Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

The House of the Peoples’ Representatives – the first chamber
The highest authority in the federal state is the House of Peoples’
Representatives (HPR). It is equivalent to the first or lower chamber of a
legislature, normally serving the interests of the people in the federation as a
whole. The members of the HPR are elected by a plurality of the votes cast in
general elections every five years (Art.54,1). But twenty of the seats are
excepted from the majority-based, one-member constituencies and are reserved
for officially recognised ethnic groups with less than 100,000 people, in order
to ensure minority representation. How elections to these minority seats should
be made is not specified in the constitution, other than that it should be
determined by law (Art. 54,3; see also Tronvoll 2000: 23). The most
important functions of the HPR are to enact laws on matters specified for the
federal level and ratify national policy standards (Art.55).
The Ethiopian system is essentially parliamentarian, where the political
party or parties with the greatest number of seats in the HPR shall form and
lead the executive and approve the appointment of members for the executive
Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister (Art.56). The HPR shall also
nominate the candidate for the president, who will be accepted by a two-thirds
majority of both chambers of the legislature (Art.70). The President has no real
powers, but should, equally to other constitutional presidents and monarchs,
formally sign all new laws coming from the HPR (Art.71). The Prime Minister
has quite extensive powers, akin to those of presidents in presidential systems.
He is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Art.74,1). Moreover, the
ministers in the executive are primarily not accountable to the HPR, but to the
Prime Minister (Art.76,2).
The House of the Federation – the second chamber
The House of the Federation (HF) is the second or upper chamber in the federal
government of Ethiopia. In conventional federal systems, the second chamber
serves as the representative institution for the regional units. In the Ethiopian
system, the HF has essentially the same function, but in the constitution this is
formulated in a slightly different way: it is not composed of representatives
from the federal units, but “of representatives of Nations, Nationalities and
Peoples” (Art.61,1).
As we have seen in chapter two of this analysis, a common dilemma in
determining the basis for representation in the second chamber is the
contradiction between equality of representation of citizens and regions. Should
17
Other rights that cannot be suspended during a state of emergency are article 1 (the
nomenclature of the state); article 18 (prohibition of inhuman treatment); and article 25 (the
right to equality) (stated in Art.93).

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all member states have the same vote, or should more populous states have
more votes than the smaller states, so that each citizen’s vote has the same
weight? The Ethiopian federal system has attempted to reach a compromise in
the conflict between equality of citizens and equality of regions in
representation in the second chamber. Each officially recognised national group
should in principle have one representative in the House. Additionally, the
population number of each nation or nationality is taken into consideration by
giving one representative extra for each million of its population (Art.61,2).
Despite the fact that it is not the regional units per se, but the nations and
nationalities which are represented in the HF, it is the State Councils in each
regional state which elect the members to the HF (Art.61,3).
The House of the Federation has the power to interpret the constitution and
to establish the Council of Constitutional Enquiry, which has the duty of
investigating constitutional disputes (Art.61,1-2). HF should also decide upon
issues related to the rights of states to self-determination including secession,
find solutions to disputes between states, and determine the division of joint
federal and state revenues and the federal subsidies to the states. But with only
two sessions annually, it has little influence on the conduct of daily federal
affairs (Art.67).
Constitutional guarantees for regional representation
One of the fundamental characteristics of federations is that the basis of
regional representation “cannot be easily altered, as by resort to the bare
majoritarian procedure which serves normal purposes” (King 1982:143, see
also chapter two of this study). Does the Ethiopian system have specific
procedures for how regional representation should be altered? Are there any
extraordinary rules to change the constitution?
As we have seen, regional representation in the central decision-making
process is ensured through the House of the Federation. Constitutional
provisions guarantee the powers and duties of this house. But the basis for
regional representation itself is relatively ambiguous, since the right of
representation is not given to the member states, but to the nations,
nationalities and peoples. Adding to this complexity is the constitutional
provision which allows nations, nationalities and peoples within states to
establish, at any time, their own states (Art.47,2) or to secede from the
Ethiopian federation (Art.39,1). But the conditions for establishing a state or
secede are complicated and do not follow “the bare majoritarian procedure ”
(King 1982:143). If national groups want their own state within the federation,
the state council has to accept it with a two-thirds majority and has to arrange
a referendum where the majority of the voters agree on it. The demand for
secession has to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the respective state
council and a majority in a referendum arranged by the federal government.
Any proposal for constitutional amendment has to be supported by a two-
thirds majority in the House of Peoples Representatives or in the House of the
Federation and or one third of the member states’ councils (Art.104). The basic
rights and freedoms as defined in chapter 3 of the constitution, and the rules
for amending the constitution cannot be altered without the consent of all

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member states (through a majority in each state council) and a two-thirds
majority in both the House of Peoples Representatives and the House of the
Federation (Art.105). The other provisions of the constitution can be altered by
a two-thirds majority in a joint session in the HPR and the HF and a majority
in two thirds of the state councils. This corresponds to the fundamental
principle in federal states that the supreme law regulating federal-regional
relations and regional representation at the federal level cannot be altered
without an extraordinary majority at both federal and regional level.

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