Explanation of advantages— Science Diplomacy

Arctic Containment

2AC

1. The Arctic is a flashpoint for conflict. Recent predictions paint a rosy picture of the region, but increased icebreakers are necessary to prevent conflict and encourage cooperative partnerships.

CNA 14 – Center for Naval Analyses, Military Advisory Board, citing retired four-star Admiral Frank L. Bowman, Former Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, Former Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Master's Degree in nuclear engineering and naval architecture/marine engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 2014 (“National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change,” Center for Naval Analyses, p. 18, http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/MAB_2014.pdf | ADM)

It is through this lens that Admiral Bowman views the rapidly evolving roles and missions of the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security in the Arctic. “As access continues to improve and expand in the area,” he notes, “there will be an upward spiral of new opportunities for natural resource exploration and recovery, increased shipping traffic, and a need for broadened naval partnerships and cooperation.” He further identifies an increase in risk: “Expect increased calls for search-and-rescue operations and disputes over territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones to continue with higher frequency.” Admiral Bowman notes “with jaundiced eye” the Russians’ planting of a titanium flag on the Artic seabed, near the North Pole: “The geopolitical situation is ever more nuanced and complex. The risk of maritime events, or even unpredictable flashpoints, endemic to national security is growing.”

To their credit, Admiral Bowman said, the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security are acknowledging this growing risk—at least on paper. Several recent planning documents have been issued, including the National Strategy for the Arctic Region and its Implementation Plan; the Department of Defense Arctic Strategy; the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030; and the U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Strategy. But in looking at responsibility for U.S. national security, Admiral Bowman is increasingly concerned that, “the United States, in particular the Navy and Coast Guard, is woefully ill prepared to execute the anticipated plethora of mission requirements in the Arctic.”

“The Navy,” he observes, “has precious few ice-hardened vessels to apply to the task, with the exception of nuclear sub- marines that are poorly suited for most Arctic missions. As a result, it has allowed its Arctic and cold-weather training to atrophy. The Coast Guard has but one fully ready icebreaker in its inventory, and even it represents old technology.” In addition, he said, “U.S. land-based infrastructure to support Arctic operations is lacking. The ability to communicate is hampered and limited in Arctic regions, and new technology is only slowly being applied to the problem.” He also laments that accurate nautical charts in the polar region are limited, describing how even nautical charts around Alaska show large areas that have never been surveyed with modern instruments.

Admiral Bowman worries that the recent outpouring of Arctic planning documents, while well-intentioned, may paint too rosy a picture of our Arctic capability or the ease of achieving that necessary capability. He cited Admiral Rickover’s fre- quent railings over reactor concepts that were not yet built, calling them “paper reactors.” Admiral Bowman remarked, “Rickover would note that these reactors had much in common: they typically were simple, small, cheap, lightweight, could be built quickly, with little research and development, because they could use off-the-shelf technology, and … they were not being built.”

Admiral Bowman worries the Arctic planning documents lay out a “paper” way ahead, noting that the United States is not yet building the capacity envisioned. Without the assets, he said, “the U.S. cannot begin the requisite training and qualification that will bring the rising standards of performance that Admiral Rickover demanded.” Admiral Bowman concludes that hard work and difficult decisions lie ahead, especially at this “exactly wrong time” to take on added mis- sions in the face of budget cuts, downsizing, and restructuring throughout the military.

2. Increasing presence and infrastructure in the Arctic is the only way to prevent Russian expansionism.

Slayton and Rosen 14 – David M. Slayton is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and co-chair of the Hoover Institution's Arctic Security Initiative. Mark E. Rosen, an international and national security lawyer by training, is a senior legal adviser at CNA Corporation, 2014. (“Another region where the Russian military threatens to dominate the U.S.,” March 14^th, Available Online at http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/14/opinion/slayton-rosen-russia-u-s-arctic/, Accessed 08-01-2014) LB

(CNN) -- While much of the world is focused on the Russian incursion into the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine, another long-term move may allow the former Soviet navy to dominate U.S. interests to the north: the Arctic.

The rapid melting of the Arctic Ocean is quickly creating a new variety of challenges that have the potential to cause significant global damage if they remain unaddressed.

The Obama administration's policy correctly recognizes that the United States has profoundly important economic and cultural interests in the Arctic but regrettably reveals very little about what the federal government will be doing outside of the science field.

While recent U.S. policies either dance around the core issues, or worse, do not acknowledge that they exist, the Russians are taking the lead on Arctic policy. After all, the Arctic is in their backyard, too.

Moreover, Russia -- as if to highlight the value they place on their navy and renaissance as a maritime nation -- took control of the strategic Crimean Peninsula, assuring and securing warm water Russian Navy access to the global commons.

In light of these recent events, it would be wise for Washington to seriously consider the economic potential and security vulnerabilities that exist on or near the U.S. Arctic coastline.

Overwhelmingly, the U.S. Arctic policy debate echoes past concerns of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Consequently, many in the policy community are pushing a heavy science and no-development agenda to preserve the pristine character of the region.

The recently issued Department of Defense Arctic Strategy is a case in point: It talks extensively about the DOD scientific mission and uses the terms "sustainable development" and preservation of the unspoiled area as important national goals.

But just saying "no" ignores the fact that the precious Arctic mineral and oil and gas resources will help assure the United States is able, over time, to achieve and then maintain its energy independence.

Science is incredibly important, as is safe and responsible development of the Arctic, but our agencies and scientists need to approach these issues with a greater sense of urgency. Arguably, the science needs to be a component of a detailed national action, but that's only a fraction of good U.S. policy.

U.S. Arctic policy should prioritize four things:

One: Demonstrate leadership in the Arctic and develop a strategy and policy to match. The U.S. has no leadership in the high north and Russia does, which is a great concern for our allies.

Two: Invest in infrastructure, Navy and Coast Guard to support U.S. security and commercial interests in the Arctic. The key here is to develop the policy that drives those requirements so we are not "late to need."

Three: Demonstrate leadership in the maritime domain worldwide -- and not retreat as we are doing by default in the Arctic.

Four: Facilitate and further develop offshore natural resources in the high north/Alaska and the national, international, maritime and geopolitical governance structures that will underpin those enterprises.

Washington, in less than two years, will assume a leadership role when it becomes Chair for the Arctic Council. Unfortunately, the DOD policy and U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014 do not articulate what the U.S. Arctic leadership agenda will entail.

The reality is ignoring the issues and choosing not to participate in the Arctic will not make the issues go away.

Yes, budgets are challenging, but the Arctic is no different from any other international frontier or global common where the U.S. has interests. We need to protect it and demonstrate leadership in the maritime domain -- not retreat.

So, too, our policy makers need to be looking beyond our shores to Moscow, Ottawa, Oslo, Copenhagen, the Arctic Council, international oil companies and Lloyds of London for help in solving this governance challenge.

The last thing that any of the Arctic states can afford is to back into a Russian-generated crisis with no resources or a plan.

The time is now for more U.S. leadership to ensure the Arctic becomes a safe, secure and prosperous region in which to live and work.

3. Icebreakers provide the critical sweet-spot – levels the playing field but doesn’t provoke conflict

AB 14

Alaska Business Monthly, 6/16/14, (“U.S. Must Answer Russia's Challenge in the Arctic, Treadwell Says”, http://www.akbizmag.com/Alaska-Business-Monthly/June-2014/US-Must-Answer-Russias-Challenge-in-the-Arctic-Treadwell-Says/)//AW

***Quotes Alaska Lt. Governor Mead Treadwell – B.A: Yale University, M.B.A: Harvard University****

Russian President Vladimir Putin's Arctic expansionism is a challenge the U.S. must answer with icebreakers, ports, and territorial claims of our own, Lt. Governor Mead Treadwell said today. Treadwell spoke this morning at the 34th Annual U.S.-Russia Forum in Washington, DC, on a panel focusing on foreign policy issues between the two nations.

Speaking just after Russia's Ambassador to the U.S., Sergey Kislyak, kicked off the program on foreign policy issues between the two nations, Treadwell talked about the need for cooperation with Russia despite disputes over Crimea and Ukraine, Syria and Iraq, which have brought U.S.-Russia relations to their lowest point in decades.

“My challenge to Russians is this: where we are neighbors, help bring our relations back to normal. Help us eliminate salmon by-catch in the North Pacific Ocean. Help us work together to prevent oil spills from all these ships coming through, and help us protect food security in the Arctic. Alaskans depend on this ocean for food and for jobs.

"My challenge to Americans is this: don’t let Russia go it alone in the Arctic. A quarter of the world’s oil and gas and one of the world's most important fisheries are located in the Arctic. Let’s exercise leadership now, by developing our own energy and building ports and icebreakers, and not let just one country control shipping.”

“In today’s tough international climate, we can’t forget we’re neighbors,” Treadwell said. "The Arctic situation demands cooperation and friendly competition. If we don't exercise stronger Arctic leadership, we will be sorry later."

Treadwell cited an April 22 speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin to his Security Council, committing for a stronger Russian military presence in the Arctic, and predicting that shipping in the Arctic would grow from 1.5 million tons in 2013 to four million tons in 2015. Putin also expressed his wish that ships using the Arctic be primarily under Russian control.

"Russian control of Arctic shipping is likely to produce more of the same kind of disputes we've had in the Caspian region," Treadwell said. "To prevent that, U.S. icebreakers, U.S. Arctic ports, and a stronger U.S. Coast Guard presence will offer the world alternatives, healthy competition, instead of a monopoly."

Treadwell discussed Alaskans’ and Russians’ shared heritage and close family and cultural ties, which have grown since the Alaska-Russia border opened in 1988. In addition, Treadwell said Alaska and Russia cooperate now on commercial aviation, weather, and wildlife management at the border. Both Treadwell and Kislyak called for expanding Alaska's trade with Russia, which at 10 or 11 million dollars per year, Treadwell said, is smaller than our trade with Mexico.

“There is much more trust and cooperation to be built all around the Arctic neighborhood,” Treadwell said. “Meanwhile, we need to stand up for Alaska's and

4. Cooperation Link Turn –

First, Ukraine provides uniqueness – undermines cooperation and wrecks relations in the Arctic

Osthagen 14 – Andreas, Director, Norway, of The Arctic Institute: Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, Master of Science from the London School of Economics in European and international affairs, 2014 (“Ukraine Crisis and the Arctic: Penalties or Reconciliation?” The Arctic Institute, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2014/04/impact-of-ukraine-crisis-on-Arctic.html | ADM)

Canada’s recent decision to boycott an Arctic Council task force meeting held in Moscow is a direct example of how the Ukraine conflict is starting to impact Arctic cooperation. Given its prominent position in the Arctic, however, Russia is integral to most schemes for the region’s future development. As vocalized by both former US Secretary of State, Clinton, and the current Prime Minister of Iceland, Gunnlaugsson, the Ukraine crisis might have a severe and unintended impact on Arctic cooperation [1].

The impact of the events in Ukraine for Arctic cooperation will be neither straight forward nor harmonized across the region. Instead it will vary according to the interests of the different Arctic states. They could decide to use the Arctic as an arena for penalizing Russia further or use it to engage Russia in dialogue. Currently, officials dealing with Arctic affairs are asking themselves what exactly these consequences will be, deciding whether to take further action (like Canada) or issue warnings (like Iceland).

Economic Development

First, the immediate and direct impact of decisions taken outside of an Arctic context could hamper Russia’s strongest interest in the Arctic, namely economic development. Sanctions put in place by the European Union and the United States have the potential to affect the multitude of European and American companies engaged in developing the vast resource potential in the Yamal, Nenets and Kara Sea regions. Highlighting this, on April 28 sanctions were put in place by the US on Rosneft’s president, Igor Sechin [2].

This summer ExxonMobil alone is scheduled to conduct some of the most expensive exploratory drillings in the history of offshore oil and gas development in the Kara Sea through its joint venture with Rosneft [3]. BP is similarly dependent on Rosneft after TNK-BP was incorporated into the Russian oil giant in 2013, leaving BP with 19.5 percent of Rosneft’s shares [4]. Should further sanctions be put in place limiting western companies dealings with Russian energy companies, from either the Russian or the EU/US side, Arctic economic development in Russia will take a hit.

Cancelling Cooperation

In terms of direct cooperation in the Arctic sphere, exclusion of Russia or the boycotting of various Arctic meetings by one or several of the Arctic states have the potential to derail the relatively well-established modes of collaboration that have developed in the Arctic. Canada’s decision not to attend the Arctic Council task force meeting in Moscow last week is a minor, but still significant symbol of how Arctic cooperation is affected by the international crisis further south [5].

Similarly, Russian officials were not invited to take part in a pre-meeting to the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum in Sydney, Novia Scotia on March 31, where the establishment of an Arctic Coast Guard Forum was discussed. The planned Northern Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) meeting scheduled for June in Iceland seems likely to be postponed as well, as could be expected. The Northern CHODs forum is one of the few arenas, in addition to the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, where all the Arctic states convene to discuss hard security matters. Consequently several of the informal and formal arenas where civilian and military issues in the Arctic are discussed are put on hold.

Various Interests

Yet, Russia’s participation in the high level Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) meeting under the Canadian chairmanship in Yellowknife on March 25-27 proceeded as planned. In the Arctic Coast Guard Forum meeting it was also pointed out that any coast guard forum for the Arctic without the Russians present would prove futile, given Russia’s predominant role in Arctic maritime matters. For the United States and the Scandinavian countries such an approach seems only logical, given adjacent maritime borders that involve shared fish stocks and natural resource deposits. This highlights the importance of maintaining a working relationship with Russia on specific issues for some of the Arctic states, albeit these interests vary amongst the Arctic countries.

For decades Norway’s collaboration with Russia on the joint management of fish stocks in the Barents Sea has been promoted as a model for dealing with Russia on a sensitive topic that entails both a civilian and a military dimension [6]. Similarly, the 2010 maritime delimitation agreement was highly motivated by a desire in both countries to develop potential petroleum resources in the former disputed maritime area. Related cooperation between Russia and Norway has expanded since [7].

Although Sweden and Finland do not share a maritime border with Russia, Finland in particular has an extensive land boundary and is dependent on a rational working relationship with its larger neighbor. Just in terms of border crossings, Finland issued 1.3 million visas to Russia in 2013, a third of all Schengen entry visas going to Russia, according to the BarentsObserver [8]. As argued by Finland’s Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade, Stubb, Finland is heavily dependent on Russia’s economic trajectory and the consequences of the Ukraine crisis might be severe for the Finnish economy [9].

In the Bering Sea the US and Russia have a long standing collaboration on research and management of fish stocks, in particular with regards to the Alaskan Pollock [10]. For the last 19 years Russia and the US have worked together in this maritime area, and as ship traffic is increasing, the need for collaboration is only set to increase [11]. Combatting illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the area has already been stated as one of the main goals in the US’ Arctic Implementation Plan from January 2014 [12]. Also, as most vessels frequenting the Bering Sea are fishing boats, the potential northern movement of fish stocks due to temperature increases as seen in the North Atlantic will force the vessels to move further north and demand even greater coordination and collaboration between Russian and US coast guards, similar to what has developed in the Barents Sea.

Russia’s Primacy in the Arctic

The different Arctic states all have their own «special» relationships with Russia, with varying degrees of interdependency and collaboration. Related, it is less counterproductive to Canada’s Arctic interests to take a strong stance towards Russia than it is for some of the Scandinavian countries. The seven Arctic states excluding Russia also do not form any cohesive block against Russia, in part due to the fact that membership in international organizations vary between NATO and the EU (5 NATO members and 3 EU members – only Denmark overlaps).

Yet, coordinated efforts to exclude Russia from specific Arctic forums have been – and will probably continue to be – put in place. We should, however, not forget that Russia is the largest of all the Arctic actors, measured in everything from population to economic activity and resource potential. Efforts to deal with environmental pollution, search and rescue, and common standards in the Arctic have also been developed with a lowest common denominator approach, depending on all the Arctic states engaging and signing up to the agreements. Therefore, having Russia onboard on Arctic-related agreements is not only preferable, but also essential to ensure a responsible development in the Arctic.

Conclusion – An Arena for Penalties or Reconciliation?

In sum, Russia is dependent on a positive Arctic development, while the country is also integral to most of the development in the region. The other Arctic states undoubtedly have an obligation to act on proceedings in Ukraine, yet on a lower working level many of them are heavily dependent on continuing business as usual in various areas where Russia constitutes an essential partner. Therefore, the somewhat inconsistent responses with regards to various Arctic domains are likely set to continue.

Second, aff solves – reinvigorates cooperation, which reduces propensity for conflict

Russell 14

Anthony Russell, 2013-2014 Coast Guard Executive Fellow to the RAND Corporation, 5/6/14, (“Crimea, Climate Change, and U.S.-Russian Relations: A Perfect Storm”, http://gcaptain.com/crimea-climate-change-u-s-russian-relations-perfect-storm/)//AW

As Russian forces took Crimea in late February, commentators repeatedly emphasized the Ukrainian peninsula’s strategic importance as a warm-water port. Meanwhile, the rapidly growing importance of Arctic waters is sometimes overlooked. The polar ice cap, now 40 percent smaller than it was 35 years ago (PDF), will continue to thaw in the coming decades, opening new shipping routes and access to oil and gas. Russia possesses the world’s most Arctic shoreline, water, and operating resources. But the United States is also an Arctic nation, even if much of the American public tends to under-appreciate this special status. With frigid international tensions and the severe impacts of climate change swirling like a perfect polar storm, the United States can’t afford to ignore the opportunities and obligations that come with being one of the world’s few Arctic nations. Less than a decade ago, presumed cooperation and overt reliance on external assistance became popular planning factors for U.S. polar activities. Given the condition of its aged icebreaker fleet, the United States turned to leases with Sweden and Russia for icebreaker capability. This approach was considered a more efficient way to traverse polar regions. Cooperation with Russia has long been among the greatest challenges to implementing a comprehensive U.S. Artic strategy. But the crisis in Crimea has already resulted in a significant retreat from engagement and cooperation with Russia: The United States and its allies dismissed Russia from the G-8, and NATO is reviewing the extent to which it cooperates with Russia. These actions are warranted, given Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s borders and the troubling precedent it sets. But the West should avoid disengagement with Russia when it comes to the Arctic, a unique region that deserves special consideration. Allowing or forcing Russian withdrawal from Arctic engagements and regulating forums could seriously weaken America’s ability to manage the increasing amount and diversity of activity in the Arctic, as well as adaptation to the impacts of climate change. Excluding Russia could even bring about Arctic militarization. But despite chilling relations with Russia and the slow burn of climate change, the United States can prevent diplomatic frostbite in the Arctic through a number of actions: Take a seat at the negotiating table. The U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) outlines procedures for establishing sovereignty over the continental shelf (the sea floor directly offshore) beyond 200 nautical miles. With Russia finalizing its long-standing claim on the Arctic shelf, the United States is absent from negotiations, limiting its ability to counter Russian claims or submit its own, placing itself at a severe strategic and diplomatic disadvantage. Sustain engagement. The United States will assume a two-year chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015. (Secretary of State John Kerry also announced a special representative for the Arctic.) A lack of Russian participation in this body stemming from international discord would produce limited results at best. Even more pragmatically, the Arctic is home to the only shared U.S.-Russian border. Established communication channels and operational protocols are necessary to enforce laws, avoid conflict, and protect sovereignty in this region. Invest in icebreakers. International regulations and agreements are critical, but they cannot rescue mariners, respond to environmental incidents, or monitor borders. Only a physical presence can accomplish these things. In the Arctic, that necessitates icebreakers. These special vessels aren’t cheap or quickly built, but America’s current inventory is in need of upgrading.. Russia’s actions against Ukraine make leasing icebreakers from Russia a non-option for the foreseeable future. This illustrates how important it is for the United States to maintain the unique capabilities required to exercise its sovereign responsibilities as an Arctic nation.

5. Tensions over the Arctic are high and volatile.

Friedman 14 – Uri Friedman has a degree in foreign policy from the University of Pennsylvania and is the global editor of The Atlantic and the managing editor of Foreign Policy, 2014 (“The Arctic: Where the US and Russia Could Square Off Next,” March 28^th, The Atlantic, Available Online at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/the-arctic-where-the-us-and-russia-could-square-off-next/359543/, Accessed 07-31-2014) LB

In mid-March, around the same time that Russia annexed Crimea, Russian officials announced another territorial coup: 52,000 square kilometers in the Sea of Okhotsk, a splotch of Pacific Ocean known as the "Peanut Hole" and believed to be rich in oil and gas. A UN commission had recognized the maritime territory as part of Russia's continental shelf, Russia's minister of natural resources and environment proudly announced, and the decision would only advance the territorial claims in the Arctic that Russia had pending before the same committee.

After a decade and a half of painstaking petitioning, the Peanut Hole was Russia's.

Russian officials were getting a bit ahead of themselves. Technically, the UN commission had approved Russia's recommendations on the outer limits of its continental shelf—and only when Russia acts on these suggestions is its control of the Sea of Okhotsk "final and binding."

Still, these technicalities shouldn't obscure the larger point: Russia isn't only pursuing its territorial ambitions in Ukraine and other former Soviet states. It's particularly active in the Arctic Circle, and, until recently, these efforts engendered international cooperation, not conflict.

But the Crimean crisis has complicated matters. Take Hillary Clinton's call last week for Canada and the United States to form a "united front" in response to Russia "aggressively reopening military bases” in the Arctic. Or the difficulties U.S. officials are having in designing sanctions against Russia that won't harm Western oil companies like Exxon Mobil, which are engaged in oil-and-gas exploration with their Russian counterparts in parts of the Russian Arctic.

In a dispatch from "beneath the Arctic ocean" this week, The Wall Street Journal reported on a U.S. navy exercise, scheduled before the crisis in Ukraine, that included a simulated attack on a Russian submarine. The U.S. has now canceled a joint naval exercise with Russia in the region and put various other partnerships there on hold.

7. Engagement inevitable – DoD increasing military presence and economic development in the region

Ria Novosti 14 – Ria Novosti, one of the largest news agencies in Russia, citing Chuck Hagel, Defense Secretary of the United States, speaking at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2014 (“US Sees Dangerous Potential for Conflict in Arctic, Plans to Bolster Engagement,” Ria Novosti, http://en.ria.ru/world/20140507/189638253/US-Sees-Dangerous-Potential-for-Conflict-in-Arctic-Plans-to.html | ADM)

MOSCOW, May 7 (RIA Novosti) - The US believes the Arctic presents ever-growing possibilities for development and exploration of new sea routes, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, adding that Washington sees the Arctic as a potential conflict zone.

"The melting of gigantic ice caps presents possibilities for the opening of new sea lanes and the exploration for natural resources, energy and commerce, also with the dangerous potential for conflict in the Arctic," Hagel said at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs on Tuesday.

"The Defense Department is bolstering its engagement in the Arctic and looking at what capabilities we need to operate there in the future," Defense Secretary added.

Arctic territories are believed to hold vast untapped reserves of oil and gas. The territories have recently been at the center of disputes between the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark as rising temperatures have led to a rapid melting of ice caps and made energy reserves more accessible.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on April 22 that Russia is also actively engaged in the Arctic region to protect its national security and economic interests.

8. Containment now over Ukraine non-uniques the containment internal link

Mohammed and Zengerle 14

(Arshad Mohammed, U.S. foreign-policy correspondent for Reuters, AND Patricia Zengerle, writer for Reuters, “In U.S. strategy on Ukraine, a whiff of Kennan’s ‘containment,’” March 6, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/us-ukraine-crisis-containment-idUSBREA2600320140307, Accessed: 7/24/14, RH)

(Reuters) - U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns on Thursday laid out a strategy of patiently trying to counter Russia, including its intervention in Ukraine, reminiscent of legendary American diplomat George Kennan's concept of "containment."

Testifying before Congress, Burns suggested that Russia's seizure of the Ukrainian region of Crimea reflected Moscow's weakness, not its strength, and that a resolution, if one is possible, will take time.

As one of the U.S. government's foremost experts on Russia, where he served twice, including as ambassador, Burns appeared to reach for Kennan's language and thinking as he spoke about the Ukraine crisis and a Russian leader with little apparent appetite for cooperation with the West in what he sees as Russia's traditional sphere of influence.

"We ... need to be mindful of the enduring strengths of the United States and its partners and the very real weaknesses sometimes obscured by Russian bluster," Burns told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

"No one should underestimate the power of patient and resolute counter-pressure using all of the non-military means at our disposal, working with our allies, and leaving the door open to de-escalation and diplomacy, if Russia is prepared to play by international rules," he added.

His phrasing contained what seemed a deliberate echo of Kennan, a diplomat and historian widely seen as the intellectual author of Washington's Cold War policy of "containment" against the Soviet Union.

Kennan first spelled out his views in a private, 8,000-word "Long Telegram" from Moscow, where he was charge d'affaires, to State Department headquarters in 1946. They later became public in his anonymous 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct."

Published as the Soviet Union was cementing its grip on countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, the essay argued that the United States had to regard the Soviet Union as a rival that sought to undermine any countervailing power.

"Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential," Kennan wrote in the journal Foreign Affairs under the byline "X."

"This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world," he added.

RUSSIAN DESPERATION?

Like Kennan, in counseling a strategy that is patient, "steady and determined," Burns may be thinking in terms of the long arc of history and implicitly acknowledging that there are unlikely to be any quick fixes to the Ukraine problem.

Crimea, which is home to Russia's Black Sea Fleet and has an ethnic Russian majority, has effectively been seized by Russian forces following last month's ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, a pro-Russian politician.

The crisis began in November when Yanukovich, under Russian pressure, turned his back on a trade deal with the European Union and accepted a $15 billion bailout from Moscow. That prompted street protests leading to his February 22 overthrow.

Moscow denounced the events as an illegitimate coup and refused to recognize the new Ukrainian authorities.

U.S.-based Russia analysts argued that Russia's effective seizure of Crimea was a reflection of Moscow's weak hand in Ukraine, illustrated by the popular protests centered in Kiev's Maidan Square against Yanukovich's spurning the EU trade deal.

"The results of the whole Maidan catastrophe, the fleeing of the president, was essentially to set back very greatly any Russian influence," James Collins, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think tank in Washington, said of the Ukrainian street protests.

"In a way I have seen the Crimea military option taken by the Russian side as a sign of, maybe desperation is too strong a word, but that they didn't see any other particular options," he added. "Their soft power wasn't working, their economic power didn't seem to be doing the trick, what was left?"

Collins, and other analysts, said Russia's weaknesses include an economy whose growth has slowed in recent years and which remains heavily dependent on oil and gas exports. Russia's strong position in European gas markets could be undercut in coming years by imports from Qatar and even North America.

"The message here is not only the Russian economy not growing fast enough that they can't have long-term confidence, (but) they probably shouldn't even have quite so much short-term confidence," said Matthew Rojansky, director of the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars think tank.

But not everyone sees weakness in Putin's actions.

"I've heard a number of people say that Russia's move in Crimea signals a certain amount of weakness on the part of Russia. Looks like a pretty strong move to me," Sen. Ron Johnson, Wisconsin Republican, told Burns, asking him: "Why do they think they can do that with impunity?"