Country of origin information report Turkey December 2007

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Evasion of Military Service and Punishment
9.08 As recorded in the report ‘Refusing to Bear Arms: A world-wide survey of conscription and conscientious objection to military service’ (Turkey: 2005 update) by War Resisters International:
“Draft evasion (asker kacagi) and desertion are widespread. The exact number of draft evaders is not known, but the number is estimated to be approx. 350,000. Draft evasion is prompted by the risk of being sent to serve in South Turkey and poor conditions and human rights violations within the armed forces…Draft evasion and desertion are punishable under the Law on Military Service and the Turkish Military Penal Code. Turkish law actually makes a distinction between evasion of military registration, evasion of medical examination, evasion of enlistment and desertion. According to Article 63 of the Penal Code, draft evasion is punishable (in peacetime) by imprisonment of:
 One month for those who report themselves within seven days;

 Three months for those who are arrested within seven days;

 Between three months and one year for those who report themselves within three months;

 Between four months and 18 months for those who are arrested within three months;

 Between four months and two years for those who report themselves after three months;

 Between six months and three years for those who are arrested after three months;

 Up to ten years’ imprisonment in the case of aggravating circumstances, such as self-inflicted injuries using false documents (Articles 79-81 of the Penal Code).
“Desertion is punishable under Articles 66-68 of the Penal Code with up to three years’ imprisonment. Deserters who have fled abroad may be sentenced to up to five years’ imprisonment, and up to ten years in case of aggravating circumstances (Article 67).” [53a] (Section on Draft evasion)
9.09 As recorded in the 2005 updated report by War Resisters International, “Draft evasion is prompted by the risk of being sent to serve in South Turkey and poor conditions and human rights violations within the armed forces. There have been regular reports of Kurdish conscripts in particular being subjected to discriminatory treatment, especially when they are suspected of having separatist sympathies.” [53a] (Section on Draft evasion)
Conscientious Objectors (vicdani retci)
9.10 As noted in an Amnesty International public statement of 9 December 2005:
“Conscientious objection is not recognized in Turkish law…In Turkey it is compulsory for all men between the ages of 19 and 40 to do military service for 15 months. Amnesty International is concerned that the right to conscientious objection is not legally recognized by the authorities, and provisions do not exist for an alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors… In recent years in Turkey there have been a small number of conscientious objectors who have publicly stated their refusal to carry out military service. They are usually subject to criminal prosecution.” [12f]
9.11 The War Resisters International 2005 document noted that:
“The right to conscientious objection is not legally recognized. Although Article 24.1 of the 1982 Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of conscience, the Constitution does not widen this to include the right to conscientious objection to military service. In 1991, the Turkish Constitutional Court explicitly ruled that the freedom of conscience mentioned in Article 24 does not include the right to conscientious objection to military service.” [53a] (Section on Conscientious objection)
9.12 The War Resisters International 2005 document further noted:
“Since the 1990s, there are a small number of COs who publicly state that they refuse to perform military service for non-religious, pacifist reasons. The Turkish language actually makes a distinction between conscientious objectors (vicdani retci) and draft evaders (asker kacagi)… Between 1995 and 2004 approx. 40 men have openly declared themselves as conscientious objectors, mostly by making a public statement or giving media interviews about their reasons for refusing military service. COs may be punished under Article 63 of the Turkish Military Penal Code for avoiding military service. COs who attract media attention or publish articles about their refusal to perform military service may also be punished to between six months’ and two years’ imprisonment under Article 318 of the Turkish Criminal Code for ‘alienating the people from the armed forces’. In 2004, a new Criminal Code was introduced (Law No 5237). Under the previous Criminal Code, ‘alienating people from the armed forces’ was punishable under Article 155 with a similar term of imprisonment…In recent years, it appears that the Turkish authorities have refrained from harsh punishment of COs. This may have been caused by the fact that previous trials of COs attracted considerable (international) attention and the Turkish authorities may wish to avoid further attention for the issue of conscientious objection. However, as long as there are no legal provisions for their right to conscientious objection, the legal position of CO’s remains vulnerable and they may still be subject to criminal prosecution. In 2004 there were five known cases of COs.” [53a] (Section on Conscientious objection)
9.13 As reported by the Turkish Daily News on 25 January 2006:
“The European Court of Human Rights ruled yesterday that Turkey had violated the rights of a Turkish citizen who was the first conscientious objector in the country to openly declare his refusal to perform compulsory military service for reasons of conscience. In the matter of the complaint filed by Osman Murat Ülke, the Strasbourg-based court decided that Turkey had violated Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the prohibition of inhumane or degrading treatment and ruled that Turkey pay 11,000 euros in financial compensation to the complainant.” [23l]
9.14 As mentioned in a press release of the European Court of Human Rights published on 24 January 2006 on the website of the Council of Europe (COE):
“The Court noted that, despite the large number of times the applicant had been prosecuted and convicted, the punishment had not exempted him from the obligation to do his military service. He had already been sentenced eight times to terms of imprisonment for refusing to wear uniform. On each occasion, on his release from prison after serving his sentence, he had been escorted back to his regiment, where, upon his refusal to perform military service or put on uniform, he was once again convicted and transferred to prison. Moreover, he had to live the rest of his life with the risk of being sent to prison if he persisted in refusing to perform compulsory military service.” [29a]
9.15 The ECHR continued:
“The Court noted in that connection that there was no specific provision in Turkish law governing penalties for those who refused to wear uniform on conscientious or religious grounds. It seemed that the relevant applicable rules were provisions of the military penal code which made any refusal to obey the orders of a superior an offence. That legal framework was evidently not sufficient to provide an appropriate means of dealing with situations arising from the refusal to perform military service on account of one’s beliefs. Because of the unsuitable nature of the general legislation applied to his situation the applicant had run, and still ran, the risk of an interminable series of prosecutions and criminal convictions.” [29a]
See also Section 8:35 Discrimination in Armed Forces

9.16 According to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs General official report on military service July 2002 sources within military jurisprudence and the Turkish Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, decided in the second half of 2001 that Turkish citizenship would no longer be withdrawn from Turks living abroad before the age of 38. This would allow conscripts the opportunity to report to the Turkish Embassy in their country of residence before reaching this age to apply for an extension with retroactive effect. Withdrawal of citizenship may only be applied in the case of individuals who indicate to the Turkish Embassy in the country in question their point blank refusal to perform military service. This is because in such cases it is unlikely that the individuals concerned would apply for an extension before the age of 38. [2d] (section 6.6)

9.17 Under Article 8 of Turkish Nationality Law No. 403 (1964), Turkish citizenship may be restored even if the individual concerned is not residing in Turkey at that point in time. [26a] (p3) The Netherlands report July 2002 states that “An application for the restoration of Turkish citizenship can be granted if the applicant states that he is still going to perform military service. Turkish citizenship can still be recovered after the age of 40. The age of 40 only signals the end of military service age for individuals who have already performed military service.” [2d] [section 6.6]
Posting after completion of basic training
9.18 The Netherlands report 2001 stated that “Every conscript’s unit for posting after his basic training is determined by computer by the Directorate for the Recruitment of Conscripts in the Ministry of Defence. The place of subsequent posting depends upon the basic training undergone, the place of registration and possible criminal record.” [2b] (p19) “Anyone who has been convicted of theft is therefore very unlikely to be placed in a unit responsible for managing an arms depot. Among others, spokesmen for the Turkish human rights association IHD and various military sources say that they do not believe that a record of past criminal offences, whether or not of a political nature, results in an extra-harsh posting by way of additional punishment…. Spokesmen for the IHD also consider it unlikely that conscripts are screened on the basis of ethnic origin or religious or political convictions for the purpose of deciding on subsequent postings.” [2b] (p21)
9.19 The War Resisters International report noted that:
“For years, the Turkish armed forces have been involved in heavy fighting with the PKK in South Eastern Turkey. In 1999 a ceasefire was agreed between the Turkish government and the PKK, but the situation has remained tense ever since. All conscripts may be sent to serve in South Eastern Turkey as postings of conscripts are usually decided at random by computer. There is a sizeable group of conscripts of Kurdish origin who refuse to perform military service because they do not want to fight against their own people. Many Kurdish draft evaders have, in fact, left Turkey and applied for asylum abroad.” [53a] (Section on Draft evasion)
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10 Judiciary

See also Annex D “Administration of justice” and Annex E for a comprehensive description of the Court system in Turkey
Organisation
10.01 The US State Department Report (USSD) 2006, published on 6 March 2007, noted that:
“The judicial system is composed of general law courts; specialized heavy penal courts; military courts; the Constitutional Court, the nation's highest court; and three other high courts. The high court of appeals hears appeals for criminal cases, the council of state hears appeals of administrative cases or cases between government entities, and the audit court audits state institutions. Most cases were prosecuted in the general law courts, which include civil, administrative, and criminal courts. In 2004 parliament adopted legislation providing for the establishment of regional appeals courts to relieve the high court's caseload and allow the judiciary to operate more efficiently.” [5g] (section 1e)
10.02 The 2006 USSD report noted:
“The Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of laws, decrees, and parliamentary procedural rules and hears cases involving the prohibition of political parties. If impeached, ministers and prime ministers can be tried in the Constitutional Court. However, the court cannot consider ‘decrees with the force of law’ issued under a state of emergency, martial law, in time of war, or in other situations as authorized by parliament. Military courts, with their own appeals system, hear cases involving military law for members of the armed forces. Military courts can also hear cases involving crimes committed by both civilians and military personnel.” [5g] (section 1e)
10.03 The EC 2007 report further stated that:
“864 judges and 476 prosecutors were appointed during the reporting period (1 October 2006 to early October 2007). The funds for the judiciary have increased from € 409 million in 2005 to € 482 million in 2006 and are planned to reach € 865 million by the end of 2007. In May 2007, nine locations for regional courts of appeal were identified and their geographical areas of jurisdiction defined in line with legal requirements.” [71d] (p10)
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Independence
10.04 The US State Department Report (USSD) 2006, published on 6 March 2007, noted that:
“The constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary was occasionally subject to outside influence. There were reports of judicial corruption. The law prohibits the government from issuing orders or recommendations concerning the exercise of judicial power; however, the government and several high-ranking military officers on several occasions issued announcements or directives about threats to the government, which could be interpreted as general directions to the judiciary.” [5g] (section 1e)
10.05 The 2006 USSD report noted:
“The High Council of Judges and Prosecutors was widely criticized for undermining the independence of the judiciary. The minister of justice serves as chairman of the seven-member high council, and the justice ministry undersecretary also serves on the council. The high council selects judges and prosecutors for the higher courts and is responsible for oversight of the lower courts. The high council is located in the Ministry of Justice and does not have its own budget.” [5g] (section 1e)
10.06 The EC 2007 report recorded that, “As regards the independence of the judiciary, YARSAV filed an application with the Council of State in October 2006 to limit the role of the Ministry of Justice in the process of selecting candidate judges and prosecutors; also, to stop conducting the planned examinations to recruit some 600 candidate judges and prosecutors… However, in August 2007 YARSAV lodged a complaint with the Council of State for the annulment of the new regulation as well. The case is pending before the Council of State.” [71d] (p58)
10.07 Furthermore the EC 2007 report noted that, “According to a court decision of 2006, judges and prosecutors could access their appraisal files. This is no longer possible under a new regulation on judicial inspectors issued by the Ministry of Justice in January 2007. This regulation also extends the responsibilities of the inspectors who now cover, among other things, probation centres and regional courts of appeal to be established. In March, YARSAV filed a lawsuit with the Council of State for the annulment of the regulation, arguing that the inspectors should not be attached to the Ministry of Justice. The case is still pending.” [71d] (p58)
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10.08 The EC 2007 report recorded that:
“Efforts to modernise the judiciary through the use of information technology continued. Judges have reported positive results as regards the National Judicial Network Project (UYAP) on court proceedings while the lawyers' portal was integrated into this network in March… However, concerns remain as regards the independence and the impartiality of the judiciary… There have been tensions as regards the appointment of high court judges… Overall, there has been some progress as regards the efficiency of the judiciary through implementation of adopted legislation and continued use of IT. However, tensions in the relations between the government and the judiciary have not been conducive to the smooth and effective functioning of the system. More needs to be done in terms of strengthening the independence and impartiality of the judiciary…[71d] (p10) Training for law enforcement bodies, judges and prosecutors should be stepped up.” [71d] (p18)
The Court System
10.09 As recorded by the Turkish Embassy website 2004:
“According to the Turkish law today, the power of the judiciary is exercised by Judicial (Criminal), and Administrative Military Courts. These Courts render their verdicts in the first instance, and the superior courts examine the verdict for the last and final ruling. The superior courts are: the Constitutional Court, the Court of Appeals, the Council of State, the Military Tribunal of Appeals, the Supreme Military Administrative Court, the Court of Jurisdictional Dispute, the Court of Accounts and the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors.” [74] (The Court System)
Courts
10.10 The same website also noted that, “The courts in Turkey are in fact divided into courts of justice, administrative courts, military courts and the Constitutional Court. Except the Constitutional Court, they are further divided into lower and higher courts.” [74] (The Court System)
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Military Courts
Military Criminal Courts (Askeri Ceza Mahkernesi)
10.11 The TESEV 2005 report further noted that:
“There is no definition in the Military Penal Code (Askerî Ceza Kanunu, ACK) as to what constitutes a military crime. Crimes committed by civilians in concert with military personnel are considered military crimes, which constitutes the grounds for their trial in military courts and causes them to be separated from their natural judges… (p52) In other words, military crimes should be those crimes committed by military personnel and related to military duty and service alone. These must be defined as those acts that directly affect military discipline and infringe upon military service and duty.” [98b] (p53)
10.12 As recorded in ‘Political Structure of Turkey’ November 2005:
“The Supreme Military Court of Appeals is the court of final instance for all rulings and verdicts rendered by military courts. It is also a court of first and final instance with jurisdiction over certain military personnel, stipulated by law, with responsibility for any specific trials of these persons. The Supreme Military Administrative Court has jurisdiction over military personnel in administrative or active military service. The Court of Jurisdictional Conflicts is the final authority to settle disputes concerning the verdicts of the Justice, Administrative or Military Courts. This court is made up of members of the Court of Appeals, the Council of State, the Supreme Military Court of Appeals, and the Military Administrative Court of Appeals. Military Courts have jurisdiction to try military personnel for military offenses, for offenses committed by them against other military personnel or crimes committed in military places, or for offenses connected with military service and duties.” [36g] (Section on Judiciary)
10.13 The European Commission Turkey 2006 Progress Report recorded that “There has been progress concerning the competence of military courts to try civilians. Under the law amending the relevant provisions of the Military Criminal Code as adopted in June 2006, no civilian will be tried in military courts in peacetime unless military personnel and civilians commit an offence together. The new law also introduces the right of retrial in military courts.” [71a] (p7)
The Military Criminal Court of Cassation (Askeri Yargitay)
10.14 As noted by the Turkish Embassy website 2004, “According to the law, this court functions as the court of appeal of all decisions and judgments given by Military courts. It is divided into five chambers.” [74] (The Court System)
State Security Courts (Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi)
10.15 The Freedom House report ‘Countries at the Crossroads 2005 – Turkey’, noted that:
“Another [in addition to the introduction of the new penal code in September 2004] major change to the justice system has been the May 2004 abolition of State Security Courts. These courts, comprising both civilian and military judges, tried cases against the integrity of the state and had been accused of human rights abuses and an absence of due process…The cases formerly under their jurisdiction have been passed to other courts. The end of the State Security Courts is widely considered to be positive, although it remains to be seen whether the types of cases formerly tried in them will be any better served by the new system.” [62c] (p13)
10.16 Amnesty International’s Summary of Concerns September 2004 stated that, “Human rights defenders welcomed the move to abolish the much criticized State Security Courts, but strongly urged that the establishment of special heavy penal courts which would deal with organized crime, ‘terrorism’ and crimes deemed to endanger state security be more than simply a change of name for the same institution.” [12l] (p56)
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10.17 The September 2006 Amnesty International’s (AI) report “Turkey Justice Delayed and Denied” noted that:
“In the context of a package of reforms to the Constitution passed in June 2004, the State Security Courts were formally abolished. The move was heralded by the government as a ‘turning point’. After some uncertainty about their new name, the State Security Courts were transformed into Heavy Penal Courts. Heavy Penal Courts (ağır ceza mahkemeleri) already existed within the regular judicial system, but those that replaced the former State Security Courts were only competent to try cases involving organized crime, terrorism and state security.Though nominally integrated into the regular judicial system, these courts did not in fact deal with cases outside those areas… The new special Heavy Penal Courts thus continued to try cases that had started before them when they were State Security Courts.” [12c]
10.18 The AI 2006 report further stated that:
“Judges and prosecutors of the special Heavy Penal Courts are often the same individuals who presided over the same cases when they were before the State Security Courts, and lawyers have consistently complained to Amnesty International that there has been no change to the panel of judges they encounter during trial hearings. The new courts are still widely known by their old name. A large backlog of cases from the State Security Courts was thus transferred to the special Heavy Penal Courts and the main argument of this report is that the new courts have failed to confront some of the most serious violations of the right to fair trial perpetuated in the earlier courts.” [12c]