The Authorities and the Collaborators Part A of the report described two aspects of the relations between the authorities and the collaborators: the mode of recruitment of the latter, and the authorities' enforcement or lack of enforcement of the law against collaborators suspected of criminal offenses. The two topics were discussed separately at the beginning of the report, describing the emergence of the collaborators phenomenon in the territories and the reasons for the hostility they arouse in the local population.
This section deals with additional aspects of the relations between the authorities and the collaborators: the punitive policy toward Palestinians suspected of attacking or trying to attack suspected collaborators, and the question of protection, rehabilitation, and assistance given Palestinians defined as being at risk.
Photograph: Armed collaborators at the entrance to the Fahmah Camp, West Bank (Photograph by Nitsan Shorer)
1. Punitive Policy Toward Palestinians Suspected of Attacking Collaborators The authorities take a serious approach to attacks on collaborators. The perpetrators are categorized as “wanted,” and the security forces spare no efforts to apprehend them. Individuals who are arrested for such offenses are tried and punished severely. The IDF Spokesperson told us that “to date, hundreds of Arab residents have been put on trial for involvement in the murder of their brethren.”62 In July 1992, the Supreme Court stiffened the punishment of Muhammad 'Anizan and 'Azzam Ghul, from the Red Eagle cell, who had each been sentenced to ten years in prison by the Jerusalem District Court for attacking four suspected collaborators. The State Attorney's Office appealed the lightness of the sentence, stating that “attacks on suspected collaborators have become a frequent offense which should be combatted by means of deterrent and cumulative punishment. Proper weight should be given the fact that the attacks on collaborators constitute an attempt to undermine the Israeli rule of law on the one hand, and to strengthen the phenomenon of noncooperation with the authorities on the other hand.” The appeal was accepted and the prison terms of the two men were increased to fourteen years. The Supreme Court stated that the punishment meted out by the District Court “is not appropriate, cannot deter, and is not a suitable expression of society's repugnance at this kind of criminal behavior. These deeds deserve a vigorous and deterrent punitive response, as a matter of normative policy.”63 In addition to lengthy prison terms, the houses of many Palestinians who attacked suspected collaborators were sealed or demolished during the Intifada. In the past six years, at least 155 houses were demolished and 130 sealed for this reason.64 Demolition or sealing of houses, which B'Tselem has repeatedly condemned constitutes collective punishment of the suspects' families.65 Following the signing of the Israel PLO Declaration of Principles, the two sides agreed on arrangements by which wanted individuals would receive amnesty. Several dozen such individuals who were identified with Fatah cells laid down their weapons and turned themselves in to the Israeli authorities. They were interrogated briefly and released. According to press reports, Israel decided that only wanted individuals who were not involved in the killing of Israelis would be eligible under this arrangement.66 It is not clear whether the Israeli authorities are prepared to grant amnesty also to wanted individuals suspected of killing Palestinians whom they believe to have been collaborators. On November 28, 1993, B'Tselem asked the IDF Spokesperson to clarify the authorities' policy on granting amnesty to wanted individuals who had killed suspected collaborators. No reply was received.
2. Protection, Rehabilitation, and Assistance to Collaborators The State of Israel is responsible for the well-being and security of all residents of the territories. As for the collaborators, the authorities clearly have a salient duty to provide them with effective protection against attempted attacks, since their lives are at risk because of their activity as Israeli agents. The authorities are also responsible for rehabilitating collaborators who were exposed to danger in their locales.
In this connection, Haim Yisraeli, assistant to the defense minister, told B'Tselem:
The defense establishment, in all its branches, assists the rehabilitation of sayanim who suffered bodily harm or property damage as a result of cooperating with [Israel], or regarding whom there is reason for concern... because of that activity. Rehabilitation assistance is given according to clear and permanent criteria either to the victim or his surviving relatives. Rehabilitation assistance is given with the goal of enabling the sayan and his family to live securely in their own place of residence or elsewhere in the territories, and if necessary in Israel, and to live respectably.67 In 1990, Defense Minister Moshe Arens set up a committee to examine the situation of the sayanim and make recommendations. The chair, until late 1991, was Brig. Gen. (Res.) Hayil Salah. The committee examined who among those who had been killed as suspected collaborators had actually been employed by one of the Israeli agencies involved in such operations, and addressed the problem of coordination among the various agencies on dealing with the collaborators.
In a conversation with B'Tselem on June 19, 1993, Brig. Gen. (Res.) Salah defined two categories of persons entitled to assistance from the state - sayanim and those at risk:
When I say sayan, I am referring to those who give information to one of the intelligence bodies or who work with the Civil Administration. A former policeman, whose life may be in danger because of his past, is not a sayan, but he is at risk. A land broker is not a sayan because he sold land to someone from Kfar Saba and not to the government; though he may be at risk, he is not a sayan. An individual at risk is anyone who once worked for the Civil Administration, who was once a policeman, whoever is the subject of graffiti in the street.
But there is another phenomenon Palestinians who claim they are presently sayanim or were in the past but when you check, you find something else. I met in Hebron with a group of sixty residents who claimed to be sayanim. I spoke with them one at a time, and of the sixty only six were really sayanim, and the rest wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to receive a little assistance. [For example] a person provided information once and was paid for it, but he was not listed anywhere as a sayan. The sayanim of the GSS and the army are taken care of and receive exceptional treatment... . There is no such thing as someone who once worked with the GSS without any record of it. The GSS has a unit that deals with the rehabilitation of sayanim. Anyone who says he worked for the GSS is checked out. There may be some who may have wanted to work with the GSS, but in practice did not. Many try to get assistance with no justification... . The Civil Administration also gives its people excellent treatment. Sometimes the Civil Administration wants to warn people that they are at risk, but it has a problem with those who have been warned but do not want to be considered part of that category.
According to Brig. Gen. (Res.) Salah, the committee submitted recommendations for improving the rehabilitation of exposed collaborators and for improving the coordination between the different agencies who work with them. The committee also tried to set criteria for arming collaborators.
The committee continued to function after submitting its recommendations, but its objectives were redefined. It was now given the task of dealing with those collaborators for whom no agencies took responsibility. The committee was transferred to the Office of the Coordinator of Activities in the Territories, and the new chair was the deputy coordinator at that time, Brig. Gen. Freddy Zach, who was replaced in late 1992 by Brig. Gen. Aryeh Ramot. The latter told B'Tselem on August 8, 1993:
The GSS periodically issues an updated list of individuals who are at risk. Our task is to call in those individuals and warn them that their lives are in danger. Some of them do not want to accept the warning. Those who are at risk are given solutions: distress buttons, a weapon, or other solutions. When we discover that a particular individual at risk has ties with one of the bodies [i.e. GSS, IDF], we approach that body.
Many of those at risk have a criminal or security background, a fact which makes it difficult for us, for example, to decide whether to issue an entry pass to Israel... . My hands tremble when I have to issue an entry pass to Israel to someone with a criminal record. The problem with the work permits is that some of those who request them have no Israeli employer. The law requires that only Palestinians who are requested by an Israeli employer may receive a work permit. Nevertheless, we reached an agreement with Labor Minister Ora Namir that collaborators can enter Israel even without being requisitioned by an Israeli employer.
During the year that I have been responsible for the committee, we have had to deal with only about sixty cases. The issue could become a real problem if the autonomy regime is implemented, because the people who worked with us are liable to be harmed, and we will have to provide solutions for more people. An inter-ministerial committee is now doing staff work with the aim of formulating a contingency plan for that kind of situation.
Of course, many sayanim have complaints. The exposed sayan loses his whole world - house, land, friends. Nothing you can do will give him back what he had. Many sayanim received one time payments from us of tens of thousands of dollars, and lost it playing cards, using drugs, or in drink. Then they come back to us [to ask for more assistance].
I do not know whether there is a supreme coordinating body that is responsible for the whole subject of collaborators. At this time an examination is underway of all the criteria for rehabilitation.