Final Draft December 2009 Bhavna Sharma, Marta Foresti and Leni Wild Table of contents
Main entry points for NSA engagement in NAMs
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5.2. Main entry points for NSA engagement in NAMs5.2.1. Main Entry points for NSAs in Sector Approaches and Sector Programme Support As discussed, sector approaches and the development of SPSPs offer a number of entry points for NSA engagement. The fact that, increasingly, sector approaches are to be funded by budget support through the development and implementation of SPSPs should not necessarily be considered as a threat to NSA engagement. As we explain below, the process leading to the establishment and implementation of SPSPs offers a number of entry points for NSA engagement which could be explored and tested in practice by EC delegations in charge of SPSP negotiations. However, as explained above, it is important to be realistic about when and where NSA can add value in aid modalities using budget support as the financing instrument, given the centrality of the government as the main interlocutor and the focus on government ownership and leadership. The development and implementation of SPSPs is based on seven key components: these are used by the EC to (i) assess whether a viable sector programme is in place which could be effectively supported by a programmatic aid modality, i.e. an SPSP funded by budget support, rather than project funded by project modality and (ii) as a basis for policy dialogue over the development and implementation of SPSPs once these are agreed. These seven components and their relationship with the development and implementation of SPSPs are summarised in the diagram below. Figure 4: The seven key components and the process for SPSP design 
Source: EC (2007) Support to Sector Programmes, Brussels: EC. Our analysis of the main entry points for NSAs engagement in the SPSP process is also based on these seven components and these are further explored below. It is important to recognise that in addition to identifying suitable entry points in SPSP processes, NSAs can be involved in complementary measures, such as projects and thematic initiatives, explicitly designed to complement and add value to SPSPs (see section 6 for more details). In addition. it is useful to bear in mind that NSA do play a variety of roles in policy and programming processes (see diagram below), which are also key features of budgetary aid. Figure 5: Role of NSA in the policy results chain 
Source: Intrac (2009) In considering what roles NSAs could play in the design and delivery of new aid modalities such as SPSP or GBS, it is important to distinguish between arguments that refer to the intrinsic value of NSA engagement in development practice, from those that seek to focus on a realistic assessment of where the value added of NSA engagement can be identified. In this study we strive to focus on realistic and pragmatic options for engaging NSAs in budgetary aid modalities with the ultimate aim of contributing to improved service delivery and overall outcomes. It is also important to recognise the intrinsic limitation of generic guidance in this field as much will depend on the specific contexts where sectoral programmes are being negotiated and developed. Existing practices for NSA engagement is likely to vary substantially between these contexts and in different sectors. A) Three core elements of SPSPs and entry points for NSA engagement The three core components of any sector programme are: the sector policy and strategy, the sector budget and medium term perspectives and the sector coordination framework. These three core components are key at the early stages of the SPSP process and specifically for determining whether a viable sectoral programme is in place which could be meaningfully supported by the EC. Below we suggest how in practice NSA engagement could be taken into account in these stages, by identifying the main entry points in relation to these three core components. Sector policy and strategy The SPSP guidelines provide clear reference to the need to specify the role of NSAs as part of the government aims and objectives for the sector policy and strategy. Box 6: SPSP guidelines, paragraph 2.4.1 What is a sector policy? Guidelines, paragraph 2.4.1 - Box 2.4: What is a Sector Policy? A sector policy is a statement of government’s objectives within a sector and a summary of how they will be achieved. Sector policies usually emerge from a range of consultative processes between the executive and legislative branches of government and other national stakeholders. […] A good sector policy explains the proposed role of government and non-government agents within the sector. It distinguishes activities to regulate provision of services by the market from direct financing or delivery of services by government. […] In practice this means that in assessing the sector policy and strategy of the government, the EC should take into account the extent to which NSAs have a clearly defined role, not only in relation to service delivery (for example in health and education) but also in policy dialogue and priority settings. For example, in sectors where the private sector plays a key role, like roads and infrastructure, it would be desirable that the business representatives and professional associations had been consulted and play a role in defining national objectives and targets. In some countries and sectors where NSAs play a particularly key role in policy and service delivery and work in partnership with government, their involvement in sector policy and strategy could be regarded as an essential condition for determining if a viable sectoral programme is in place and could be supported by the EC. This would also be in line with the suggestion in the SPSP guidelines that there should be mutual agreement between the EC and the partner governments that the basic principles of (development) cooperation to be respected43. Box 8: South Africa and the Justice Sector (SBS): Policy dialogue between government and Civil Society Organisations supported by the EC The general objective of the Access to Justice and Promotion of Constitutional Rights Program is to improve access to justice and the promotion of constitutional rights through Sector Budget Support (SBS) to the Department of Justice and Constitutional development (DoJ&CD) and direct support to Civil Society Organisations through project mode call for proposals. One of the challenges the DoJCD faces is to reach vulnerable and marginalised groups, particularly those in the townships and rural areas. In addition, the level of awareness of constitutional rights and access to justice in these areas is relatively low. In order to address these challenges the programme will facilitate DoJCD partnerships with civil society to strengthen capacity and empower CSOs that promote and protect constitutional rights and improve access to justice. The call for proposal is designed to empower CSOs to better engage in public policy dialogue with public institutions and government in promoting constitutional rights, and is managed at the delegation level to respond more closely to local needs and context. Additionally, one of the conditions set for the disbursement of the second tranche of SBS is “DoJCD policy framework on enhancing Civil Society participation and good governance finalised”. Thus, evidence is required that civil society has been able to participate in policy dialogue with the government. The key outcome desired from increased CSO participation is “Enhanced participatory democracy through strengthening the capacity of civil society organisations to engage with public institutions at all levels of government in promoting and protecting human rights and enhancing participatory democracy including through public policy dialogue.” The Key Performance Indicators include:
Source: Action Fiche for the Republic of South Africa: Access to justice and promotion of constitutional rights (DAC-code: 15130) Sector coordination framework Similarly, the SPSP guidelines (see below) suggest that the sector coordination framework should include national actors, including government but also NSAs, as well as donors. In practice this implies paying particular attention to the role of coalitions, umbrella organisations, networks and other platforms that coordinate the work and engagement of different kinds of NSAs at the national or sectoral levels. A key challenge here is to distinguish between a technical (and potentially superficial) approach to coordination, where NSAs are simply invited to coordinating initiatives with other actors as part of formal sectoral processes, from more meaningful, and hence political, coordination which implies an open and transparent policy dialogue between government, NSAs and donors.
In terms of realistic expectations for NSA engagement in sectoral coordination, it is important to acknowledge that these will vary in different contexts and sectors. In some well established sectors, like education and health, where forms of budget and sector support are already in place, the role of NSAs is likely to be better defined and be part and parcel of the natural development of the SPSP. If, however, the EC is looking to support new or emerging sectors, with limited previous programmatic experience, it is unlikely that meaningful coordinating mechanisms with NSAs will be in place, though improved coordination could be agreed as an objective of EC support. Sector budget and medium term perspective The component on sector budget and its medium term perspective is a less obvious entry point to consider NSAs engagement. However, as we suggest below, in relation to performance monitoring systems, NSAs do play an increasingly important role in monitoring and oversight of budget processes which, in turn, should feed in to the definition of annual sectoral budget priorities and strategies. In conclusion, at the early stage of the SPSP development, whilst the opportunities to engage NSAs directly in policy dialogue might be limited, the analysis of the three core components to be taken into account in deciding whether there a viable sector programme in place (which could be effectively supported by EC budgetary aid) offer a number of entry points for considering the role that NSAs play within that sector at the more strategic and programmatic levels. This is particularly relevant in relation to sector policy and strategy and the sector coordination framework We now turn to potential entry points for NSAs engagement in the design and implementation of SPSPs. B) Four additional elements for SPSPs and entry points for NSA engagement A recent study of SBS implementation44 found that there is a significant gap in SBS in terms of leading to improvements in the quality and accountability of services, and it called this the “missing middle”. SBS has failed to generate the incentives for service providers to improve the quality of services, as emphasis in placed on more “upstream” issues of policy dialogue rather than decisions regarding service delivery and human resource issues. The suggestions below on how in practice NSAs can be engaged in the different phases of SPSP design and implementation are an attempt to fill this ‘missing middle’ by re-focusing at least some of aspects of the SPSP at service delivery end. The following four components are key in the design and implementation phase of a SPSP:
Whilst the macroeconomic policies and public financial management components do not offer significant entry points for realistic and useful NSA engagement, as these refer to government functions and responsibilities, institutional settings and capacities and performance monitoring systems offer a number of options for NSA engagement and opportunities to improve current practice in the design and delivery of SPSPs. Capacity development Concerns over government capacity and the wider institutional challenges that affect such capacity are at the heart of sectoral approaches. A key chain of logic at play here is that by using and relying more on government systems they can be reinforced and the capacity improved. The focus of capacity development is an integral part of SPSP and, as the guidelines suggest, should not be seen as an ‘add on’ to the programme. The focus of the capacity assessment and development component of SPSP is strongly on governmental institutions (i.e. line ministries or ministry of finance) and on systems which are responsible for service delivery in the specific sector. However the SPSP guidelines suggest that capacity is also an issue for NSAs: ‘It is important to consider as well key organisations outside the public sector whose capacity are influencing quality of the sector policy dialogue, sector coordination and are key for domestic accountability’45. What is less clear is how to ensure that the focus on capacity development of both state and non state actors in sectoral programmes will translate into improved service provision and delivery. The recent study of sector budget support in seven African countries suggests that the investment in capacity development of line ministries has very little effect on the quality of service provision and on sectoral outcomes. In Mozambique, for example, public sector support in the agricultural sector does not appear to have addressed the constraints faced by farmers and others involved at the front end of service delivery and, as a result, has not improved outcomes46. Rather than calling for a generic support for capacity development of non state actors, these findings suggest a more careful and strategic approach to the purpose and use of capacity development in sectoral programmes. The focus should firmly be on improving not only the quantity but, crucially, the quality of sector outcomes. This requires a more holistic approach to capacity development, beyond enhancing the technical capacities of line ministries, to include a wider range of skills and knowledge at different levels of the impact chain, from policy formulation to those in charge of day to day delivery. Inevitably, this will include state and non state actors, at national but also at local level. In this context the role of NSAs should not only be on improving their existing capacities, for example in service delivery. In some contexts and sectors, NSAs are likely to have the knowledge, experience and outreach capacities which could be invaluable for improving the quality of services at the national and, especially, at the local level. For example, grassroots organisations are often uniquely positioned to reach vulnerable and isolated groups who are at risk of remaining excluded by national mainstream initiatives. Thus, one way of engaging NSAs in the capacity development component of the SPSP could be to further support and make use of these knowledge and skills. Performance monitoring and management Perhaps the most relevant entry point for NSAs engagement in SPSP design and implementation is performance monitoring and management. The SPSP guidelines suggest that a sectoral performance assessment framework (PAF) should be developed consisting of a set of inputs, outputs, outcomes and possibly impact indicators. The evolution of the PAF is periodically monitored to assess progress towards the achievement of the sector’s policy and strategic objectives. The idea is that the monitoring system provides key elements to steer policy dialogue and is an integral part of the overall policy process. There are at least two aspects of the performance monitoring and management of the SPSPs that are currently overlooked by the EC guidance where NSA could play a useful role. Firstly, lessons to date on sectoral budget support implementation suggest that more attention needs to be paid to fostering accountability for improved services and the incentives necessary to achieve this47. At present all the incentives for performance and accountability are concentrated at the coordination, policy and management level of the sectoral programmes, with downstream processes focusing on management and delivery. This includes the performance monitoring and management systems which are primarily based on sectoral and national level measures and indicators and which involve forms of accountability which, at best, can be mutual between the donor and the key ministries of the partner governments, typically the ministry of finance and the sectoral line ministries. Very little or no attention is paid to accountability and incentives at the ‘front end’ of service delivery, for those directly involved in implementation (teachers, doctors, local government etc.) as well as service users (farmers, patients etc.). NSAs could play a key role in designing and contributing to performance monitoring of services and outcomes in different ways. For example in India, many NSAs spoke of how donors could strengthen the role of NSAs in monitoring and evaluation by including such provisions in the GBS and SPSP design (or even go further and include their role as a condition). Examples for NSAs role in monitoring and evaluation of sectoral performance could include:
Box 9: Ethiopia and PBS: Citizens and social accountability GBS was suspended in 2005 following governance concerns as a result of the 2005 elections. The Protection of Basic Services (PBS) programme was designed to protect the delivery of service to the poor in light of the suspension of GBS. One of the components of the PBS focuses on social accountability and seeks to support capacity building initiatives for selected large scale pilot initiatives aimed at strengthening citizen voice and enhancing accountability of public sector service providers to citizens. The other components focus on maintaining the flow and predictability of the level of aid to these services (at the same level as predicted in GBS) and financial accountability and transparency, particularly at local levels involving enhanced engagement of citizen groups on public budget processes and public service delivery. A mid-term evaluation of PBS found that in terms of increasing information on budget processes available to citizens, some small advances have been made. Budget information is clearly available to communities in a way that it was not pre-PBS, resulting in the development of a solid base on which to enhance accountability of governments to citizens, and the flow of basic governance information. There have been some significant developments in the dialogue between government and citizens, and in particular civil society organisations, at woreda (local) level. There appears to be an opening up of space between citizens, their organisations and local government across the regions. However, levels of awareness are patchy within regional governments. Additionally, there is very little room for manoeuvre in the budget. Thus, a limit on discretion is a brake on social accountability. Citizens can discuss with government the execution of the budget, and better understand the work of government (and the constraints faced). But discussion is not centred on making real choices, because resources have dictated that real choices are not possible. This considerably dilutes the dynamics around social accountability, and the incentives that might drive these. An interesting finding of the evaluation was the language used in social accountability of “holding the government to account” which is seen as conflictual and therefore unhelpful. Instead, a vocabulary and understanding reflecting constructive engagement has emerged, signifying increasing partnerships between citizens and local government around basic service delivery. The entry point here is clearly the way in which local communities are actually contributors to their own service provision. And, in some cases, they are even trying to influence CSOs to act on their behalf in the provision of services. This will certainly present wider opportunities for local citizens to become engaged in social accountability, and has the potential to result in citizen involvement in key decision making processes. Source: Lessons to be learnt from the Protection of Basic Services Instrument, 2008. Secondly, NSAs could contribute to help the government and donors to pay greater attention to the quality, not just to quantity, of service delivery. Sectoral approaches to date have not addressed the “missing middle” in service delivery – the process for management of frontline service providers, the actual delivery of services, human resources management, and the accountability for service provision48. One of the reasons is the challenges of managing the ‘non financial’ components of sectoral budget support, such as capacity development, which have thus far focused on upstream policy development (with a particular focus at the ministerial level) and not enough at the delivery end. Some NSAs, particularly those directly involved in service delivery and use, could be usefully involved in addressing this ‘quality gap’, for example by designing and coordinating ‘quality assurance’ system to complement the more quantitative and financial performance management and monitoring. Box 10: India and the Reproductive and Child Health Programme (RCHP) In India, donors provide sector budget support to the health sector programme known as the Reproductive and Child Health Programme (RCH), part of the broader National Rural Health Mission (NRHM). As well as aligning themselves to the national policy framework donors have sought to strengthen the capacity of the state in key areas. For example, monitoring and tracking of health issues and progress is a significant issue and gap for the government at national and state levels. The EU supports the development of National AIDS Control Programme's monitoring and evaluation system, by working on integrating data gathered by NSA partners into the national system. Whilst there is an abundance of data gathered there is so far very little structured analysis that is able to input into future policy and programme design and implementation processes. Some NSAs play a pivotal role to improve the quality of indicators and data for these monitoring systems as well as analysing the data. Donors have played a useful facilitative role between NSAs and government officials to synchronise systems (e.g. programme log frames to match national indicators) and improve relations between NSAs and state and district officials. The EC has also been using the thematic instrument to supplement support given to the RCH Programme to focus on areas that have lacked attention or funding. For example, the EC has been working with the government and NSAs to provide services in overlooked states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar which are considered to be “hard to reach” states. Source: India case study, 2009. C. Implementation of SPSPs Finally, depending on the sector and on the context, there is scope for some NSAs to be directly involved in the implementation of SPSPs. This is likely to be highly dependent on the specific context in which the programme takes place, on existing arrangements between state and non state actors within a particular sector and on the knowledge and specific added value that NSAs can bring to the implementation of a programme. It is important to acknowledge that there could be tensions between ensuring that government ownership and, crucially, capacity to develop and implement sectoral programmes aimed at ensuring sustainable outcomes in the medium and long term, and engaging NSAS, particularly if on a large scale, in the implementation and delivery. In some countries, this might undermine the long term objective of enabling governments to become more responsible for the delivery of public services. However, in the short term, active engagement of NSAs could help to address specific gaps within a particular sector, for example by improving the level of quality and equity of a given service or outcome. Examples of NSA roles in implementing SPSPs could include:
In conclusion, there are a number of entry points for NSA engagement in the design and implementation of SPSPs. Some of these entry points are more relevant or promising than others and judgement is required to make realistic choices on what to prioritise. The table below is an attempt to provide an overview of the relative strengths of the different entry points in relation to the main phases of SPSP processes. Table 2: Relative strength of NSA entry points in SPSPs processes
5.2.2. GBS cycle and entry points for NSAs. In considering the potential entry points and modalities for NSA engagement in GBS it is important to be cautious about what can realistically be achieved and what can be the meaningful added value of NSA engagement. As discussed, the nature, processes and systems of GBS do not offer the same range of opportunities for NSA engagement as SPSPs. For two main reasons; firstly, the main rationale of GBS is to support national development policy and plans and to mainstream resources into countries domestic national policies and strategies. The focus here is on PFM and related budget systems and on macroeconomic policies rather than on more specific sectoral or thematic entry points which are often where NSA engagement is more meaningful49. Secondly, from a more pragmatic perspective NSAs are often more active and have better defined roles within a given sector, including partnerships with government, contribution to sectoral governance as well as implementers of policies and programmes. These existing arrangements are easier to build upon in the different phases of the SPSP cycle as they tend to reflect practices and norms which are already in place. The dialogue and negotiations over GBS is, on the other hand, relatively new territory in donor-partner governments relations and as such it would be difficult, and in some cases unwise, to expect to broaden it to other players such as NSAs. As explained in the box below, the risk of overloading GBS has also been identified by the recent donors’ joint evaluation. Box 11: The risk of overloading GBS On the specific risk of overloading budget support the Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support made the following comments: "Our review of the GBS record so far indicates that there are many things that it can (help to) do. But its potential range is itself a risk: there is a serious danger of overloading one instrument, expecting it to achieve too many things and too quickly. There are both conceptual and practical aspects to this. There are some things that an instrument such as GBS is inherently unlikely ever to achieve. In particular it is unrealistic to expect it to effect radical institutional transformations, or change the political foundations of states and governments. Setting unrealistic objectives is a recipe for failure, and could distract from less grand, but still useful, things that GBS can help towards. Even when focusing on what is practical, it is important not to attempt too much at once. It is important to learn from experience with the instrument before extending its scope. In prioritising the reform focus of PGBS, it is important to remember that its ability to strengthen PFM systems is fundamental to its other effects." Source: IDD and Associates (2006) Evaluation of General Budget Support: Synthesis Report, Paris: OECD, para 6.29. Despite these limitations, there is scope for considering how NSA engagement can add value to GBS processes. It should also be recognised that in many countries NSAs have been actively involved in macro-economic policy processes, such as PRSPs, and that useful lessons have been learnt about how in practice NSA involvement can improve these processes (see McGee, R., and Norton, A. (2000) and section 6 below). Our analysis suggests that NSA engagement is potentially useful to improve GBS processes, and that the most suitable entry points for NSAs engagement in the GBS cycle are:
One of the general and strategic objectives of GBS is to enhance domestic accountability. This is perhaps an example of where GBS should be pragmatic and avoid making too grand claims of what it can actually achieve in the short and medium term. Nevertheless, the EC GBS Guidelines refer to improved budget processes through GBS which has the potential of enhancing government accountability. In particular, the guidelines refer to increased transparency in the budget, the role of parliament in the budget (in particular finance committees), and the internal and external control associated with the budget as teh key vehicles for domestic accountability. However, these processes alone are not enough to enhance domestic accountability. A recent study on donors’ support for voice and accountability50 suggests that unless concrete, both formal and informal, mechanisms and institutions are in place for holding governments to account, information alone, however accurate and transparent, will not change behaviour and practice. These mechanisms could include media reports, ombudsmen and other legal fora, anti-corruption commissions and budget audits. The engagement of NSAs, and citizens more generally as service users and rights holders, is critical for the success of such accountability mechanisms and institutions: if GBS aims to contribute to domestic accountability it needs to consider this wider institutional context, beyond the objective of increasing budget transparency. One of the key eligibility criteria for GBS, and a general conditions for the disbursement, of all tranches, is that a national development or reform policy and strategy is in place or under implementation, such as the PRS, Association Agreement or National Action Plan. Although these cannot be expected to define NSAs’ role to the same level of detail in strategy definition and delivery, in many countries NSAs are actively engaged in policy dialogue and are consulted during the development of these national strategies and plans (see the example form Zambia in Box 10 below). Furthermore, GBS is meant to be built around support to a country-owned national policy and strategy. The GBS Guidelines recognise that it is domestic political considerations which drive reform processes and that “ownership” of these reforms is critical for their successful implementation. If such ownership is meant to go beyond government ownership, towards broader country/domestic ownership, it is vital that the direction and objectives of national policies and strategies are understood and shared beyond the ministries and government circles. NSAs can play a vital role in ensuring that citizens and service users are informed about policy processes and, when possible, that their views and priorities are taken into account. If GBS is to realise its potential benefits a first step is to assess the extent of commitment and ownership to the declared national policy and strategy. In practice this implies that, particularly in countries where NSAs are traditionally engaged in policy dialogue and have a role in contributing to define national strategy, the EC should take this into account in its assessment of the eligibility for GBS and in the general conditions for disbursement. Box 12: NSA in Policy Dialogue. Zambia The overall objective of the proposed MDG-C programme (MDG-C) is to support the implementation of the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) covering 2006-2010, and any successor plan. The purposes of the programme are to support macroeconomic stability whilst allowing for the scaling-up and enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of poverty focused public programmes implemented through the budget, so as to accelerate progress in attaining the MDGs. Whilst the official MDG-C documents focus on the role and engagement of the donor community in dialogue and monitoring implementation of the programme, Zambian civil society are active and fairly capable of engaging in policy dialogue, planning and monitoring of GBS activities. Zambian NSAs see their role as monitoring that these funds are used in the best interest of the Zambian people, first by ensuring, that donors use the influence they gain through their funding for effective poverty reduction in line with life plans of the Zambian poor and second by working with the government in the planning, implementation and monitoring of national development policies. The EU funded a civil society network, known as the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR), to review and analyse the effectiveness of the Zambian GBS and the role for civil society. The study found that there were two levels of entry points for Zambian NSAs to engage: namely directly within the GBS framework and consultations and indirectly through the FNDP and the national budget. Some entry points were already being utilised whilst others provide potential entry points for the future, as identified by civil society themselves. GBS review meetings: The last joint annual review meeting for GBS included more than 70 people from government and cooperating partners but only one NGO (Transparency International Zambia). IMF and Macroeconomic Sector Advisory Groups: One of the key institutions of donor and government consultations. Here issues of PEFA reform, PAF review, budget performance, etc. are discussed. Whilst some NSAs are invited to these meetings, many decisions are made by the ministry before consultation with the Sector Advisory Group or in technical sub-committees, where exclusively donors and the government take part. For example, the IMF reviews where central budget issues are discussed and decided while the budget is still in parliamentary discussion. Engagement around FNDP and budget: Many NSAs have been involved in contributing to FNDP or PRSP planning processes as well as advocacy for pro-poor priorities in the budget and monitoring of its implementation. NSAs could add value in their engagement in these processes by analysing whether the structures proposed in the FNDP and related documents (like the ToRs for the Sector Advisory Groups), are really in place and working efficiently in fulfilling the role they were assigned and ensure they are not considered as an experiment designed and destined to fail. They could also review the progress that is done in devolving planning, implementation and monitoring from the national level, through the line ministries and the provincial headquarters, to the district and ward councillors and respective advisory groups and planning committees. Source: Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (2007), “The Effectiveness of the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) and the Role of Civil Society”, Lusaka: CSPR In the formulation phase a Financing Proposal or Action Fiche is developed which forms the basis of the GBS agreement between the EC and the partner government. This presents a few entry points for considering NSA engagement, although this is an example where attention should be paid to not overburden what is already a complex and ambitious phase of the GBS process. The Action Fiche requires some description of the main stakeholders of GBS, including ‘beneficiaries’. In the GBS Guidelines these are defined as ‘broad sections of the community’ (i.e. the poor) or as ‘targeted sections of the community’ (i.e. girls in school, women receiving a treatment etc.). The Guidelines also suggest that ‘when considering the issue of stakeholders and beneficiaries, contacts with non-state actors should be encouraged. There is often a temptation in GBS operations to focus attention on discussion and dialogue with governments, overlooking the potential for discussions and consultation with organisations and groups outside of government, such as NGOs, professional associations, and trade unions. Consultations with these groups can be used to better formulate the GBS operation, assist in implementation, as well as help in improving understanding of the EC’s approach to giving budget support’Although this reference to the potential role of NSAs is welcome and could be a useful entry points for EC delegations to consider NSAs engagement, it is important to recognise that if NSAs are only involved as potential beneficiaries, and not in the broader policy dialogue underpinning the development of GBS, this is not likely to be a very useful exercise. As part of the rationale for the GBS, the Action Fiche describes actions undertaken by the partner country to complement and co-finance GBS support to a national plan or reform (i.e. complementary actions). These actions could be funded by the partner country, other donors or the EC and they often cover issues of capacity development needed to complement GBS support for the national plan or reform. As discussed above in relation to SPSPs, it is important to consider the needs and capacity of both state and non state actors and, ensure that capacity development is tailored to these specific needs and, when relevant, build on the existing experience, knowledge and skills of NSAs not just as recipient of capacity development but as contributors to it too. Box 13: The GBS guidelines on capacity support What are the organisations and actors to be supported? Based on the objectives of the budget support programme, the organisations and actors can be identified. In the case of budget support this might include the Ministry of Finance, the Supreme Audit Institutions, the National Statistical Organisations, Parliament and its finance committee, organisations in charge of PRSP monitoring, and non-state actors involved in public financial management issues. Focus should be on existing organisations, and support to ad-hoc organisations to meet the specific needs of donors should be avoided. Link between diagnosis and support to capacity development There should be a clear link between any diagnosis and any capacity development and institutional support to be provided. For example, the actions proposed in terms of public financial management should reflect the analysis of the problems in this area. Source: Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (2007), “The Effectiveness of the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) and the Role of Civil Society”, Lusaka: CSPR Source: GBS guidelines Finally, as with SPSPs, there is potential to include NSAs more proactively in monitoring the performance of GBS and in evaluating its results. The issue of quality of performance is as central to GBS as it is to SPSPs and the EC GBS guidelines acknowledge that a dedicated programme to ensure the quality of the performance indicators used to measure objectives should be in place. The Guidelines also mention the challenges posed by collecting the relevant information needed to monitor these indicators and therefore the need to invest in capacity development in this area. NSAs can play a role in monitoring the performance of GBS, particularly in relation to indicators of performance quality (i.e. by contributing to setting up and running data collection and monitoring systems at local level, as channels for collecting and analysing the feedback from service users etc.) and more generally for monitoring the non financial aspects of GBS, especially at the output/service level.
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