AT//PC Bad / Dickerson
HT 6-13
[The Hindustan Times. 6/13/13 ln//GBS-JV]
Obama has gently pushed the bill from behind the scenes for months, fearing¶ his open support would swell the ranks of conservatives who see the bill as offering amnesty to illegal immigrants and who are determined to kill it.¶ ¶ But as the legislation faced a crucial test vote in the Senate, Obama waded into the fray, leveraging the political capital on the issue he won during last year's election campaign, particularly among Hispanic voters.¶ ¶ "This week, the Senate will consider a common-sense, bipartisan bill that is the best chance we've had in years to fix our broken immigration system," Obama said at an event at the White House.¶ ¶ The president also sought to disarm conservative Republicans -- even some who support immigration reform -- who argue that the bill should not be passed without tough new border security measures.
Obama can’t pick a fight on immigration – that would kill the deal – our ev comparative
Foley 1-15
[Elise is a writer @ Huff Post Politics. “Obama Gears Up For Immigration Reform Push In Second Term,” 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/obama-immigration-reform_n_2463388.html]
Obama has repeatedly said he will push hard for immigration reform in his second term, and administration officials have said that other contentious legislative initiatives -- including gun control and the debt ceiling -- won't be allowed to get in the way. At least at first glance, he seems to have politics on his side. GOP lawmakers are entering -- or, in some cases, re-entering -- the immigration debate in the wake of disastrous results for their party's presidential nominee with Latino voters, who support reform by large measures. Based on those new political realities, "it would be a suicidal impulse for Republicans in Congress to continue to block [reform]," David Axelrod, a longtime adviser to the president, told The Huffington Post.¶ Now there's the question of how Obama gets there. While confrontation might work with Republicans on other issues -- the debt ceiling, for example -- the consensus is that the GOP is serious enough about reform that the president can, and must, play the role of broker and statesman to get a deal.¶ It starts with a lesson from his first term. Republicans have demanded that the border be secured first, before other elements of immigration reform. Yet the administration has been by many measures the strictest ever on immigration enforcement, and devotes massive sums to policing the borders. The White House has met many of the desired metrics for border security, although there is always more to be done, but Republicans are still calling for more before they will consider reform. Enforcing the border, but not sufficiently touting its record of doing so, the White House has learned, won't be enough to win over Republicans.¶ In a briefing with The Huffington Post, a senior administration official said the White House believes it has met enforcement goals and must now move to a comprehensive solution. The administration is highly skeptical of claims from Republicans that immigration reform can or should be done in a piecemeal fashion. Going down that road, the White House worries, could result in passage of the less politically complicated pieces, such as an enforcement mechanism and high-skilled worker visas, while leaving out more contentious items such as a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.¶ "Enforcement is certainly part of the picture," the official said. "But if you go back and look at the 2006 and 2007 bills, if you go back and look at John McCain's 10-point 'This is what I've got to get done before I'm prepared to talk about immigration,' and then you look at what we're actually doing, it's like 'check, check, check.' We're there. The border is as secure as it's been in a generation or two, so it's really time."¶ One key in the second term, advocates say, will be convincing skeptics such as Republican Sen. John Cornyn of Texas that the Obama administration held up its end of the bargain by proving a commitment to enforcement. The White House also needs to convince GOP lawmakers that there's support from their constituents for immigration reform, which could be aided by conservative evangelical leaders and members of the business community who are pushing for a bill.¶ Immigrant advocates want more targeted deportations that focus on criminals, while opponents of comprehensive immigration reform say there's too little enforcement and not enough assurances that reform wouldn't be followed by another wave of unauthorized immigration. The Obama administration has made some progress on both fronts, but some advocates worry that the president hasn't done enough to emphasize it. The latest deportation figures were released in the ultimate Friday news dump: mid-afternoon Friday on Dec. 21, a prime travel time four days before Christmas.¶ Last week, the enforcement-is-working argument was bolstered by a report from the nonpartisan Migration Policy Institute, which found that the government is pouring more money into its immigration agencies than the other federal law-enforcement efforts combined. There are some clear metrics to point to on the border in particular, and Doris Meissner, an author of the report and a former commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, said she hopes putting out more information can add to the immigration debate.¶ "I've been surprised, frankly, that the administration hasn't done more to lay out its record," she said, adding the administration has kept many of its metrics under wraps.¶ There are already lawmakers working on a broad agreement. Eight senators, coined the gang of eight, are working on a bipartisan immigration bill. It's still in its early stages, but nonmembers of the "gang," such as Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) are also talking about reform.¶ It's still unclear what exact role the president will play, but sources say he does plan to lead on the issue. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.), the top Democrat on the House immigration subcommittee, said the White House seems sensitive to the fact that Republicans and Democrats need to work out the issue in Congress -- no one is expecting a fiscal cliff-style arrangement jammed by leadership -- while keeping the president heavily involved.
Wins don’t spill over – prioritization is key
Schultz 1-22
[David. Prof at the Hamline Univ School of Business. “Obama’s Dwindling Prospects in a second term” The Minneapolis Post, 1/22/13 ln//GBS-JV]
Four more years for Obama. Now what? What does Barack Obama do in his second term and what can he accomplish? Simply put, his options are limited and the prospects for major success quite limited.¶ Presidential power is the power to persuade, as Richard Neustadt famously stated. Many factors determine presidential power and the ability to influence including personality (as James David Barber argued), attitude toward power, margin of victory, public support, support in Congress, and one’s sense of narrative or purpose. ¶ Additionally, presidential power is temporal, often greatest when one is first elected, and it is contextual, affected by competing items on an agenda. All of these factors affect the political power or capital of a president.¶ Presidential power also is a finite and generally decreasing product. The first hundred days in office – so marked forever by FDR’s first 100 in 1933 – are usually a honeymoon period, during which presidents often get what they want. FDR gets the first New Deal, Ronald Reagan gets Kemp-Roth, George Bush in 2001 gets his tax cuts.¶ Presidents lose political capital, support¶ But, over time, presidents lose political capital. Presidents get distracted by world and domestic events, they lose support in Congress or among the American public, or they turn into lame ducks. This is the problem Obama now faces.¶ Obama had a lot of political capital when sworn in as president in 2009. He won a decisive victory for change with strong approval ratings and had majorities in Congress — with eventually a filibuster margin in the Senate, when Al Franken finally took office in July. Obama used his political capital to secure a stimulus bill and then pass the Affordable Care Act. He eventually got rid of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and secured many other victories. But Obama was a lousy salesman, and he lost what little control of Congress that he had in the 2010 elections.
Presidents think PC is real – our link is true in practice
Marshall et al 11
[Bryan W, Miami University BRANDON C. PRINS University of Tennessee & Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Influence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 (September)
We argue that the more important effect of Congress occurs because presidents anticipate how the use of force may affect the larger congressional environment in which they inevitably have to operate (Brulé, Marshall, and Prins 2010). It may be true that presidents consider the chances that Congress will react to a specific use of force with countervailing tools, but even more importantly they anticipate the likelihood that a foreign conflict may damage (or advantage) their political fortunes elsewhere—in essence, the presidential calculus to use force factors in how such actions might shape their ability to achieve legislative priorities. To be clear, presidents can and do choose to use force and press for legislative initiatives in Congress. Taking unilateral actions in foreign policy does not preclude the president from working the legislative process on Capitol Hill. However, political capital is finite so spending resources in one area lessens what the president can bring to bear in other areas. That is, presidents consider the congressional environment in their decision to use force because their success at promoting policy change in either foreign or domestic affairs is largely determined by their relationship with Congress. Presidents do not make such decisions devoid of calculations regarding congressional preferences and behavior or how such decisions may influence their ability to achieve legislative objectives. This is true in large part because presidential behavior is motivated by multiple goals that are intimately tied to Congress. Presidents place a premium on passing legislative initiatives. The passage of policy is integral to their goals of reelection and enhancing their place in history (Canes-Wrone 2001; Moe 1985). Therefore, presidents seek to build and protect their relationship with Congress.
Obama’s Velcro – only blame will stick
Nicholas and Hook 10
[Peter Nicholas and Janet Hook, Tribune Washington Bureau, “Obama the Velcro president,” http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730]
If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack Obama is made of Velcro. Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become ensnared in blame. Hoping to better insulate Obama, White House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public. But Obama remains the colossus of his administration — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve. The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape. What's not sticking to Obama is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. Political dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill have been fleeting. Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll. "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations."
Marshall et al 11
Bryan W, Miami University BRANDON C. PRINS University of Tennessee & Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Influence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 (September)
We argue that the more important effect of Congress occurs because presidents anticipate how the use of force may affect the larger congressional environment in which they inevitably have to operate (Brulé, Marshall, and Prins 2010). It may be true that presidents consider the chances that Congress will react to a specific use of force with countervailing tools, but even more importantly they anticipate the likelihood that a foreign conflict may damage (or advantage) their political fortunes elsewhere—in essence, the presidential calculus to use force factors in how such actions might shape their ability to achieve legislative priorities. To be clear, presidents can and do choose to use force and press for legislative initiatives in Congress. Taking unilateral actions in foreign policy does not preclude the president from working the legislative process on Capitol Hill. However, political capital is finite so spending resources in one area lessens what the president can bring to bear in other areas. That is, presidents consider the congressional environment in their decision to use force because their success at promoting policy change in either foreign or domestic affairs is largely determined by their relationship with Congress. Presidents do not make such decisions devoid of calculations regarding congressional preferences and behavior or how such decisions may influence their ability to achieve legislative objectives. This is true in large part because presidential behavior is motivated by multiple goals that are intimately tied to Congress. Presidents place a premium on passing legislative initiatives. The passage of policy is integral to their goals of reelection and enhancing their place in history (Canes-Wrone 2001; Moe 1985). Therefore, presidents seek to build and protect their relationship with Congress.
Political capital in the context of immigration means pushing from behind – that ensures passage and doesn’t generate opposition
Pace 3-27
[Julie. Politics for the AP. “Obama: Immigration Bill could Pass by Summer” The Times Union, 3/27/13 ln//Cal-JV]
President Barack Obama pressed for swift action on a sweeping immigration bill Wednesday, saying last-minute obstacles are "resolvable" and predicting Congress could pass historic legislation by the end of the summer. In back-to-back interviews with Spanish-language television networks, Obama repeatedly voiced confidence in a bipartisan Senate group that appears to be on the cusp of unveiling a draft bill. And he said that while he is still prepared to step in with his own bill if talks break down, he doesn't expect that step to be necessary. "If we have a bill introduced at the beginning of next month as these senators indicate it will be, then I'm confident that we can get it done certainly before the end of the summer," Obama told Telemundo. While overhauling the nation's patchwork immigration laws is a top second term priority for the president, he has ceded the negotiations almost entirely to Congress. He and his advisers have calculated that a bill crafted by Capitol Hill stands a better chance of winning Republican support than one overtly influenced by the president. In his interviews Wednesday, Obama tried to stay out of the prickly policy issues that remain unfinished in the Senate talks, though he said a split between business and labor on wages for new low-skilled workers was unlikely to "doom" the legislation. "This is a resolvable issue," he said. The president also spoke Wednesday with Univision. His interviews followed a citizenship ceremony conducted Monday at the White House where he pressed Congress to "finish the job" on immigration, an issue that has vexed Washington for years. The president made little progress in overhauling the nation's fractured immigration laws in his first term, but he redoubled his efforts after winning re-election. The November contest also spurred some Republicans to drop their opposition to immigration reform, given that Hispanics overwhelmingly backed Obama. In an effort to keep Republicans at the negotiation table, Obama has stayed relatively quiet on immigration over the last month. He rolled out his immigration principles during a January rally in Las Vegas and made an impassioned call for overhauling the nation's laws during his early February State of the Union address, then purposely handed off the effort to lawmakers. The president has, however, privately called members of the Senate working group, and the administration is providing technical support to the lawmakers. The Gang of Eight is expected to unveil its draft bill when Congress returns from a two-week recess the week of April 8. Obama and the Senate group are in agreement on some core principles, including a pathway to citizenship for most of the 11 million illegal immigrants already in the country, revamping the legal immigration system and holding businesses to tougher standards on verifying their workers are in the country legally. But they're at odds over key issues. The Senate group wants the citizenship pathway to be contingent on securing the border, something Obama opposes. The president has also sidestepped the contentious guest-worker issue, which contributed to derailing immigration talks in 2007. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO have reached significant agreements on a new visa program that would bring up to 200,000 lower-skilled workers to the country each year. But they reached a stalemate Friday over wages for the workers, with the labor union pushing for higher wages than the chamber has agreed to so far. Since then, talks have resumed and negotiators are "back on the right track," Ana Avendano, a lead AFL-CIO negotiator, said Wednesday. Avendano declined to offer specifics but said the chamber had moved off what she termed its insistence on "poverty-level wages" for the new workers. "We're very hopeful that we're moving," Avendano told reporters after a briefing for congressional staff on temporary-worker programs. While Obama tries to keep the pressure on lawmakers this week, four members of the Senate immigration group toured Arizona's border with Mexico to inspect the conditions there. Arizona's Republican Sens. John McCain and Jeff Flake were joined by Democratic Sens. Chuck Schumer of New York and Michael Bennet of Colorado for the border tour.
More evidence – Obama’s involvement makes passage more likely because of Latino support
Garrett 2-21
[M. Politics for the National Journal. “The Hidden Obstacles to Legal Immigration Reform” The National Journal Online, 2/21/13 factiva//GBS-JV]
This isn’t a fail-safe border-security plan, but it is the bare minimum Republicans can accept — and it still may not be enough (we won’t know until lawmakers start voting). But its absence from the White House draft conspicuously informs Republicans that the White House is pushing legalization, and the fight to come will be on many fronts — one of them over the GOP’s ability to push enforcement while embracing but not delaying reform. The White House knows it has the upper hand politically and intends to dare Republicans to slow immigration reform over any issue. Informally, the White House has signaled to the Senate working group that it has until late March to finalize its bill or President Obama will spring his.¶ As one top administration official told me: “The only thing that prevents the GOP from getting into a much worse hole with Latinos is a bill with a path to citizenship on the president’s desk. Anything else and they have killed immigration reform again. And Obama is by far the most popular player in this game in the Latino community. The last thing Republicans want to do is vote down a bill with the president’s name on it.”
Capital’s key – history proves that immigration reform dies without a strong presidential push
Brownstein 1-31
[Ronald, National Journal, 1/31/13, On Immigration, What Obama Can Learn From Bush's Failed Efforts, www.nationaljournal.com/columns/political-connections/on-immigration-what-obama-can-learn-from-bush-s-failed-efforts-20130131]
The prospects for major immigration reform are now the brightest in years, but for key players in Washington, a shadow still looms: the ghost of 2006. That was the last time the stars were aligned for a breakthrough. Immigration reform that included a path to citizenship for those in the United States illegally had the support of President Bush, a broad labor-business-faith coalition, and a bipartisan Senate majority. Yet that armada ultimately splintered against the stony refusal of House Republican leaders to consider a bill opposed by a majority of their majority. Any of that sound familiar? Already many of the same dynamics are developing, with President Obama stamping immigration reform as a top priority, a bipartisan Senate coalition reassembling, a broad outside alliance of support groups coalescing—and most House Republicans rejecting anything that hints at “amnesty” for illegal immigrants. Yet the contrasts between now and 2006, particularly in the political climate, are also significant. Understanding both the similarities and the differences will be critical for reform advocates if they are to avoid replicating the disappointment they suffered under Bush. Presidential interest was then, as it is now, critical in elevating immigration reform. Since his days as Texas governor, Bush had courted Hispanics, and—even during the 2000 GOP presidential primary campaign—he strikingly defended illegal immigrants as “moms and dads” trying to make a better life for their children. Together with his political “architect,” Karl Rove, Bush saw comprehensive reform that coupled a path to citizenship with tougher enforcement as an opportunity to consolidate the beachhead that allowed him to capture more than 40 percent of Hispanic voters in his 2004 reelection. But Bush largely looked away when Republicans who controlled the House channeled that impulse in a very different direction. In December 2005, they passed an enforcement-only bill drafted by Judiciary Committee Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin, that, for the first time, designated all undocumented immigrants as felons. (Previously, illegal presence in the U.S. had been a civil, not criminal, violation.) Initially, debate in the GOP-controlled Senate drifted. Majority Leader Bill Frist, considering a 2008 presidential bid, pushed his own enforcement-only bill. But amid the backdrop of huge public rallies against Sensenbrenner’s proposal, Sen. Arlen Specter unexpectedly joined with three other Republicans and all eight Judiciary Committee Democrats in late March to approve a comprehensive plan, including a path to citizenship, that followed a blueprint negotiated by Sens. Edward Kennedy and John McCain. When broader Senate agreement teetered over the terms of legalization, Republican Sens. Chuck Hagel and Mel Martinez devised a compromise that divided illegal immigrants into three categories, requiring those here less than two years to leave but allowing those with deeper roots to eventually earn citizenship by paying fines and learning English. After Bush finally delivered a national address on immigration, a bill embodying that plan cleared the Senate with 62 votes, including support from 23 Republicans. House Republicans immediately signaled their disinterest by refusing to appoint a conference committee and instead scheduled hearings in border communities to highlight security lapses. “Border security reigned supreme,” recalls Ron Bonjean, the communications director for then-Speaker Dennis Hastert. “I remember being in a meeting with … the leadership where pollsters came in and said border security was the key to our reelection.” Even in 2006, something like the Senate plan likely could have attracted 218 votes in the House—but not a majority of Republicans. Faced with a collision between his two political imperatives—courting Hispanics and mobilizing conservatives—Bush blinked, allowing House leaders to replace the Senate bill with enforcement-only legislation, which he signed that fall. These choices began the GOP’s slide among Hispanics that continues unabated: Hispanic support for Republican House candidates plummeted from 44 percent in 2004 to just 29 percent in 2006, presaging Mitt Romney’s disastrous 27 percent showing among those voters in 2012. That slippage is one of the two most important differences in the political environment around immigration between 2006 and today. Back then, as Bonjean notes, hardly any House Republicans argued that the GOP needed to pass a plan attractive to minorities. But many GOP leaders now see that as self-preservation. “The political imperative has shifted the tectonic plates,” says Frank Sharry, a key player in the 2006 debate who remains central as executive director of America’s Voice, which backs full citizenship for immigrants. “Immigration was viewed as a wedge issue for Republicans in 2006. Now it’s viewed as a wedge issue for Democrats.” The “Gang of Eight” proposal released this week makes it likely that, as in 2006, the Senate will eventually pass a bipartisan immigration bill. Once again, there are probably 218 House votes for such a plan, but not a majority of the majority Republicans. That raises another key difference from 2006: Hastert faced little pressure to consider the Senate bill, because Bush bit his tongue when the speaker buried it. If House Republicans shelve another bipartisan Senate plan in 2013, they should expect much more public heat,
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