It is argued that a second chamber based on a different composition and representing the interests of states, more specifically less populous states, is an institution that reflects the normative diversity inherent in federalism.
It is also suggested that second chambers reflecting the entrenched representation of the states distinguishes federations from other types of polities.
Chapter Three Federations and Second Chambers
It is also suggested that second chambers reflecting the entrenched representation of the states distinguishes federations from other types of polities.
It is argued that a second chamber based on a different composition and representing the interests of states, more specifically less populous states, is an institution that reflects the normative diversity inherent in federalism.
In the study of legislatures, little attention is given to the second chambers of bicameral parliaments.
Chapter Three Federations and Second Chambers
Rational
What is the justification for a second chamber?
Although bicameral houses can be found in unitary systems, owing to the federal idea, second chambers are more common, if not inherent in federations.
Bicameral legislatures, in which there are two chambers involved in the federal law-making process, are common in federations.
The lower house is often uniformly organized on the principle of proportional representation and there is a less strong federal element in it.
But the upper chamber is often expected to reflect some federal idea and its legislative role is defended for at least two reasons.
Chapter Three Federations and Second Chambers
- The first emanates from the qualified application of the concept of sovereignty in federations.
Stated otherwise, federalism as enshrining both unity and diversity qualifies to a certain extent, the ‘one man, one vote’ principle of democracy, particularly, in relation to the organization of the second chamber.
While there may be many circumstances in federations in which majority rule is qualified, the point here is that federal arrangements by providing second chambers based on a different organizing principle from the lower house, limit majority rule.
Watts has rightly pointed that ‘the distribution of seats in federal second chambers in terms of units may appear to counter the democratic majoritarian principle’ in favor of an equally important value in federations, the promotion of diversity
