Journal of the Institute

Part Two: Theoretical Approaches
The informed consent model is frequently used in literature related to juvenile transfer. Under this model, the law recognizes an individual as competent if “he or she is capable of making a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision” (Fried and Reppucci, 2001: 46). The informed consent model focuses on capacity for reasoning and understanding (Scott, Reppucci & Woolard, 1995). In general, under this model studies have found that after the age of 14, youths are competent to make decisions providing that they are of average or above average intelligence (Fried and Reppucci, 2001). However, some researchers point out the inadequacies of this model stating that it places too much emphasis on the cognitive components of decision making without taking psychosocial factors into account (Scott, Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996). Immaturity in psychosocial development should be considered when decision making capabilities are evaluated (Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996).

In order to compensate for the limitations of the informed consent model, Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard (1995) developed a new approach, which they refer to as the Judgment Model. Under this approach, factors such as conformity and compliance in relation to peers and parents, attitude toward and perception of risk, and temporal perspective are taken into consideration in addition to reasoning and understanding. The authors’ intent in creating this model was to allow researchers to contribute more effectively to the development of legal policies through providing more accurate information (Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard, 1995).

There are several other theories from various fields that concern juvenile offending. In the biological sciences, much of the current research on delinquency focuses on genetics. Some of these studies involve twins or situations where siblings have been adopted and raised apart from one another, or instances where children are not raised by their biological parents in order to determine if there is a genetic predisposition to violent behavior (Flowers, 2002). These studies are in relation to the debate of nature versus nurture.

The social sciences also provide a number of theories related to juvenile deviance. In the discipline of psychology, these theories range from psychoanalytic theories which view deviant behavior as reflections of unresolved issues to personality theories which explain delinquency as personal or emotional flaws that might have nothing to do with the underlying psyche (Flowers, 2002). Other mental health factors worth considering, when assessing risk of reoffense, are mood disorders and psychotic disorders (Carbonell and Perkins, 2000).

Dr. Thomas Grisso refers to theories on social circumstances as focusing on the social conditions of the youth to explain their current delinquency (Grisso, 1998). Social conditions of youth may include environments, such as exposure to intrafamily conflict and aggressive relationships among family members, victimization of abuse and neglect by family members, and families that have been characterized as antisocial and support criminal activity as a way of life (Anderson and Dyson, 2002; Grisso, 1998).

Social control theories claim that all individuals have the opportunity to become delinquent; however, most do not because of fear of social constraints. Some theorize that communities and institutions lack the ability to socialize and control youth. These are social disorganization theories. Others follow the Social Bonding Theory developed by Travis Hirschi, which holds that it is a social bond that causes the youth to maintain social order. This bond is composed of four components: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief. The degree and strength of these components vary depending on the individual (Anderson and Dyson, 2002; Flowers, 2002).

Other sociological theories are grouped under the heading of strain theories. These theories suggest that juvenile delinquency is caused by lack of socially acceptable opportunities. These include anomie theories such as Merton’s Strain Theory that delinquent behavior is caused by an anomic interaction between culturally defined goals and the structured means for achieving them (Anderson and Dyson, 2002; Flowers 2002). Among his five modes of adaptation to goals and means, Merton identified innovation and retreatism. Innovators accept the culturally prescribed goals but do not use socially acceptable means to achieve them. Retreaters reject both the culturally prescribed goals and the means for achieving those goals (Flowers, 2002).

Cultural transmission theories propose that delinquency is a learned behavior and reflects the norms and values of those with whom the juvenile interacts. Edward H. Sutherland’s Differential Association Theory (DAT) is from the family of operant conditioning, which is based on the concept of rewards and punishments to reinforce certain behaviors. DAT has the premise that criminal behavior is learned via association (Vold, Bernard, and Snipes, 1998). In other words, rewards and punishments associated with certain behaviors teach youth perpetrating a behavior if it is culturally acceptable or not. DAT claims that delinquency depends on the frequency, duration, and intensity of a youth’s interactions with other delinquents or non-delinquents (Anderson and Dyson, 2002; Flowers 2002).

Albert Bandura (1977) indicated that social learning theory, also an area of operant conditioning, emphasizes the notion that behavior can be reinforced via the process of observing others behavior and the subsequent consequences of their behavior. Ronald Akers’ Social Learning Theory suggests that youths learn to commit crimes through communication and interaction with people who are their primary source of reinforcement, such as their family and peers (Flowers, 2002). This communication provides the techniques of committing the crime, as well as motivations. An offending individual has an excess of definitions favorable to law violations, and differential associations may vary in “frequency, duration, priority, and intensity” (Akers, 1998:24; Anderson and Dyson, 2002:175-176, and Vold et al., 1998:184). Labeling theory, another form of cultural transmission, postulates that delinquency does not necessarily begin with a delinquent act, but by an individual being labeled as delinquent by others (Flowers, 2002). What occurs is the individual, having already been labeled as delinquent, fills the role of being delinquent (Anderson and Dyson, 2002).
Part Three: Current Data - National and Local
Methods

In order to investigate the rates and trends of juvenile transfer to the criminal court, data was downloaded from the ICPSR data archive. The data Juvenile Defendants in Criminal Courts (JDCC): Survey of 40 counties in the United States, 1998 (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003), conducted by Pretrial Services Resource Center, was downloaded in SPSS format for analysis. Secondary data was used because it was more practical than attempting to gather a national sample of juvenile transfer cases on limited resources.

The data included 7,135 individual cases of juvenile transfer from 39 urban counties and one city (Baltimore)¹¹⁰. The average age of arrest for the individuals in the study was 16.66 with a standard deviation of 1.08. Males accounted for 95.7% of the cases (6830 juveniles) while females accounted for only 4.2% of the cases (303 juveniles). Sex was unknown for two of the cases. The racial composition of the participants was fairly diverse. African Americans/ blacks accounted for 61.6% of the sample; whites, 19.7%; Asians, 1.1%; American Indians and Alaskan Natives, .4%; and Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders, .3%. The race of the remaining 16.9% was unknown.

The cases for Jackson County, MO were separated out from the rest of the sample to see if the characteristics of these individuals were comparable to the 40 counties as a whole. The Jackson County sample consisted of 22 individuals, all of them male. The average age of arrest for this sample was 16.45 years with a standard deviation of .94. The sample was 54.5% African American or Black, 36.4% white, and 9.1% Asian.

In addition to this data set, the researchers created a separate database, which used the 40 counties as individual cases. The purpose of this was to see how the counties differed from one another on characteristics as a whole. In addition to data from the Juvenile Defendants in Criminal Courts (JDCC): Survey of 40 counties in the United States, 1998 database, demographic information of the juvenile population was added for each of the 40 counties. Total juvenile population, population by sex, and population by race were obtained from Gerard A. Rainville and Steven K. Smith’s article Juvenile Felony Defendants in Criminal Courts which highlights the characteristics of the sample used in this study (Rainville & Smith, 2003). The average juvenile population for the counties was 166,024. The minimum population for one county (San Francisco) was 56,427 while the maximum was 1,038,667 (Los Angeles). The mean upper age of jurisdiction in 1998 was 16.48 with a standard deviation of .751. The ages ranged from 15-17.¹¹¹
Results

The first task of this section is to present general results of the data regarding the 40 counties and also Jackson County alone. For this section, the results of the 40 counties come from the article Juvenile Felony Defendants in Criminal Courts: Survey of 40 Counties, 1998 (Rainville and Smith, 2003). The results found in this article will be compared to Jackson County, which was singled out by the current researchers.

In the entire sample of the 40 counties, 63.5% of the transferred juveniles had committed a violent offense such as murder, rape, robbery, or assault as the most serious felony arrest charge. Of the remaining, 17.7% committed property offenses (burglary or theft), 15.1% committed drug offenses, and 3.5% had committed public order offenses (generally weapons violations). In the Jackson county sample, 86.4% of the defendants had committed violent offenses, 9% committed property offenses, and 4.5% had weapons violations.

Type of sentence received was looked at next. In the sample of the 40 counties, 63.6% of the participants received a prison sentence. This statistic was slightly higher in Jackson County with 68.2% receiving a prison term. In the 40 county sample, 20.3% of the youth received a jail sentence. In Jackson County this percentage is only 4.5%. Most of the remaining defendants in both samples received some form of probation and only a few were fined.

Another variable of interest in this paper is the age at which the various types of crimes were committed. In all of the categories of crimes, the majority of the defendants were between the ages of 15 and 17. In the 40 county sample, 89.8% of the defendants committed their crime between these ages. In the Jackson County sample, 86.4% of the youths transferred committed their crimes between the ages of 15 and 17.

Also important to the current study is the type of filing mechanism used to transfer the youth to the adult system. This is particularly relevant because of the legislative changes that allow for various types of filing mechanisms. In the case of this study, 1,675 of the participants were filed through judicial waiver, 2,445 through direct file, and 2,933 through statutory exclusion (Rainville and Smith, 2003). The chart in Appendix B exhibits the number of times each type of waiver was used by county. As a side note, all 22 of the cases in Jackson County were judicially waived because that is the only form of waiver in Missouri.

The county dataset created by the current researchers was utilized in the following analysis. A One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to see if there were significant differences in the number of juveniles transferred depending on the type of waiver or waivers are allowed in the state in which the county resides. The categories for type of waiver allowed were: judicial only; judicial and statutory or judicial and direct file¹¹²; all three types of waiver; or some other combination. All of the counties in the last category allowed for statutory exclusion only. The One-way ANOVA revealed that significant differences in the number of juveniles transferred did exist depending on the type of waiver allowed (sig. = .001). Post Hoc analysis revealed that counties which allowed all three types of waiver sent significantly more youth to the criminal court system than those who used only judicial waiver or judicial waiver combined with either statutory exclusion or direct file.

Part Four: Discussion
First it should be pointed out that although the racial composition of the participants was fairly diverse, there seems to be an overrepresentation of black youth at 61.6% for the entire sample. This could be due to the fact that only urban counties were included in the study. This could also be an indication that black youths are transferred to the adult system more frequently than their white counterparts. It should also be noted that the fact that the majority of the participants in this sample were between the ages of 15 and 17 at the time they were arrested is consistent with previous literature that suggests this is the period when adolescents are most likely to exhibit delinquent tendencies.

The fact that the number of juveniles transferred was significantly higher in counties that allowed for all three types of waivers could mean juveniles are being unnecessarily transferred under new legislation. Statutory exclusion and direct file tend to be more rigid. Under these types of waivers, juveniles may be transferred without the individual circumstances of their crimes or their culpability being examined thoroughly. More research could be done to see under what circumstances the different types of waivers are generally used.

It has been demonstrated in our literature base that adolescents do tend to differ from adults on several psychosocial factors and in decision making. If this is the case, there is little rationale for holding adolescents to adult standards. If poor judgment, lack of future orientation and inability to resist peer influence is common in 15-17 year olds, these factors should be taken into consideration when deciding whether or not to transfer a youth and also when sentencing a youth.

Scott and Steinberg discuss a mitigation model of juvenile justice. Under this model, punishment is not only based on the amount of harm caused but also on the blameworthiness of the individual. Youth are not completely excused for their actions, but they also are not held fully responsible. This model is based on the idea that teens are less competent decision makers than adults and that their identity and character are not fully formed. Juvenile delinquents differ from adult criminals in that forces of their development such as peer pressure and deficient decision making abilities, rather than bad character, drive their conduct. Because of this, punishment of the adolescents should be mitigated (Scott and Steinberg, 2003).

Steinberg reports that about one-third of 11-13 year olds and one-fifth of 14-15 year olds performed at the level of mentally ill adults who have previously been found incompetent to stand trial. He gives many reasons for this. Among them is that adolescents do not understand the judicial process, such as the role of the judge and the jury, the differences between defense and prosecuting attorneys, and are less likely to understand their rights under the law. Many of these children are not able to draw logical conclusions from facts and are less able to realize what the future consequences of their actions might be (Steinberg, 2003).

Juvenile justice should impose punishment that is proportionate to the culpability or blameworthiness of the youth. This raises one important question when considering how waiver and punishment should be determined. Should these determinations be made on an individual basis (as they are for adults), or should they be made on a categorical basis?

Steinberg and Scott believe the uniqueness of immaturity as a mitigating condition warrants a renewed commitment to a categorical approach. Under a categorical approach, most youth would be handled in a justice system separate from that of adults. Rehabilitation should be a central aim of this system. They argue that the age boundary is justified because it can be presumed that immaturity as a mitigating condition can be applied with confidence to most adolescents. In addition to this, there is the obvious practicality of this method over a more individualized approach. Steinberg and Scott also point out that making this distinction does not mean that all youths lack maturity in decision making capacity or that all youths have unformed identities. Punishing youths who are as mature as adults, as adult offenders would be fair but only if these teens could be identified accurately (Steinberg and Scott, 2003).

Sabo favors a more individualized approach to waiver and punishment proceedings. He argues that a decision to waive a youth’s case from the juvenile system where they would receive the benefits of a rehabilitative ideal to the adult punitive system could change the juvenile’s life forever. In light of this, a decision should be made “only after a full and impartial consideration of the juvenile’s individual circumstances and best interests (1996: 2454).” He argues that only judicial waiver should be used because statutory and direct file do not allow for this kind of examination (Sabo, 1996). Similar to Steinberg and Scott, Sabo believes that youths should have the opportunity to be rehabilitated.

N. Dickson Reppucci points out that legislative changes lowering the age at which juveniles can be charged as adults is evidence that we as a society are abandoning the concept of adolescence (Reppucci, 1999). As can be seen in the analysis of the types of crimes committed by the juveniles in this study, it is not just the most violent offenders that are being transferred to the adult court system. Teens are being transferred for property crimes, drug crimes, and weapons violations as well. When transferred, they do not receive the same rehabilitative and educational opportunities as they would in the juvenile system.

In criminal justice, it seems as though youth are considered developmentally comparable to adults whereas they are not in other realms of society. This point can be best summed up through the following quotes:

The current ‘get tough’ reforms that treat youths as adults are not found on other regulatory domains. A youth can become eligible for the death penalty 5 years before he or she is old enough to purchase alcohol, 2 years before the age of majority in every state in every area of nonpenal law, and in Virginia, 2 years before he or she can get a tattoo! (Reppucci, 1999: 323)

The assumption that minors are developmentally inclined to use immature judgment is often explicitly invoked when courts endorse restrictive policies on such issues as adolescent abortion and psychiatric hospitalization; it is discounted when policymakers are urged to expand adolescents’ rights to get tough on juvenile crime. (Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard, 1995: 228-229)

'Are there differences between adolescents and adults?' For example, I find it ironic that the same Virginia legislative session that lowered the age of transfer to 14 also passed a law that prohibited youth under the age of 18 from getting a tattoo without their parents' permission because they were too immature to make this decision on their own! (Reppucci, 1999:315).
The literature reviewed for this study has shown that adolescents are, at least to some degree, psychologically different from adults. Because of this, they should be given different considerations in criminal circumstances. It does not seem rational to hold juvenile criminals to the same standards as adult criminals. In his article Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, Reppucci states, “Differences do exist between adolescents and adults and they do not disappear because an adolescent commits a crime" (Reppucci, 1999: 323).
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