Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Credibility Adv. – I/L – Hurts US Credibility

PMC’s lack oversight and accountability, their mistakes destroy the credibility of the US army as a whole.
Evans 6(Lieutenant Colonel Samuel, “There When You Need Them? Defining Reliability in Army Contracting for Operation Iraqi Freedom” 15 MAR, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA449435)KM

Another measure of contractor dependability is discipline. Once again, the rules that apply to soldiers do not apply to contractors. One of the first rules of applicability for the Uniform Code of Military Justice is being a member of the military. Keeping contractors disciplined in a war zone, where law and order is usually nonexistent all around them is often a challenge. For soldiers, the Uniform Code of Military Justice travels anywhere they go. Unfortunately, there is no similar code or set of standards that travels with contractors. Earlier descriptions of the indiscipline of armed contractors indiscriminately shooting Iraqi citizens, while in the performance of their personnel security tasks, demonstrates the issues with not having enforceable rules for military contractors. The lack of discipline for contractors in a stability operation can have severe negative effects for the soldiers working with the contractor. Unfortunately, the local populace in Iraq does not see the difference between the contractor and the soldier. To the local Iraqi, they are both Americans, often even wearing much of the same equipment and similar uniforms, making them indistinguishable. The recent involvement of contractors in the scandal at Abu Grahib has caused the U.S. government to take a closer look at what rules they can enforce on contractors. Depending on their employment (armed versus unarmed) contractors have different statuses under the Geneva Conventions. When unarmed, contractors would be considered to be “civilians authorized to accompany the force in the field.”20 If armed they lose their legal protection under the Geneva Conventions and could be charged with violations of the laws of war. Domestic law of the country they are working often does not affect the discipline of contractors, because it either is nonexistent in a stability operation, or as is the case in Iraq, the contractor has signed an agreement providing them with immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law. Contractors are only subject to military law under the Uniform Code of Military Justice during a declared war, which is a rare event and unlikely in a stability operation.21 Contractors working for the Department of Defense might be prosecuted under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-778), know as MEJA. This act was passed to protect U.S. soldiers and their dependents on U.S. bases abroad, who sometimes are victims of crimes committed by military contractors with effective immunity from prosecution. MEJA permits the prosecution in federal court of U.S. civilians who, while employed by accompanying U.S. forces abroad, commit certain crimes. Generally, the crimes covered are any federal crime that carries a punishment greater than one year.22 In July 2004, the first prosecution under MEJA ended in a mistrial in the case of a woman who admitted to stabbing to death her Air Force sergeant husband in Turkey. 23 The MEJA is obviously too new and untested, as well as too specific to be an effective tool to discipline contractors. Therefore, with no domestic law or effective specific law in place to control the behavior of contractors, the only recourse to deal with an ill disciplined contractor is to fire him from his job. The Army should continue to work to develop a tool to discipline deployed contractors as necessary. The Army should also be aware of this loophole for contractors and be careful to provide provisions in the contract to prevent the hire of potential discipline risks and to deal swiftly with those contractors that display a lack of discipline. Although it may be possible to hire a contractor to interrogate prisoners, it becomes a risky decision to use a contractor who is not governed by any law. Use of a contractor in this situation is clearly a risk to the reputation of the Army and the U.S. The Army should avoid using contractors in this scenario.
Contractors hurt our credibility- Karzai’s indicts show

Press TV 10 (Internationally acclaimed news source, Press TV, 13-Jun-10) ET

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has accused of foreign security contractors in the country of performing as militias amid increasing violence.  Karzai made the comments on Sunday in the presence of the top NATO commander in Afghanistan, US General Stanley McChrystal, in a meeting with key local and religious leaders in the volatile Kandahar province.  The visit comes ahead of a large-scale NATO operation in the province. Many of the 30,000 additional American troops to be deployed to Afghanistan are to participate in the operation.  Karzai said the security contractors are worsening the security situation in Afghanistan, calling for their contracts to be cancelled and new ones to be signed after consultations with Kabul.  Notorious American security firm Xe Services LLC, formerly known as Blackwater, has been reportedly involved in the civilian killings in several cases.  Growing discontent over the civilian causalities have sabotaged the chances of western forces victory in Afghanistan, analysts say.  Despite the presence of nearly 130,000 US-led soldiers in the war-torn country, civilians continue to pay the price for the 2001 invasion that sought to uproot the Taliban. 

Credibility Adv. – I/L – Hurts US Credibility

PMC integration hurts the legitimacy of armed forces use – people perceive sovereign state action has been sold out to commoditized surrogates.
Anechiarico and Dehn 8 (“Ultimately Unaccountable: Governance of Private Military Companies Nationally, Supranationally and Internationally” Frank Anechiarico, Ph.D. Professor of Government and Law Hamilton College, and John Dehn, Professor of Law United States Military Academy, June, http://www.4tad.org/ws/paper_wks4_Anechiarico.pdf)KM

It is now that case that there are as many contract personnel in Iraq as soldiers and that half of the contractors are armed security personnel. (Hastings, 2008:1) This paper will examine the governance challenges, at various levels of government, of using private military companies (PMC’s) to perform the equivalent of military combatant functions.1 We contend that innovation in public management (the New Public Management), by encouraging the use of private companies to replace government provision of services – in our paper, PMC’s – has begun to undermine the legitimacy of the use of armed force. Based largely in their governmental character, uniformed forces are held to much higher standards of accountability than PMC’s. This lack of accountability makes PMC’s a more attractive option on many occasions, when a state considers the use of force. This situation, convenient to the state, undermines attempts to make PMC’s more accountable. Accountability deficits, both legal and democratic, are not limited to national governments or legal systems. Lacunae in the law, or more frequently its enforcement mechanisms, exist at every point where governance systems are weak, including at the international level. The less accountable these PMC’s are, the more it appears that the formal profession of arms has been replaced by commoditized surrogates.2 Commoditization of national defense, a defining element of sovereignty, has a direct and significant impact on governance, in particular the difficulty the state may encounter in claiming democratic authority when it uses private entities for military operations. Civil-military relations, as they are affected by increased government reliance on the private sector, are then a primary factor in the relative legitimacy of democratic governance.

PMC’s destroy the legitimacy of US military occupations – they are seen as external to the military.
Anechiarico and Dehn 8 (“Ultimately Unaccountable: Governance of Private Military Companies Nationally, Supranationally and Internationally” Frank Anechiarico, Ph.D. Professor of Government and Law Hamilton College, and John Dehn, Professor of Law United States Military Academy, June, http://www.4tad.org/ws/paper_wks4_Anechiarico.pdf)KM

Bovens defines accountability as “a social relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant other.” (2005:183) Accountability can be inefficient. It often requires more effort, at more cost, to demand or impose accountability than to overlook mistakes. Even in the best of circumstances, a government does not possess the resources to investigate and prosecute all potential procurement violations. The widespread use of PMC’s creates radical ambiguity in lines of command, accountability, and liability that threatens the legitimacy of civilian use of military force. The notion of a democratic nation at war, defending its security and way of life – a broad, public responsibility of great constitutional seriousness – is blurred by PMC combatants who take no official oath and who are, in Iraq, immunized from liability by Chief Administrator Paul Bremer’s CPA Order 17 (Order 17). Bremer mentions and defines PMC’s specifically: “Private Security Companies” means non-Iraqi legal entities or individuals not normally resident in Iraq, including their non-Iraqi employees and Subcontractors normally resident in Iraq, that provide security services to Foreign Liaison Missions and their Personnel, Diplomatic and Consular Missions and their personnel. . . Contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with to acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a contract or any sub-contract thereto.” (Bremer,2004:3,5)