Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

Conclusion: A qualified but peculiar federal model
If we strictly follow King’s minimalist definition of federations, neither the
meagre regional powers, the right to secession, the lack of checks on the central
executive nor the absence of an independent constitutional court disqualify the
Ethiopian system from being federal. Constitutionally guaranteed
representation of regions in the central decision-making process, which is the
critical criterion for King’s definition of federations, is still unchallenged by
these particularities.
King’s claim that constitutional units in federal systems have to be
incorporated into the central decision making process does not include any
parameters on how much power and influence they should have or what
regional empowerment should entail, except that their representation should be
constitutionally guaranteed. Federal systems could therefore in practice have
similar power sharing arrangements between central and regional level as
decentralised unitary systems, as long as they are entrenched in the

---

C M I
63
constitution. Hence, it is problematic to claim that the Ethiopian regional
states’ meagre powers would make the Ethiopian system less federal. Several
writers, including Abbink (1997:167) claims that the actual division of powers
between member states and federal government is “not federal enough”
because the states do not have any role in debating the policies and in
proposing legislation formulated at federal level. He justifies this claim by
pointing at the fact that other federal systems, such as the German, Canadian,
Nigerian and Mexican, have given more power of this kind to the member
states. Thus, his judgement of the Ethiopian federal system is based on
comparison with other federal systems, and not on a clear definition of what a
federation is.
The most common critique of the Ethiopian federal model is that it includes
the right to secession (Brietzke 1995; Abbink 1997; Mattei 1995; Paul 2000;
Cohen 1994). As mentioned above, their critiques are supported by federal
theorists, such as Duchacek (1987), who argues that the right to secession
undermines a state as federal. I would argue that the right to secession does not
disqualify the Ethiopian system from being federal, again referring to King’s
definition of federations. Reading the Ethiopian constitution, it is apparent that
the right to secession is hard to exercise both politically and procedurally and it
is by all practical purposes not likely that it will take place. But as the critics
rightly have pointed out, the fact that this right is written into the constitution
might encourage groups or regions to try this option, and this might again
destabilise unity of the federation in the long run.
Even though the institutions responsible for constitutional interpretation, the
House of the Federation and the Council of Constitutional Enquiry, are not
politically independent and might be dominated by the political party in power,
it is still necessary to consult the regions to change the constitution. Complex
rules of voting have to be followed, and hence, King’s requirements that the
constitution cannot be easily altered and that the amendment process “cannot
resort to bare majoritarian procedure” is not violated. Therefore, the marginal
checks on the central executive and the lack of an independent constitutional
court do not endanger the federal arrangements in Ethiopia per se. But it might
decrease the political leadership’s commitment to the principle of
constitutionalism, because it gives the party in power a greater opportunity to
act without consulting the federal houses or the courts and to exploit the space
of action which the lack of checks provide. Ultimately, this might influence the
running of the daily affairs in the federation and obstruct federal-regional
relations.
The most apparent trait in the constitutional history of Ethiopia is the lack
of constitutionalism, the idea of self-imposed limits to the powers of rulers to
make the government accountable to the law and prevent arbitrary action.
They reflect to a large extent the thoughts behind the old Amharic proverb:
“Just as the sky cannot be ploughed, the negus (king) cannot be indicted”
(Leenco Lata 1999:xviii). None of the constitutions under Haile Selassie and
Mengistu Haile Mariam prevented the government from imposing a repressive
and autocratic regime on their subjects. Compared to these, the Ethiopian
Constitution of 1994 is a great step forward. The central government is
restricted by a range of constitutional provisions, and unlike the system of

---

C M I
64
regional autonomy during Mengistu, the regional governments’ rights are
constitutionally protected. But still, the fact that there are few of checks on the
central executive and the political party in power implies that there are some
continuities between the past constitutions and the one of today. Whether this
will result in continued repressive rule can only be determined by exploring the
actual implementation of the federal constitution and to what extent the central
government decides to exceed their mandate. This will be the subject in the
final chapter of this analysis, which considers the Ethiopian federal system de
facto.

---

C M I
65