borchetta, Jenn and Alice Fontier. “When race tips the scales in plea bargaining.” Slate, October 23, 2017.

“A new study ... plea to offer.”

The oppressive nature of the criminal industrial system is not an anomaly caused by bad actors, but rather is a necessary part of the system’s design.

Borg, Lane. “Racism is built into our criminal justice system.” Oregon Live, February 22, 2016.

"The liberal wing ... for large-scale protest."

Working within the system can’t solve because the system itself is, by its nature, a tool of racism.

Brewer, Rose and Nancy Heitzeg. “Crime and punishment: criminal justice, color-blind racism, and the political economy of the prison industrial complex.” American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 51, no. 5, January 2008.

“The call for ... and classist corollaries.”

Trials are not a feature of the CRIMINAL INJUSTICE SYSTEM but rather an anomaly.

Scott, Robert and William Stuntz. “Plea bargaining as contract.” The Yale Law Journal, vol. 101, no. 8, Symposium: Punishment, June 1992, pp. 1909-1968.

“The criminal process ... criminal injustice system.”

Because of the nature of plea bargains as agreements between parties, attorneys that agree through dismissive conversation exclude defendants entirely and make truth beside the point.

Lippke, Richard L. The Ethics of Plea Bargaining. 1st ed., vol. 1, Oxford University Press, 2011.

"It would seem ... crimes have done."

Elected prosecutors will by definition be responsive to antiblack pressures coming from their constituents; in this context, maintaining a criminal injustice system with the power to incarcerate black bodies is inherently violent.

Savitsky, Douglas. The Problem With Plea Bargaining: Differential Subjective Decision Making As An Engine Of Racial Disparity In The United States Prison System. Cornell University, Proquest Dissertations Publishing, 2009.

“Plea bargaining has ... of Black defendants.”

And, plea bargaining cannot occur absent the societal background.

Lippke, Richard L. The Ethics of Plea Bargaining. 1st ed., vol. 1, Oxford University Press, 2011.

"Demonstrating this in ...their fellow citizens."

Aff Normative Epistemology

First, the aff will accept neg preferences on specificity and implementation in cross-x. This is theoretically legitimate because a. it doesn’t justify infinite abuse as it’s limited to the two areas where the neg and aff commonly disagree on interps, rather than abusive versions that allow the aff to kick skep triggers and b. the neg knows the aff will accept reasonable interps in the AC, before they start prepping, so there’s no skew.

Second, ought only implies obligation, since there are multiple sources of normativity. Dowd¹:

Before we try to understand "morally ought", we must first get clear on what we mean by "ought". Not every ought is a moral ought. For example, consider the statement, "If you want to reach the bus stop on time, you ought to leave now." This is a perfectly legitimate use of the word "ought", yet it has no moral content. It's a completely open question whether I morally ought to leave for the bus stop. Likewise, consider the statement, "You know A; A implies B; therefore, you ought to believe B." Again, this is (at least in everyday, non-philosophical discourse) a perfectly legitimate use of "ought", but it has nothing necessarily to do with morality.Therefore, I propose the following definition of "ought [means]": it is true, within a given normative sphere, that P ought to do X if and only if, within that normative sphere, P has sufficient reason to do X. This definition relies on the notion of "normative spheres". An example of a normative sphere would be [such as] the epistemic sphere. The statement "You know A; A implies B; therefore, you ought to believe B" is a statement within the epistemic sphere. And, if true, it entails that, within the epistemic sphere, I ought to believe B: we might say that I epistemically ought to believe B. Notice that there might be conflicting oughts in other normative spheres. For example, if someone will get tortured to death if I come to believe B, then I might have a moral obligation to do everything I can to avoid believing B. In other words, both of the following [it] may be true: (1) [that] I epistemically ought to believe B; [and] (2) I morally ought not believe B. To be a bit more precise, [Thus] I define "ought" [means that] as follows: it is true, within a given normative sphere, that P ought to do X if and only if, given only the reasons for and against doing X that are available within that normative sphere, P has sufficient reason to do X, all else being equal. P epistemically ought to believe B if and only if, given only the epistemic reasons for and against believing B, P has sufficient reason to believe B, all else being equal. Of course, all else may not be equal. If someone will be tortured to death if P believes B, then P may not have sufficient reason to believe B, all things considered. If there is a moral prohibition on P believing B, [t]his doesn't change the fact that P epistemically ought to believe B, because it doesn't change the fact that, given only the epistemic reasons for and against believing B, P has sufficient reason to believe B, all else being equal.

Thus, the aff only has to show an obligation, not a moral obligation, so ethical arguments aren’t sufficient to negate under the aff framing. Prefer since it’s the only definition that addresses how duties obligate agents, while other definitions presume a specific framework.

The key question when oughts conflict is then which one comes first; I will argue that the epistemic ought is a prior question. Booth²:

I will argue that it follows from a certain understanding of what epistemic ought is. How are we to understand epistemic ought? To ask that question is, un-controversially, to ask something about the nature of epistemic normativity. It is to ask in virtue of what epistemic norms are normative. It is to address this concern: In so far as epistemologists endorse epistemic norms, it is incumbent upon them to explain the source of this normativity. How is it that epistemic norms come to have their normative force? (Kornblith 1993: 358) Of course, the question of what makes epistemic norms normative is an open one; but it seems natural to look to ethics for help in answering it, since the question concerning what moral normativity is has received an overwhelming amount of attention. One of the most influential accounts of what moral normativity is (i.e. what the phenomenon that ethical theories have been trying to capture) belongs to Christine Korsgaard. Moral normativity for Korsgaard is that which gives normative ‘force’ to the norms of ethics, that is, that which answers the question: why be moral? And that whatever the answer to the latter question is, it needs to be able to address our asking it qua moral agents deliberating as to what we ought to do in the ‘heat of action’: ‘the normative question is one that arises in the heat of action. It is as agents that we must do what we are obligated to do, and it is as agents that we demand to know why’ (Korsgaard 1996: 91). In other words, an adequate account of normativity must necessarily be able to function as a guide to action, such that when we are confronted with deliberative dilemmas it will adequately inform us what we should do. This is not quite the claim that norms are essentially action-guiding, but the claim that whatever it is that makes norms normative (whatever answers the question: why be moral?) has to be able to inform us of what to do, since the normative question is essentially one that we are interested in qua agents. That is, we ask the normative question because we want to do the right thing, not just know what the right thing to do is.3 Let’s call this the principle of the action-guiding nature of normativity: AGN: An adequate account of normativity must be able to function as a guide to action. I claim that if an account of a particular kind of normativity (belonging to a particular sortal, such as moral normativity) makes the relevant kind of ought incommensurable, then it cannot function as a guide to action. So, for instance, if moral normativity (what makes moral norms normative) makes moral ought incommensurable, then moral normativity cannot function as a guide to action. Why? Because if one cannot say why we should do the moral thing as opposed to doing, say, the most pragmatic thing, then the answer to why we should be moral does not guide action. To see this, consider this case: suppose I am deliberating as to whether to f. Legal considerations lead me to think I legally ought to f, but moral considerations lead me to think that I morally ought not to f. I am an agent, though, and the reason I want to know why I should f or not f is because I will f or not f. So I want to know whether I should f all things considered. Knowing that I morally ought not to f and legally ought to f does not help me answer the question whether I ought to f all things considered unless those oughts somehow commensurate.4 In most such cases, I imagine, we think that the moral ought trumps the legal ought, such that the moral ought turns out also to be the all things considered ought. So AGN turns out to be the demand that an account of why one morally ought to f (for instance) needs to do so in a such a way that would make the presence of those oughts relevant to whether one ought to f all things considered. Note: that is not to demand that one needs to explain why moral oughts always override other kinds of ought.

Normative epistemology hijacks the link to all other normative theories – they are either wrong or they advocate the same things normative epistemology does.

First, in order to judge any action, the framework and the decision rendered must cohere. For example, if ethics claimed killing is bad, but you came to a conclusion that killing is good, there is a flaw in the deduction. In order for an ethical theory obligate people to act according to it, it first must assume epist is relevant, because epist evaluates relationships between premises in moral deductions.

Second, epistemology shows what beliefs are justified and how we derive them. For example, a justification for Kantianism based in coherentism makes no sense if that epistemology is false. If a theory comes in conflict with the dictates of epistemology, we thus reject the moral theory.

Third, normative theories categorize actions into right and wrong, which makes epistemology normative, as it determines which actions fall into categories. Wedgwood³:

I propose that certain concepts are normative because it is a constitutive feature of these concepts that they play a regulative role in certain practices. Suppose that a certain concept 'F' is normative for a certain practice. Then it is a constitutive feature of the concept 'F' that if one engages in this practice, and makes judgments about which moves within the practice are F and which are not, one is thereby committed to regulating one's moves within the practice by those judgments. Perhaps, for example, if one engages in this practice, and makes a judgment about moves that are available to one, of the form 'Move x is F and move y is not F', one is thereby committed to making move x rather than move y, if one makes either.

Fourth, all other theories assume the value of the search for truth, because they seek to find justified beliefs. The motivation to find morality comes from a motivation to find truth, so questions of truth are prerequisite to moral projects. This also means that epistemology is normative since it is the reason for engaging in moral discourse.

And, moral judgements have been characterized by widespread error historically, and we see no reason to believe our current judgements are more accurate. Under uncertainty over which ought to use, prefer the most robust epistemic. Tarsney⁴:

Thus, whatever population one takes to be the appropriate reference class of competent moral judges, it must be conceded that one’s own moral convictions are far from universally shared within that class, and indeed that one’s own comprehensive set of moral beliefs is almost certainly shared by a tiny fraction of moral judges at best. In addition to these ongoing moral disagreements, the degree to which moral opinion has [of] changed over time should challenge our confidence even in those moral judgments that are widely shared among present-day moral agents. Practices that have been generally accepted or encouraged in many times and places, like slavery, infant exposure, pederasty, and arranged marriage are now widely or universally viewed as morally repugnant, while requirements once seen as stringent, say with respect to personal or familial honor or sexual chastity, have lost their stringency or dropped out of our shared moral code altogether. There are good reasons to regard many of these belief changes as moral progress—we need not be too troubled by our disagreement with our ancestors regarding, say, the permissibility of declining a duel. But reflection on this history should lead us to conclude, by pessimistic induction, that many of our own moral beliefs will likely be seen as absurd and perverse by our own descendants, and likely in some respects that even the most morally reflective among us would be unable to guess.

Turns the link to Ks and NCs, to avoid committing to actions which are in fact morally repugnant we should prefer the epistemic sphere.

Next, the aff thus does not take a stance on the moral question of the resolution, which means that if a K shows the topical action is bad, this is the best aff on the topic, as it avoids arguing that the oppressive situation the topic advocates is morally good.

The standard is consistency with the action-knowledge principle, or that you should not act in a way which assumes knowledge that p if you do not know that p.

First, the action-knowledge principle is necessary to account for normative epistemic oughts, - three reasons. Hawthorne⁵:

In contrast to the picture just sketched, our ordinary folk appraisals of the behavior of others suggest that the concept of knowledge is intimately intertwined with the rationality of action. Suppose, for example, that Hannah and Sarah are trying to find a restaurant, at which they have time-limited reservations. Instead of asking someone for directions, Hannah goes on her hunch that the restaurant is down a street on the left. After walking for some amount of time, it becomes quite clear that they went down the wrong street. A natural way for Sarah to point out that Hannah [she] made the wrong decision is to say, “You shouldn’t have [because] gone down this street, since you didn’t know that the restaurant was here”. Here is a similar case. Suppose John decides not to buy health insurance anymore, reasoning that he is healthy enough. He calls his mother to report excitedly on his money-saving decision. His mother can berate him for not buying the insurance, by appealing to the fact that he doesn’t know that he won’t fall ill. Another case is as follows. You are offered a cent for a lottery ticket that cost a dollar, in a 10,000 ticket lottery with a $5,000 first prize and reason as follows: I will lose the lottery If I keep the ticket I will get nothing If I sell the ticket, I will get a cent So I ought to sell the ticket. This piece of practical reasoning is absurd. It is not acceptable to act on one’s belief that one will lose the lottery (or one’s belief that if one keeps the ticket, one will get nothing). The most natural explanation for why one can’t act on these beliefs as that these beliefs are not knowledge. Consider also how knowledge interacts with conditional orders. Suppose a prison guard is ordered to shoot a prisoner if and only if they are trying to escape. If the guard knows someone is trying to escape and yet does not shoot he will be hel¿?d accountable. Suppose meanwhile he does not know that someone is trying to escape but shoots them anyway, acting on a belief grounded in a baseless hunch that they were trying to escape. Here again the person will be faulted, even if the person is in fact trying to escape. Our common practice is to require knowledge of the antecedent of a conditional order in order to discharge it. The lesson transfers to instructions with less weighty consequences than death by gunshot. Suppose a sous-chef is told by the master chef to take a cake out of the oven if it done before the master chef returns. It will cast doubt on his competence were he to take the cake out without knowing whether it is done – whether or not the cake is in fact done. There is something of an analogy here with the knowledge-assertion connection. The kind of defect manifested by the sous-chef who takes acts on that order without knowing whether the cake is done is similar to the kind of defect manifested by a sous-chef who answers ‘yes’ to the question ‘Is the cake done’ when he does not know whether it is. Consider next how blame, judgments of negligence and so on interact with knowledge. If a parent allows a child to play near a dog and does not know whether the dog would bite the child, and if a doctor uses a needle that [they] did not know to be safe, then they are prima facie negligent. Neither the parent nor doctor will get off the hook by pointing out that the dog did not in fact bite the child and the needle turned out to be safe, nor by pointing out that they were very confident that the dog/needle was safe. Of course, some excuses are acceptable but these too are sensitive to the facts about knowledge. If the parent knew that they didn’t know that the dog would bite the child, and if the doctor knew that he didn’t know that the needle was safe, we will deem the action inexcusable. If such second order knowledge is absent we will be more open to excuses. Here again there is an analogy with the case of assertion. If someone asserts that p without knowing it and knowing that they don’t know that p, they will have no excuse for their failure to act to the norm that one should assert only if one knows. If on the other hand, they assert that p, do not know that p, but cannot be expected to know that they don’t know that p, we may be willing to deem their failure to comply with the norm excusable. The conceptual structure, one familiar from the normative realm, explains suitable appraisal in terms of a combination of norms and excuses for failure to comply with them. Consider finally certain occasions when beliefs are properly disregarded. Suppose someone is sufficiently paranoid to believe that his hands are dirty even after he has washed them, knows this about himself, and forces himself to disregard that belief in his conduct. It seems crucial to the propriety of his behavior that he knows that the belief is not a piece of knowledge, which it turn leads to a recognition that the content of that belief is not a suitable basis for action. Many epistemologists would argue that justified belief is enough for the propriety of the relevant behavior in many of the examples we have given. We will have much to say in response to this view in the pages that follow. For now, it bears emphasis that (in English at least) it is considerably more natural to appraise behavior with the verb “know” than the phrase “justified belief”, or even “reasonable belief”. Perhaps this is because “know” is a phrase of colloquial English, whereas “justified belief” is a phrase from philosophy classrooms. But this is itself a fact that should be surprising, if the fundamental concept of appraisal were justification rather than knowledge.

This precludes ethical theories, including Ks – (a) part of any normative theory explaining why people err in cases where they act wrongly, not fulfilling moral requirements, and only the aff provides this, (b) only the action-knowledge principle provides an explanation for the common language of epistemic oughts, and common usage is the source of definitions, so meeting the standard means the resolution is definitionally true.

Second, the action-knowledge principle unites the justifications for action and belief, providing an epistemic explanation for both practical and theoretical rationality. Hawthorne⁶ 2:

The Action-Knowledge Principle makes immediate sense of our use of “know” to criticize the actions of others. When someone acts on a belief that does not amount to knowledge, she violates the norm, and hence is subject to criticism. That is why we use epistemic vocabulary in criticizing the actions of others. (Of course, as noted earlier, we will in some cases be open to excuses where the norm is violated. It would a grave mistake to respond to this by complicating the norm: as in other realms, we should recognize that some violations of norms are more excusable than others.) Note that an analogous principle seems plausible for reasons for belief, viz: Treat the proposition that p as a reason for believing q only if one knows that p. One attractive feature of the Action-Knowledge Principle is that it unifies the practical and theoretical domain of reasons: if it is correct, then proper reasons for belief and reasons for action have a uniform nature.

This precludes the NC, including Ks – all normative rules argue that people must know or believe some things in order to act well, only the aff explains the underlying epistemic reason why.

Third, the obligation to base criminal decisions on the truth has broad support in legal theory.

Gonzales⁷:

The right to the truth has not yet been the object of a specific international convention. Some argue that¶ the right derives from other well-established rights in international human rights law, such as the right to¶ a remedy, the right to receive and impart information, and the right to due process. Others say it is an autonomous right, independent of or in addition to these other rights. Nevertheless, the core elements of the¶ right are well accepted.

Prefer justifications based in consensus because people who do this for a living know more about the topic than high schoolers.

Fourth, other theories collapse due to a double bind. Either A) they don’t concede truth has to be established before action, in which case their theory collapses because there’s no reason why their framework’s truth means people should follow it or B) they concede that truth first, and you maximize its pursuit in the CJS.

Fifth, the AC turns arguments about the need to recognize oppression on a higher layer – such recognition depends on empirical recognition of the facts of cases, without which oppression can be papered over. Historically, for example, racist anthropology was a major source of racism.

To clarify, the AC functions independent of a specific epistemic theory; I say that whatever it means to be true, acting inconsistently with processes which produce truth is incoherent. This means justifying that something is the source of truth doesn’t turn the aff.

Offense.

First, plea bargaining necessarily acts without establishing the facts both about the truth of the crime and which crime was committed, violating the standard. Lippke⁸:

It would seem that a crucial feature of charge-adjudication schemes is their ability to help us discern the truth or falsity of the charges against individuals that have been levied by state officials. Punishment of the factually innocent is a grave injustice; in the vast majority of cases, whatever meager benefits it produces will be hugely outweighed by the burdens it imposes on the individuals wrongly punished and the public who must pay for it. 1Non-punishment of the guilty is likewise highly undesirable. Justice is not done if they escape the punishment they deserve, and when their crimes are grave, intense distress is caused to victims, their families, and the public more generally. In cases in which the unpunished guilty have continuing criminal proclivities, the failure of the state to deter or incapacitate them means that they may well go on to victimize others. Beyond accurately and reliably separating the innocent from the guilty, we want charge-adjudication schemes to help us assign[ing] appropriate sanctions to offenders. Ordinarily, they do this by refining the charges of which defendants are convicted and according to which they are sentenced. Whatever the goal of a sentencing scheme, the determination of sentences in specific cases should be made by a sensitive and informed weighing of the relevant factors surrounding crimes and offenders. Over or under punishment of offenders conveys falsehoods about the seriousness of their crimes or the danger they constitute to the community. Broadly speaking, if the criminal justice system is to discern and convey truths—in the form of accurate verdicts and sentences keyed to offenders and their criminal acts—we must see to it that it performs three crucial tasks at a high level of proficiency. First, there must be trained officials who gather, sort, and preliminarily analyze evidence concerning apparent offenses. In most countries, police and criminal investigators perform this key function, though at times they do so in concert with prosecutors or judges. Second, there must be officials whose task it is to evaluate (p.218) the evidence that has been amassed and determine whether and which charges should be filed against individuals suspected of crimes. In most countries, prosecutors fulfill this role, though they may be aided by the police and judges. Third, there must be some authoritative means of resolv[e]ing charges, of determining which, if any, are adequately supported by the evidence. Trials are often imagined to be this authoritative mechanism and in some countries they are. But, as we have seen, in other countries a[n] more informal resolution of charges, usually in the form of plea bargaining, is the dominant mechanism. Given the concerns of this book, the main focus in this chapter is on the authoritative means of resolving charges. Yet the evaluation of charge-adjudication schemes cannot be entirely disentangled from prior charging decisions made by state officials, or from the collection of evidence by police and other criminal investigators. More often than we would perhaps like to think, mistakes made by state officials in the early stages of criminal investigation defeat the ability of charge-adjudication schemes to produce accurate verdicts and appropriate sentences. 2 All of this is obvious and might go without saying, but I would not want my focus on charge adjudication to be taken as a sign of uncritical acceptance of the quality of the evidence with which it works and upon which it depends. To some, it will seem absurd to suggest that either adversary trials or robust forms of plea bargaining aim at discovering and affirming truths about what individuals accused of crimes have actually done. Adversary trials are too much in the way of oppositional dramas to have truth be a reliable outcome. Both prosecutors and defense attorneys have powerful incentives to conceal or distort the truth, especially if doing so will enable them to prevail. If we want trials to get at the truth, we would do much better to move toward the inquisitorial versions of them that are the norm throughout much of Europe. In inquisitorial trials, prosecutors and defense attorneys play less prominent roles, and the judges who oversee the proceedings seem disinclined to permit tactics that distort the search for the truth. 3 Especially in its more robust forms, plea bargaining’s relation to the truth seems more tenuous still. The negotiated resolution of charges makes the truth or falsity of charges against individuals seem almost beside the point. What matters is what the interested parties—prosecutors, defendants (or their attorneys), and sometimes judges—are willing to agree on. Rather than having truth or falsity determined by flawed trial procedures, it is determined by mutual consent, which seems no kind of truth-seeking mechanism at all. The apex of absurdity is reached when it is possible (p.219) for prosecutors and defendants to engage in “fact bargaining,” that is, negotiations about the facts that are to be appropriately captured by the charges. 4 Fact bargaining makes it seem as if no crime has been committed until the parties involved in the negotiations agree to stipulate what that crime is. It is hard to imagine a legal procedure more illsuited to discovering the truth about the crimes individuals have or have not committed, and for assigning the guilty sentences that accurately convey the gravity of their crimes to the public. Though these indictments of adversary trials and plea bargaining move too quickly, it is relatively easy to show that robust forms of plea bargaining are unreliable mechanisms for getting at the truth of what those charged with crimes have done.

Second,plea bargaining actively hinders our pursuit of the truth, by giving incentives to plead guilty the truth is obscured, empirically proven Pozner⁹:

The unavoidable truth is that purchased testimony is inherently unreliable. Yet purchased testimony is now the favorite tactic of prosecutors with weak cases. If indeed the conspiracy charge is the darling of the federal prosecutor's nursery, then the “cooperating witness” is the midwife. Changes in federal sentencing law in 1984 and 1986 gave prosecutors -- not judges or juries -- the sole power to say who does time and who does not. Now it is the prosecutor who also determines the length of a defendant's sentence, by his charging decisions, and later often on a motion to reduce the sentence for “substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another. “The decision by the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in the Singleton case emphasizes that the condition of the promise is truthful testimony. But as the Supreme Court noted in Washington v. Texas (1976), “Common sense would suggest that [a cooperating witness[es]] often ha[ve]s a greater interest in lying in favor of the prosecution rather than against it, especially if he is still awaiting his own trial or sentencing.” Desperate to get a reduced sentence, jailhouse informants listen for new cases and race to “get on the bus” -- testify against persons they perhaps do not know but learned of through the grapevine. Faced with a lengthy prison term, desperate defendants are eager to please the prosecutor. Indicted individuals suddenly “recall” incriminating conversations with the prosecutions's targets. Whatever the prosecution is missing is suddenly filled in -- and if they don't know enough about a case to cut a deal, they will make things up. Prisoners will do what they need to do to reduce their sentence. The Singleton court posits that a prosecutor himself could be prosecuted for suborning perjury. True in theory this is not the case in practice. The Chicago Tribune recently examined 381 murder cases around the country since 1963 that w[h]ere reversed because prosecutors knowingly used false testimony or concealed evidence of innocence. Yet not a single prosecutor in those cases was ever brought to trial for criminal misconduct. Instead, the Tribune notes, the cheating prosecutors were usually rewarded with promotions. For snitches, the incentive to provide testimony is whatever gets them their deal, truthful or not. Prosecutors reward informants for convictions, not truth. This is the way the system works in real life. It's time to change the system. It's time to stop the government from bribing witnesses

Prefer impacts to intentions over impacts to implementation problems under the standard.

1) Action theory: Actions are defined by their intents, so without evaluating the intent you can’t evaluate the action. The intent unifies the action, for example if I drink I must raise the glass to my lips and then swallow, which then have different constituent parts, making actions infinitely divisible. The only way to judge the topical action is by looking to intent.

2) Normativity: Only intent-based ethics are normative because if you’re held responsible for things you don’t intend, then there’s no reason to be moral because you can’t help your actions being immoral, because you’re held responsible for unintended effects. This controls the link to ethics because otherwise there’s no reason to follow morality and ethics are circular.

Underview:

First, if neg wins a violation on T or theory, re-evaluate offense under the new interp. a. I speak in the dark, whereas neg can adapt, so give aff the reciprocal right to adapt. b. Multiple legit interps means aff is subject to T every round. I can't predict norms at my first tournament. c. It would be unfair to nullify 6 minutes of the AC for a marginally better interp. Their T shell justifies dropping the arguments, not me.

[~:18] Second, theory is ground to drop the neg but not the aff because if the neg runs abusive arguments, I have to be able to go all on in theory against those arguments in the 3-minute 2AR which I can’t do if it’s only drop the argument, but the neg has a 6-minute 2NR, so they don’t need to be able to collapse. Time skew is key to fairness because you need sufficient time to be able to develop arguments. Further, this is also a reason to grant the aff a RVI but not the neg because the aff doesn’t have to time to win only generating defense while the neg can generate defense on theory and easily win substance in a 6-minute speech, thus if I win offense to a counter-interp or I-meet on T or theory, vote aff since I have to spread out in the 1AR.

[~:08] Third, aff is disadvantaged A) there’s a 61%¹⁰ side bias against the affirmative. B) 6-4-7-3-time skew, C) aff has to extend offense twice while neg just once. 3 implications - 1) force them to quantify abuse claims against the structural skew already inherent 2) if the neg doesn’t weigh against side bias I get a free I meet, because you can’t prove a sufficient violation 3) presume aff since if I overcame this skew I was the better debater.

Fourth, prefer TT because A) isomorphism, alternative RTBs aren’t binary win/loss, and thus cannot function in debate B) constitutivism, the ballot and tab software present decision as aff/neg, not who best achieves some good value. Also, “affirm” is “To state that (a proposition, or part of a proposition) is true; to give as an affirmative proposition,”¹¹ and negate is “to deny the existence or truth of; to deny.”, which independently proves truth testing. C) coordination, tournaments provide focal points for debaters by announcing a topic, giving it salience. Absent that focal point, debate is impossible since the chance of our being prepared to debate the same thing is literally zero. That means debating the truth of the announced resolution is a requirement of debate.

[~:15] Fifth, if both sides have offense on T or theory, affirm: A) mooting theory means I’m the better debater since I neutralized more arguments in less time. B) If I have to go all in on theory due to the time disadvantage, evaluating substance turns theory into a no risk issue if the neg can make theory indecisive. C) The neg choosing to be abusive rather than engage the AC since they think I’m going to win framework, shouldn’t also force me to also be a better theory debater. If they evade phil and theory is a tie, affirm. D) This sets better norms because it adds risk to the theory blip spread. The neg always wins otherwise.